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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Mexico’s relationship with the Second Spanish Republic, and 
analyses the rationale behind the Lazaro Cardenas government’s (1934-1940) 
decision to provide military, diplomatic and moral support to the Republic during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The Mexican government sent arms and 
ammunition to Spain when other nations refused to do so, constrained by the so- 
called Non-Intervention Pact. Moreover, Mexican diplomats organised a covert 
network to buy arms in third countries and then re-direct them to Spain. Mexico also 
lent the Spanish Republic its diplomatic backing at the League of Nations, where its 
delegates defended the Republican cause and denounced both the Axis intervention 
and the democracies’ inaction. The thesis also interprets the repercussions that such 
policy had on internal Mexican politics, and for Mexico’s international position, 
most particularly with regards to the United States. The Spanish War generated a 
backlash in Mexico, with the growth of a domestic Right, heavily influenced by 
European Fascism and Spanish Falangism. Conversely, Cardenas’ position 
concerning Spain ultimately afforded his government the backing of the Roosevelt 
administration in the final showdown with that Rightist opposition. Extensive 
reference is made to primary sources, mainly diplomatic documentation and 
newspaper reports of the period.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines how the Mexican Government pursued its national interest 
within an international background that drifted toward a large-scale international war. 
It is a study of the correlation between Mexico’s internal politics and the 
transformations experienced by the international context between 1936 and 1939. 
The thesis attempts to analyse a complex picture of domestic-international interaction 
within the framework of the specific case of the Mexican-Spanish bilateral 
relationship before, during, and immediately after the Spanish Civil War. The study 
presumes that far from being an ideological or romantic stance, Mexican support for 
the Republic represented a conscious effort that resulted in an increase of Mexico’s 
economic and political autonomy amidst the sweeping conflict between the fascist, 
communist and liberal doctrines of the time. This solidarity also represented the 
opportunity for the Mexican revolutionary regime to confront a rising Right in the 
home front, which, emboldened by Spanish events, threatened to replicate them in 
Mexico. Moreover, Spain also afforded the Mexican revolutionary regime the 
opportunity to challenge the Right in its own terms on a “cultural struggle” for the 
hearts and minds of the Mexican people.1 The Mexican Right had historically 
usurped for itself the image of Spain through the manipulation of the Hispanista 
discourse. The emergence of a “new” Spain after 1931 represented in that sense a 
vindication of the Mexican Revolution.
Shortly after the Spanish Civil War started the government of Lazaro Cardenas 
(1934-1940) declared its solidarity with the beleaguered Spanish Republic and 
pledged official support to its cause. Throughout the conflict, Mexico almost alone
1 John Sherman, The Mexican Right. The End of Revolutionary Reform, 1929-1940 Westport, Conn., 
Praeger,1997. pp.87-98.
2 Hispanismo, a doctrine, which combines the imperial ideas of Charles V ’s Spain with the assumption 
of a “mother” culture developed by the historian Marcelino Menendez Pelayo (1856-1912). Its main 
tenet proclaims the existence of a supposed “community” or transatlantic race that bonds all nations, 
which at some point were ruled by the Spanish crown. For an analysis o f the links between Mexican 
Conservatives and Hispanismo see Ricardo Perez Monfort, Hispanismo y  Falange. Los suehos 
imperiales de la dercha espahola. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1992.
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among nations -and, actually in opposition to the major powers of the time- gave its 
unrelenting support in every imaginable way to the Loyalists.
Weeks after Franco mutinied, Cardenas ordered his Minister of War to send a 
freight of 20,000 rifles and 20 million pieces of ammunition. Various other 
consignments of arms followed all through the hostilities. When the Mexican arms 
industry proved insufficient to meet Republican needs, Cardenas instructed his 
diplomatic agents to serve as intermediaries in arms purchases conducted by Spain in 
third countries.
The Mexican President also ordered Mexican representatives in the League of 
Nations to undertake the diplomatic defence of the Republic against the Non 
Intervention Pact imposed by the great powers. When defeat came for the Republic 
and hundreds of thousands of refugees poured out of Spain, Mexico welcomed to its 
own territory as many exiles as was possible. It was on Mexican soil that a 
Republican govemment-in exile was established and, for almost forty years Mexico 
refused to recognise Franco’s regime, while acknowledging the government in exile 
as the true government of Spain.
This extraordinary episode of Mexican diplomatic history constitutes, in 
diverse ways, a unique event. Firstly, because it represented an unprecedented 
attempt by a nation deemed peripheral and subordinate to intervene in affairs beyond 
its geographical scope, in direct confrontation with the major powers of the time. 
Furthermore, because Mexico had seldom, if ever, engaged in international affairs 
and rather was regarded by contemporary observers to be little more than the 
American “backyard,” safely placed under that country’s sphere of influence. 
Mexican links with the outside world had been mostly limited to resisting American 
intervention in its own domestic affairs. In 1913, the U.S. occupied the port of 
Veracruz, while in 1916 following an incursion into an American border town by 
Villa, a 10,000 “punitive expedition,” led by General Pershing penetrated Mexican 
territory. For the next 13 years, the revolutionary governments resisted American 
pressures and threats of military action. Furthermore, both the turmoil generated by
7
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the Revolution as well as the First World War had the effect of cutting Mexico off 
from its European links.
In 1931, thanks to Spanish sponsorship, Mexico was admitted to the League of 
Nations. This forum gave Mexico the chance of making her voice heard beyond the 
realm of American dominance, that is the Pan-American conference. From this 
platform, Mexico would be able to carry out an active foreign policy, advancing its 
agenda of a fairer international order, and even to play a part proportionate to her size 
in international “power politics.”
In a quiet and unobtrusive way Mexico under Cardenas came to broaden her 
horizon to see and be seen beyond and apart from the overshadowing “Giant 
of the North” as the United States is called in the southern republics.
Cardenas did not hesitate to raise his voice in world affairs, for he felt that 
the twenty million people for whom he spoke had a right to be heard.4
In Geneva, Mexico raised its voice against Japanese aggression in Manchuria 
and opposed the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, on legal and juridical grounds. In the 
Spanish case, this doctrinal outlook went further, being also accompanied by tangible 
aid in the form of arms, raw materials and money. The spectacle of a lesser nation 
asserting its rights had few, if any, parallels at the time and, in fact, proved too much 
for 1930’s totalitarian powers, and for European right-wingers, which accused 
Mexico of meddling in European affairs.5 This may well be defined as an attempt to 
play power politics, in the sense of trying to influence events rather than witnessing 
them passively. In this sense, Cardenas’ aid to the Republic may be regarded as 
inaugurating an active foreign policy for Mexico. As a contemporary observer 
commented at the time:
3 Ultimately, Mexico took in about thirty thousand refugees between 1937 and 1945. Patricia Fagen 
Exiles and Citizens: Spanish Republicans in Mexico Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38- 
39
4 William Cameron, Townsend, Lazaro Cardenas. Mexican Democrat George Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
Wahr Publishing Co., 1952 p. 184
5 “By covering up illegal trafficking for the Communists, Mexico is disturbing European Peace”. 
Italian Ambassador to London, Dino Grandi, in Giomale di Italia, March 24, 1937. p.l See also 
Popolo di Italia and II Messagero, same date “Mexico, a country which has notoriously become the 
main agent of Soviet and French contraband of war materials and volunteers to Spain, thus overtly 
favouring Red Anarchy’. See also Evelyn Waugh’s Robbery Under Law. The Mexican Object-Lesson. 
London, Chapham & Hall, 1939. Passim.
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Mexico’s foreign policy openly opposed conservative elements throughout
the world for it was literally the most aggressive liberal diplomacy of its
6era.
Few allusions have been made to the Mexican contribution to the struggling
n
Republic, while entire books have been devoted to Soviet involvement in the
o
Spanish conflict-as well as its intervention in the Republican camp’s infighting-. 
The very intensity and continuity of Mexican aid to the Republic, well to the end of 
the war, makes this omission at best, puzzling.
With regard to the existing literature, it must be said that while an enormous 
amount of work has been devoted to the subject of the Spanish exiles in Mexico, 
scant reference has been made to the role played by the Lazaro Cardenas 
administration (1934-1940) in assisting the Azana government in its war effort. The 
exceptions to this are Louis Elwyn Smith’s study Mexico and the Spanish 
Republicans, published in 1955, and T.G. Powell’s Mexico and the Spanish Civil 
War, published in 1981. Still, these studies display considerable limitations.
Smith’s book is a precursor. It represents the first attempt to make a rigorous 
narrative of the Mexican response to the Civil War. Before that, there existed a 
number of partisan memoirs or recollections, without any pretension to objectivity, 
and with all the shortcomings of expiation or propaganda, written either by 
Republicans or Francoists. Nonetheless, having been written more than forty years 
ago, it naturally seems outdated. Not only have new sources surfaced, but also 
Smith’s work, for all of its virtues, owing to its proximity to the subject, lacked the 
necessary historical hindsight.
Powell’s work suffers from a blatant anti-Cardenas bias that often smacks not 
only of Cold War anti-communism, making the book more of a partisan allegation 
than an academic paper, but also of a hasty research which involved a shallow review
6 Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front. The Battle o f Europe vs. America± Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press 1942. 367 pp.
7 Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson pp. 374-375 ; Hugh 
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War.Condon, Penguin Books, 1986.
8 See for example David Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War. Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1957, or Noam Chomsky, “Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship” in American Power 
and the New Mandarins. New York, Random House, 1967.
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of secondary sources. Furthermore, the book is completely outdated. Finally, Powell 
tries to belittle Mexican aid to the Republic as a myth created by the Mexican 
Revolutionary regime to legitimise itself as democratic. The arguments used for that 
purpose lack seriousness and may be easily disregarded as a damning evidence of the 
author’s bigoted beliefs or his personal aversions.9
More strangely, perhaps, the topic has been barely studied by Spanish and 
Mexican academics, in spite of the obvious relevance to each country’s national and 
international histories. Most Mexican works on the subject have been bachelor 
dissertations for Law or Diplomatic Schools. These have focused chiefly on the 
international legal aspects of Mexican diplomacy concerning the war, or on the 
country’s presence at the League of Nations.10 A notable exception to this is Jose 
Antonio Matesanz’s volume Mexico ante la Republica Espanola,u which, as its 
subtitle implies, is a valuable collection of documents that cover almost five decades. 
This work is highly useful as a researcher’s tool but remains far from being a 
thorough account of the specific episode.
The most oft-repeated explanation of Mexico’s conduct towards the Republic 
may be summarized in Hugh Thomas’ words:
The Mexican government was from the start an ardent supporter of the
Spanish Republic, as might be expected from a country whose Constitution
had itself derived from a rising against clerical and aristocratic privilege.12
For Angel Vinas too, Mexico’s “determined aid” to Spain was a natural 
consequence of the ideological parallelism between both regimes, but also a means to
9 Thus, for instance, Powell asserts: “one of many ironies involved in Mexico’s unshakable support for 
the Spanish Republic was that it forced the anti-intellectual, macho Cardenas into alliance with 
cerebral, effeminate Manuel Azana, a man whose type he heartily detested; in terms of temperament, 
Cardenas had much more in common with General Franco than with the Republican Head of State” 
op. cit. p. 13.
10 See Jose Antonio Gomez Cangas, El caso Mexico- Espaiia. Mexico, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias 
Politicas y Sociales UNAM, 1960. Omar Martinez Legorreta, Actuation de Mexico en la Liga de las 
Naciones: El Caso de Espaiia. Mexico, Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, UNAM, 
1962; Laura Elena Farias Peraldi, La actitud de Mexico ante las agresiones fascistas. Mexico, FCPyS, 
UNAM. 1966.; Fernando Aramburu Santa Cruz, Actitud del gobiemo de Mexico en el caso de Espaiia. 
Mexico, Escuela Libre de Derecho, 1963.
11 Antologia de Documentos. 1931-1977. Mexico, Centro Republicano Espanol de Mexico, 1978.
12 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1965. p.304.
10
Introduction
enhance its own international position.13 Thus it served the double purpose of aiding 
a congenial government in its direst hour of need, while persuading the Great Powers 
(namely the U.S.) to support the imperative of a more equitable international system 
that would put an end to imperialist aggression.
Still, Cardenas’ decision to assist the Republic has yet to be plausibly 
explained. Unlike the alliance between workers and the government, the 
nationalization of oil or the vast land distribution, it has never been considered one of 
Cardenismo’s finest hours. At worse it has been deemed irrational and groundless, 
attributable in any case to Cardenas’ sole will and to the Constitutional faculty 
bestowed upon the president to determine the course of Mexican foreign policy.14 
This contrasts sharply with his decision to bring in a sizable exile community, mainly 
to academia, which has been unanimously eulogized.15
Clearly, a historiographical void needs to be filled. This in itself justifies the 
need to undertake such research. Moreover, Cardenas’ motives for supporting the 
Republic are far from clear. At first sight, it seems perplexing that Cardenas had 
knowingly embarked a poor country with such gross limitations into the murky 
waters of a transcontinental conflict. His administration has come to be best known 
through the nationalization of American and British oil interests undertaken in 1938. 
Before the expropriation, the Mexican government had been labelled as communistic 
or heading towards Bolshevism. When the companies tried to organize a boycott 
against the newly nationalized oil concern, Mexico shifted exports to Germany, Italy 
and Japan. Thenceforth, the charge most often levelled against his regime was of 
being shifting towards fascism.16 This reveals in itself the complexity of Cardenismo 
and the way it defies casual conceptualisation
13 Angel Vinas, La guerra civil espahola 50 ahos despues. Barcelona, Editorial Labor, 1985. pp.140- 
142.
14 Constitution Politica de Mexico, Article 89 paragraphs III, VIII and X and Archivo Historico 
Diplomatico Mexicano. Mexicoy Espaiia: solidaridad y  asilopolitico. 1936-1942. p.l 1.
15 See, for example, J. B. Trend Mexico. A New Spain with Old Friends. Cambridge, University Press, 
1941. Patricia Fagen Exiles and Citizens. Spanish Republicans in Mexico. Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1973. Or Jose Alameda, et al., El exilio espahol en Mexico, 1939-82. Mexico, FCE/Salvat, 
1982.
16 See Evelyn Waugh, Robbery Under Law The Mexican Object-Lesson, London, Chapman and Hall 
1939. pp. 42 and 283-286. Franz L. Kluckhohn The Mexican Challenge. New York, Doubleday, 
1939.
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No account of Cardenismo may be complete if it fails to acknowledge Mexican 
involvement in the Spanish Civil War. That episode gave the regime an international 
dimension that together with the staunch diplomatic defence it undertook of Austria, 
Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Finland bestowed the regime with an international 
prestige, which at the time was clearly unmatched.
The question naturally arises as to what may have led Cardenas to engage a 
weak country in an international adventure in a far off context, without an internal 
consensus behind his decision and with no apparent benefit for its national interest. 
Indeed, Mexican support for the Republic was far from unanimous. Apart from the 
President, the governmental bureaucracy, trade unions and the Mexican Communist 
Party, the Republican cause had few followers. The Mexican upper and middle class 
were, in the main, pro-Franco, and later, pro-Axis. This had to do more with an 
ingrained bias among these sectors towards the Hispanista ideal, as well as to a 
profound anti-Americanism, rather than to a real sympathy for the Nazi creed.
Many reasons have been advanced to justify or explain this decision. The 
official line of the time held that Mexico was repaying in such manner its debt to 
Spain after this country had built several vessels for the Mexican Navy, and that it 
was its duty to assist a friendly and legitimate government with which it had 
relations, after it had required assistance.17 In such fashion, the Mexican government 
could defend domestically the shipments as part of a commercial transaction; a 
measure to which not even Right wing malcontents could object. On the other hand, 
the fact that Mexico was paid for the equipment it shipped to Spain, a point raised by 
Leftist critics, does nothing to lessen the sincerity of Cardenas’ stand. Other nations 
would not ship weapons to Loyalist Spain even for money. While the Soviet Union 
required Spain to pay for the arms in gold, at the exchange rate set by the Russians,
1 ftMexico accepted payment in Spanish currency at the prevailing international rate.
The official line ever since has rested on legalistic and rhetorical considerations 
such as Mexico’s allegiance to international law and to the traditional principles of 
Mexican diplomacy that prescribe respect for national sovereignty and self­
]1El Nacional, September 7, 1936.
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determination.19 This of course, has allowed the official party to legitimate its 
position as democratic and progressive. Accordingly, it advanced a homegrown 
purpose of self-righteousness. Yet, these very principles have been used by Cardenas’
90detractors to dismiss his policy towards Spain as a breach of the Estrada Doctrine, a 
precept that has determined much of Mexican foreign policy since 1930.
For the Mexican Right, Cardenas’ staunch support for the Republic was the 
ultimate proof of his sinister association with the “Jewish-Masonic-Communist 
conspiracy’.21 Furthermore, both Mexican and Spanish conservatives have coincided 
in their accusation that the aid to the Republic was merely a sinister ploy of the 
Mexican government to seize the treasury of El Vita. For Mexican historian, Jose 
Fuentes Mares, quoting the President himself, what really motivated Cardenas was 
both “the fact that Spaniards belong to our race” and that the Republic “represented
99the trend towards economic and social emancipation of the Spanish people.” Other 
authors have tried to explain his attitude hagiographically as part of his romanticism 
and idealism. Of course, such diatribes or eulogies have scarcely contributed to 
clarify the real motives behind such a complex decision. If anything, these versions 
only show how much passion and debate the decision has generated.
18 Lois E Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955, 
p.190.
19 See, for example, Alberto Enriquez, (compiler) Mexico y  Espaha: solidaridad y  asilo. 1936-1942. 
Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990.
20 The Estrada Doctrine of September 23, 1930,’ A communique issued by the then Foreign Minister, 
Genaro Estrada, has come to constitute the milestone of Mexican Foreign Policy. It stated literally: “It 
is a well known fact that Mexico has endured, as few countries have, the consequences of a doctrine 
which leaves to the discretion of foreign countries the capacity of pronouncing themselves over the 
legitimacy or the illegitimacy of another regime.. This generates situations by which the legal capacity 
and national ascendancy of governments and authorities seems to be subordinated to the opinion of 
strangers. The doctrine of recognition has been applied since the Great War, particularly to countries 
of the American continent... Mexico does not take a stand on granting recognition, because it 
considers this to be a denigrating practice, which apart from damaging the sovereignty of other 
nations, puts them in a position where other governments can qualify their internal affairs. These 
governments, in fact, assume a position of criticism, when they decide, favourably or unfavourably, on 
the legal capacity of a foreign government. Therefore, the Mexican government limits its practice to 
maintaining or withdrawing its diplomatic agents, when it considers it pertinent and to continue 
accepting the diplomatic agents of the nations accredited in Mexico, without qualifying neither hastily 
nor a posteriori, the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace their governments or 
authorities”. See El Universal, September 28, 1930. For an analysis of the Estrada Doctrine see, 
among others, Daniel Cosio Villegas, Ensayos y  notas Volume 2. Mexico, Editorial Hermes, 1966.
21 Alfonso Taracena, La revolucion desvirtuada, Vol. V, Mexico Costa-Amic, 1968. See also 
Salvador Abascal, Lazaro Cardenas. Presidente Comunista, Mexico, Editorial Tradition, 1988. and 
Carlos Alvear Acevedo, Lazaro Cardenas: El Hombrey el Mito. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1961.
22 Jose Fuentes Mares, Historia de un conflicto. El tesoro del Vita. Madrid, CVS Ediciones, 1975, pp. 
163-165.
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Other, more scholarly approaches, particularly originating from the American 
academia, have too easily dismissed Cardenas diplomatic achievements by rejecting 
them wholesale as “nationalistic mythology” or “boastful patriotism.”23
Internal factors surely weighed considerably. In any case Mexican official 
support of Madrid came in the face of a spectacular growth of the Conservative 
opposition, no doubt driven by Cardenas’ radical programme itself. From 1929 
onwards, the Mexican regime faced the mounting challenge of a radical Right, first 
religious, and then secular. The rise of fascism in the world scene compounded this 
threat and forced the adoption of new strategies both internally and externally to 
confront the risks posed by a burgeoning Rightist opposition. The Spanish war 
reverberated deeply in Mexican politics encouraging domestic pro-fascist forces to 
attempt exploiting the social and political tensions within the Mexican State. On the 
external front this demanded the diversification of links in order to secure collective 
security.
This research aims to examine the rationale behind Mexico’s sustained support 
for the Republic, both with material aid and in the diplomatic front at the League of 
Nations. It attempts to demonstrate how, far from being a symbolic aid resulting from 
ideological affinity, it served Mexican national interest, and how, in that sense it was 
expedient to domestic necessities. Contrary to what has been previously believed, 
Mexican foreign policy of the time was deeply interconnected with the internal 
agenda.
In 1936, the Cardenas administration, not yet consolidated after the showdown 
with former strongman Calles, feared a rightist coup. Later, when the Republic’s 
fortune ailed, Cardenas dreaded that a Francoist victory might arouse his Rightist 
enemies to coalesce in a similar Fascist organisation such as Falange, or even, to try 
an equivalent insurrection.24 Worse still, Cardenas feared that such moves might give
23 For examples of such patronizing approach see, Thomas G. Powell, op cit. or Mark Falcoff and 
Frederick Pike, The Spanish Civil War. American Hemispheric Perspectives. Lincoln, Nebraska, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
24 “A victory of Franco might precipitate an immediate and powerful onslaught against the 
revolutionary forces in Mexico. By aiding Spain, the Mexican government is not only siding with 
legality, justice and the Mexican popular causes, but it also furthers its own cause in the forefront that 
is being disputed in the Peninsula. Accordingly, the government presided by Franco may not be for us, 
even if it wins, anything else but the seditious and historical enemy” The Spanish Institutions were
14
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a pretext for American abandonment of the Good Neighbour policy and set the 
ground for renewed American interventionism. New evidence has shown that 
American concern with Fascist activities in Mexico had led the U.S. to consider the 
possibility of repudiating the Good Neighbour policy and to intervene militarily in 
Mexico with the aim of preventing the Axis from doing so.
While the prospect of a Falangist attempt to set up a puppet state in Mexico or 
an outright protectorate may now seem grossly exaggerated or even preposterous it 
was a serious concern of both the Mexican government and the U.S. intelligence. 
American archives, several articles in specialised press and books of the era attest to 
this.26 The entrepreneurs, the discontented middle classes and even large sectors of 
the peasantry and the working class, which had been affected by Cardenas radical 
agenda, overtly supported the Axis, rather out of sheer anti-Americanism than from 
real identification with the Nazi ideology. Francoism, with its appeal to Catholicism, 
family and tradition represented an even greater danger to the revolutionary regime 
than Nazism, for the masses could more easily relate to it, due to age-old cultural 
parallelisms between Mexico and Spain. As a contemporary commentator noted:
Franco’s Hispanism is nothing more than Spanish fascism adapted to Latin 
American consumption. It is Creole Nazism.27
These apprehensions intensified when, at the victory procession of May 19, 
1939, in Madrid, General Franco, at the head of 250, 000 Italian, German, and 
Spanish soldiers, appeared surrounded by the banners of the Spanish conquistadors of 
America. It shall be remembered that point 3 of the Falange bluntly stated:
We have a will of Empire. We affirm that the historical plenitude of Spain is 
the Empire. We demand for Spain a pre-eminent position in Europe. We do
defended by the People. Had the Government armed them, no town would had fallen to the Military. 
However, the Spanish War will not end with the Triumph of Franco or the Republic, but with an 
International Conflagration. Confidential Report from the Mexican Ambassador to Madrid, Ramon P. 
De Negri to the Foreign Minister. AHSRE, exp. III-765-1 (4th section).
25 See Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security and Spies. Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II 
University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 15.
26 National Archives of the United States (NAUS.) RG 59, Box 3960, 812.00/32033-l/5ff. “Spanish 
Government’s Influence in the Mexican Presidential Election of 1940.” 1941. For literary approaches 
see, for instance, Carleton Beals, “Totalitarian Inroads in Latin America” in Foreign Affairs Vol. 17 
No. 1, October 1938 pp. 78-90 or Frank Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge New York, Doubleday, 
1939. pp. 138-142.
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not bear international isolation or foreign interference. With regard to 
Spanish America, we shall set towards cultural, economical and political 
unification. Spain asserts its condition as spiritual axis of the Hispanic 
world.
Let us, in that sense, recall also several pronouncements made by various 
Francoist leaders after the Civil War about Spain’s “destiny in the universal,” to 
understand how justified were Mexican official concerns.28 Thus, for instance, Jose 
Maria Pemartin, National Chief of University and Secondary Education of the Franco 
regime, in praising the magnificence of the German National Socialist movement, 
declared that one of the imperatives of Spanish existence was:
To extend and expand our political jurisdiction, above all, over the South 
American countries, of Hispanic soul and language.
In similar vein, Julian Maria Rubio, President of the University of Valladolid, 
in an article, which appeared in the March 1939 issue of the Francoist magazine 
Spain, published in the United States said:
Nationalist Spain is linked to Latin America by a triple bond: the past, the 
present, and the future. Because we want to triumph and conquer in our war, 
in order to share our victory with our brothers across the Atlantic, and if 
necessary to give it to them, so they may be saved.
Marshall Goering made a more alarming statement on the eve of Franco’s 
victory, when he declared to the Nationale Zeitung of Essen:
Spain is the key question for the two continents. The victory of Franco 
decides between chaos and reconstruction in the two hemispheres. His final 
victory alone can preserve for Ibero-American countries their true Spanish 
culture and tradition. If these are lost, then the American continent will be 
more or less surrendered to the influences of the Yankees and the 
Muscovites, who march arm in arm, especially in the New World.29
27 F. Carmona Nenclares “Hispanismo e Hispanidad,” in Cuademos Americanos, May-June, 1942.
28 Eduardo Gonzalez Callejas and Fredes Limon, La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate. Raza 
e Imperio en la prensa franquista. Madrid, CSIC, 1988.
29 Reproduced through cable by the Chicago Daily News, February 18, 1939.
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As we now know, Spain was too weak, Mexico too far away. American 
industrial and military might would have made it highly difficult, or even impossible, 
for those aspirations to be realised. Yet we have the benefit of hindsight, and in 1939 
no one could have thought that Spain would stay out of the Axis and remain first as 
neutral, then as non-belligerent for the duration of war. What would have happened 
had Franco entered into an alliance with Hitler? This has been a subject of much 
speculation, particularly concerning his ambitions over France’s North African 
possessions, yet scant attention has been paid to his Spanish American designs. It is 
not our aim to attempt counterfactual analysis, yet these factors must be taken into 
account if we are to understand Cardenas’ motives.
Although many Mexican academics have tried to minimize Fascist 
involvement in indigenous right-wing organisations and conspiracies, new evidence 
shows that Francoist Spain did send secret agents to Mexico during the 1940 election 
to assist Almazan’s camp and to destabilize Cardenas’ succession, and that Almazan
*5 1
himself sought to emulate Franco, for whom he declared open admiration. Equally, 
recent scholarly works have revealed that such designs existed indeed and were not 
the product of the febrile imagination of the sensationalist press. That the threat 
was sufficiently feasible as to raise American concerns may be inferred by 
Roosevelt’s own words:
The next perfectly obvious step, which Brother Hitler suggested in his 
speech yesterday (January 30, 1939), would be Central and South America.
(...) These are things you ought to regard. How far is it from Yucatan to New 
Orleans or Houston? How far from Tampico to St. Louis or Kansas City?
How far? Now do not say this is chimerical. Would any of you have said six 
years ago when this man Hitler came into control (...) that Germany would
30 See, for example, Carlos Martinez Assad, Los rebeldes vencidos. Cedillo contra el Estado 
Cardenista. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1990 or Brigida Von Mentz, et al, Los 
empresarios alemanes, el Tercer Reich y  la oposicion de derechas a Cardenas. 2 volumes. Mexico, 
CIESAS, 1988.
31 Informe del Servicio de Inteligencia sobre Mejico, septiembre de 1939, in Fundacion Nacional 
Francisco Franco, Documentos ineditos para la historia del Generalisimo Franco. Volume 1, Burgos 
1992 pp. 588-602. See also Friedrich E. Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt. Mexican 
Foreign Relations in the Age o f Lazaro Cardenas 1934-1940. Albuquerque, The University of New 
Mexico Press, 1998. pp. 76-77.
32 KlausVolland, Das Dritte Reich und Mexiko. Frankfurt, Lang, 1987 or Leslie Rout and John 
Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and U.S. Counterespionage in Latin America during 
World War II. Washington: Greenwood Press, 1986.
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dominate Europe, completely and absolutely? That is why we cannot afford 
to sit here and say it is a pipe dream. It is the gradual encirclement of the 
United States by the removal of its first lines of defence.33
At any rate, the decision to assist the Republic was not an automatic one. It 
certainly was not a personal decision. The existence of a strong presidentialism as 
main feature of the Mexican political system, as well as the constitutional provisions 
that confer ample powers to the Executive concerning foreign policy have allowed 
for such versions to gain credence.
Like the Republican experiment, Cardenismo was a radical attempt at social 
transformation in an era characterised by major upheavals and considerable political 
experimentation. The reforms brought about a staunch opposition from the propertied 
classes, which in its turn gave rise to a proliferation of right wing organizations. 
These groups adopted a vociferous stance that presaged a civil struggle akin to that, 
which was taking place in Spain.
Thus, in that sense Spanish events produced a backlash in Mexican domestic 
politics, influencing its course more deeply than had previously been thought. In fact, 
the Generals’ rebellion in Spain provided the necessary focal point for the hitherto 
fragmented rightist opposition to converge. The emergence and spectacular growth of 
the Union Nacional Sinarquista during the Civil War years bears witness to this 
influence. Moreover, the appearance of the Partido Action Nacional (PAN), 
Mexico’s foremost Conservative party, took place also under the appeal of Franco’s 
rebellion.
In this sense, this thesis’ principal hypothesis is that Cardenas aided the 
Republic in order to challenge the Mexican Right and to offset any possibility of it 
attempting a similar uprising. Thus should be read Cardenas recurring line that ‘by 
defending Spain we are defending Mexico’. His insistence on the Republic’s right to 
defend itself was a call to the foreign powers and especially to the U.S. to support his 
government and forestall a repetition of Spanish events in Mexico.
33 Conference, Jan 31, 1939. Quoted in Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. The Social and 
Political Ideas o f Franklin D. Roosevelt. Michigan, State University Press, 1958, pp. 181-182.
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In the end it would be Roosevelt’s assistance to Cardenas that prevented a 
Rightist insurrection in Mexico. Yet, this fell short of supporting the continuation of 
his policies. The price that Cardenas had to pay in order to guarantee the survival of 
the regime was to be a shift to a more conservative position.
In the jigsaw of the Mexican foreign policy of the 1930s there are several 
missing pieces. If Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy helps us to understand the 
increased autonomy enjoyed by the Cardenas government to carry out the oil 
nationalization, it does not clarify in any way American tolerance or even assent for 
Mexico’s support of the Spanish Republic. Let us remember that not only did 
Roosevelt reject the League of Nations in 1932 as inefficient, but also that under his 
second government a Law of Neutrality was passed in 1937.34 It is true that this 
occurred during a particular international conjuncture when America was abandoning 
its isolationism, facilitating Cardenas’ espousal of a firm nationalist stance. As the 
World War approached the USA tolerated a dissident policy in Mexico so as to 
contribute to the internal stability of that country, a stability that suited American 
national interest.
Another peculiarity worth noticing is that Mexico and the USSR-the only 
countries that supported the Republic-had no diplomatic links all through the 
Spanish Civil War. During the 1920s both revolutionary regimes had effected a 
rapprochement that led them to the establishment of diplomatic links- the first Soviet 
embassy in the Western Hemisphere opened in 1924. The growing identification 
between revolution and communism after 1917 made the Mexican Revolution 
extremely vulnerable to attacks by the American press of flirtations with Bolshevism. 
This did not prevent Mexican diplomats at the League of Nations from coordinating 
their efforts at defending Spain with those of the Soviet delegation headed by Maxim 
Litvinov. These peculiarities need further clarification.
34 Charles A Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making 1932-1940. A Study in Responsibilities. 
Yale, University Press, 1946 pp. 178-180.
35 Let us also remember from that episode that Alexandra Kollontai was appointed as the first woman 
minister ever in the annals of diplomatic history.
36 Report of the Sixth Commission formulated by Manuel Tello at the 18th Assembly of the League of 
Nations, October 1937, Exp. III-488-2 Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive AHSRE, Exp. 
Ill-170-33; III-491-6.
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On the other hand, a cross chronology of Cardenismo and the Spanish process 
reveals at first glance a surprising coincidence between the milestones of Cardenismo 
and the diverse stages of the Spanish process. Cardenas came into power shortly after 
the Asturian October Revolution. His final riddance of the tutelage of Calles came 
shortly before the uprising of the Moroccan garrisons. The expropriation of oil, 
which marked the zenith of his government, took place at the time of the failed Ebro 
offensive. After this radical measure, the experiment ended and Cardenas veered 
course towards greater moderation. Accordingly the choice of Avila Camacho over 
Mugica as his successor was simultaneous with the defeat of the Republic. A relation 
of events may be thus inferred. This thesis aims to address and analyse the interplay 
of these events from the Mexican perspective in greater detail.
This research also aims to analyse the complex frame of domestic-international 
interaction of Cardenismo and the way it defies facile stereotypes of dependency. 
Mexico was not a Third World power meekly resigned to American hegemony. Quite 
the contrary; the Cardenas administration seized every opportunity the international 
context provided to serve the national interest and advance its agenda through the 
inter war crisis and exploit the contradictions of the Great Powers for its own benefit.
Secondly, this research is also an account of the way the Spanish Civil War 
resonated in Mexican events and determined the subsequent course of the Mexican 
Revolution, that is the interplay between domestic affairs and Spanish events. 
Throughout the text the extent to which Mexican conservatives were galvanized 
following Franco’s successive victories will become evident, and how the then young 
Mexican revolutionary regime came to link its own survival to that of the struggling 
Republic.
The dynamics between Cardenismo and the Spanish Civil War, may be seen 
through the text in a series of issues such as propaganda, Church-State relations, 
educational policy, the military, rebellions, trade unionism, land reform and domestic 
politics altogether. From a theoretical outlook the paper relates to foreign policy 
analysis. This orientation focuses on how and why decision makers behave the way 
they do. Thus the identification of the intellectual, psychological, and institutional
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factors that affect the reasoning process by which leaders arrive at decisions is the 
central analytic element of this thesis.
This is also a study of how the Spanish case became a source of national pride 
and legitimacy for the Revolutionary regime and how it set a precedent for Mexican 
foreign policy, at least until 1989, when the signing of NAFTA took President 
Salinas de Gortari to adopt a more ‘pragmatic’ stance in international relations.
Finally, this thesis attempts to determine if the impact of the Spanish Civil War 
in Mexico had any bearing on the transformation of the ruling PNR into the PRM, 
the denial of the vote to women in 1937 and in the outcome of the 1940 presidential 
election.
The research is organised into 7 chapters. The first chapter will provide an 
overview of Spanish-Mexican relations from independence to 1931. The second 
chapter will deal with the Spanish-Mexican relations prior to the Civil War. 
Relations between the two countries had been dwindling into irrelevance ever since 
Mexico had obtained its independence in 1821. Spanish domination had been 
substituted by British and French interests, and above all, American hegemony. After 
the Spanish Republic was established there was newfound enthusiasm brought about 
by its image of modernity. Thus, Republican Spain became a sort of beacon, or point 
of reference that confirmed in the eyes of the revolutionary bureaucratic elite the 
correctness of their course. The common cultural links were renewed and even 
increased. Spain became Mexico’s privileged relation with the outside world. What 
had seemed a reactionary museum-like nation of die-hards had become a respectable 
and influential ally in the international stage and a model worthy of emulation.
The third chapter will deal specifically with Mexican support of the Spanish 
Republic, both with material aid and diplomatic solidarity and will examine the 
rationale behind this support. In this section we will also survey the responses that 
Mexican aid had in the Republican zone. The crisis of the refugees inside the Latin 
American embassies in Madrid will also be examined, with a special emphasis 
placed on those who sought sanctuary at the Mexican Embassy and the brief 
estrangement that this brought about to the bilateral relationship. Chapter 4 will 
attempt to settle as far as possible the question of Mexican military aid to the
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Republic. Rigorous estimates of Mexico’s military shipments to the Republic have 
yet to be tried. Some of the methodological difficulties to establish the precise 
importance of this cooperation have to do with the own clandestine nature of the 
operations.
The fifth chapter will concentrate on Mexican support for the Republic in the 
diplomatic front, at the League of Nations, before the United States, at the 
hemispheric level in the realm of the Pan-American conventions, as well as through 
its representations in Latin America. The sixth chapter will scrutinize the 
repercussions generated by the Spanish Civil War in the Mexican political scene. 
Chapter seven will analyse the end of the war, the arrival of the Spanish refugees and 
the way Franco’s victory reverberated in Mexican politics well up to the landmark 
presidential election of 1940.
The research concludes that Cardenas’ assessment of the Spanish Civil War as 
a stage in a larger conflict between Fascism and democracy was a correct one and 
was validated by further events. The greater part of the League’s member states 
limited themselves to witnessing the bloody Civil War in the hope that it would 
remain an exclusively Spanish affair. The Mexican government did not consider this 
to be the case. It interpreted the Spanish conflict as a preliminary stage in the ongoing 
world offensive of the anti-democratic forces. On June 17, 1937, President Cardenas 
wrote in his diary:
Should the rebels win in Spain, it would not be remote that Germany and 
Italy, together with the Spanish military caste should assume an arrogant 
stance vis-a-vis the American nations. They would easily come to terms with 
Japan and would do everything to drag it into a war against the United 
States; on the contrary, should the Spanish government win, the fate of the 
German and Italian people could easily change.37
37 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras. I. Apuntes 1913-1940. Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico, 1972. p.370.
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These words show Cardenas at his best, both as an unwavering idealist and as a 
visionary statesman. On both counts, subsequent events would prove him and his 
generation right.
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SPANISH-MEXICAN RELATIONS 1821-1931: AN OVERVIEW
Mexican governing circles hailed the coming of the Spanish Republic, on April 14, 
1931, with unprecedented warmth. The Mexican Revolution was entering its 
eleventh year since the armed struggle ended, and the prospect of a friendly 
government in the Peninsula was relished by a hitherto isolated regime. Still, it seems 
paradoxical that a political system, which had based most of its nation-building 
efforts through an educational discourse of Hispano-phobia and exaltation of the 
Indian element, had embraced whole-heartedly the cause of Republican Spain. Yet 
this would be the case and the only possible explanation for this new approach would 
be a combination of ideological identification and pragmatic consideration that 
allowed both governments to overcome historically entrenched suspicions.
Past relations between Mexico and Spain had been far from cordial ever since 
the independence, and in fact, had reached acutely low points. The failed attempt by 
the Barradas expedition to re-conquer the former colony for the Spanish crown, or 
the ensuing expulsion of all Spaniards decided by successive Mexican governments 
in the 1820s, had left a legacy of mutual enmity.1 Feelings were embittered further 
because of Spain’s refusal to grant recognition to its former possession well up to 
1836.2
'After Mexican independence, Spain kept a stronghold in the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, from where 
it successfully blockaded the port of Veracruz. Evicted by Santa Anna in 1825, the Spaniards 
attempted a re-conquest of Mexico under Isidro Barradas 3 years later. Partially defeated by Generals 
Santa Anna and Victoria the expedition was decimated by malaria. As a reprisal, the government of 
Vicente Guerrero decreed the expulsion of all Spaniards from Mexican territory. The American 
historian Harold Dana Sims has rendered the now classic versions of those events on his books: La 
reconquista de Mexico. La historia de los atentados espanoles, 1821-1830, Mexico, FCE, 1984, and 
La expulsion de los espanoles de Mexico, 1821-1830. Mexico, FCE, 1985.
2 Tratado Definitivo de Paz y  Amistad Suscrito entre la Republica Mexicana y  su Majestad Catolica 
Doiia Isabel II suscrito en la Ciudad de Madrid el 28 de diciembre de 1836, in Luis Miguel Diaz and 
Jaime G. Martini, Relaciones Diplomaticas Mexico-Espana (1821-1977). Mexico, Porrua, 1979.
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The first Spanish minister reached Mexico only on December 1838. Although 
controversies were partly settled through diplomatic recognition and by conventions 
on debt-in the years 1844, 1847, 1851 and 1853-old animosities would come to the 
fore again after Spain’s recognition of the Maximilian Empire in 1862. This event 
led to severance of diplomatic relations by President Juarez in 1867; a connection 
that would not be renewed until 1871.
Under the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911), the bilateral relation 
improved dramatically, yet paled as irrelevant by comparison with those held with 
France, Britain the U.S. and even Germany. Trade between the two countries was 
insignificant due to the relative backwardness and peripheral situation of both 
countries in the international economy, while both were largely dependent on foreign 
capital. An additional factor would be that both economies were competitive rather 
than interdependent. None of them had achieved a solid industrialisation during the 
nineteenth century, and remained agriculturally and mining-oriented. For those 
reasons the trade exchange between both countries, albeit having grown considerably 
under Diaz government, remained largely negligible. Mexico bought less than 5% of 
its imports from Spain, while sending 0.8%-2% of its exports to Spain.4 Mexico 
bought in Spain wine and groceries; textile purchases were negligible, while it sold 
sisal fibre, timber, chickpeas and tincture extracts.5
The colonization policy of Diaz encouraged a sizable flow of Spanish 
immigrants into Mexico that was duly appreciated by the Spanish government.6 
Anyhow, it never achieved the success secured by Argentina, Brazil or Chile, as the 
Mexican government, unlike its South American counterparts, did not offer to pay
3 Ibid.
4 Great Britain was Mexico’s main client and purveyor, taking as much as 39.65% of its exports. See 
Roger D. Hansen, La politica del desarrollo mexicano, p.23. It is noteworthy to mention that 
according to Carlos M. Rama at the turn of the century Spain participated in world trade with barely a 
1.2% of the total, in spite of having a coastline of more than 4,000 kilometres. La crisis espanola del 
siglo XX,, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica. p.40.
5 Manuel Grijalva, “Tendencias generates de las relaciones comerciales entre Mexico y  Espana”, in 
Clara Lida, Tres aspectos de la presencia espanola durante el porfiriato, Mexico, El Colegio de 
Mexico, Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1981, pp.131-132.
6 Spaniards were the preferred immigrants owing to the obvious factors of language, religion and to 
their higher potential of integration with the local element than immigrants from other nationalities 
such as Germans, French Italians or, worse of all, the dreaded Anglo-Saxon. Let us remember, in that 
sense, that a first wave of immigration of American settlers in the 1820’s and 30’s had brought the loss 
of Texas and the American war of 1846-47.
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the travel expenses. Nonetheless, the Spanish community rose from 6380 in 1877 to 
29, 541 strong in 1910, a number larger even than the American colony.
During the Spanish-American war of 1898, Mexico remained neutral in spite of 
the governmental and popular sympathies for the Mother country. American pressure 
saw to it that Diaz stayed aloof from the conflict. Nevertheless, the Spanish Casino in 
Mexico was able to raise 800, 000 dollars and send them to Madrid as a contribution 
to the war effort.7
After Spain’s defeat, Mexico became-according to Carlos Illades-a priority for 
Spanish foreign policy as it came to be regarded as a dyke in containing overflowing
Q
American influence. Diaz also valued the Hispanista policy undertaken by Spain 
from the second half of the 19th Century, insofar as it coincided with his policy of 
leaning on Europe to contain the U.S. Hispanismo asserted the existence of a 
Hispanic family of nations bound by links of race, culture, language, Weltanschauung 
and, not least, religion.9
This became clear in the festivities organised by Spain for the Fourth 
Centennial of America’s discovery, in which Mexico partook with “pomp and 
munificence.”10 But it was the 1898 “disaster” which drew the American republics, 
and most particularly Mexico, closer to their defeated “Mother country”, as they now 
became aware that the real danger was coming from the North. Hispanic roots were 
accordingly reassessed as a common element of unity to counter the ‘Saxonisation of 
America.’
Under the aegis of Diaz’s Minister of Education, Justo Sierra, Mexican support 
for Hispanidad received a new boost, as cultural exchanges with Spain began in 
earnest. In this context, the 1909 visit of Rafael Altamira y Crevea (1866-1951),
7 See Michael Kenny, et al, Inmigrantes y  refugiados espanoles en Mexico, siglo XX, Mexico, 
Ediciones de la Casa Chata, 1979, 369 pp. p.54.
8 Carlos Illades, Presencia espanola en la Revolucion Mexicana (1910-1915). Mexico, UNAM- 
Instituto Mora, 1991, p.4.
9 Much later, the Spanish writer, Ramiro de Maeztu (1874-1936), would incorporate anti-Liberal and 
anti-democratic elements to this idea, thus breeding Hispanidad, a doctrine that prescribed the tutelage 
of Spanish American nations by the mother country. See Frederick Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936. 
Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and their relations with Spanish America London, University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1971, pp. 1-9, and Ramiro de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad Madrid, 1933.
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ahead of a commission of academics, who lectured at the National University set up a 
mutual rediscovery and an unprecedented dialogue between the two countries 
through scholarly interactions. Grand plans were made to institute a Spanish chair at 
the National University and a Mexican professorship in the University of Madrid. 
The Mexican Revolution wrecked this enterprise. Thirty years later, Altamira came 
back to Mexico, this time as a Republican exile.11
Another, less significant, yet highly symbolic gesture came on Mexico’s 
centennial anniversary of independence when Spain presented Diaz’s government 
with the uniform of Morelos -Mexico’s independence hero- captured by the vice­
regal troops during the War of Independence. This was interpreted at the time as a 
milestone towards complete reconciliation between two kin, yet protractedly 
estranged nations.12 Moreover, the Spanish Plenipotentiary, General Camilo Garcia 
de Polavieja presented President Porfirio Diaz with the collar of the Order of Carlos 
IE.13 Polavieja had received upon his arrival:
(...) the most roaring ovation that had been conferred to any diplomat. It was 
one of the few times that a Mexican crowd had spontaneously and 
enthusiastically cheered a foreigner, as if he was one of the Republic’s 
finest.14
Such acclaim would not last. With the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution the 
bilateral relation rapidly deteriorated. Spain’s image in Mexico since its birth as a 
nation had been negative. The rupture of the colonial relationship deteriorated 
Spain’s image both in Mexico and the rest of the Spanish American nations as a 
result of the wars of independence. Moreover, the influence of the Enlightenment’s 
ideas, the American Republican model and the Liberal doctrines furthered that 
rejection. The colonial era was repudiated as historical project and Spanish 
domination came to represent all things political and spiritual that the (Spanish)
10 Carlos M. Rama, Historia de las relaciones culturales entre Espana y  la America Latina, Mexico, 
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1982, 350 pp. p.186-191.
11 For a description of this cultural mission and a complete portrait o f Altamira, see Javier Malagon 
and Silvio Zavala, Rafael Altamira y  Crevea. El historiadory el hombre, Mexico, UNAM, 1986.
12 Josefina MacGregor, Mexico y  Espana. Del porfiriato a la revolucion, Mexico, Institute Nacional 
de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1992.
13 Hector Perea, La rueda del tiempo. Mexicanos en Espana Mexico, Cal y Arena, 1996 510 pp.
p.126.
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Americans did not want to be.15 To historical resentment now socio-economic 
mistrust was added. Hispano-phobia thus became a sort of State ideology of a nation 
aspiring to differentiate itself internally and internationally.
Manifestations of hostility towards Spaniards became particularly acute in 
Northern Mexico. When over forty Spaniards were killed on April 1911, Spanish 
subjects sent a petition to King Alfonso XIII informing him of the “deplorable 
situation” and urging him to take extreme measures.16 Furthermore, the Spanish 
Ambassador’s equivocal position towards the events that led to the assassination of 
President Madero,17 as well as damages to Spanish property and lives caused by the 
revolutionary tumult, brought about renewed ill faith. Old prejudices and grievances 
about Spanish superiority to the ‘barbarous’ aboriginal or the black legend of the 
Spanish conquest and the exploitation by the “selfish” Spaniard resurfaced with 
vigour.
This fresh nationalism set off by the Revolution has led several scholars to 
debate whether the Mexican Revolution was intrinsically xenophobic or not. It has 
been argued that while revolutionary events did affect foreign communities, the
• 10 ,Revolution was not xenophobic in nature or aimed at a particular group. While the 
Spaniards were affected it was mainly due to the fact that they were the largest
14 Carlos Illades, op. cit. p. 12.
15 Luisa Trevino y Daniel de la Pedraja, Mexico y  Espana, Transicion y  cambio. Mexico, Joaquin 
Mortiz, 1983, p.35.
16 The New York Times, April 29, 1911.
17 On February 9, 1913, General Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz (nephew of the old dictator) staged a 
right-wing counterrevolution against Madero. Reyes tried to assault the National Palace, where troops 
loyal to the President shot him dead. Upon learning these events, Diaz retreated to the capital’s main 
arsenal, where he aimed to resist. In a fateful decision, Madero appointed Victoriano Huerta, an old 
crony of Porfirio Diaz, as Chief of Staff and sent him to crush the rebellion. Instead, Huerta engaged in 
a phoney exchange with Diaz, while entering in secret negotiations with him and the American 
Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson. During these exchanges, the civilian population suffered heavy 
losses in what has come to be known as the “Tragic Ten Days”. Finally, Diaz and Huerta agreed under 
the auspices of Lane Wilson to overthrow Madero, in what is known as the “Pact o f the Embassy”. 
Huerta’s second Colonel Aureliano Blanquet arrested Madero and then murdered him together with 
vice-president Pino Suarez on February 19, 1913. Huerta assumed the Presidency, while Diaz fled the 
country. Presumably, the Spanish Minister Bernardo Jacinto Cologan y Cologan engaged in these 
intrigues, or at least, chose to turn a blind eye on them. Thus, Mexico’s brief democratic experience 
ended. This episode would later be the object of recurrent comparisons by the Cardenas government to 
the Francoist insurrection against the Republic, as well as to the Axis interference in Spanish affairs.
18 It should be noted that an anti-Chinese sentiment did arise, leading to outrages and even massacres 
of Chinese settlers, who accepted lower wages than Mexicans did and thus were regarded as 
competitors. The most notable example of these outrages was the carnage of Torreon in 1914, incited 
by Villa’s troops.
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foreign community. Nevertheless, American and British interests, being far more 
important, remained the major targets, both of disorders and radical measures, by the 
Revolutionary governments.
Mutual perceptions between Mexicans and Spaniards remained tainted by old 
stereotypes and prejudices. The fact that Spaniards controlled the liquor trade and 
usually owned the general stores in small towns made them particularly liable to loss 
of property, prone to resort to diplomatic protection, and therefore vulnerable to the 
resentment that caused xenophobic reprisals.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the Spaniard was readily equated in the populace’s mind 
with the greedy grocer, a cliche that owed much to the preponderance of the Spanish 
community in both retail and wholesale commerce. The Spanish ‘grocer’ also 
indulged in usury, which may explain that so much of popular animosity was vented 
against that community. Other prevalent images included that of the Spaniard as the 
beastly foreman of the Porfiriato’s Hacienda, crueller with the serf than the landlords 
themselves, the operator of crummy taverns and brothels, the drug peddler, or the 
dowry-seeker of affluent families.
As a consequence of the oppressive caste system, bequeathed by the colonial 
era, yet well in force up to the Porfiriato, the Spaniard felt culturally and racially 
superior to the Indian or the Mestizo. Ramon de Valle Inclan, who heartily endorsed 
the Mexican Revolution, gave good examples of this bigotry in his famous novel 
Tirano Banderas where a moneylender brashly retorts to a girl’s complaint: ‘If it 
wasn’t for Spain you’d still be walking in feathers.’19
In his works, Valle Inclan drew a devastating portrait of the corruption that 
often underlay the accumulation of most quick fortunes made by the Indiano in the 
New World. Valle-Inclan loathed the Spanish immigrant that had arrived in the New
90World to “Hacer la America, ” with his denigrating trade of shopkeeper, 
hardworking, but ignorant, representative of the stereotyped Spain “of the 
tambourine.” Spaniards of this sort, declared Valle-Inclan, did little to win esteem for 
Spain.
19 Ramon de Valle Inclan Tirano Banderas. Madrid, Austral, 1985.
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The hatred of the Spaniard had originated in the time of the colonial era. 
Brading recalls the fact that the crowd assembled to independence over the cry of 
‘Long live Fernando VII! Long Live our Lady of Guadalupe! Down with the
gachupinesV Gachupin, a term of unknown origin came to be a derogatory locution
01to refer to the Spaniards in Mexico. Memories of Mexico’s long struggle with 
Spain between 1810 and 1825 made it easy to stir popular resentment against 
individual Spaniards.
This dislike further increased during the Diaz dictatorship as the perception of a 
common identity became ingrained in the popular mind between the ruling classes 
and the Spanish element. The oft-repeated phrase that under Diaz Mexico had 
become “the mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans” underscores the 
conjunction most Mexicans saw between the preferential treatment accorded to 
foreigners in general, and Spaniards in particular, and their own exclusion from the 
Porfirista representation of national community. Consequently, this double 
association may have produced a popular animosity against the Spaniards during the 
Revolution, according to Illades.22
MacGregor disagrees, sustaining her claim in the estimate given by Gonzalez 
Navarro of the number of foreigners killed during the Mexican Revolution. While the 
revolutionary armies, particularly those of Zapata and Villa, did commit excesses 
against the Spanish residents, such as killing and looting, other communities were 
equally exposed to such outrages, because of their privileged positions. Again, 
according to this calculation, 1477 foreigners lost their lives in the period 1910-1919. 
Out of these, 471 were Chinese, 209, Spaniards, 550 Americans, 14 French and 38 
British.23 In this sense, MacGregor states it would be unfair, as well as untrue, to 
define the revolution as xenophobic, less so Hispano-phobic.24 In truth, unlike the
20 Literally, to become rich.
21 David Brading, Los origenes del nacionalismo mexicano, Mexico D.F Sepsetentas 32, p.112-113. 
Interestingly, according to Maria Moliner (1360) a distinction was established after the Spanish Civil 
War in Mexico between the old residents who were referred to as ‘gachupines’, and the Republican 
exiles that were plainly called ‘Spaniards’. See also, Diccionario de la Real Academia Espanola, 
1999, p.248.
22 Carlos Illades, op. cit. p.58.
23 Moises Gonzalez Navarro, Poblacion y  sociedad en Mexico. Mexico, Facultad de Ciencias Politicas 
y Sociales, UNAM, 1974 (2 vols.) Vol. 2, p.79.
24 Josefma MacGregor, op. cit. pp. 11, 16 and 53.
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Chinese or the Americans, Spaniards were less conspicuous objects of hatred, as they 
could not be so readily identified among the Mexican population.
Nonetheless, for Conservative Historian and champion of Hispanidad, Jose 
Fuentes Mares, from 1913 onwards the Revolution adopted a distinctly anti-Hispanic 
stance, at least from an ideological perspective. The inveterate readiness shown by 
Spanish great landowners not only to demand consular protection but also to sponsor 
armed insurrections and competing warring factions, whenever they felt their 
interests might be at stake, did little to endear them with the successive governments. 
In short, to the anti-Spanish nationalist sentiment produced by its identification with 
the colonial past, and its economic prominence now a political factor was added, as 
the Spaniards became associated with the counter-revolution.
In due course, Venustiano Carranza, leader of the Constitutionalist Revolution 
that overthrew Huerta, severed links with all powers that had recognized the putschist 
regime and called for the expulsion of their diplomatic agents. This would be the case 
of Cologan’s appointed successor, Manuel Walls y Merino, who was ordered to leave 
federal territory on 1914. Simultaneously, Carranza ordered the dissolution of the 
Mexican Foreign Service abroad,27 which in its turn led to the exile in Spain of 
several former Huertista agents, such as Amado Nervo, Diaz Miron and others. 
Carranza accused Spain of having supported the dictator, a claim that gained credit 
when Huerta secured diplomatic asylum and went on to live in Barcelona. 
Diplomatic relations would be renewed months later, but the Spanish diplomats 
would have to face the problem of dealing with the various warring factions.
In all fairness it should be acknowledged that several Spaniards also fought in 
the ranks of the Mexican Revolution, notably in the armies of Villa, Zapata and
-n o
Obregon, among them, apparently, Luis Araquistain. This, however, did little to 
repair the tarnished image left by a century of bitter prejudice and the association 
fixed in the popular mind between the exploiters of the dictatorship days and the
25 Jose Fuentes Mares, Historia de dos orgullos. Espana y  Mexico. Mexico, Oceano, 1984. 213 pp. pp. 
56-59.
26 Carlos Illades, op. cit. pp. 130-131.
27 ‘Decreto del Poder Ejecutivo suprimiendo las representaciones diplomaticas y consulares del 
General Victoriano Huerta’. AHSRE Serie EMBESP 343.
28Josefina MacGregor, op. cit. p. 65.
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Spanish element. It is equally true that the Mexican Revolution owed a great deal of 
its intellectual origins to the influx of anarchist ideas, originating mainly from Spain, 
and brought into Mexico by Spanish immigrants who arrived with the migration 
waves of the turn of the century.29
I n t e l l e c t u a l s  a n d  D ip l o m a t s
In spite of the political ups and downs of the diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, there existed a continuous cultural exchange that may have set the stage for 
the subsequent Mexican involvement in the Spanish Civil War. Although it is not the 
aim of this chapter to explore in depth the nature of these contacts, it may well be 
worth refer to some of these relationships in order to appreciate the extent by which 
personal contacts translated subsequently into institutional commitments.
Friendship and close liaisons between Spanish and Mexican prominent figures 
in the cultural and political domains have been proverbial. To the friendship between 
Obregon and Valle Inclan may well be added those of Calles and Alvarez del Vayo or 
the almost symbiotic one between Manuel Azana and the Mexican writer Martin Luis 
Guzman, in the 1930s.30
Ever since the Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario launched the Modernist 
movement in the turn of the century, Latin American intellectuals were very well 
regarded as peers, rather than as exotic artists from remote regions. Thenceforth, 
several Latin American literati and artists had actively engaged in the debate of ideas 
and aesthetic renewal of the former metropolis. The Dominican essayist Pedro
29 See, among others, Colin Maclachlan, Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution. Berkeley, University 
of California, 1991; David Poole, Land and Liberty. Anarchist Influences in the Mexican Revolution, 
Sanday England, Cienfuegos, 1977; John M. Hart, Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class. (1860- 
1931), Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978. and James D. Cockroft, Intellectual Precursors o f the 
Mexican Revolution. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1968.
30 Exiled in Spain from 1925 to 1936. There, he worked as Azana’s private secretary, and directed two 
Spanish dailies El Sol and La Voz, to which he was a regular contributor. Guzman took the Spanish 
citizenship and functioned as an advisor without portfolio to Azana (1931-1933), carrying functions of 
liaison between Azana and the Spanish press. Guzman carried out, on direct instructions from Azana, 
secret missions such as supporting the Portuguese opposition of Alfonso Costa or trying to persuade 
Valle Inclan of accepting an official duty from the Republic. See Manuel Azana, Memorias politicos 
1931-1933, Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1992, pp. 84-85, 125-128 and 261. See also Cipriano Rivas Cheriff, 
Retrato de un desconocido. Vida de Manuel Azana. Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1979.
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Henriquez Urena (1884-1946) had the merit of bringing together several circles on 
both sides of the Atlantic and of solidifying such contacts.
Thus, as far as the Mexicans were concerned, it may be noted that a group of 
emigres had made their presence felt in the Iberian Peninsula from the late 1910s. 
Among them stood out the historian Carlos Pereyra, the writers Salvador Diaz Miron, 
Amado Nervo, Luis G. Urbina and Alfonso Reyes, as well as the magistrate Rodolfo 
Reyes; these two, offspring of the late General Reyes. From 1914 till 1919 Alfonso 
Reyes worked along with Americo Castro, Federico de Onls, Tomas Navarro Tomas 
and Ramon Menendez Pidal at the prestigious Centro de Estudios Historicos de 
Madrid, directed by the latter, and widely contributed to the Revista de Filologia 
Hispanica, published by that centre. Subsequently, Reyes helped the Republic in 
various instances, either as Ambassador to Argentina where he joined efforts by local 
Leftist and progressive organisations to raise funds for the Republic, or by lending 
support, both legal and financial, to the beleaguered Spanish Ambassador there, 
Enrique Perez Canedo. Last but not least, his main contribution to the Republic came 
when he convinced President Cardenas to give haven to Spanish intellectuals and 
open a centre for research for them in Mexico.31
Another worthy example is that of the poet Jaime Torres Bodet who after 
having served as a junior official in the Mexican Legation in Madrid in the late 
1920s, played a crucial role in the evacuation of Spanish refugees from French soil a 
decade later. As first Director-General of the UNESCO in 1948 Torres Bodet also 
contributed to the upkeep of the Republican cause by promoting several 
condemnations of the Francoist regime and boycotting its accession to the United 
Nations.
These expatriates would somehow prefigure the Spanish exile in Mexico, two 
decades later, in their active participation in Spanish culture. Their views would 
parallel the divide that would split the Spanish intellectuals along the lines of left and
31 This would be the origin of El Colegio de Mexico. See Chapter 4
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right. Hence, Pereyra and Rodolfo Reyes would remain in Spain and become 
prominent members of the Francoist intelligentsia.
On the other hand, the Mexican tradition of giving diplomatic posts to 
intellectuals and artists allowed several Mexican writers to establish close bonds with 
their Spanish counterparts. Weekly journals like Espana ox La Pluma and intellectual 
societies like the Ateneo of Madrid greatly contributed to this meeting of minds. 
Thus, for instance, Azana and his in law Rivas Cheriff developed a close friendship 
with Urbina as well as with the poet Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, who would later act 
as Minister of Mexico in Spain. Other cases worth mentioning include the historians 
Daniel Cosio Villegas and Silvio Zavala, the diplomat, Genaro Estrada and the 
painters Diego Rivera and David Alfaro Siqueiros, all of whom had, at one time or 
another, junior posts in the Mexican representation in Madrid, held grants or had 
special commissions from the Mexican government.
Unlike England, in the Latin world in general and in the Hispanic world in 
particular the intellectual has historically exerted a great influence. Such prestige has 
often resulted in the holding of high public office.33 Cultural Brahmins constituted 
the majority of the first Republican cabinet and a large segment of the Mexican 
diplomatic corps. Most of the future leaders of Mexico represented their country 
abroad at one time or another, and many of them were posted in Spain, or established 
contacts with Spanish diplomats. Familiarity between both groups was constant and 
productive. These associations would prove crucial in cementing a close relationship 
between Mexico and Spain in 1931, as shall be seen below.
Sp a in  a n d  t h e  M e x ic a n  R e v o l u t io n
During the 1920s, Spanish-Mexican relations were characterised by a reciprocal lack 
of understanding. Spanish diplomats regarded the Revolution’s triumphant faction, at 
best, with disdain, at worst, with horror. The contrast between the international
32 See, for instance, Juan F. Marichal, La sombra del poder. Intelectuales y  politica en Espana, 
Argentinay Mexico. Madrid, Cuademos para el Dialogo, 1975.
33 Let us recall in that sense recall the Presidencies of Romulo Gallegos in Venezuela (1947-1948) and 
Bartolome Mitre in Argentina (1862-1864).
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respectability earned by the Diaz regime and the ‘rustic parvenus’ which had seized 
power after the armed struggle was too much to swallow for Spanish Conservatives. 
Many of the Revolution’s main events came to be seen by Spanish Conservatives as 
nothing more than the pinnacle of Masonic and Protestant influence stemming from 
the United States. Furthermore, to many of these Conservatives Mexico, like the 
nascent Bolshevik Russia, was the foremost example of the threat to Catholicism 
posed by doctrines “alien to Hispanic tradition” such as communism or socialism. 
Hence, the Mexican Revolution came also to be seen as a menace to the very 
“spiritual unity” advocated by Conservative Hispanism.34
In several occasions, Spanish Liberals condemned too the novel nationalism 
that emerged from the revolutionary process. This nationalism combined elements of 
anti-clericalism, Indianism or the exaltation of the native element in detriment of the 
Spanish root, and American Liberalism; all three, abhorrent to Spanish traditionalists. 
Unsurprisingly those same three factors became the main arguments vented by 
Spanish Conservatives to reject the Mexican Revolution and to deny any legitimacy 
to the successive governments emanated from it. The second element was, for 
obvious reasons, equally repugnant to Spanish Liberals.
A celebrated case in point was that of the, then fashionable, Valencian novelist, 
Vicente Blasco Ibanez, who after having enjoyed the high regard and patronage of 
Obregon’s government went on to publish a series of articles for the American press, 
later collected as a single volume, in which he denounced the revolutionary clique as 
a gang of rowdy kleptomaniacs, prone to banditry and endless insurrection. Accurate 
as many of Blasco’s accusations may have been, a tone of Hispanist spite is present 
all along the book, especially when dealing with the nationalist sentiment promoted 
by the revolutionary elite, or their onslaught against Spanish interests through 
agrarian reform.35 Thus, true to form, several Spanish newsreaders, even those from 
Socialist or Liberal journals, began to consider whether the revolutionaries were
'Xfkindeed nothing more than a gang of bandits.
34 Frederick Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936. Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and their relations 
with Spanish America. London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. pp. 182-183.
35 Vicente Blasco Ibanez, El militarismo mejicano. Estudios publicados en los principales diarios de 
Estados Unidos. Valencia, Prometeo, 1921.
36 Frederick Pike, op.cit, p.l 12.
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Interestingly, a remarkable friendship developed in that period between Spanish 
writer, Ramon de Valle Inclan, and the Revolution’s new strongman, General Alvaro 
Obregon. During his second visit to Mexico, Valle Inclan had enthusiastic praise for 
the agrarian reform and openly lauded his friend Obregon. October 1921, for 
“opening a new way for America.”37 He also wrote about the General:
Free men like Madero and Obregon have made the Mexican Revolution. Men 
who felt the need to redeem the Indian, before the Indian felt the need to 
redeem himself.38
This did not help very much to counter the prejudiced opinions that were 
widespread, not only in Spain, but in much of the ‘civilized world’. Far from it, 
Valle-Inclan scandalized the Spanish Ambassador and community with his 
denunciations of the Gachupin and with his demonstrations of support for the 
Revolution.39
At that stage, the confiscation of Spanish-owned land estates by the 
government of Alvaro Obregon, made under the spirit of the agrarian law, which 
commenced to have effect in 1921, became the main point of friction in the bilateral 
relation. According to the then Spanish Ambassador, Luis Martinez de Irujo, 95% of 
all foreign-owned land holdings in Mexico belonged to Spaniards, making them 
highly vulnerable to forcible schemes of land redistribution.40 Although Martinez de 
Irujo acknowledged that the land seizures affected Spanish proprietors far less than 
their English or American counterparts he tried to stop land expropriations through 
all available channels, even by means of joint diplomatic pressure with other 
legations. Moreover, Alfonso XIII’s representative was prone to follow the lead of 
the United States government in demanding ample compensation for lands taken 
from its citizens. In some instances Madrid seemed to be even more intransigent than 
Washington was in pressing claims.
37 Hector Perea, op, cit., pp. 240-255.
38 Paulino Masip “Obregon, el presidente de Mejico, asesinado, visto por Valle-Inclan”, in Estampa, 
A l, Number 30, Madrid, July 24, 1928.
39 On Valle Inclan’s second visit to Mexico (the first one was in 1892) see Dru Dougherty “El 
segundo viaje a Mexico de Valle Inclan: Una embajada intelectual olvidada” in Cuademos 
Americanos, Vol. 223, 2, 1979.
40 AMAE, Legajo HI 659. Dispatch of the Spanish Legation in Mexico, October 25, 1921.
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This in turn produced an exacerbation of Hispano-phobia, which was put to use 
by various regional political bosses in order to advance their particular interests or 
simply to gain popularity among the masses. Public discourse became infected with 
xenophobic explanations of the evils suffered by Mexico. Attacks against Spanish 
properties and lives soon followed. There were land occupations, arbitrary 
detentions, harassment of all sorts, and, more gravely, kidnaps, rapes and murders. 
The Spaniard became the preferred scapegoat of many local politicians and caciques. 
In 1921 there were several attacks in places as diverse as Acapulco, Puebla, Yucatan 
or Coahuila. Representative of this mood were the wild declarations of candidate to 
the governorship of Coahuila, Aurelio Mijares, consigned by Martinez de Irujo in a 
dispatch to Madrid: “Our purpose is to kill all gachupines and take over their 
haciendas
As land distribution continued apace, the new Spanish Minister, Saavedra y 
Magdalena threatened to suspend official correspondence between his legation and 
the Mexican government. Obregon reacted swiftly and sharply to this menace, not 
only making the Spanish diplomat subject of “rude remarks”, but also threatening 
him with expulsion from Mexican territory.42
In the eyes of the Mexican government, Spain came to be identified as a force 
basically hostile to the national Revolution, as a country inclined to pursue, if it had 
the means, an interventionist policy similar to the one associated with its powerful 
northern neighbour. It was only in 1925 that a bilateral covenant to negotiate the 
Spanish colony’s claims could be signed. The calls for entitlement set forth were so 
great, that an adjournment for its compliance had to be re-negotiated in 1930.43 
Consequently, the Hispano-phobia that emerged after 1913 seems to have spread, not 
only among the popular masses but also among the governing circles.44
However, with the U.S. mounting again its pressure over Mexico, President 
elect Calles saw fit to start a rapprochement with Europe as a balance against
41 AMAE, Legajo H1659, memorandum, May 9, 1921.
42 AMAE, Saavedra y Magdalena to Ministry of State; transcript o f dispatch February 27, 1923.
43 The covenant was signed in Mexico City, on November 25, 1925, while the deferment of payments, 
on December 5, 1930. See Senado de la Republica, Tratados ratificados y  convenios ejecutivos 
celebrados por Mexico. Mexico, 1984.
44 Ricardo Perez Monfort, op.cit., pp. 32-33.
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mounting American pressure.45 In an effort to diversify Mexican external links Calles 
toured Europe in 1924 where he was officially welcomed in Berlin and Paris. 
Although this tour did not include Spain, every effort was made to intensify the 
bilateral link, as part of this strategy.
On that same year, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera appointed Jose Gil 
Delgado y Olazabal, Marquis of Bema, Plenipotentiary Minister in Mexico46 
Cooperation seems to have increased. This was the case especially in agricultural 
schemes where the introduction of pineapple and other tropical crops in Spain was 
reciprocated by technical advice from Spain to Mexican farmers 47 An increased 
trade between the two countries also took place during these years.
A curious instance of ‘Hispanic solidarity’ may have taken place on those days. 
Obregon was said to have sent Primo de Rivera a detachment of 200 Yaqui Indians 
after the “Disaster of Annual” to fight in the Riff War. According to these versions, 
these men saw action and were approvingly praised by their Spanish superiors for 
their “temerity and courage.”48
T h e  M e x ic a n  R e l ig io u s  C o n f l ic t  a n d  S p a in
Another source of dispute was certainly the relentless anti-clericalism espoused by 
the administrations of Obregon and Calles. The enactment of the 1917 Constitution, 
in its chapter concerning religion and Church-State relations brought about mounting 
friction between the government and the Catholic hierarchy. The question had been a 
thorny one ever since Juarez had declared the separation of Church and State and had 
brought about a radical secularisation with his Reform Laws of 1857.
45 Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y  el mundo. Historia de sus relaciones exteriores. Tomo VI. Mexico D.F. 
Senado de la Republica, 1991. 215 pp., p.73.
46 Ricardo Perez Monfort, op. cit., p.39.
47 Archivo Historico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Mexico (AHSRE) (exp. EMESP 566) 
1923-1924. Technology transfer included techniques for the industrial use of sesame seed, wine 
production and agreements of trade that included Mexican sales of cotton, tobacco, vanilla, chickpea, 
candles and sisal fibre and Spanish sales of wine, cork, conserves (exp. EMESP 974) and even fighting 
bulls, (exp. EMESP 757).
48 General Francisco L. Urquizo, an old Carrancista, self-exiled in Spain since 1920, first referred this 
episode. See his Obras Escogidas, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1987. Coleccion Letras
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In 1923 the confrontations reached a climax when Obregon expelled the 
apostolic nuncio Ernesto Filippi for having defied the prohibition on open-air 
religious acts. This was followed by the expulsion of several Catholic priests, most of 
whom were Spaniards, as a result of their participation in unauthorised religious acts, 
and on account of not being Mexican nationals, a condition prescribed by law. Far 
from of expressing its disapproval with the measure, the Spanish legation limited 
itself, in a dispatch sent to Madrid, to attribute the eviction to the resentment of the 
local clergymen against the higher instruction of Spanish priests and their 
“diaphanous” vocation for religious vows. The communication is also interesting 
insofar as it shows the unabashed racism and chauvinism of the Spanish envoys 
posted in Mexico before the advent of the Republic:
The Mexican clergy is mostly formed by Indians, with all the concomitant 
defects of that ignorant, degenerate race: ignorant, of doubtful morality, and, 
as all Indians apathetic, susceptible, envious and rebel to discipline.49
From 1926 to 1929, all religious services were suspended, and civil war broke 
out in Central Mexico between government troops and the Cristero peasants 
instigated by the Church.50 At its peak, the war engaged 50, 000 Cristero regulars. It 
is claimed that the war produced 90, 000 casualties on both sides.51 Predictably, the 
Mexican religious conflict appalled Spanish Catholics who saw in it a reversal of the 
‘civilizing mission’ that Spain had pursued in Mexico and left there as its most 
‘precious’ legacy.
The ‘godless’ Mexican government was to be repeatedly condemned in 
diplomatic dispatches by the Spanish emissary as “Bolshevising”, institutionalised 
banditry, not very differently from the way it was regarded by other governments at 
the time. The religious conflict aroused a great concern among Spanish
Mexicanas. pp. 1038-1042. A version of this story may also be found in Gutierre Tibon, Mexico en 
Europa, Mexico D.F., Editorial Posada, 1979, pp. 110-115.
49 AMAE Delgado y Olazabal to the Ministry of State; dispatch 29; Mexico February 28, 1926.
50 Graham Greene in his novel The Power and the Glory has acutely portrayed these events. Of course, 
being a Catholic, Greene displays an overt bias against the revolutionaries.
51 The standard work on the subject is, without doubt, Jean Meyer, La cristiada, (3 volumes) Mexico 
D.F., Siglo XXI, 1974.
52 See for instance, F. Ravie, Le Mexique Rouge. Paris G. Beauchesne, 1928; Francis McCullagh, Red 
Mexico. London, Brentano, 1928 or Francisco Gomez del Rey, The Black Czar, Plutarco Elias Calles, 
Bolshevik Dictator o f Mexico. El Paso Texas, El Diario del Paso, 1928.
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Conservatives, many of which saw in it a pre-figuration of things to come in Spain. 
The intensity of such feelings may be seen in the almost daily coverage of Mexican 
events afforded by Spanish newspapers at a time when Latin American news barely 
made the headlines. Moreover, the Spanish Catholic press utilised the Mexican 
religious conflict to indirectly criticise any political move aimed at secularisation or 
at the dis-establishment of the Catholic Church in Spain. Thus, for instance, at a rally 
“in defence of Mexican Catholicism, celebrated in Valencia, which was given wide 
coverage by Madrid’s press the speaker ominously rumbled:
Mexican persecution of Catholics represents for us a providential portend.
Our present tranquillity is nothing more than a pause. We, the Spanish
Catholics, must come together lest one day we shall weep like women that
53which the disgraced Mexicans could not defend like men.
Several masses and meetings of solidarity for the Mexican Catholics were held 
in various Spanish cities, while the Spanish press echoed in its polemics the 
conflicting positions between Catholics and secularists. In that sense, the Mexican 
religious conflict served the Spanish newspapers to reflect upon and debate over 
domestic issues, in a way similar to that by which Mexican newspapers would 
discuss Mexican problems through the prism of the Spanish War a decade later. 
Thus, for instance, all through the summer of 1926 Angel Herrera’s El Debate 
engaged in a controversy with El Liberal, in which the former urged “solidarity with 
our brothers of the New Spain”, while the latter justified an defended the conduct of 
the Calles administration.54
In addition, religious persecution meant more ominously for Hispanistas a 
surreptitious, yet deliberate, attempt by the “Protestant” United States to dilute 
whatever remained of Mexico’s Spanish identity as a prior step towards the complete 
takeover of that country. Therefore, defence of religion represented for Mexico, 
according to Hispanistas, the defence of its identity, the very same that the “Mother 
Country” had bequeathed four centuries ago:
53 El Debate, November 30, 1926.
54 Ricardo Perez Monfort, op. cit., pp. 45-46
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Two races contest one another in the New World for regional hegemony.
One is the Hispanic race, the other the Anglo-Saxon. Every breakthrough 
English language makes, by way of infiltration of an English expression into 
Spanish language, a legislative reform or a religious alteration; it means an 
Anglo-Saxon victory and a Hispanic defeat. Religion is the most prized 
bond between Spain and the Spanish-American Republics. Therefore to 
favour Protestantism or to persecute Catholicism amounts to an abjuration 
of Spanish-America. In Mexico-the Spanish-American nation more directly 
menaced by Americans, whose claw has already mutilated its territory- 
revolutions, which make possible American interventions, are 
commonplace. These revolutionaries victimized in the past the Spanish 
element, and now they persecute Catholics.55
Various Catholic organisations asked Primo de Rivera to use his good offices 
to bring to an end the acts of persecution and “barbarity” to which Christians were 
subjugated in Mexico.56 However, in spite of their anxieties, the Spanish government 
refrained from adopting any official stance, let alone making any kind of protest vis- 
a-vis the Mexican government. Spanish Ministry of State’s documentation evinces 
little sympathy for Cristeros, which as an “outgrowth of Mexican brigandage” could 
hardly be considered as a remedy to the original evils of revolutionary
en
governments. In any case, the Spanish government’s position regarding Mexico 
was less apocalyptic than that of Spanish Catholics, or for that matter, than the 
opinions of its own representative in Mexico. It may well have been that Primo de 
Rivera’s government did not want to agitate the waters of the bilateral relation when 
more compelling issues, such as the settlement of outstanding debts generated by 
land seizures, were at stake. The fact is that the diplomatic relation remained distant 
but away from open conflict.
Two major affairs drew the attention of Spanish press and diplomacy towards 
Mexico in an unprecedented way. The first was the assassination of President Elect 
Alvaro Obregon by a disgruntled Catholic in July 18, 1928 and the second was the 
Presidential Election of 1929, at which the renowned Hispanist intellectual and
55 El Debate, August 22, 1926.
56 Archivo General de la Nacion, Legajo 292, Presidencia de Gobiemo.
57 AMAE, Legajo 2564, oficio 52, March 15, 1927.
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former Minister of Education was robbed of an incumbency almost everybody held 
for certain, by the newly-created Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR).
Obregon’s assassination seemed to have taken everybody, including the 
Spanish Legation, which had anticipated trouble for the Presidential succession, off 
guard. The warlord had apparently succeeded in imposing his re-election in spite of 
the fact that non-re-election had been precisely one of the Mexican Revolution’s 
main tenets. On June 30, a fortnight before the assassination the Spanish Minister to 
Mexico, Manuel de Figuerola Marquis de Rialp, informed Madrid that:
Obregon’s inauguration will take place, for sure, without any hindrance and
58in a peaceful and routinely fashion.
A month later, with Calles frantically trying to stabilise a dire situation and the 
Obregonistas incensed over what they deemed as a scheme by Calles to become the 
revolution’s new strongman. Against that backdrop Rialp reported to Madrid:
The assassination of General Obregon may be considered the most severe 
political crisis that Mexico has experienced since the collapse of General 
Porfirio Diaz’s government. With Obregon disappears the leading military 
and political figure of Mexico, while his death represents the end of a stage 
of the Mexican Revolution that initiated with the assassination of Carranza.
Throughout this phase, Obregon was the soul and supreme arbiter of
59Mexican public life.
Once more, the Spanish Liberal and Catholic press became engaged in a 
controversy over the possible motivations of the slayer and over whether the Catholic 
Church had been behind the murder; an argument which only reflected their own 
differences within the Spanish political context. Thus while El Sol deplored the 
murder, it hinted at the Catholic rebels as its main culprits,60 El Debate and ABC 
rejected any connection between the assassination and the Catholic Church.61 
Furthermore, El Debate harshly remarked a day later:
58 AMAE, Dispatch 157, Marquis de Rialp to the Ministry of State. Mexico, June 30, 1928.
59 AMAE, Marquis de Rialp, summary of dispatch sent to the Ministry of State, July 31, 1928.
60 El Sol, July 20, 1928.
61 El Debate, July 19, 1928; ABC, July 20, 1928.
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Obregon has been murdered by the same reign of violence to which he
62contributed chiefly to engender.
This gave rise to an immediate retort from Liberal broadsheet, El Heraldo de 
Madrid, which not only rejected such a version of events but also obliquely 
condemned the apology of violence upheld by El Debate in a tirade that may also be 
read as premonitory of the attitude assumed by the Spanish Right precisely eight 
years later:
They preach law and order, when order is the one they want and when law is 
interpreted in a manner favourable to their interests. But whenever a power 
emerges which seeks to impose a different order of things, those same 
guardians of “order” surrender themselves, without hesitation, to all sorts of 
violence and recur to all sort of means, fanatizing the masses and infusing 
them with a spirit of vengeance and rancour.63
Both the Spanish Legation in Mexico and Catholics in Spain welcomed 
Vasconcelos’ entry into the contest for the Presidency as a salutary development for 
Mexico’s political future. Hispanistas had high hopes in a man whose anti- 
Americanism and whose advocacy of Hispanic values such as language, culture and 
religion were precisely their own. His offer to restore “liberty of conscience”, 
furthermore, had the effect of endearing him with the Spanish Catholic intelligentsia, 
which saw in him a beacon of hope that could put an end to “atheistic barbarity”. 
However, these very elements were highly pessimistic about Vasconcelos’ chances, 
precisely on account of his extreme Hispanism and Yankee-Phobia:
The mighty Republic of the North will never tolerate that a man who is not a 
marionette of Washington and of its Ambassador, Mr. Morrow, may 
conduct Mexico’s destinies.64
The Spanish Legation’s dispatches grew increasingly anti-Calles and pro- 
Vasconcelos. After the election the Spanish Legation cried foul in its confidential 
reports to Madrid, ascribing Vasconcelos’ defeat to the “apathy” of the Mexican 
people, a nation “without structure” and to Calles’ wicked impulses:
62 ibid. July 20, 1928.
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Ortiz Rubio (the PNR’s winning candidate) is nothing more than a tool in 
the hands of Calles. The latter is held to be the most nefarious figure in 
Mexican politics, and still more to Spanish interests as all of his political 
performance has distinguished for its hatred towards all things Spanish.65
It may also be a matter of speculation, whether Primo de Rivera’s corporate 
regime had any influence on the later creation of Calles’ National Revolutionary 
Party in 1929. Certainly, many Mexicans admired the dictator’s early steps towards 
economic modernisation and his gradualist approach reflected in his dealing with 
socialist trade unions, and may have attempted to emulate them.
H is p a n is m o  a n d  t h e  E x a l t a t io n  o f  t h e  In d ia n  b y  t h e  M e x ic a n  R e v o l u t io n
By 1921, Obregon had re-established a Ministry of Education with Jose Vasconcelos 
(1882-1959) as Minister. Vasconcelos was highly enthusiastic about the cultural 
aspects of the revolution, involving Mexican artists in the education of the country. 
He held to the thesis that the Indian should be “redeemed” and the masses educated. 
Therefore, beginning in 1921, rural schools, teachers’ training schools and cultural 
missions were developed. Amidst the great resurgence of national pride came the 
birth of a Mexican school of painters, the muralists, whose inspiration came directly 
from the Mexican popular scene. The nationalistic movement in painting left its 
imprint on market places, government buildings and other public spaces. Under that 
stimulus Mexican folk tunes and regional music came also widely into fashion.
The exaltation of the native element furthered by the governments of Obregon 
and Calles, known as Indigenismo, clashed directly with Hispanismo and accordingly 
brought about sour complaints by the Spanish diplomats posted in Mexico during the 
1920s and 30’s. This would be the case precisely with the Mexican muralist 
movement that extolled the virtues of the Indians while depicting the conquistadors 
as wretched, degenerate and syphilitic. In like manner, the school texts presented the 
conquest of Mexico by Spain as the main cause of Mexico’s backwardness, and the
63 El Heraldo de Madrid, July 21, 1928.
64 AMAE, Legajo 2565, Marquis de Rialp to Ministry of State, June 10, 1929.
65 AMAE, Legajo 2565, August 2, 1929.
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Spaniards as covetous brutes. These images would coincide in time with the 
assumption by the Primo de Rivera’s regime of the doctrine of Hispanismo.
The Spanish Minister, Marquis of Rialp, bitterly complained over the 
publication of “Hispano-phobic libel” edited by the Mexican Ministry of Education. 
The book in question was Los gobernantes de Mexico desde Agustln de Iturbide 
hasta el General Plutarco Ellas Calles written by a certain Roberto D. Fernandez.66 
The author went to great lengths to demonstrate how Spain had bequeathed Mexico 
its backwardness and poverty, while indulging in the old stereotype of the avaricious 
grocer in such passages as the following:
Manifold were the causes of Mexican independence: the example set by the 
United Sates, the principles proclaimed by the French Revolution and above 
all the hateful oppression imposed by 70, 0000 foreigners unto 7 million 
Mexicans. Oppression with no more bases other than the unfair privilege of 
having been bom in Spain.
Or:
Spaniards have succeeded in persuading our people ... that for the sale of 
kilos of 800 grams, metres of 90 centimetres, adulteration of basic utilities, 
manufacture of poisons called liquors...it is necessary to possess a very 
special technique. One, which may only be acquired in Spain.
The book called for the immediate expulsion of all Spaniards from Mexico as 
well as for the confiscation of their properties. Furthermore it demanded the 
prohibition of Spanish immigration and the barring of Mexican nationality to 
Spaniards as far as 1950. In spite of Rialp’s protestations, the book was still 
circulating massively in 1932, being distributed at schools, army garrisons and 
universities, with apparent “official connivance.” Fernandez was the leader of an 
obscure group of ultra-nationalists who called themselves Agrupacion Mexicana de 
Reintegration Economica. This organisation accused the Spanish colony of
66 Published in Saltillo, Coahuila by a publishing house jingoistically called “Cuauhtemoc”, as the last 
Aztec Emperor, with no date of publication.
67 Jose Maria Albinana, Espana bajo la dictadura Republicana (Cronica de un periodo putrefacto) 
Madrid, Imprenta El Financiero, 1932.
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dominating Mexican economy and, consequently, of exhausting the lot of the 
Mexican people.
According to Fernandez the spirit of exploitation animated the Spaniards, those 
“bloodthirsty leeches” to usurp Mexico’s wealth. Notwithstanding the Hispanistas’ 
claims, Fernandez’s opinions did not conform to those of Mexico’s mainstream. Far 
from that, the group went on to harass pro-Spanish journalists labelling them as 
‘black gachupines’ and even accused Calles and other leaders of the PNR of having 
‘sold out’ to the Spaniards and their wretched allies, the Catholic Church. The group 
became ever more outspoken in their belligerence, yet never conducted an actual
/TQ
attack on the community.
The steadfast Mexican Hispanista intelligentsia was quick to counter these 
Indigenista onslaughts. Eminent Mexican Hispanistas included the likes of Jose 
Vasconcelos, then Minister of Education, as well as such outstanding rightists as 
Alfonso Junco and Querido Moheno. Therefore, it came as no surprise that a work by 
the Catholic Hispanista, Jose Elguero, had appeared before long as an urgent 
vindication to the “spiritual homeland”. In a counter-pamphlet, Espana en los 
destinos de Mexico, the author called for a reappraisal of the Spanish cultural legacy 
in the presence of the American threat. Thus, for Elguero, an anti-Spanish Mexico 
would readily become a “Yankee Mexico.” The Spanish root was thus the chosen 
arm to oppose the real enemy: the United States, owing to the higher moral and 
cultural values of Hispanic civilization. Ultimately, this stance began to gain 
acceptance even among some Mexican left-wing intellectuals.
The decade closed with the Ibero-American Exhibition in Seville, inaugurated 
on May 10, 1929, to which Mexico, according to the otherwise hostile Spanish 
Catholic press: “duly attended as an obedient American daughter.”69 Previous 
diatribes against Mexico on account of the religious conflict gave way in the Spanish 
Conservative press to open praise for its cultural and industrial achievements, 
“gallantly” on display in its pavilion. As far as the bilateral relationship was
68 “La Embajada de Espana se queja de las calumnias e injurias a espanoles por la Agrupacion 
Reintegration Economica Mexicana de Veracruz” AHSRE, III/ 243(46)9 and Archivo del Ministerio 
de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid (AMAE), leg. H2565, Informe del 17 de abril de 1929.
69 El Debate, May 12, 1929.
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concerned, official ties reached a low point in the turn of the decade, primarily due to 
the lack of settlement for Spanish claims arising from the Revolution. Many 
Spaniards had amassed enormous wealth and property during the Porfiriato, 
comprising vast amounts of real estate, large haciendas and industrial and 
commercial concerns. Much of this property had been damaged, plundered or 
destroyed during the long years of the conflict.70 And in spite of manifold bilateral 
efforts the two governments had been unable to satisfactorily resolve the resulting 
claims. Furthermore, the Spanish colony in Mexico in general was not well disposed 
towards the Revolution and continued to support openly opponents of the Mexican 
government, spawning a vicious circle of attacks to their properties and lives and 
attendant demands for compensation.71
The fall of Primo de Rivera would coincide with the end of the era of the 
warlords in Mexico, and with the emergence of the era of the institutions, as 
expressed with the creation of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR). Thus both 
countries embarked concurrently towards political transitions that would set them 
together, albeit briefly, through a close association not seen since colonial times.
70 Edith O’Shaugnessy, A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico. New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1916, pp.93-96, 176-178.
71 J. H. Plenn, Mexico Marches. Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill, 1939. pp. 68-69. For the endless list of 
claims see Archivo Historico de la Embajada de Espana en Mexico 1826-1939. Biblioteca Daniel 
Cosio Villegas, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico D.F. MP 142 Pt. Microfilm 141 (38).
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CHAPTER TWO 
MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH REPUBLICAN SPAIN 
PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR (1931-36)
In 1931 Mexico was very much an international pariah. Its revolutionary ill-fame 
ostracised it in a fashion similar to that of Soviet Russia. Both countries were often 
compared for their unruliness, anarchy and godlessness. The Revolution’s economic 
nationalism was often equated to communism by the Western press, while relations 
with the U.S. and Britain were markedly tense. Following the crisis of 1929, 
Hoover’s administration forced the repatriation of more than 300,000 Mexican 
workers.
Mexico had also strained relations with its southern neighbour Guatemala, 
where the extreme right dictatorship of Jorge Ubico held sway. Its Latin American 
counterparts-mostly presided by conservative govemments-regarded Mexico with 
suspicion and contempt. Relations with Peru and Venezuela had been suspended, 
while those with Argentina cooled to a minimum. In 1930, Mexico also severed 
diplomatic links with Communist Russia, because of Mexican Communist agitation 
among the peasantry and alleged Soviet meddling in a railway strike.1 Official ties 
with Spain had reached a low point in early 1931, primarily due to the Spanish claims 
arising from the Revolution. As will be remembered, Many Spaniards had 
accumulated great wealth and possessions, including vast amounts of real estate, 
large haciendas and business. Much of this property had been damaged or destroyed
1 Mexico was the first American country and the second western nation to establish diplomatic 
relations with Soviet Russia in 1924 when both the U.S. and many European powers still kept the 
Bolshevik regime quarantined. In 1926, Alexandra Kollontai was appointed as Ambassador to 
Mexico, giving motives to those in Washington whom regarded Mexico as too radical, or even leaning 
towards Communism Secretary of State Frank Kellogg is said to have pressed the Mexican 
government to suspend those links. In any case, Mexico would not renew those relations until 1943, 
under the instances of the U.S. See William Harrison Richardson, Mexico Through Russian Eyes, 
1806-1940. Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988 Hector Cardenas Las relaciones 
mexicano-sovieticas, Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1974. Lorenzo Meyer, op, cit., pp. 
135-37.
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during the long years of conflict,2 and the two governments had been unable to 
satisfactorily resolve the resulting claims.
After the municipal elections of February 1931 returned a sweeping victory for 
the Republican formula-forcing King Alfonso XIII to leave the country-the Mexican 
establishment, hitherto introspective, turned its attention towards Spain. The reaction 
of the Mexican government to the advent of the Republic was unusually enthusiastic 
given the practice of aloofness established by the Estrada Doctrine. Mexican 
Minister, Enrique Gonzalez Martinez was the first diplomatic envoy to approach 
President Niceto Alcala Zamora and transmit his country’s endorsement for the new 
government. On April 16, Mexico became the first country-together with Uruguay- 
to recognize the Republican regime.
The eagerness showed by the Mexican government in establishing a link with 
Madrid’s new regime did not come out of the blue. Such a swift and spirited reaction 
may well induce us to believe that the Mexican government had closely scrutinised 
events in Spain from August 1930, when the various anti-monarchist parties 
convened in San Sebastian. The friendship that many Mexican intellectuals, civil 
servants and diplomats had with the leaders of the Junta Revolucionaria, as well as 
their ideological associations, made Mexico take sides with them even before they 
secured power.
An episode of the time reveals the degree of involvement that Mexican officials 
were having in Spanish affairs. On December 12, 1930 the governmental troops of 
General Berenguer quashed an abortive revolt organised by the Republicans. As 
several prominent Republicans were arrested, Azana hid in Martin Luis Guzman’s 
house on Velazquez Street where Gonzalez Martinez readily offered him asylum at 
the Mexican Embassy. Azana declined for reasons not disclosed and went into 
further hiding just before the police raided Guzman’s residence. This episode shows 
the way the Embassy, and, by inference, the Mexican govemment-as Gonzalez 
Martinez could not act without the latter’s approval-were immersed in those events.
2 Edith O’Shaughnessy, A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico. New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1916. pp. 93-95 and 176-177.
3 Frank Sedwick, The Tragedy o f Manuel Azana and the Fate o f the Spanish Republic. Ohio, State 
University Press, 1963.
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From its onset, the Mexican political class showed a great appreciation for the 
Republic. The Spanish Republic came to be regarded by many as a vindication of the 
Mexican Revolution, following her example in the abolition of feudal privileges. A 
number of Mexican officials and trade unionists openly expressed their satisfaction 
with Spain’s political transformation. Their enthusiasm was reciprocated by similar 
declarations from their Spanish peers. This mutual regard was expressed by an added 
gesture of goodwill: the Spanish representation in Madrid was upgraded from 
Legation to Embassy by parliamentary decree. The Mexican government followed 
suit and took an identical step days later. This was far beyond a symbolic gesture. As 
Friedrich Schuler has recently observed:
Thirty-four nations had diplomatic relations with the Mexican government 
in 1935, but only eight of them had considered Mexico important enough to 
give their representation the rank of embassy. Seven belonged to American 
nations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Peru and the United 
States. Only the eighth belonged to a European country: the government of 
Republican Spain.4
Nearly all Mexican newspapers devoted their headlines to inform about the 
Republic’s proclamation and about the potential implications this event could have 
for Mexico. Right-wing newspapers, such as El Universal or Excelsior, while 
expressing a cautious optimism towards the new regime, preferred to devote their 
pages to the lot of the fallen royal family.5 King Alfonso Xffl’s abdication and his 
exile were presented as a noble and dignified gesture. Along with these reports, 
various editorials and articles written by renowned Mexican and Spanish writers tried 
to interpret events for the Mexican readers. Mexican government’s mouthpiece, El 
National, eulogised the Republic, sent special correspondents and sought the regular 
contributions of Spanish commentators, politicians and academics to include them in 
its pages.6
These views were amply matched. Many Spanish Republicans had always 
looked up to the Mexican Revolution with admiration, noting the close resemblance
4 Friedrich Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, p .33.
5 Excelsior, April 21-22, 1931.
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of problems and solutions between the two countries. Alvarez del Vayo described the 
Mexican government as “an example and a stimulus for today’s Spain.” Mimster of 
Justice, Fernando de los Rios had equal praise for the Mexican Revolution: “There is 
a great similarity between your revolution and ours. We are facing identical 
problems-agrarian, social religious and economic. I consider that the study I have
o
made of your laws will be very useful to me now.”
Spanish writer and diplomat Salvador de Madariaga (1886-1978), a life long 
Republican, was in Mexico during the proclamation of the Republic. He had arrived 
there as a visiting professor at Mexico’s National University and to head a technical 
mission of the League of Nations. Excelsior interviewed him about the recent 
developments in his country:
The triumph of the Republicans is a sanction against the errors of the 
monarchy. The restoration could have taken root in Spain had it bothered to 
create a prosperous agrarian class. Instead, the monarchy chose to rely on 
force. From beginning to end the reign of Don Alfonso has been a military 
reign. The Spanish revolution represents the latest endeavour through which 
Liberal Spain attempts to civilise, that is to de-militarise, public life. With 
this effort, it may be said, that the Spanish Nineteenth Century has finally 
been laid to rest.9
It is interesting to note how for Madariaga, the coming of the Republic meant 
ultimately Spain’s definitive accession to modernity, a theme that became recurrent 
among both Spanish and Mexicans liberals alike. The idea of two Spains gained wide 
acceptance in Mexico as a way of countering the Conservatives’ misappropriation of 
“eternal Spain.”
During and after the Revolution, Spanish heritage had become the rallying 
banner of the Mexican Right, which saw in it the origin of the privileges it aimed to
6 Editorials of El Nacional included the likes of Jose Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de Unamuno, Azorin, 
Luis de Zulueta, Manuel Azana, etc.
7 Salvador Novo, La vida en Mexico bajo la presidencia de Lazaro Cardenas, p.348.
8 Roberto Nunez y Dominguez, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
9 Excelsior, April 14, 1931.
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preserve. Conversely, for the revolutionaries, Spanish heritage represented everything 
they wanted to discard, namely religion and property. The two ideologically 
antagonistic “Mexicos” saw themselves and their adversaries through that prism. In 
this anti-thesis, the image of a Spain frozen in time was exaggerated by both camps 
in a somehow caricaturesque fashion.
In that sense, the coming of the Republic meant that for the first time Mexican 
leftists saw a Spain composed of men different to the conquerors, the grocers, the 
foremen or the landlords, facing similar problems and sharing their same 
expectations. This new Spain also afforded the Mexican Revolutionary government 
the opportunity of confronting the rightists on their own terms. Thereafter, the 
controversy would not be limited to rejecting or embracing the Spanish heritage 
wholesale, but to acting as heirs to one or another Spain. Altogether, the Mexican 
government and its supporters saw in the Republic the perfect occasion to reconcile 
itself with Spain without coming to terms with the heritage wielded by the 
traditionalists.
From his sojourn in Mexico, Madariaga also left us a portrayal of Mexican 
popular responses to the establishment of the Republic in his Memoirs:
Alfonso XIH’s message to the Spanish people and the news from Spain 
monopolised the front-pages of all newspapers, and more. They even 
relegated the presidential messages about Pan-Americanism to the bottom 
pages. The effervescence in Mexico was a case beyond belief: jostlings, 
frights and 50 wounded. However united our colony might be, it seemed 
that our people were grossly exaggerating. This, I told to Estrada, who 
confirmed the version nonetheless: there were: 50 injured at least, although 
none was Spanish.10
Indeed, there had been a row between Spanish Monarchists and Republicans 
outside the offices of the pro-Republican journal Espana Nueva, at Madero Street, 
smack in the middle of Mexico City’s downtown. Several Mexican citizens took 
sides with both groups, and it took police intervention to separate the
10 Salvador de Madariaga, Memorias (1931-1936), Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1974, pp. 244-245.
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troublemakers.11 The brawl showed how many Mexicans across the social divide 
were attracted to Spanish developments, and to what extent they became involved by 
them.
In Mexican official circles, the appearance of the Republic was seen as the 
dawning of a new era, signified by the birth of something that was perceived as 
kindred and dear. It seemed as if Spanish circumstances had come closer than ever to 
those of the American nations, and had drawn nearer to Mexican revolutionary 
sentiment. The Spanish Republic meant at last the implantation of a liberal and 
progressive regime, one that had been several times glimpsed since 1812, yet had 
never been able to unfold completely. It was the culmination of a revolutionary 
process, more than century old, full of setbacks, and the expression of the same 
aspirations and hopes contained in the transit followed by Mexico since its
1 9independence, through its Reform and Revolution.
Various Mexicans were also present in Spain at the time of the proclamation of 
the Republic. Of these, Roberto Nunez y Dominguez, correspondent of Excelsior in 
Spain, was an outstanding eyewitness of the change of regime in Spain, as he 
consigned what he saw in his book Como vi la Republica Espanola. His testimony is 
yet another source whence Mexican sentiment towards Spanish happenings may be 
inferred. Certainly a most engaging report as it bears witness to the metamorphosis 
experienced later by Excelsior before the Republic. Nunez described the euphoria in 
Madrid, after the April election results were announced, as epochal. The Mexican 
legation cast aside all diplomatic protocol and openly partook in the celebration. 
Mexican Minister, Enrique Gonzalez Martinez, confirmed his impressions on having
arrived in Spain at a time of historical shift: “This is one the most definitive moments
11of Spanish history, as Spain has finally reached modernity.”
Another privileged spectator of the historical transformation was the historian 
Silvio Zavala who had received a grant to carry on research at the Archivo de Indias 
at Seville, and who covered for El Nacional the debates of the Constituent Assembly.
11 Excelsior, April 15, 1931.
12 Felix F. Palavicini, ed., Mexico: Historia de su evolucion constructiva Mexico, Distribuidora 
Editorial Libro S. de R.L., 1945, Vol. IV.pp. 257-258.
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The projected Constitution generated considerable interest in Mexican political 
circles, where its conceptual resemblance in several articles to the 1917 Constitution 
was widely pondered. Special attention was paid to the chapters devoted to the 
disestablishment of the Church, agrarian reform, and individual guarantees. The 
incorporation of the writ of habeas corpus, or due process of law, which protected 
the rights of the individual against the excesses of the authority, produced self- 
conceited pride among many Mexican lawmakers, as it was considered a Mexican 
contribution to the individual rights.14
On June 6, 1931 Julio Alvarez del Vayo arrived in the Spagne at the port of 
Veracruz. A chronicle by an eyewitness describes rhetorically the reception given to 
Alvarez del Vayo:
All ships stationed at the port hoisted the red, yellow and purple flag. From 
prow to stem, pennants with the national colours of all countries were laid 
out. The 30th platoon commanded by General Durazo intoned the martial 
notes of the Riego Anthem.
Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jesus Silva Herzog, gave a speech on 
behalf of the Workers and Intellectuals Bloc, in which he stated that the 
representatives of Revolutionary Mexico, who were creating a new homeland, had 
gathered to greet him:
Those assembled here disagree with the existence of a privileged minority.
We consider that all peasants have a holy and indisputable right to a plot of 
land. We consider that all workers have rights and duties, as consecrated by 
the Constitution. This Mexico welcomes the first Ambassador of the 
Spanish people. These revolutionaries coincide with the aspirations of the 
Spanish people. Men are dissatisfied with the misappropriation by the 
privileged minorities, with the hoarding of land, with the exploitation of the 
working class.15
13 Roberto Nunez y Dominguez, Como vi la republica espanola. Pelicula impresionista, Mexico, 
Imprenta Mundial, 1933. pp. 78-80.
14 Though inherited from the Fueros de Aragon the Nineteenth Century Liberal jurist Mariano Otero 
rendered the habeas corpus in its modem sense. Silvio Zavala, Las proximas cortes espanolas, in El 
Nacional June 29, 1931.
15 El Nacional, June 7, 1931.
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Silva Herzog and Alvarez del Vayo had met before at the Soviet Union where 
Silva Herzog had been Ambassador. Years later, Alvarez defined his mission as one 
intended to put an end to a period of misunderstanding between “two people equally 
sensitive about personal bravery and equally jealous of their independence.”16 This 
was not a mission of mere protocol. The Mexican Revolution with its agrarian 
reforms, had affected the interests of Spaniards who had owned vast stretches of land 
that were expropriated under constitutional provisos to be distributed among the 
landless peasants. At the time of Alvarez del Vayo’s arrival there were three hundred 
unsettled claims, protests, deaths and a pervading tension between Madrid and 
Mexico. The end of his tenure apparently solved these grievances, while tensions
1 n
between both countries eased dramatically.
Thirteen days later he presented his credentials to Mexican President Pascual 
Ortiz Rubio. Ortiz Rubio expressed his “special satisfaction and genuine emotion” in 
welcoming the Republic’s envoy:
The congeniality between our peoples and governments, manifest in the 
upgrading of our respective representations, expresses, not the cold and 
affected acts of required diplomatic courtesy between nations, but rather 
deeper and more affectionate bonds. These sentiments are rooted both in the 
community of ideals shared by Mexico and the Spanish Republic and in the 
certitude that we are about to inaugurate a new era in the relationship 
between our two countries.18
Beyond the customary rhetoric implicit in all diplomatic practice it is worth 
noting the stress placed by Spanish and Mexican officials on class discourse, social 
emancipation and radical reform. In an era distinguished by counterrevolutionary 
discourse and practice, and even arrogant racist slur, these overtures carried 
significance far beyond mere effusion, and clearly reflect the identification both 
regimes shared. They, no doubt, differ sharply to those uttered by other coetaneous 
European diplomats posted in Mexico. A case in point is British Minister in Mexico, 
Owen O’Malley St. Clair’s words upon leaving his post which merit to be quoted at
16 Julio Alvarez del Vayo, The Last Optimist, London, 1970, p.202.
17 Ibid. p. 204.
18 Boletin Oficial de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores 56 no. 6 (1931) El Nacional, June 20, 1931
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length in order to illustrate, by way of contrast, the refreshing novelty that 
Republican diplomacy represented for Mexico:
Mexico City is a combination of the sinister and the meretricious. It 
represents a rather macabre answer to a problem biologically insoluble. I 
find it impossible to believe that the mingling of Spanish blood with the 
blood of the numerous tribes of degenerate Indians can make any permanent 
valuable contribution to humanity. For all the sunshine and glitter of their 
habitation the people of Mexico City seemed to me to have lost the 
innocence and beauty of animals without any prospects of learning to 
understand the life of the spirit, While therefore one could seem sympathise 
with their difficulties and with their somewhat jejune attempts to raise their 
standards of life and culture, it was with rather the same sense of escaped 
that I said good-bye to them as I experienced on terminating a journey 
through Russia in 1935.19
Long before the Spanish Civil War broke out, Spain, Russia and Mexico came 
to be likened negatively in the eyes of conservatives as exemplified by Pius XI’s
90definition of the three outcast nations as the “Red Triangle.” This paragon was 
replicated by left-wingers everywhere. A celebrated book of the time, lA  donde va el 
siglo? Rusia, Mejico, Espana, by Socialist ideologist, Teofilo Ortega, proposed that 
these three nations represented, in their respective paths, the avant-garde of social 
betterment and radical progress of the time. Ortega was careful to establish a parallel 
between Mexico and Spain and draw the line with Russia. Ultimately, the text aimed 
to set up an oft-repeated ‘third way’, a cliche that has been constantly sought after 
from Tito and the Non Aligned Movement to Blair.21 On March 28, 1934 the PNR’s 
candidate professed his faith in socialism and not in communism. Among the reasons 
he gave to found his beliefs he remarked:
The principal action of the Revolution’s new phase is the march of Mexico 
towards socialism, a movement which is equally distant of the anachronistic 
norms of classical liberalism and those of communism which has its field of 
experimentation in Russia. It dissociates itself from liberalism because this
19 PRO, FO 371, File 21472 A4932/10/26, O’Malley on board of HMS Acquitania, “report to 
London,” June 24, 1936.
20 John, Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope. The Secret History o f Pius XII. Middlesex, Penguin, 2000.
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was incapable of generating something other than exploitation of man by 
man. It dissociates itself equally, from communism, as it is not in the 
idiosyncrasy of our people the adoption of a system, which deprives it from
the integral enjoyment of its efforts, nor does it wish to substitute an
22individual employer with a State-employer.
The PNR think-tank that drafted the 1933 Six-Year Plan took good care to 
stress the unequivocally national nature of the Mexican way to socialism:
The Mexican Revolution progresses towards socialism a movement that 
draws away equally from the superannuated tenet of classic liberalism and 
from the norms of the communist experiment being made in Soviet Russia.
In fact, both regimes adjusted to the definition of socialism as characterised by 
H.G. Wells in the following terms:
The ordinary socialist of today is what is called a collectivist; he would 
allow a considerable amount of private property but put such affairs as
education, transport, mines, landowning, most mass production of staple
23articles and the like into the hands of a highly organised state.
Precisely those ideals were enshrined in both the Spanish and Mexican 
constitutions. For instance, Article 1 of the Spanish constitution proclaimed Spain to 
be a “Democratic Republic of Workers of all Classes.” Legislation over property 
contained in Article 44 of the Spanish Constitution meant a clear alteration of the 
classical principles of economic liberalism as it stated:
All the Nation’s wealth, whoever may be its owner, is subordinate to the 
interests of the national economy. Property of all sorts may be the object of 
forcible expropriation by cause of social utility through means of adequate 
indemnification. With the same requisites property may be socialised.
Public services and assets that affect common interest may be nationalised 
in those cases in which social need demands so. The State may intervene by 
law in the exploitation and coordination of enterprises whenever the
21 Teofilo Ortega, £Adonde va elsiglo? Rusia, Mexico, Espaha. Madrid, 1931.
22 Amaldo Cordova, La Revolucion en crisis. La aventura del maximato. Mexico, Cal y Arena, 1995, 
pp. 485-486.
23 H.G. Wells, Pocket History o f the World New York, Pocket Books Inc. 1941, pp. 330-333.
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rationalization of production and the interests of the national economy may 
dictate.24
In similar fashion, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution provided for the 
breaking up of big estates and endowment of the land to those who worked it, namely 
the peons. It also reaffirmed the old Spanish law that subsoil wealth is the property of 
the nation, a principle later invoked in the oil expropriations. Article 123 was in its 
time the most advanced labour legislation in the world. It established six-to eight- 
hour day, social security, minimum wage, and the right of labour to bargain 
collectively and strike. These measures predated both Roosevelt’s New Deal as well
9Sas the general trend to Keynesianism and Welfare State in the second post-war.
Without a doubt there were differences between both countries, yet the sense of 
identification between both administrations, albeit subjective, largely cemented a 
shared sense of purpose and identity. This may be the case of Spanish-Mexican 
identity in the 1930’s. Then, in spite of the obvious and perhaps abysmal differences 
between the two countries, let alone their political classes, both governments chose to 
draw a parallel between their social challenges and the solutions advanced to 
confront them. Thus the insistence of both administrations in stressing their identities 
should not be discarded as rhetorical, nor the parallels of both realities may be 
downplayed as too remote to hold. Coincidences in given spheres (i.e. agrarian 
reform, Church-State relations etc.) were too striking as to be ignored by both 
governing elites as well as by their respective societies. Mexico and Spain had 
shared 300 years of history and it was patently obvious that many of the social
96structures Mexico wanted to cast off had been bequeathed by Spanish domination. 
The legacy of authoritarianism, caste privileges and intolerance may not be easily 
disregarded by way of the particularities each society exhibited at the time.
Although certain regions in both countries had secured levels of relative 
development-such as Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain or Nuevo Leon and 
Veracruz in Mexico-many others remained trapped under semi-feudal modes of
24 Carlos M Rama, La crisis espanola del siglo XX, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1976, p.34.
25 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years o f Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth 
Century. London, Tauris, 1996. pp.55-56.
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production. Nearly 50% of the Spanish Economically Active Population was 
dedicated to agriculture. Only 25 % was engaged in industrial activities. Out of an 
active population of eleven million in 1936, two million might be named lower 
middle class (tradesmen or small artisans) four and a million agricultural workers,
97and about two to three million industrial workers or miners.
Among the agricultural regions, the north, the northeast and the coast along the 
Mediterranean to Valencia were covered with smallholdings long enough to support 
a family. The rest of agricultural Spain was undeveloped and poor:
Conditions in Andalusia and Extremadura were in 1936 very much the same
28as they had been since the Reconquista, or even the Romans.
Yet, it must be said that unlike Mexico, Spain was not a country were the 
latifundist phenomenon was pronounced, nor did the landed gentry or the clergy 
played any longer a decisive weight in the agrarian structure of property as in Eastern 
Europe. Thus, whereas in Mexico properties over 1,000 hectares represented 62% of 
the total in Spain they only amounted to 5%. Albeit restricted to a certain area, there 
was a latifundia problem nonetheless. Whereas 96% owned 47% of rural lands 3,5% 
possessed more than half of them.29 Braceros or land-less seasonal labourers were a 
common element in both countries.
According to the 1938 census Mexico had 16 million inhabitants. Of these, the 
economically active population was five million. Three and a half million or 70% 
were engaged in agricultural activities. The Mexican middle class accounted only for 
8-9% of the total population.30 It was still a rather small stratum, though an unusually 
influential one, not least because it included the liberal professions, journalists, 
doctors and lawyers. Finally, the challenge posed by the Spanish and the Mexican 
churches, both politically militant, and the liberal attempts in both countries to rid
26 See for instance, Barbara Stein, La herencia colonial en America Latina Mexico, Siglo XXI 
Editores, 1974.
27 Javier Tusell, Historia de Espana en el Siglo XX. II. La crisis en los arios treinta: Republica y  
Guerra Civil, p. 16.
28 Hugh Thomas, op. cit., 76-77.
29 Ibid. p. 19.
30 Anuario Estadistico, 1938. Mexico, DAPP/Direccion General de Estadistica, 1939. See also Luis 
Gonzalez, Los artifices del cardenismo. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1979. p.33.
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themselves of their encroachment, which has been amply studied elsewhere, is also a 
common feature shared by Mexico and Spain. As a Spanish sociologist has recently 
established:
The Socialist-Republican coalition of 1931-33 implemented a series of 
reforms in the fields of land ownership, labour affairs, and education, 
religious freedom and military organisation that entailed certain similitude 
or approach to the solutions and outlines that had been attempted in
Mexico. Thus, it is only logical that a current of sympathy and solidarity
31had developed among both countries’ cadres.
It is beyond the scope or purpose of this research to deal specifically with each 
one of the reforms in question, least of all to attempt to analyse them comparatively. 
Yet, it may be said that the longing for secularisation through education, land reform, 
a radical social legislation and a developmentalist approach were certainly the most 
striking among the various shared policies attempted by both revolutionary Mexico 
and “revolutionary” Spain.32 Ultimately, the very claim by both regimes to be 
deemed as “revolutionary” offers an additional affinity that may be cited as 
representative of this desire for renewed identity. In 1936, this coincidence deepened 
further as both the Popular Front and the Cardenas administration attempted to 
establish their own paths towards indigenous forms of left-wing reformism.33
A regrettable point of coincidence between the two regimes, particularly acute 
under Cardenas in Mexico, and in the period running from the Asturian Revolution to 
the formation of the Popular Front in Spain, was the use of radical violent language,
31 Manuel Ortuno Martinez, ‘Cardenas, Mexico y Espana’ in Leviatan, Revista de Hechos e Ideas No. 
6 1 II Epoca, Madrid, Inviemo de 1995. p. 140.
32 It is interesting to note how in spite the fact that the establishment of the Republic in 1931 had not 
come as a result of a violent overthrow, many Republican politicians of the time referred to that 
change of regime as “the Revolution.”
33 Both the Spanish Republic and the Mexican Revolutionary exhibit a degree of complexity that 
defies clear-cut definitions. While the Spanish Republic was progressive liberal, the weighty presence 
of the PSOE in the Popular Front coalition took many to label the alliance as socialistic and even as 
downright Communist. The same may be said of the PNR-PRM, a regime where Liberals coexisted 
with Marxists. This “guilt by association” heavily contributed to earn both regimes a reputation as 
consorters of Communism if not as patently communistic among Conservative circles and American 
policymakers, something they were far from being. See, Douglas Little, “Anti-Bolshevism and 
American Foreign Policy.” in American Quarterly, Volume 35, Issue 4 (Autumn, 1983), pp. 376-390.
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no doubt inspired by the then in vogue intoxication with Soviet Communism.34 Such 
usage often resulted provocative to other political formations and frequently made 
each government prey to red scares and far-fetched accusations levelled either by 
their domestic opponents or, more damningly, from abroad. Both Spain and Mexico 
were capitalist nations in the sense that private property, however contested, was 
prevalent and enshrined by law. In Spain the employment of inflamed Marxist 
rhetoric was evident in the PSOE’s left wing, where the likes of Largo Caballero, 
Luis Araquistain and Julio Alvarez del Vayo flung irresponsibly their visions of a 
Socialist Spain unto the political debate of the day. In Mexico, people like Lombardo 
Toledano, Mugica and Bassols were equally reckless in their expressions. This 
together with anti-clerical discourse in both countries had the effect of alienating 
important segments of their respective populations, such as the middle classes and 
the conservative peasantry, sections, which may had otherwise been amenable to 
their projects. The fact that middle classes in Spain were larger than in Mexico 
ultimately meant that the perils faced by the Republic as a result of the antagonism of 
these social groups posed a greater risk
To Mexican Liberals, the Republic represented the “new Spain,” a modem and 
cultured country governed by an enlightened generation, a salutary development as 
compared to the old, idolatrous and prudish Spain represented by Perez Galdos’ 
“Doha Perfecta” that stood for everything the Mexican revolutionaries abhorred, the 
“old Spain” with its hatred for freedom and its irrational attachment to the Church 
and the latifundium, the Spain of the gachupines and the mutinous generals, 
lampooned by Valle-Inclan.
To most progressive circles in Spanish America, the Republic’s arrival marked 
a major departure in their perceptions of Spain. Prior to the advent of the Republic, 
Spain had had an image as a backward and decadent country. After independence, the 
former Spanish and Portuguese colonies were for the first time open to other foreign 
influences. This produced in turn a systematic rejection of Spanish or Portuguese 
culture, which was deemed to be antiquated and authoritarian. Spanish-Americans 
tended to regard their former metropolis as fanatical, backward and even fully hostile
34 Diego Rivera ironically remarked, “Mexico is a bourgeois revolution with the language of Karl 
Marx.” Quoted by Frank L. Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 220
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to progress, and not having anything to teach them. There was a generalised feeling 
of disdain, among Spanish-Americans who regardless of their country of birth
-jc f
assumed it to be infinitely more advanced a progressive than Spain. In sum, Spam 
was accused of not having fully emerged from the era of inquisition. In their 
contempt for Spain Latin American upper classes turned to France as a cultural and 
fashionable role model-Paris became the intellectual capital of Latin America-, the 
middle classes reacted thinking Spain to be a fanatical country governed by priests, 
while the working classes hated it as a fulcrum of oppression. In general, Mexican 
liberals and leftists had been historically averse to:
The Spain of militarism, clergy and aristocracy. Precisely, the three
structures that in the life of independent Mexico had represented the
Spanish legacy.
After the Republic’s proclamation this view was radically altered as the visits 
of Spanish intellectuals and progressive politicians helped Mexicans to:
...identify with a progressive Spain, different from the traditional land of
Church and bullfighting.37
With the advent of the Republic Spain had begun to recapture some part of her 
lost cultural empire in the Americas. Students from Spanish America began 
frequenting Spanish universities again, instead of going as a matter of course to the 
Sorbonne. In fact, the ill-fated University City on the northwestern outskirts of 
Madrid had been conceived to attract a Spanish-American clientele.
Still, this sense of a shared identity was far from being homogeneous. In Spain 
itself, the identification with the Mexican Revolution seemed to be more pronounced 
among the Socialists than among the Liberals. Some Spanish Socialists like Luis 
Araquistain or Enrique Gomez Barrero were highly enthusiastic in their praise for the 
revolution as their regular contributions to El Sol, or the former’s 1928 volume on
35 Frederik Pike, op cit., p. 163
36 Octavio Paz, Las peras del Olmo, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1957. p. 136
37 Michael Alpert, A New International History o f the Spanish Civil War. London, Macmillan, 1994,
p.108
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the social movement attest.38 After the bloody suppression of the Asturian uprising 
this identity became stronger among Socialists, as exemplified by Antonio Ramos 
Oliveira, Chief editor of “£ / Socia listawho wrote in prison:
The battle of the Republicans to save the Republic has to be in Spain a 
repetition of the Mexican struggle. The Republic’s enemies are the same 
antagonists of the Mexican Revolution: the feudal landlord and the Catholic 
Church, the latter an ally of the latifundist and a latifundist herself. To 
vanquish the Church and the territorial bourgeoisie-in Mexico they were, 
literally, one and the same- General Calles availed himself of the 1917 
Constitution of Queretaro. With this Constitution, no more democratic or 
more revolutionary than the Spanish code, the Mexican democrats have 
defended their country from ecclesiastic piracy and Yankee voracity. But, 
where is our Calles? Could he be Azana in a new guise? A Calles without
the harshness of the Mexican. A cultured Calles, without the stubborn,
39energetic and peasant determination of the other.
Spanish Liberals were far more inclined than their Socialist counterparts to 
have reservations and misgivings with regards to the Mexican Revolution. Some 
liberals hailed the anticlerical features of the movement and had praise for the 1917 
Constitution that removed every vestige of clerical influence in the secular domain. 
However, others bitterly complained about the anti-Spanish attitude unleashed by the 
Revolution.
Whereas El Sol, Spain’s leading liberal journal, or Estampa consistently 
defended the revolution, other liberal publications such as Revista de Ambos Mundos 
or Cultura Hispanoamericana displayed an ill-concealed hostility against the 
Mexican social movement.
This animosity became more pronounced after the Presidential election of 
1929, when the official candidate, Pascual Ortiz Rubio defeated the charismatic Jose 
Vasconcelos amidst widespread allegations of fraud. Vasconcelos, who had toured
38 Luis Araquistain, La revolucion mejicana. Sus origenes, sus hombres, su obra. Madrid, Editorial 
Espana, 1930.
39 Antonio Ramos Oliveira, “La revolucion en Espana. Nuevos documentos y revelaciones.” (Ultimo 
capitulo del libro inedito “La revolucion de Octubre” escrito en la carcel.) In Revista Futuro Tomo III, 
no.5, June 1935. pp. 443-444.
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Spain a year earlier, winning the admiration of many Spanish Liberals, was regarded 
as the true standard-bearer of Spanish Liberalism in Mexican soil, owing to his 
enlightened views and “spiritualism.” The fact that Ortiz Rubio had won by an 
exorbitant margin confirmed in their eyes the accusations of ballot rigging and 
exposed the revolutionary regime as an autocracy. Ironically, Vasconcelos, 
embittered by his defeat, shifted ever since to the right, embracing wholeheartedly 
conservative Hispanism. Thus by the time the Republic was proclaimed, Vasconcelos 
had become one of its most tenacious Mexican antagonists.
For their part, Conservative newspapers such as El Debate or ABC, with far 
wider circulation than their Liberal competitors, were predictably disgusted by the 
Revolutionary government and vented consistent attacks against it. These papers also 
drew parallels between the Spanish Republic and the Mexican Revolutionary 
government, albeit for the wrong reasons. Hence, in May 1931, after the first draft of 
the Republican anti-clerical laws was presented at the Cortes, and several convents 
were burnt in Madrid, both papers seized the occasion to liken Spain to Mexico. El 
Debate headlined: “Here as in Mexico, the religious persecution has already 
started,”40 while ABC captioned: “The sectarian violence will take more lives here 
than in Mexico.”41
Some authors have noted that, either by omission or deliberately, Republican 
politicians failed to criticise or question the “peculiarities” of the Mexican 
democracy, and that unlike the Republic they set in motion in 1931 the Mexican 
revolutionary regime was far from being a representative democracy 42 In this sense, 
they argue, Republicans not only refrained from censuring the existence of an 
hegemonic party, that is the PNR, as undemocratic, many of them actually praised it 
as a way to end chaotic rule by warlords.
This, however, seems clearly to be a retrospective critique. In 1931 the PNR 
was only two years old and a far cry from the PRI that came to control all three 
branches of government, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, and rule virtually 
unopposed for over 70 years. In fact, its stability was then far from assured. Recent
40 El Debate, May 12, 1931.
41 ABC, May 12, 1931.
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scholarship suggests that Spanish Republicans themselves were not precisely all that 
“democratic” either. According to Tussell, Azana did not want to erect a legal 
framework for democracy, under which diverse political options could compete 
against each other, but rather a radical programme of transformation from above. A
sort of “despotism of freedom” or “sectarian Jacobinism” which resembled in many
ways what the PNR and its heir the PRM sought to impose in Mexico.43 In any case, 
it goes without saying that 1930s events should not be appraised through the prism of 
contemporary values. At the time, governments everywhere put a prime on stability 
rather than in democracy, and in this, both Spanish Republicans and Revolutionary 
Mexicans, were not very different from any other politicians of their time.
During his stay, Alvarez del Vayo toured all over Mexico, thoroughly studied 
the Mexican educational system and had praise for its reforms. On several occasions, 
he accompanied the Minister of Education, Narciso Bassols-who would later play a 
key role in Mexican aid to the Republic-in visits through various regions, being 
impressed by the achievements of the rural schools, teachers' colleges and cultural 
missions, which so much resembled the pedagogic missions set up by the Republic 44 
Alvarez del Vayo and Bassols would meet again years later representing their 
respective countries at the League of Nations, where they joined forces in 
condemning fascist aggression against Spain. The Embassy of Spain became a 
gathering place for many Mexican leaders, including diplomats Genaro Estrada, 
intellectuals Daniel Cosio Villegas and Jesus Silva Herzog and labour leader Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano. Alvarez del Vayo also became the friend of ex-President 
Plutarco Elias Calles and of the Minister of War and future president, Lazaro 
Cardenas.
42 See Jose Fuentes Mares, op. cit., pp. 143-144; and T.G. Powell, op. cit., pp. 45-46
a|c
Jacobinism understood as a form of radical elitist politics, in which an elite, possessed of true social 
and political knowledge believes itself entitled to obtain and hold political power in the name of the 
people. Jacobinism is also sometimes used to describe the practice of those who engage in nation- 
building, forging national homogeneity out of diverse peoples, without much regards to their consent 
Both definitions may also be seen as yet another parallel between the Mexican revolutionary regime 
and the Spanish Republican political class.
43 Javier Tusell, op. cit. pp. 94-95.
44 Salvador Novo, La vida en Mexico bajo la presidencia de Lazaro Cardenas. Mexico, Empresas 
Editoriales, 1957.
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In one of his private conversations with the Mexican strongman, Alvarez del 
Vayo noted that Calles kept in his library an issue of the Diario de Debates de las 
Cortes Constituyentes. According to Fuentes Mares when asked by Alvarez about the 
volume, Calles avowed that he considered its spirit to be “an example for the 
American democracies.” Alvarez del Vayo wondered: “if the circumstances and spirit 
of the Cadiz Cortes and the resulting influence of the Constitution of 1812 on the 
New World were being reproduced.”45
The Spanish Ambassador was a well-known and respected socialist politician 
and journalist whose articles were known to the Mexican educated public through the 
Mexican press. As may be recalled, Alvarez del Vayo would later become Minister 
of State during the Civil War years. From that position he would thank Mexico for its 
contribution to the Republic and often reminisce about his ‘Mexican days.’46 
Considering these transformations, it may well be said that Alvarez del Vayo 
instituted a new style for Spanish-American relations. All in all, as Fuentes Mares 
has noted on the early 1930s Mexico and Spain were to live an authentic 
honeymoon,47
The bilateral relation greatly improved owing much not only to personal 
sympathy between the Spanish Ambassador and Mexican officials, but also to an 
overall change of attitude of the Second Republic towards Mexico. In effect, the new 
Republic inaugurated an era of respect and equitable treatment of the Latin American 
republics, casting aside the paternalistic and patronizing approach of previous 
Spanish administrations towards their former colonies. In the opinion of a Spanish 
historian:
During the first two years of the Republic [Spanish Foreign Policy] aimed 
at a more realist policy towards Spanish America. Old demagogy was 
rejected, while an economical, cultural and political rapprochement was 
initiated-in the framework of the League of Nations-aiming at a plain of 
equality. Here too would political and ideological considerations prevail. A
45 Jose Fuentes Mares, op. cit. pp. 142-144.
46 See Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom’s Battle, London 1940.
47 Ibid, p. 145.
66
Mexican Relations with Republican Spain prior to the Civil War (1931-36)
more intense relationship developed with those republics that had 
democratic regimes-most particularly with Mexico.48
Republican mediation was crucial in putting an end to the bloody Chaco War 
between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-1936), and played a leading role in settling the 
Peruvian-Colombian dispute over the Leticia region (1933-1934). Concerning 
Mexico the change in diplomatic outlook reflected a fresh respect for national 
traditions, especially indigenous ones. Hence, a new discourse emerged with less 
reference to Spanish “superiority” and a disposition to understand rather than to 
impose judgments. This in turn led to a significant attenuation of Hispanophobia 
among Mexican Liberals.
The ideological affinity and mutual sympathy also translated into very practical 
results. Through Spanish sponsorship, Mexico entered the League of Nations in 
1931. The then Minister of State, Alejandro Lerroux appeared to have played a key 
role in that negotiation 49 Hence the idyll seemed to be bearing tangible fruits and had 
not only ideological significance. Mexico’s accession to the League gave it the 
opportunity of having its say heard beyond the traditional realm of Pan-American 
conferences where it had felt confined by American hegemony. At a first meeting of 
the Mexican and Spanish delegations to the League of Nations in Geneva, mutual 
signs of admiration and respect were exchanged. Emilio Portes Gil, first Mexican 
representative to the League, the Foreign Minister, Genaro Estrada, and the 
Ambassador to Madrid, Alberto Pani, composed the Mexican delegation. The 
Spanish commission included Alejandro Lerroux, Salvador de Madariaga and 
Manuel Pedroso. But not all were pleasantries and compliments. Deep-seated 
sensitivities and competing national prides could not disappear overnight. Portes Gil 
has given his rendition of that encounter in his memoirs where he describes a 
dialogue he had with Lerroux:
Lerroux: I congratulate Mexico for having accepted the invitation that was 
made to her to enter the League of Nations. My country has given a great
48 Ma. de los Angeles Egido Leon, La conception de la politico exterior durante la Segunda 
Republica. Madrid, UNED, 1987 pp. 620-621.
49 Daniel de la Pedraja, “La Admision de los Estados de America Latina en la Sociedad de las 
Naciones: El caso de Mexico” in Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Politico, number 57, UNAM, Mexico, 
July-September 1969.
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lesson of civility. In 72 hours and without bloodshed, we have passed from 
Monarchy to the Republic. This is not the case with other countries that had 
to sacrifice thousands of victims in order to change regime.
Portes Gil: I congratulate the Spanish Republic for such a transcendent step 
and for the fact that not a single a drop of blood had to be shed to perform 
it. Mexico may not boast such a thing. Yet, my country is proud of having 
shed so much blood, as this has proven beneficial to the fatherland, which 
has found thus its way to achieve its greatness and the reforms that the 
current degree of civilisation demands.
Portes Gil added that in a private conversation afterwards, he answered the 
repeated apologies of Lerroux, who thought he had offended his Mexican interlocutor 
with his remarks, by saying:
Let us hope that Spain shall not have to shed its blood to lay the 
foundations of the Republic, and may you secure the success that Mexico 
wishes you so the Republic may be ever more vigorous.50
It may have been that Portes Gil had prophetic vision; however it is more likely 
that his statement had been made out of nationalist spite, thus exhibiting the degree 
of mutual suspicion that still remained.
Another limit to the otherwise cordial rapprochement was seen in the rejection 
by Mexican lawmakers to the proposal to extend Spanish citizenship to all Spanish- 
Americans, passed by the Cortes in 1931. In Mexico, the law generated renewed 
controversy between conservatives and the government. In vogue nationalism made it 
difficult for the Mexican revolutionaries to swallow the proposal without losing face 
about their purported defence from foreign interference. It may be that the rejection 
had also much to do with that who advocated the decision and what they represented. 
Conservative Hispanistas, whose reasoning included historical and cultural affinities 
as well as utilitarian considerations, enthusiastically lauded the decision. For them, 
dual citizenship could become a barrier to American imperial intentions and the 
“Monroeism” of native Yankee-philes by creating a legal statute to the Ibero- 
American unity, that would be advantageous not only to the countries involved “but
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to the whole world.” It was true that the idea of a common Hispano-American 
citizenship could mean a boost to long sought cooperation and integration. Yet, the 
very arguments used by its propagandists of “a common historical destiny” or “the 
future of Hispanic spirit,” by implying a responsibility of the Peninsula over its 
former possessions smacked of tutelage.
Furthermore, the Mexican constitution excluded the possibility of dual 
citizenship; as a naturalized foreigner had to renounce its former citizenship, in order 
to obtain the Mexican nationality. It also prescribed the loss of Mexican citizenship 
on the acceptance of another nationality. Once approved by the Cortes, Hispano- 
American citizenship aroused diverse reactions. Some Latin American countries 
debated the principle in their legislatures and made it compatible with their own 
constitutions. The Mexican Congress, instead, refused categorically even to consider 
it.51
On July 1931, Alvarez del Vayo gave a lecture at the assembly hall of the 
University of Mexico about the political situation in Spain. Dr. Pedro de Alba, a 
celebrated Mexican humanist and director of the National Preparatory School, who 
would subsequently witness the outbreak of the Civil War itself, introduced him. At 
the conference, Alvarez once more drew parallels between the Mexican and Spanish 
challenges, and the way both administrations were tackling them. The Ambassador 
started his lecture making a brief recapitulation of what he literally dubbed the 
‘Spanish Revolution’. He denounced previous Spanish governments for having 
pursued a mediocre foreign policy, “submissive to the Great Powers whose 
benevolence they valued as a prerequisite for the perpetuation of the Monarchy.” 
This foreign policy-he said-had been equally responsible for “a rhetorical, stale and 
unbearable Hispanism that far from endearing the American republics had made 
them turn away with disgust.”52
50 Emilio Portes Gil, Quince afios de politico mexicana. Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1941. pp. 422-426.
51 In 1998 the Mexican Congress passed a law that acknowledged dual citizenship. For a full view of 
the 1931 debate on Hispano-American citizenship, see Ricardo Perez Montfort, “Mexico y Espana. 
Apuntes de una discusion sobre la ciudadania hispanoamericana en 1931” in La Jornada Semanal, 
Mexico D.F, June, 6, 1993.
52 See Julio Alvarez del Vayo, “La Republica en Espana” in El Nacional, July 18, 1931. For reactions 
to the lecture, see Jose Cordoba, “Alvarez del Vayo, conferencista” in El Nacional, July 20, 1931.
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Calles and Alvarez del Vayo developed a very close friendship, which certainly 
translated into closer bonds between the two countries. Fuentes Mares said about this 
mutual esteem that Alvarez felt for Calles “a respect that bordered on fascination.”53 
From the Spanish rightist perspective this friendship was frequently derided, as may 
be seen in a libel written by the leader of the Spanish Nationalist Party, Dr. Jose 
Maria Albinana:
A brother in law of Araquistain, Alvarez del Vayo (...) has been appointed 
as new Ambassador to Mejico (sic). Our diplomatic “prestige” progresses!
This character, a dimwit, is ridiculing Spain with the initiative of paying 
homage to Calles. Naturally! The time has come to pay back the pesetas 
that his brother in law swindled from him! Diplomacy has its secrets, and I 
have revealed this one. If such a tribute takes place it shall be a disgrace for 
Spain.54
Alvarez’s relation with the Mexican political elite was largely determined by 
the admiration the Ambassador felt for the General and by Calles’ deference towards 
the Ambassador and the community represented by him. Other cabinet members such 
as the War Minister, Lazaro Cardenas or Foreign Minister, Jose Maria Puig 
Casauranc, took a keen interest in Spanish affairs and befriended the Ambassador. 
After his departure from Mexico, they corresponded regularly.
Owing to these associations and to the general rapprochement between 
governments that presided over them, several concessions were granted to Spain in 
what amounted to a most favoured country treatment. Thus, for instance, in 1932, 
under the patronage of Calles, the Mexican Federal Law of Employment-which 
limited the number of foreign employees in a Mexican enterprise to a 10% of the 
work force-was abrogated in cases that could affect Spanish workers. The move was 
taken in spite of the fact that domestic unemployment was very high. Alvarez del 
Vayo acknowledged this measure as a gesture of goodwill.55 So close was the official 
rapprochement between both countries that a dispatch sent by the Associated Press
53 Jose Fuentes Mares, op. cit. pp. 142-143.
54 Espana bajo la dictadura Republicana (Cronica de un periodo putrefacto) published in Madrid 
sometime around 1932. For a portrayal of Dr. Albinana and the activities of his proto-Fascist party 
consult Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana Sous la foi du serment, Paris, Flory, 1938 (2nd. edition).
55 AMAE, Alvarez del Vayo al Ministerio de Estado; despacho 41; Mexico, 10 de marzo de 1932.
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correspondent in Mexico City to syndicated newspapers worldwide remarked on the 
fact that:
The extreme nationalist propaganda furthered by anti-Spanish organisations 
has been waning under the sobering influence of the Mexican government.
The latter appears visibly pleased with last year’s events in Spain, which 
turned out in a change of regime, and has acted accordingly toning down 
the Hispano-phobic discourse it formerly seemed to have sanctioned.56
The new climate reflected the change of attitude of Spanish diplomacy towards 
the Mexican revolutionary government whose nationalist policies the Embassy came 
to respect. Past relations had been considered as interventionist by successive 
Mexican governments and this new approach offered a vivid contrast to them. The 
protests expressed by former Spanish Ambassadors to the government concerning 
muralist painters or the official school texts were made in a new and constructive 
fashion. Alvarez del Vayo proposed to erect a statue of Heman Cortes in Cuernavaca, 
something that amounted, then and now, to a national taboo in the Mexican psyche. 
Strangely enough, the Mexican government agreed to the scheme and offered to 
contribute to it. Nevertheless, the scheme would never materialize.
The relation seemed to achieve its symbolic peak, when Spanish President, 
Niceto Alcala Zamora, was officially invited by the Rodriguez government to visit 
Mexico. The Spanish President accepted the proposition and the news were greeted
* • 57with excitement, as no Spanish Head of State had ever paid a visit to Mexican soil. 
Despite the official acceptance no further talk of the state visit has since been found, 
either at the newspapers or the official documents of the time, thus depriving us from 
any explanation as to why the tour never took place.
Regardless, more tangible issues from the bilateral relation seemed to be 
bearing fruit. A major landmark came in 1933 when Alvarez del Vayo negotiated the 
sale of 15 Spanish vessels to Mexico. Under his competence an agreement was
56 Excelsior, December 24, 1932.
57 The same day El Nacional informed of the planned state visit, Alvarez del Vayo was interviewed on 
the subject. He declared: There is an enormous ideological interest within the intellectual and workers’ 
circles about Mexico. The same may be said concerning my government. As examples of these 
sentiments I should mention the current presence in Mexico of the Commission of Friendship and 
Study, and the future state visit of President Alcala Zamora. See El Nacional, November 12, 1932.
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signed for the construction of the vessels Durango, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, 
Queretaro, Zacatecas and other coast guard cutters with the Sociedad Espanola de 
Construction de Levante S.A. and the Astilleros de Valencia y Cadiz.58 The 
transaction would prove far more transcendent than it may have seemed at the time, 
for it would provide Cardenas with an invaluable pretext to justify subsequently the 
sale of arms to Spain. The intensity that the bilateral cooperation had reached may 
also be inferred by the fact that Prime Minister Azana seriously explored the 
possibility of acquiring concessions of Mexican petrol.59
Alvarez attempted to increase commerce between the two nations, 
notwithstanding the economic downturn caused by world crisis. Nevertheless, he did 
achieve some success in certain areas. In December 1932, prompted by Calles, 
Alvarez lobbied for, and secured an increase of chickpea purchases from Mexico. 
This proved a mutually beneficial arrangement, as chickpea, a legume shunned by 
Mexicans, was a staple in Spain. Producers in the northern states of Sinaloa and 
Sonora, who were entirely dependent on the Spanish market for the merchandising of 
their produce, saw their output soar. Mexico would go on providing up to 60% of 
Spanish chickpea consumption well up to the Republic’s demise. Mexico was Latin 
America’s third importer of Spanish goods, only behind Argentina and Chile, 
although only Spain’s fourth purveyor in the subcontinent. The trade balance was 
largely unfavourable to Mexico.60
When the Spanish community renewed its protests against the publication of 
books with anti-Spanish content, the Ambassador took a more enlightened approach 
than his predecessors did. Alvarez realised that the conservative Hispanismo as well 
as the ignorant prejudices of the Spanish community had done as much in harming 
bilateral relations as the Hispanophobic libels. The Ambassador tried to counter this, 
not by requesting the publications’ withdrawal to the Mexican authorities, but, rather, 
by asking the Spanish Foreign Ministry to send Spanish books to furnish libraries and
58 AHSRE EMESP. Legajos, 630-677.
59 Manuel Azana, Memorias Politicos 1931-1933, Mexico, Grijalbo, 1978 p.320.
60 In 1934, Mexico sold goods to Spain for a value of 4, 223, 000 pesetas, while it bought there 12, 
263, 000 pesetas. Although, seemingly negligible, it was the only Latin American country where the 
trade balance with Spain grew, avoiding the slump provoked by the world crisis. See Pike op, cit., p.4.
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public schools and thus improve Spain’s distorted image.61 In spite of his good 
offices, his success in this respect was very limited: only a mere 240 books seem to 
have arrived. Ultimately, his request would disappear in the labyrinths of Spanish 
bureaucracy.
Finally, during his tenure, Alvarez performed a successful diplomatic 
negotiation, when, through his intercession, Peru and Mexico re-established 
diplomatic links which had been broken since 1932, when Mexico granted political 
asylum to Raul Haya de la Torre, leader of the APRA.62 His overall record proved 
fruitful, as he truly improved the bilateral relation and laid the foundations for 
Mexican commitment to the Republic. Unfortunately, Alvarez had to leave his post 
prematurely, forced by the political change in his country on September 30, 1933. 
After his departure, Alvarez continued to correspond with Cardenas. Alvarez del 
Vayo later credited President Cardenas with saving him from arrest; he believed that 
the telegram that Cardenas sent him inviting him to his inauguration in Mexico City 
convinced the Spanish authorities that an arrest could have international 
repercussions.63
Back in Madrid, Alberto Pani, former Mexican Minister of Finance, presented 
his credentials as Ambassador to the Spanish president Niceto Alcala Zamora on 
August 13, 1931. At the ceremony, Pani also stressed the parallelism of the social 
challenges faced by both countries, and of the political approaches taken to solve 
them. More tellingly, perhaps, was the fact that both parts stated their will to 
recuperate the Carranza Doctrine of Hispanic solidarity against the U.S. growing 
influence in the Western Hemisphere. Thus while Pani stressed how “racial 
solidarity” together with ideological identity would conform the basis of a new 
rapprochement between Spain and its former colonies, Alcala Zamora defended the 
launching by the Republican government of an “American policy.”
For the first time (and I dare to say so) we have been able to have a foreign
policy, more concretely, an American policy that goes beyond verbosity
61 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (AMAE) Madrid Legajo R 950 Record 8.
62 Nuria Tabanera, La segunda Republica espanola y  Mexico (1931-1936) in Historia 16, January, 
1985. pp. 6-7.
63 Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Give Me Combat. Boston, Little Brown, 1973, p. 209.
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towards substance. An American policy that gives the people at the other 
side of the Atlantic the sensation not of supremacy that seeks to subject 
them to the yoke of an institution, which they had already shed. A policy 
that lying in the similarity of ideals, political formulas and of social 
structures will enable us to reach a fraternal association of Spanish 
nations.64
Diplomatic contacts at all levels intensified. On July 4, 1931 Azana, then War 
Minister, attended a reception at the Palace Hotel, organised by the Mexican military 
attache, Daniel Samuano Lopez, to honour a group of Mexican officials who had 
graduated successfully at the Spanish Military Academy. On that occasion Azana 
“conversed pleasantly” with Jaime Torres Bodet who would later play a key role in 
evacuating Republican refugees out of Spain.65 The event was not a rare one as 
Mexican officers had been sent to Spain to attend courses since the 1920s. Although 
both armies were diverse in origin and nature, relations between them were cordial. 
In 1930 a ceremony to honour General Millan Astray was held at the Mexican 
Legation, while in 1933 the Mexican government decorated several Spanish officials. 
An unconfirmed version suggests that shortly before the 1936 uprising, General 
Franco himself had been decorated at the Mexican Embassy.66
Pani imposed unto himself as a diplomatic duty, but above all as a personal 
interest, the daily assistance to the Cortes’ sessions in order to witness “the 
tournaments of eloquence and wisdom that gave shape to the Spanish Republic’s 
Constitution.”67 Pani declared his admiration for the high values of the Republican 
intelligentsia and his pleasure in hearing that “several times our constitution of 1917 
was cited with praise.”68 On one such occasion, on September 26, 1931, the Mexican 
Ambassador attended the Cortes as a guest of honour. It was not an auspicious 
occasion. The session that day had gone awry, and Pani had to endure stoically
64 Alberto Pani, Apuntes autobiograficos. Exclusivamente para mis hijos, Mexico, Editorial Stylo, 
1945. p.417.
65 Manuel Azana, Memoriaspoliticas 1931-1933, p. 15.
66 Mary Bingham de Urquidi, Misericordia en Madrid. Mexico, Bartolomeu Costa Amic Editor, 1975.
p.20.
67 Alberto Pani, op.cit, p.417
68 ibid. p.418.
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continuous interruptions and jeers from Rightist deputies to his Left Republican 
hosts.69
Pani left an interesting insight in his memoirs on what he deemed the 
impending threat of the old order against the new Spanish regime. In a revealing 
entry, Pani describes how he perceived in those parliamentarian sessions the extent to 
which the administrative machinery of the monarchy, together with the “intact 
strength of the olden blue-blooded families,” represented a burden for the 
government that reminded him of the unfortunate government of Madero:
Spain, after Alfonso M ’s flight, as Mexico after the Pact of Ciudad 
Juarez-toute proportion gardee-\eft unpaid, the toll of blood, wealth and 
suffering implied in the desired political change. The fact that political 
transformation was more sudden in Spain than it had been in Mexico made 
it reasonable to believe that the toll might rise to a point where it could not 
be paid.70
Once again, a Mexican politician attempted to draw a parallel between the 
short-lived democratic experience of 1913 Mexico and the fledging Spanish 
Republic, if only for fear that it could collapse in a similar and brutal way. In a later 
addition written ex post facto in 1945, Pani concluded that the combined strain of 
native conservative forces and foreign intervention had brought down both 
democratic projects.
Pani’s tenure was to be a brief one, as he was recalled to serve as Minister of 
Finance in the new cabinet of President Rodriguez. Genaro Estrada, former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, replaced him, showing the importance accorded by the Mexican 
government to the Spanish representation. Estrada was also the author of the doctrine 
of Non-Intervention, which bears his name. Mexican opponents to Cardenas would 
later invoke this doctrine to censure his aid to the Republic. Interestingly, this note 
would be conjured by Francoists at a later day to contest Mexico’s refusal to grant 
recognition to their regime.71
69 Manuel Azana, op, cit., pp. 186-187.
70 Alberto Pani, op.cit., pp.418-419.
71 “Cada pais puede adoptar la linea y  politica que prefiera ante un conflicto extemo, pero Mejico 
exagero y  ha exagerado su posicion desde el fin de la guerra civil hasta el punto de incurrir en el
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Estrada, who already enjoyed the recognition and respect of the Spanish 
intellectual milieu, pursued an intense editorial activity, initiating the Mexican 
Embassy’s publishing house. The concern was launched with the manifest intention 
of divulging Mexico’s image in Spain and countering the negative stereotypes 
generated during the Revolution. In only two years, 1933-1934, the Mexican 
Embassy published 12 volumes concerning subjects as diverse as art, bilateral trade,
79archaeology, Mexican history, literature and economy.
The close contact between the Mexican revolutionary elite and the Spanish 
Republicans is well illustrated by the intense correspondence exchanged by its 
leaders and the mutual counsel they dispensed to one another, particularly in 
moments of emergency. In December 1931, after a protracted strike of the Telephone 
Company by the CNT trades union, the Republican government considered the 
possibility of nationalizing without compensation the company, then in the hands of 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Calles sent several letters to the 
Spanish government advising the government to expropriate the foreign concern. The 
admonition not only prefigured the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938, but also 
symbolizes the shared ideological outlook of both regimes in what pertained to the 
relation between Labour and Capital, especially foreign-oriented one. Mexican and
7*3 f
Spanish trade unions also engaged in that correspondence. In the end, the Spanish 
Government recoiled before American diplomatic pressure.74
Another instance of close mutual consultation took place briefly after 
Sanjuijo’s failed uprising on August 1932. On that occasion, Calles went beyond 
diplomatic protocol and sent a message to Azana advising him that:
absurdo de (siendo un pais que reconoce la doctrina Estrada de no intervencion en los asuntos 
internos de otras naciones) reconocer, contra toda regia del derecho intemacional, a un gobiemo en 
el exilio”F emando Schwartz, La internacionalizacion de la guerra civil espanola. Barcelona, Ariel, 
1971, p.126.
72 El Universal, October 19, 1934.
73 Fundacion Pablo Iglesias. Madrid. Correspondencia entre Plutarco Elias Calles y Francisco Largo 
Caballero 1932; correspondencia CROM-UGT.
74 The Department of State was outraged and demanded Spain that Spain abandon the project. 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson likened the move to the Bolshevik takeover of power. The dispute 
dragged on for over a year, and Azana agreed to withdraw the confiscatory proposal only after 
Stimson threatened to sever diplomatic relations with Republican Spain. For a complete account of 
this episode, see Douglas Little, ‘Twenty Years of Turmoil: ITT, the State Department and Spain 
1924-1944.” in. Business History Review, 53 (1979), pp.449-472.
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If you wish to avoid bloodshed and to uphold the Republic have Sanjuijo
shot.75
Azana left the suggestion unheeded, and pardoned Sanjuijo. Four years later 
the General was to be prominent among the conspirators against the Republic. Such 
leniency alarmed recurrently the Mexican revolutionary establishment, which saw in 
it a sign of weakness rather than a sensitive and pragmatic approach. Undoubtedly, 
the precedent of Madero’s tragic downfall in 1910 weighed heavily in their fears. In 
his memoirs, Jesus Silva Herzog recalled later having been greatly troubled about the 
excessive magnanimity shown by the Republicans towards its enemies, and how, he 
felt, benevolence could cost them dearly.
The rapprochement between both governments became emotional due to a 
tragic episode. On June 1933 the airplane Cuatro Vientos piloted by Captain Mariano 
Barberan and Lt. Joaquin Collar left Seville in a mission of goodwill. The plane 
made a stop in Havana and was due to arrive to Mexico City, when all contact was 
lost. En route to the capital, the plane crashed somewhere at the Sierra Madre. An 
expedition was launched to rescue the ill-fated aircraft, awakening an emotional 
response from the Mexican public. Poems and scores were composed to honour the 
fallen pilots who were even compared to Columbus. Thousands of letters from 
people from all walks of life flooded the Spanish Embassy, expressing their 
sympathy. On July 16, 1933, a massive demonstration of gratitude to the people of 
Mexico took place in Madrid. Even unyielding Hispanistas would acknowledge that 
Mexico had confirmed their “affectionate love for Spain.”77 In September, President 
Abelardo Rodriguez bestowed the Aztec Eagle-Mexico’s supreme award to foreign 
nationals-posthumously on the two ill-fated aviators. For Fuentes Mares the tragedy
70
of the Cuatro Vientos marked the highest moment of Mexican Hispano-philia ever.
While such displays of emotion may now seem an irrelevant outburst of 
emotion, it must be remembered that this was the time of pioneering aviation when
75 Julio Alvarez del Vayo, The Last Optimist. London, Putnam, 1950. p.226.
76 Jesus Silva Herzog, Una vida en la vida de Mexico. Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1975, pp.165-166.
77 El Universal, July 19, 1933. For the Republican reaction to Mexican solidarity to the fallen pilots. 
See Manuel Azana, Diarios Robados 1932-1935. Barcelona, Critica-Grijalbo Mondadori, 1997. July 
16, 1933 entry, pp. 376-377.
78 Jose Fuentes Mares, op. cit. pp., 146-147.
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the “aces” were received as bearers of goodwill between nations. Let us recall, in that 
sense the emotions stirred by the expeditions of Lindbergh in the Spirit o f Saint 
Louis, Amelia Earhart, or the sensation caused by Ramon Franco in his voyage to 
South America. The fact that Franco had not included Mexico in his American tour
7Q *caused at the time tremendous disappointment. Hence the expectations the 
expedition had raised and the feeling of empathy its tragic outcome generated among 
peoples and governments.
It may be said that until then, Mexico had lacked an authentic foreign policy. 
Mexico had been virtually isolated from the world and its external relations had 
focused almost exclusively with its powerful northern neighbour. In that sense, 
Mexico was able, for the first time since Diaz, to counterbalance its key economic 
relationships with the United States and Great Britain with the development of 
important political and cultural links with Spain, and in a minor scale with France 
and Czechoslovakia.80
The Spanish- Mexican rapprochement, however, proved to be a brief 
honeymoon. Already at the 1933 election campaign, one Spanish rightist party 
widely distributed a poster showing a bloodstained Spain pierced by a spear on which 
the words Moscow and Mexico could be clearly read.81 With the defeat of the Liberal 
Republican formula in the election of 1933 relations between the two countries 
rapidly deteriorated. The shift toward conservatism in Madrid caused relations 
between Mexico and Spain to cool.
After their coming to power Spanish conservatives ceaselessly attacked Calles 
for his anti-clerical and allegedly left-wing policies. This introduced an element of 
strain into bilateral relations that had not previously existed. During the 1934-35 
period, Mexican diplomats bitterly complained over what they assumed to be a 
“campaign against Mexico” conducted by the Conservative press and the Spanish 
Catholic hierarchy. As Alpert has observed: “the Spanish Right used consistently 
Mexico, where anti-clericalism was even fiercer than in the mother country, as an
79 Frederick Pike, Hispanismo, op cit., pp. 132-133.
80 Friedrich Schuler, op cit. p. 139
81 “Ambassador of Mexico to Mexican Foreign Ministry.” Madrid, November 22, 1933. AHSRE III/ 
243 (72-46)72,111-125-42.
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example of the horrors of revolution.” In December 1934, Madrid’s Informaciones 
published an editorial warning Spaniards to be on guard against Communism lest 
Spain become “another Mexico.”83 When Mexican diplomats tried to get their 
versions of the religious conflict in Mexico published in Spanish papers they were 
unceremoniously turned down.
By an ironic coincidence, as Lerroux and Gil-Robles began to reverse the 
programmes of the Republic, Mexico elected President Cardenas, who planned to 
carry out many of the unfulfilled promises of the Mexican Revolution, many of 
which had existed largely on paper for more than a decade. As their policies 
diverged, the two governments became suspicious of each other and began to 
criticize each other’s policies. Relations were not to be friendly again until just before 
the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.
On April 1934, Lerroux appointed Domingo Barnes Salinas, who had served in 
his first government and Martinez Barrios’ as Minister of Public Instruction and Fine 
Arts, as new Ambassador. Little of his activities are known other than that he 
decorated some Mexican generals and that he travelled to Villahermosa, Tabasco, 
fief of the staunch anti-clerical Tomas Garrido Canabal to attend the Workers and 
Peasants Congress. Barnes also witnessed the 1934 election on which Cardenas was 
returned to the Presidency. According to his report, the election was the quietest that 
Mexico had witnessed in years. Notwithstanding, he reinstated the patronizing tone 
that had characterized many of his predecessors, by referring to the polls in the 
following terms:
The way elections are understood and practiced in Mexico is a thorough
85demonstration of how uncivilised these people are.
Barnes’ tenure was a short-lived assignment, as he left his commission on
or
October 1934, in protest at the repression that followed the Asturias insurrection. 
The post was vacant until March 1935, which meant that the inauguration of
82 Michael Alpert, A New International History o f the Spanish Civil War, p. 108.
83 Informaciones, December 12, 1934.
84 AHSRE, 111/514(46) (04)/l; 111-307-31.
85 AMAE, Legajo, R 965, Record 14.
86 El Universal, October, 7, 1934.
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Cardenas as President had to be attended by the Spanish Minister in Costa Rica, Luis 
Quer y Boule, as requested by Madrid’s Chancellery. This move utterly displeased 
the Mexican government, which took it as an outright snub. The Lerroux government 
then appointed Emiliano Iglesias Ambrosio, a Radical deputy, as Ambassador to 
Mexico.
Iglesias was a very discredited figure. He had been involved in a corruption 
scandal in 1931 when he offered Radical deputy, Jaume Simo Bofarull, 25, 000 
pesetas if he succeeded in getting his parliamentary group to turn a blind eye to Juan 
March’s illegal activities. March rewarded him with a payment of 200, 000 pesetas. 
As a result of these illegal activities the Spanish Cortes impeached him. Azana refers 
to Iglesias as a ‘barbarian’ an anti-Catalanist and a “rather asinine character.”87 It was 
rather an inauspicious appointment. To add injury to insult, the Lerroux government 
abruptly suspended the purchases of Mexican chickpea, which in its turn gave rise to 
numerous complaints by the Mexican press.88
During his stay in Mexico, Iglesias protested continuously against what he 
regarded as nationalist affronts against Spain. Official Mexican identification with 
Azana’s left liberal government made Mexico vulnerable to attacks from the Spanish 
Rightist press. Thus the Spanish Catholic press ended its truce and renewed its 
attacks against the ‘atheist’ Calles. Special hostility was reserved for the socialist 
education law, promoted by Bassols and enacted on July 1934. The law idealistically 
and candidly declared that the socialist school was to be “obligatory, free, co­
educational, integrative, progressive, scientific, cooperative, de-fanatizing, 
emancipating and nationalist.”89
For Spanish Catholics, instead, the law proved, beyond dispute, that Mexico 
had become the “first beach-head of International Marxism in Spanish America.” 
According to Razon y  Fe, a Spanish Jesuit periodical, Liberal democracy had 
engendered in Mexico its inherent offspring, ‘atheistic socialism’. Therefore, 
Mexico, having joined Russia as one of the ‘Satano-cracies’ of the world, had
87 Manuel Azana, Memorias pp. 268 and 273-277.
88 AMAE, Legajo R 962, Record 9.
89 Victoria Lemer’s, La educacion socialista en Mexico. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1979. is the 
classic study on socialist education.
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replaced religious instruction with sexual education in all schools. In due course, 
Mexican boys and girls bathed together in the nude in order to arouse their carnal 
appetites.90
In similar vein, the Mexican conservative press like Excelsior used the 
downfall of the Azana government to advance its domestic agenda. After the failed 
October Revolution in Asturias, the paper accused Azana of attempting to deliver 
Spain into “the clutches of International Communism and the Soviet Union.” Several 
editorials of October 1934 taunted the ‘Reds’ for trying to establish a ‘godless 
tyranny’ and for aiming to drown "immortal Spain’ into the bloodshed perpetrated by 
the ‘ignorant and resentful riffraff."
Meanwhile, Iglesias spent his days denouncing films with anti-Spanish content, 
and condemning school texts and books that indulged in the aforementioned 
stereotypes of “bloodthirsty conquerors” and the “greedy Spaniard.”
To make matters worse a scandal broke out when it was revealed that state 
schoolteachers received examination books containing questions unequivocally 
insulting to Spain. One question required pupils to discern correct statements among 
the following possible answers to form a list:
During their rule of Mexico the Spaniards (a) encouraged drunkenness
among Indians; (b) built roads to facilitate communications; (c) encouraged
robbery among the Indians; (d) put to use all sources of food production; or
(e) left the Indians in the most complete ignorance.
Another question stated:
For forty years the Spaniards murdered in America 15 million Indians.
Calculate the number of Indians killed per year.91
As was to be expected, Iglesias issued a heated official complaint to the 
Mexican Chancellery, in December 1935, about the contents of the public school 
primer. The note claimed that textbooks aroused hatred against Spain. Such a 
curriculum was “poisoning the minds of Mexican children, and predisposing them
90 Quoted by Frederik B. Pike, op cit., pp. 294-295.
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against the Spanish blood that lay at the root of their origins.”92 Despite such 
reproaches the new President, Lazaro Cardenas tried to maintain an amiable attitude 
towards Iglesias. Therefore, he was invited to attend the Mexican Congress and 
deliver a speech, which was cordially, if not enthusiastically, applauded.
Having been largely neglected by the successive Ambassadors during the so- 
called Two Black years the Spanish representation fell effectively under the control 
of the First Secretary Ramon Maria de Pujadas, who had been appointed by Barnes 
on September 1934. Pujadas revived the reactionary style and content that had been 
characteristic of the Monarchic diplomacy. He was mainly responsible for the reports 
sent to Madrid during that period. In spite of Quer y Boule’s presence Pujadas sent 
the report concerning Cardenas’ inauguration. The Spanish secretary remarked the 
absence of military in the new cabinet and drew attention to the presence of several 
Callistas in it, all of which confirmed, in his opinion, the continuity of the General’s 
patronage over the new government. The appointment of the frenzied anti-Clerical, 
Tomas Garrido Canabal, as Minister of Agriculture made Pujadas share the 
anxieties of the Mexican Right that the new government might unleash a new round 
of religious persecution:
Garrido Canabal’s inclusion in the cabinet bestows this government with a 
radical and intransigent character over religious affairs, given his well- 
known anti-Catholic inclinations, rabidly displayed during his long tenure 
as Governor of Tabasco.94
Pujadas identified Garrido as:
91 Excelsior, November 14, 1935 and December 10, 1935.
92 ‘Emiliano Iglesias a Eduardo Hay’, December 3, 1935, AHSRE, III/243 (46-72), AMAE, Legajo 
R962, exp. 9.
93 Leader of the regional Radical Socialist Party, Garrido rose to become Governor of Tabasco. From 
that position he aimed to socialize the State and drive the Church out of its bounds his laws on the 
Church were the strictest in Mexico. The number of churches that could function was drastically 
reduced. Begun in the name of fighting Catholic fanaticism, Garrido’s radicalism became in its turn a 
new fanaticism Extravagant decrees were passed. Priests had to be married in order to officiate, 
making it impossible for them to carry their religious duties legally. Public burnings of sacred images 
and saints became commonplace.
94 AMAE, Legajo R 962 , File 8.
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The brain behind of the so-called Red Shirts, a priest-baiting organisation
and one of the most exceptional upholders of socialist ideology within the
PNR.
To all appearances, Pujadas seemed to be correct in his appreciation as by early 
1935 a bloody confrontation between Catholics and Red Shirts in the southern suburb 
of Coyoacan, resulted in the killing of five churchgoers and one Red Shirt, tainting 
the new administration. In his New Year’s message, Cardenas accused clerical 
elements of plotting anti-patriotic schemes from abroad. The confrontations 
continued, and by early January the Red Shirts staged yet another altercation in 
Mexico City’s downtown. This time the government outlawed the demonstrations, 
and ordered the Red Shirts back to Tabasco.95
Pujadas notified his Ministry about the event as a Spanish citizen was among 
those murdered in Coyoacan. The charge d ’ affaires met with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Emilio Portes Gil, and demanded him a clarification of events and 
"punishment for whomever may be blamed."96 For Pujadas the new government was 
veering towards communism, as the administration was "fomenting strikes and 
agitation in accord with Russian radical elements.”97
On another dispatch he criticized the appointment of General Manuel Perez 
Trevino, as new Ambassador to Spain, in regard to his attacks against the Catholic 
Church while he deplored his unaccountable enrichment under the cover of the 
revolutionary governments.
Although Cardenas had declared an end to religious persecution, the Catholic 
press in Spain continued its attacks against the Mexican government, denouncing a 
recurrence of religious oppression.98 Nevertheless, in the light of those declarations,
95 As Minister of Agriculture, Garrido imported an ass and an ox, which he duly named Pope and 
Bishop, and displayed them in several cattle fairs across the Republic. His Red Shirts organised every 
weekend ‘cultural’ festivals, dubbed ‘Red Saturdays” at Mexico City’s Palace of Fine Arts, at which 
blasphemy and sacrilege were commonplace. At one of such events, the main speaker ‘challenged’ 
God to prove his power by throwing a beam to the building and although “the Almighty disdained the 
challenge, several Red Shirts left the theatre, lest the Inexistent may answer the dare”, Fernando 
Benitez, Lazaro Cardenas y  la Revolucion Mexicana. Vol. Ill El cardenismo. Mexico, Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1978. pp. 15-16.
96 AMAE, Legajo R 962, File 9.
97 AMAE, Legajo R 712, File 42.
98 El Debate, February 28, 1935.
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the Spanish government felt compelled to attempt a mediation between the Vatican 
and Mexico, which possessed no diplomatic links, through Pujadas and its 
Ambassador at the Holy See, Leandro Pita Romero." It is worth noting how the 
Rightist Government assumed a moral authority capable of bringing back ‘impious’ 
Mexico to the fold of the “Spanish family of nations.” Pujadas had an interview with 
Foreign Undersecretary, Ramon Beteta on the matter. Notwithstanding, Spanish good 
offices were snubbed by Mexican officialdom. According to a letter subsequently 
sent by Pujadas to Pita, the Mexican government wanted:
The complete submission of the Church to the State, thus making very 
remote the possibility of a rapprochement between the Mexican government 
and the Vatican.100
In the same letter Pujadas warned about the ominous implications for the 
Spanish community if the Spanish government insisted on the mediation.
From 1931 on Calles’ early radicalism had waned under American pressure. As 
he became the Revolution’s true boss, a succession of puppet Presidents was elected 
under his domination, abandoning many of the Revolution’s most radical goals. It is 
not altogether clear why Calles decided to select Cardenas as the PNR’s presidential 
candidate in 1934. Calles had expected Cardenas to submit meekly to his influence as 
his predecessors had done.
Alarmed by Cardenas policies and by his success at generating mass support 
among workers and agrarian labourers. Calles initiated a confrontation with the 
President. When an unprecedented series of workers’ strikes broke out throughout 
1935, the old General angrily protested against the government’s complacency with 
disorder and ‘unpatriotic’ industrial action. In subsequent declarations to the press, 
Calles condemned the divisions in Congress, the “marathon of radicalism” and the 
strikes disturbing the nation. Moreover, Calles slid the thinly disguised threat that the 
President could end as ignominiously as Ortiz Rubio, the pawn President that had 
succumbed under Calles supremacy, did.101 It was clearly a challenge. Beneath
99 AMAE, Legajo R 962, File 9.
100 AMAE, Legajo R 962, File 12.
101 Excelsior, June 12, 1935; El Universal, June 12, 1935.
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appearances, the anti-clerical provocations had been a stratagem by Calles, through 
his henchman Garrido, to discredit Cardenas and to make him clear who was really in 
control.102
Pujadas depicted the mounting split between Cardenas and Calles as a result of 
the new president’s “unabashed embrace of communism.” He pointed that Cardenas 
was weak and in no position to challenge the strongman’s dominion. The conflict 
evidenced the emergence of a rightist tendency, supported by Calles, which was 
opposed to the radicalism that Cardenas was conferring to his administration, 
particularly in the domains of education and labour relations. Pujadas defended 
Calles’ declarations as a note of “good sense and prudence in the face of the radical
1 A -l
excesses of the new President.”
As it is known, in the clash of wills, Cardenas leaned on the peasants and 
workers to force a final confrontation with Calles, purge the cabinet and Congress of 
Callistas, and expel him from the country in April 1936. Fellow politicians, Francisco 
Mugica, Gildardo Magana and Satumino Cedillo incited the new president to show 
his independence. For them as for others in the PNR, Calles’ words had become an 
illegitimate and menacing intrusion to the viability of the government. Accordingly, 
the government fomented strikes as a show of strength in order to discourage the old 
boss.
In February 1936, concurrently with the Popular Front electoral victory in 
Spain, Vicente Lombardo Toledano and Cardenas launched the Mexican Workers’ 
Confederation (CTM) a strong coalition of several trade unions that received support 
and financial backing from both the PNR and the Mexican government. 
Subsequently, Lombardo would often embarrass the government and Cardenas 
himself with his verbal incontinence. Such excesses had the effect of alarming the 
middle class and playing on their fears of a communist takeover.
102 Lorenzo Meyer has suggested that “the objective o f the Maximum Chief was to destabilize the new 
administration in order to prevent it from gaining the strength and confidence necessary to challenge 
him.” See Lorenzo Meyer, Los inicios de la institucionalizacion: La politica del Maximato. Mexico, 
El Colegio de Mexico, 1978. pp. 294-295.
103 AMAE, Legajo, R 962, File 9.
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Ironically, Calles had become in the eyes of many Mexicans Conservatives as 
well as Spanish rightists the sole guarantor of “law and order” against the 
radicalisation brought about by Cardenas. Calles was not silenced of course and from 
his exile in Texas he accused Cardenas of planning “to socialize the machinery of 
production, disregard property rights, and establish a collective system of agriculture 
similar to that of the Soviet Union.” Moreover, he warned, Communism would not 
work in Mexico.104 On March a new series of strikes impelled the Employers 
Confederation to issue a protest against the unruliness of the trade unions and to 
threaten a general lockout. Cardenas openly sided with the workers’ organisations 
and even threatened to let the workers seize the factories “if the entrepreneurs felt 
tired enough to continue.”105 Rumours about an imminent rightist coup, headed by 
Calles, grew to the day. Pujadas sent reports concerning these conflicts and assured 
its Ministry that:
At schools a systematic campaign is being completed to bring about
Communism. In the area of labour relations, Cardenas, far from appeasing
employers concerns, has openly scorned them.106
For Pujadas, a fresh realignment of Rightist forces under a new common front 
was distinctly taking place:
The expulsion of Calles has only reinforced Callismo, as it now represents
everything that is rebellious against General Cardenas and his government.
It is the landlord, the industrialist, the merchant, and the small saver, in
107sum, all of those who suffer the consequences of Mexican social policy.
By then, however, Spain itself was experiencing considerable agitation. On 
February 12, 1936, the Spanish election returned a precarious victory for the Popular 
Front, yet enough for the Leftist coalition to form a government. The result was 
greeted with unconcealed satisfaction by the Cardenas administration, which saw in it 
the arrival of a cognate regime and the renewal of the special relation of the early 
thirties.'
104 Jose C. Valades, Historia general de la Revolucion Mexicana. Tomo 9. Un Presidente Substitute). 
Mexico, SEP/ Ediciones Gemika, 1985.
105 Luis Gonzalez, Los dias del Presidente Cardenas. Mexico, Editorial Clio, 1997, p.62.
106 AMAE, Legajo 712, File 41.
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The new government’s envoy, Felix Gordon Ordas, arrived in May 1936, 
amidst the acclaim of the Mexican governing circles that had great expectations over 
the bilateral connection. They had good reasons to be optimistic as the new Popular 
Front government had as a priority the re-launching of the bilateral nexus, setting 
itself towards a greater cooperation. In his first declaration to the Mexican press 
Gordon made clear his government intentions and summarized what would be his 
tasks in Mexico:
We shall work intensely so the relations between Mexico and Spain grow
ever closer. We have the prime objective of implementing a free trade
108agreement. We shall clarify the true situation in the Iberian Republic.
In an era characterised by a staunch protectionism of the world trade, such an 
ambitious goal reflected the importance attached by Republican Spain to the 
development of preferential relationships with Mexico. If the Constitution of 1931 
had prescribed a “cultural expansion of Spain in Latin America” and the first 
Republican government had committed itself to extending full citizenship to all Latin 
Americans, the Popular Front aimed to endow with a new meaning the relationship 
with its former colonies by way of an increased economic association.
At his presentation of credentials before President Cardenas, Ambassador 
Gordon reiterated sentiments expressed five years before by Alvarez del Vayo. More 
than ever, he said, Mexico and Spain were linked together by common social 
philosophies and programmes:
Today, once again, we have parallel historical destinies. Both our nations 
are confronting the same challenges in a similarly dramatic way. In both our 
countries the same pressure of the masses is felt towards an increased social 
justice. Therefore, Republican Spain understands deeply Mexico’s 
monumental efforts to fulfil its historical destiny. It is only logical then, that 
the Spanish people and government fervently aspire that Mexico may
107 AMAE, Legajo R 962, File 9.
108 Excelsior, May 29, 1936.
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render into the most prosperous reality all the idealism of its generous 
• . •  109aspirations.
Cardenas response equally emphasized the ideological ties that bound together 
the two regimes:
I share your Excellency’s views about the mutual historical destiny that 
unites Mexico and Spain. This parallel now extends to a common social 
task, which I am sure will be effectively and promptly accomplished in both 
countries. Please express to your government, Mr. Ambassador, that 
Mexico understands and estimates its demonstrations of international 
cordiality, and that we will now and in the future strive to achieve in both 
nations a unity of objectives and actions that will serve our two peoples, 
who have joined permanently to seek the same solution to our social 
problems.110
Sadly for them, the Spanish Civil War broke out exactly 40 days later.
109 Felix Gordon Ordas, pp. 153-154.
1,0 ibid. p.155.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MEXICO AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. MATERIAL AID AND 
DIPLOMATIC SOLIDARITY
The Spanish Civil War attracted the attention of international public opinion in a way 
that was unmatched since the days of the First World War. Perhaps no other 
international event has stirred such an emotional response. This was even more 
pronounced in Latin America where the cultural and “racial” kinship meant that the 
war was felt even more passionately than elsewhere.1 Moreover, the Spain of the 
1930s appeared to Latin Americans as a mirror that reflected similar predicaments to 
those that unfolded in their respective societies. In addition, the fact that many had 
Spanish relatives or, at least, ancestry meant that no Spanish American country could 
allow itself to be unconcerned about Spanish events or feel alien to them. Spam was 
also the laboratory of a European civil war that in fact broke out only months after 
the demise of the Republic.
In Mexico the challenge to a radical reformist government posed by the 
military rebellion was felt even more deeply than in other Spanish American nations 
as it was only there that a revolutionary regime held sway. From its onset, working 
class organisations under the newly formed Mexican Workers’ Confederation (CTM) 
viewed the Spanish conflict with alarm fearing it might spread to the domestic front. 
Their concern was shared by the Cardenas administration, which felt, correctly, as 
time would prove, that Spanish events might give inspiration to local conservatives. 
The continuity and success of one regime necessarily would have an impact upon the 
other. More so as both countries were regarded as international outcasts.
1 See, for instance, “The Other Spains. Spanish America and the War” in The Times, August 24, 1937.
2 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey o f International Affairs 1937. Vol. II The International Repercussions o f  
the War in Spain. Oxford, University Press, 1938. pp. 210-211.
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In that sense, it may be said that Mexican diplomacy made Spanish affairs an 
integral part of domestic ones, insofar as the Republic’s survival was deemed 
essential to the unhampered continuity of the Mexican Revolution programme. But it 
would be inaccurate to assume that only the Mexican government reacted to the 
Spanish conflict. The Spanish war afforded Mexican Conservatives with the 
possibility of portraying the Spanish Republic as a red anti-Christian bastion, and 
thus, to play on the religious sentiments of the Mexican masses and upon the fears 
spawned by the Russian Revolution and by the Mexican Revolution itself, whose 
anti-clerical excesses were apparently being reproduced in Spain.
For many Mexicans, as for the rest of the Western world, the Spanish war was 
the ultimate battlefield where the mutually excluding principles of democracy and 
authoritarianism would settle their differences. For others it was a struggle between 
fascism and communism. For yet others, a conflict opposing Church and State, 
people and army, Republic versus dictatorship. The very complexity of the Spanish 
Republic facilitated the identification with the diverse colours of an ample spectre of 
ideologies and political stances. In that sense Mexicans of different political hues 
“appropriated” the Spanish war to push forward their own political agendas. As The 
Times’ correspondent in Mexico City noticed:
The Spanish War has seized and held firmly the imagination of the people of 
Mexico, even more than the American presidential election; and it is on 
Spain, rather than on Washington, that Mexico waits for an indication of her 
own political future.3
Another contemporary eyewitness, Evelyn Waugh, further developed this view:
The war in Spain was very much more real to them than any other piece of 
contemporary history; more real even than Roosevelt’s New Deal. They 
understood the Spanish issue in Spanish terms, without any English and 
French and American confusions, and felt strongly about it one way or the 
other. It was like part of their own lives.4
3 “Mexican Eyes on Spain. Temptations to Generals” in The Times, London, November 4, 1936.
4 Evelyn Waugh, Robbery Under Law. The Mexican Object-Lesson. London, 1939, pp.37-38.
90
Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. Material Aid and Diplomatic Solidarity
M e x ic o  in  t h e  e v e  o f  t h e  S p a n is h  C iv il  W a r . A  R e c a p it u l a t io n
Waugh’s statement accurately captures not only the Mexican response to the Spanish 
war, but the comparable effervescence Mexico was living in its wake; the domestic 
clashes which echoed those in Spain, and the deep polarity of the Mexican society; 
discrepancies that went well beyond the more obvious divide between left and right. 
In that sense, according to the Times’ Mexico City correspondent, beyond:
...the racial and cultural affinity of a former colony with its mother country the 
Mexican people feel themselves divided by the same rift of political opinion 
that has made a battlefield of Spain.5
When Cardenas became President, he inherited a situation that had been 
stabilized to some extent but still had explosive potential. Mexico’s political future 
was anything but certain. Some stability had been achieved in presidential succession 
since 1920. The creation of the PNR had secured elite cohesion and discipline. 
Furthermore, since the late 1920s the army had been increasingly professionalised 
and removed from direct intervention in politics. However, in 1934 the regime’s 
future was anything but certain, and few were aware that it was indeed, in the midst 
of a dangerous fracture.
At the PNR’s presidential nominating convention in 1933, an internal cleavage 
between party renovators and Conservatives had become apparent since its very 
opening. Whereas Calles himself had become increasingly conservative on issues 
such as land reform and labour militancy, other members of the revolutionary group 
concluded that the regime needed to move to the left.
In view of the growing conservatism displayed by the regime, or what seemed 
to many the exhaustion of the Revolution’s early promises, various party cadres 
sought a revitalization of the Mexican Revolution through Marxist ideology. This is 
not surprising in light of the prestige enjoyed then by the Soviet Union, and since 
Calles himself had also promoted experimentation along fascist and Soviet models, 
especially after the 1929 crisis.6 The appearance of a leftist wing in turn gave rise to
5 The Times, London,November 4, 1936.
6 Jose C. Valades, Historia general de la Revolucion Mexicana. Tomo 9. Un Presidente Substituto. 
Mexico, SEP/ Ediciones Gemika, 1985. pp. 18-30.
91
Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. Material Aid and Diplomatic Solidarity
the emergence of cliques within the party as early as 1930. The PNR itself was far 
from being a monolithic entity. Its origins lay as a coalition designed to articulate the 
competing demands of the diverse revolutionary factions within the regime. Still, the 
disagreements within the party came to the fore during the Convention.
The drafting of a Six-Year Plan, of clear Soviet echoes, became the 
battleground between supporters of the revolutionary status quo and those who 
sought to radicalise the process. At the Convention the leftist bloc succeeded in 
imposing its views upon the Callistas. Nowhere was this more clearly seen than in 
the realms of education and land reform. Among other resolutions, the congress 
agreed to reform Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution to provide for mandatory 
‘socialist” education in public schools.7 What the concept meant was far from clear 
even to those who postulated it. Nonetheless it clarified the necessity of renewing the 
revolution. Calles and Rodriguez tried to oppose the passing of the resolution by 
diverse means to no avail.
Two prominent cabinet members, Generals Lazaro Cardenas and Manuel Perez 
Trevino, Ministers of War and Interior respectively, emerged as the front-runners in 
the party’s candidacy. The former was identified with the party’s left while the latter 
represented distinctly its right wing. Ultimately, Calles anointed Cardenas as the 
party’s nominee, conceivably on account of his loyalty towards him, or, as has been 
suggested, because he had no relevant previous political history, and perhaps thought 
him easier to manipulate.8
The 1934 Presidential election confronted the PNR with a divided opposition 
both from the Left and the Right. The PCM regarded the leftist Cardenas as yet 
another stooge of Calles, and consequently fielded its own candidate, secretary- 
general, Heman Laborde. In this conclusion they seemed justified as a luminary of 
the regime’s left wing, Adalberto Tejeda, launched his own candidacy through the 
Partido Socialista de las Izquierdas.9 For Tejeda, like for other leftist veteran
7 Gilberto Bosques, The National Revolutionary Party o f Mexico and the Six Year Plan. Mexico, 
Partido Nacional Revolucionario, 1937.
8 Jose C. Valades, op. cit. pp. 109-110.
9 Tejeda’s PSI sprung from the radicalised agrarian communities of Puebla, Veracruz and Tabasco and 
reflected the discontent of many leftist revolutionaries with the regime’s shift to the right. See Romana 
Falcon, op. cit. pp. 134-137.
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revolutionaries Calles’ inner circle had experienced an attitude of ‘revolutionary 
regress’ since 1929, and the PNR ‘no longer represented the interests of workers and 
peasants.’10
In a like manner, the Mexican Right seemed incapable of settling its differences 
and fielding a single candidate. From his exile Vasconcelos advised his followers to 
abstain from the election so as not to legitimise the regime. Despite his admonitions, 
a sizable segment of the Right, mainly represented by the Anti-Reelectionist Party 
(PNA) and the so-called Confederation Revolucionaria de Partidos Independientes 
(CRPI), mobilised to contest the Presidency.11 A volatile coalition of discontented 
ex-revolutionaries, Catholics and ex-Cristeros, and open advocates of fascism, such 
as Diego Arenas Guzman, editor of the ultra-rightist tabloid El Hombre Libre, joined 
forces to pick a candidate.
The most outstanding figures in fray were Luis Cabrera, a former finance
minister, Gilberto Valenzuela, leader of the misnamed Partido Social Democratico,
1 0and the disaffected General Antonio I. Villarreal. After some initial wavering 
Cabrera declined the nomination, arguing that he saw no object in elections as long 
as Calles controlled the army and the bureaucracy. His decision engendered much 
animosity within the Rightist camp as Cabrera and Villarreal viciously exchanged 
accusations of collusion with the regime.
Ultimately, Villarreal organised his own party, and disowned the anti- 
reelectionists that had launched the candidacy of Roman Badillo. Unable to settle its 
differences the Right partook in the election with two separate nominees. Like the 
Vasconcelos campaign five years earlier, the opposition headed by Villarreal 
included many true-blue conservatives. Strange bedfellows, Catholics, ex-Cristeros, 
and displaced revolutionary veterans rallied behind the old revolutionary. Anxious to 
secure an entente with the government, the Church hierarchy distanced itself from the
10 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras I. Apuntes 1913-1940. Mexico, UNAM, 1972. p.229.
11 John W. Sherman, The Mexican Right, pp. 33-34.
12 Villarreal participated in the 1929 Gonzalo Escobar revolt, closing chapter of Mexican military 
intervention in national politics. The government crushed the revolt with the support o f United States 
and by mobilising labour and agrarian forces. See, John W. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico. A Chronicle 
of the Revolution, 1919-1936. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1961. op. cit., pp. 218-263.
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coalition. Moreover, the failure of Vasconcelos to endorse the campaign further 
harmed its possibilities.
Gross disparity of forces and the ceaseless harassment of the rightist alliance by 
the PNR’s apparatus dominated the 1934 campaign. Widespread suspicion and the 
apathy generated by the electoral fraud of the 1929 election against Vasconcelos 
made up the rest by de-mobilising the electorate. The official count returned a 
landslide victory for the PNR with a dubious margin of 2,2 million for Cardenas, 
24,000 for Villarreal 16,000 for Tejeda and 1,118 for Laborde. There were the usual 
allegations of fraud, and there was talk that Villarreal would set off an uprising from 
Texas, but nothing came to pass.
Cardenas’ inauguration on November 30, 1934, took place less than two 
months after Spain’s Red October, which had left a deep impression in Mexican 
upper and middle classes. The strict censorship imposed by the Lerroux government 
during the state of emergency meant that Mexican newspapers could reproduce only 
the government’s reports, which were obviously damning to the revolutionaries. 
Moreover, the conservative press, favoured by the middle classes, added fuel through 
heated editorials that presented the revolutionaries as nun-rapists and priest-slayers. 
These strata saw with horror through the press and newsreels how a radicalised 
proletariat had ‘surrendered to homicidal excesses,’ no doubt encouraged by
I  *3
Moscow’s ‘sinister hand.’ Labour agitation and strikes at home, openly encouraged 
by the new President, portended for many a repetition of Spanish events in Mexico.
Their fears were compounded by the declared intentions of the new Mexican 
President. Antithetically, the Mexican government followed attentively events in 
Asturias regarding them as a struggle that would define the course of “popular 
sovereignty.”14
13 Several editorials of El Universal and Excelsior condemned the excesses of a general strike that had 
degenerated in an open insurrection. Reports of the hanging of 22 nuns by the rebels in Sama de 
Langreo , the purported binning of several convents, the proclamation of libertarian communism in 
several towns, and the attempted secession of Catalonia, among other events, must have been 
particularly shocking for the middle class readership of this dailies. See Excelsior and El Universal, 5- 
18 October 1934.
14 Moreover, The Mexican government requested the Lerroux government clemency for the Socialist 
trade-unionist and politician Ramon Gonzalez Pena, who had been sentenced to death following the 
1934 insurrection. For Mexican official reaction to the Asturian Revolution see, Felix Palavicini,
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Such outlook was not unusual given Cardenas’ political orientation. At his 
inaugural speech Cardenas announced that state intervention in the economy would 
be ‘greater, deeper and incessant.’ The new President proclaimed that he aspired to 
govern with the support of the people and for the popular masses: “I consider very 
difficult to realise the postulates of the Six-Year-Plan without the partnership of the 
organised, disciplined, and unified workers and peasants.” Cardenas also announced 
that his government would assume those tasks that “the private sector can not or does 
not wish to address.”
Cardenas avowed his will to resolve once and for all the agrarian question, 
particularly in those regions where the land endowment had been withheld. He 
expressed his concern over the deep divisions of the Mexican labour movement and 
exhorted the workers to form a single front. Finally he called for the unity of the 
army with the popular masses in the different phases of the class struggle, hoping that 
it would be the source from which militias of a National Guard might spring, 
allowing the government to “eliminate the last bastion of the organised reaction 
represented by the white guards and the corrupt interests which they defend.”15
Following his words a general leftward move followed. Marxist rhetoric 
pervaded public discourse.16 Furthermore, the new cabinet included besides Bassols 
and Garrido Canabal several other radicals such as Juan de D. Bojorquez*, a fierce 
anti-Catholic, who was appointed Minister of Interior, Francisco Mugica, Minister of 
National Economy, and Ignacio Garcia Tellez, Minister of Education. The latter, 
declared that he would strive to “obliterate the Catholic Church,” inaugurated the 
First Congress of the Proletarian Child, an decreed that in all state-run schools the
17word Adios must be replaced by a “Salud, camarada.” For the key Labour 
Department Cardenas chose yet another self-proclaimed atheist, Silvano Barba 
Gonzalez.
Mexico. Historia de su Evolution Constructive. Mexico, Distribuidora Editorial del Libro S.de R.L., 
1945. p.261.
15 El National, December 2, 1934.
16 New York Times, March 20, 1935 “The rhetoric o f President Cardenas is the language of 
proletarian revolution, official speeches abound in the phraseology o f  class struggle, while the 
bookstores’ windows are brim with Marxist literature.”
* “D” being an foolish attempt to conceal his middle name, Dios.
l7John W. Dulles, op. cit. p.626. Compare to similar undertakings in Spain in Hugh Thomas, op.cit., 
p.231.
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Thus, as in Spain, the irresponsible use of a radicalised rhetoric by certain
political actors generated an equally extremist response from its adversaries. The
intoxication with Marxist thought suffered by many of the PNR cadres was
comparable to the radicalisation experienced by the PSOE’s left wing. Such a
confusion brought about a ‘red scare’ among Mexican conservatives comparable to
1 &that which had drove their Spanish peers to insurrection. A deep polarisation would 
be the dominant note of Cardenas’ tenure.
To make parallelisms worse, religious persecution began anew. On May 10, 
1934 the Red Shirts desecrated the San Francisco temple in Mexico City, precisely 
three years after the first church burnings and anticlerical mob violence in Spain. As 
in Spain, Mexican police turned a blind eye on incidents without intervening. Many 
Mexicans consequently began to wonder if Cardenas was determined to unleash a 
leftist revolution similar to the one that had recently shaken Spain.19 The Red Shirts’ 
brutal antics must doubtless have reminded many Mexican Catholics of mob rule in 
Spain.
Furthermore, reform of article 3 of the Mexican Constitution ruled mandatory 
socialist education in state schools. This, together with a previous law that ordered 
the closure of parochial schools, infuriated Catholics. The bill was precipitately 
debated and passed by Congress on October 1934, instantly becoming a divisive 
issue, even within the PNR.20
The amendment served only to aggravate large sectors of the population, which 
in its great majority ignored the meaning of the word socialism, yet feared it 
nonetheless. The vagueness of the reformed law reflected the differences even among 
the party’s leftist circles, between those who proposed a “Mexican socialism” and 
those who aspired to conform to the Marxist doctrine. Such ideological minutiae 
were beyond the grasp of the traditional sectors of Mexican society, which of course
18 For a conservative perspective on Cardenista policies see, Carlos Alvear Acevedo, Lazaro 
Cardenas: El Hombrey elMito. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1961. Chapter Five.
19ibid. p.630.
20 The reformed article stated that only the State was allowed to provide elementary and secondary 
education. Moreover, the education imparted by the State was to be ‘socialist’ and would exclude any 
kind of religious doctrine. Finally, the new education “will combat fanaticism and prejudice, 
organising its teachings and activities in such fashion that youth may acquire a rational and precise 
notion o f the universe and social life."
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became alarmed at what they regarded as the communist indoctrination of their 
children. In addition, the introduction of sexual education by the Ministry enraged 
parents who were led to believe that their children were being initiated into 
masturbation and other degenerate practices.21
Bishops condemned socialist education declaring it to be inimical to religion. 
Riots and demonstrations, often involving rampant violence, followed. Catholics 
revolted against socialist education in the central states of Jalisco, Guanajuato and 
Michoacan. Archbishop Pascual Diaz himself went to jail. In urban centres, droves 
of enraged parents rallied to calls of ‘Death to the PNR’s educational policy!’ Police 
and demonstrators clashed in Mexico City, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon and Zacatecas.
Parents’ associations readily fomented disturbances and school strikes. The law 
also triggered violence especially in the rural areas. Between September and 
December 1936 villagers murdered 37 rural teachers and wounded hundreds of 
others, often incited by local priests. Overall, between 1931 and 1940 at least 223 
rural teachers were the victims of violence.
The doctrine of socialist education was never fully explained or defined. The 
concept itself often became interchangeable with that of ‘rationalist education’ or 
‘modem school’ within the documents generated by the commission. Private and 
confessional schools were already in decline making the move totally incongruous 
beyond the logic of the PNR’s internal struggle.24
The new law had also the effect of reviving the Cristero movement that had 
plunged Mexico into a civil war a decade earlier. There was renewed fighting in 
Durango, Jalisco and Michoacan. Although it peaked in late 1935, the second 
Cristiada was even less successful than the preceding guerrilla war. Its failure owed 
much to the fact that the Church withheld support for the rebellion and forced its 
parishes to ignore the guerrillas completely. Besides, the army, equipped with
21 Alfonso Taracena, Historia Extraoficial de la Revolucion Mexicana. Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1972.
22 Eduardo J. Correa, El balance del cardenismo. Mexico, Talleres Linotipograficos Accion, 1941 
p.31.
23 The cruelty of the assaults was shocking, as educators were either maimed or died at the hands of 
lynch mobs. See John Sherman, The Mexican Right, p. 43
24 In Mexico City, to cite an instance, there were 48 private schools with 7,000 pupils as compared to 
599 state-run schools with over 200,000 students. See, Jose C. Valades, op. cit., p.69.
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modem technologies such as military aircraft and radio communications, was able to 
put down the rebellion swiftly. The insurrection, nonetheless, showed the potential 
for instability that the new government’s radical measures could foster.25
Again, as in Spain, religious discord became another source of instability in 
Mexico. A month after Cardenas’ inauguration, heavily armed Red Shirt thugs fired 
on Catholics as they left mass in Coyoacan. Five believers were killed and one Red 
Shirt died. Cardenas suppressed Red Shirt activity after Calles purging, with Garrido 
Canabal banished to Costa Rica for his loyalty to Calles during the PNR power 
stmggle. The Red Shirts were disbanded and sent back to Tabasco. Still, Cardenas 
public image became tarnished by Catholic accusations of persecution. The decision 
to do away with the Church’s influence in education, as an essential step toward 
creating a lay educational system, had been a major objective of the Republic since 
1931. Hence, as in Spain, the politics of education became a source of bitter 
divisiveness in Mexico.
After the suppression of the Cristeros, most conservatives concluded that any 
attempt at armed resistance was futile. However, widespread rejection of the 
revolutionary regime remained, adopting other forms. Catholic loathing of what it 
saw as the prelude to communist takeover in Mexico bred the organisation of 
Catholic movements, most notably the Union Nacional Sinarquista (1937) and the 
Partido Accion Nacional (1939), a name that had been used by Gil-Robles for the 
antecedent of CEDA. Former Central Bank Governor and National University 
Rector, Manuel Gomez Morin organised the new party, which, in due time, would 
become the most permanent opposition to the official party. The PAN set out from 
religious principle. The term “salvation” was applied lavishly in their documents to 
every aspect of social and economic life. Subsidiarity and corporatism were at the 
core of its doctrine. It was the first expression of Catholic organisation in a political
Ofkparty since the nineteenth century.
25 Jean Meyer, La Cristiada, I. La guerra de los Cristeros, Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1973. pp. 
353-381.
26 Soledad Loaeza, El Partido Accion Nacional, la larga marcha 1939-1994: la oposicion leal y  
partido de protesta. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1999. pp. 22-37 and 45-49.
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The radicalisation of Labour under Cardenas was yet another element that 
resembled Spanish events of 1934 and that, consequently, raised the alarm between 
the upper and middle classes. Encouraged by Cardenas, Mexican workers confronted 
management to obtain wage increases and improved working conditions.
In February 1936, the month of the Popular Front electoral victory in Spain, 
Marxist barrister, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, launched the Mexican Workers’ 
Confederation (CTM) with Cardenas’ blessing. The CTM charter condemned 
‘bourgeois society’ as one that led to fascism, and Lombardo invited Communist 
Party members to take high positions within the organisation. Moreover, Lombardo 
attempted repeatedly during the late 1930’s to obtain Cardenas’ consent to the 
creation of armed workers militias to defend the ‘conquests of revolution’ from a 
Franco-type fascist attack, the imminence of which he never tired of announcing. 
Still, Cardenas refused to do so undoubtedly restrained by the army’s opposition to 
Lombardo's design.27 Unsurprisingly, Lombardo became the most reviled figure in 
the eyes of the Mexican Right.
The number of strikes soared from 202 in 1934 to 675 in 1936.28 In that 
context, the tension that a general strike had provoked in the industrial town of 
Monterrey forced the President himself to appear there. Such disturbances echoed 
union violence during the brief Popular Front period in 1936 and consequently 
outraged the upper and middle classes. Chaos had helped to precipitate the civil war 
there, and few Mexicans were likely to forget that as long as Lombardo remained at 
the helm of the labour movement.
Another policy designed to attain social justice and bolster political support for 
the administration was land distribution. Like the encouragement of labour, however, 
it brought about discontent and opposition not only from the former large landlords 
and business interests but also from smallholders, which found it inimical to their 
interests. Cardenas allotted more land than all previous revolutionary presidents 
combined. Whereas from 1915 to 1934, the regime distributed less than eight million
27 Raquel Sosa, Los Codigos Ocultos del Cardenismo. Mexico D.F., Plaza y Valdes-UNAM, 1996. 
Albert Michaels, Mexican Politics and Nationalism pp. 203-204.
28 Joe Ashby, Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro Cardenas. Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1965. pp. 24-26. Jose C. Valades, op. cit., p. 182.
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hectares, Cardenas allotted over twenty million hectares in six years, more than twice 
as much as in the previous twenty years.29
In addition, the Mexican middle class and Catholics dreaded the rising 
prospects of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), which was restored to legality by 
Cardenas. Prior to 1934 the Mexican Communist Party had bleak prospects. The 
party had been proscribed in 1931. Mexico had broken its diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union and had imprisoned several Communist leaders. Calles deeply 
resented Soviet self-professed superiority over the Mexican Revolution: ‘The first 
social movement of the Twentieth Century.’
Their 1934 electoral slogan ‘Neither Calles nor Cardenas’ had left the 
Communists in the wilderness. As many, the Communists were convinced that 
Cardenas would be a mere puppet and that Calles would continue to dictate the 
regime’s policy.
Laborde shunned systematically all of Cardenas’ conciliatory overtures towards 
the party until 1935 when Soviet power decreed otherwise. At the Seventh Congress 
of the Communist International the chairmanship of George Dimitrov had expounded 
the Popular Front strategy. This called for anti-fascist unity to be extended to former 
enemies such as social democrats, liberals and democrats, irrespective of their 
ideologies and political beliefs in order to resist the advance of fascism. The end 
result of this strategy would be the formation of wide electoral and political alliances 
or ‘Popular Fronts.’30
Mexican Communists Laborde, Miguel A. Velasco and Jose Revueltas were 
present at that congress. All three endorsed the adoption of the new line and called 
for the creation of a Mexican Popular Front that would include all workers and
peasants organisations and chiefly the PNR to face the combined ‘challenge’ of
•  ^1 •imperialism, reaction, war and fascism. Internal concerns also played an important
role in the PCM’s espousal of the new line. The emergence in 1934 of an indigenous
29 Hector Aguilar Camin and Lorenzo Meyer, In the shadow o f the Mexican Revolution : 
Contemporary Mexican History, 1910-1989. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1993, pp. 142-144.
30 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991. London, Abacus, 1995 
pp. 147-148.
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fascist movement, the Camisas Doradas or Golden Shirts (sobriquet of Action 
Revolucionaria Mexicana, ARM), gave the PCM strong reasons to follow the path 
dictated by the Comintern.
A paramilitary organisation modelled after the German Brown Shirts and the 
Italian Black Shirts, its ideology was characterised by a strong anti-Semitism and 
anti-communism. Their principal activities consisted of strike-breaking and Jew 
baiting. By 1936 the group had grown so spectacularly that several prominent 
entrepreneurs and shopkeepers were willing to finance it. Concurrently, Nazi 
Germany, which had initiated subversive activities in Mexico, saw the need to 
subsidise the group through its legation. The Mexican government discovered also 
that Japanese agents gave clandestine alimonies to the group. Hence, the new 
Comintern line of popular frontism compelled the PCM towards collaboration with 
the PNR.
Embraced by Cardenas the PCM came to exert a considerable influence in his 
administration, particularly in the Ministries of Education and Communication. 
Under the Popular Front strategy adopted in 1936, the Mexican Communists played a 
major role in implementing the President’s pro-Republic policy during the Spanish 
Civil War. Still, Cardenas was able to keep his distance and maintain his 
independence vis-a-vis the PCM. Its mediocre leaders proved no match for his 
authority. Thus, in spite of the high offices awarded to them the party remained weak 
and was unable to secure a lasting growth. Yet few opponents of the Revolution 
grasped this and there was an exaggerated, yet real, concern about a possible 
Communist takeover of Mexico. Calles himself seized on these fears and encouraged 
them in order to discredit the President.33
All these elements combined to produce a background of considerable 
domestic upheaval. Against this setting, the Spanish Civil War broke out providing a
31 Partido Comunista Mexicano, La nueva politica del PCM. Mexico, Frente Cultural/ PCM, 1936, pp. 
8-22 .
32 Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front. The Battle of Europe versus America. Norman, University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1941. pp. 140-143.
33 Miguel A Velasco, “El partido comunista durante el periodo de Cardenas” in Gilberto Bosques et al, 
Cardenas. Mexico, 1975, p.38.
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focal point for all the rightist organisations to put aside their differences and 
challenge the government.
T h e  S p a n is h  W a r
The Spanish War had a profound impact on Mexican urban classes across the 
ideological spectre. In Mexico City, department stores’ windows exhibited gigantic 
maps of Spain, marking day by day with little flags and pins the breakthroughs of 
either Franco’s troops or Loyalist militias.34 In the cinemas, when the newsreels 
depicted scenes from the Spanish front, a storm of cheers and counter-cheers 
revealed the depth of feeling in the partisans of either side.
At the outbreak of Franco’s rebellion President Cardenas was engaged in one 
of his frequent working tours in the state of Coahuila. A strike by the electrician’s 
trade union had plunged Mexico City in an almost complete blackout, and the 
President had remained deliberately absent so as not to interfere with the solution of 
the industrial conflict. Upon his return to the capital, Cardenas remained silent, and 
no official position concerning the Spanish conflict was announced. The first official 
reaction to the uprising came from the governing PNR, which in a message declared 
its complete solidarity with the “socialist” Spanish government. Interestingly, the 
note drew a parallel between the Spanish situation and the military uprising that had 
brought down President Madero’s government in 1913. The message signed by the 
party’s president, Emilio Portes Gil stated that
The National Revolutionary Party, advocate of regimes identified with the 
working classes expresses its wish for the definitive consolidation of the 
Spanish Government at this moment when it is threatened by the disloyalty of 
the military. The democratic victory of a government, which threatens old 
privileges, would consummate the social reforms that unite our nations, 
intimately linked by historical destiny and by the struggle against every form 
of inhumane exploitation.36
34 Nestor Sanchez Hernandez, Un mexicano en la guerra de Espana. p.94.
35 The Times, London, November 4, 1936.
36 El Nacional, July 19, 1936.
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Aside from the PNR, the first organisations to react to Spanish events were the 
Mexican Communist Party (PCM) and the CTM. Barely a week after the war began 
the CTM organized a unitary demonstration on behalf of the Republic sent a 
communique to the Spanish UGT.
On behalf of Mexican proletariat, the CTM expresses its complete solidarity 
with the Spanish proletariat in this moment of trial and looks out for the 
definitive triumph of the oppressed “Spanish People.” The secretary-general 
of the CTM, Vicente Lombardo Toledano.37
Solidarity with the besieged Republic began to flow from the Mexican workers 
almost immediately. The Electricians Trade Union donated $1, 000 Mexican pesos to 
the Spanish Ambassador.38 Moreover, several trade unions sent a message of 
sympathy and friendship to their Spanish peers for their “magnificent feat against 
fascism” and accorded to donate a day’s wage to the Republican cause.39 That same 
week, there was a first talk of establishing of a Mexican leftist Popular Front and of 
arming the workers against the threat of fascism. At a later meeting, things seemed to 
get out of hand as some improvised orator spoke of the necessity of organizing armed 
militias as in Spain. Such displays provoked an immediate outcry from conservative 
organisations such as the Confederation de la Clase Media (CCM), or the Union 
Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolution (UNVRM).40 Still, the government 
remained silent about the Spanish crisis and only would react to specific questions 
when prompted by the press as will be seen below.
T h e  S p a n is h  E m b a s s y  in  M e x ic o
Felix Gordon Ordas, a veterinary by training, and a Radical Socialist by affiliation, 
who had served as Minister of Industry and Trade under Azafia’s third government, 
took charge of the Embassy. Upon landing his first task was to settle the uproar that
37 El Nacional, July 25, 1936.
38 Excelsior, July 22, 1936.
39 ABC, Madrid, August 13, 1936.
40 Hugh G. Campbell, La derecha radical en Mexico. Mexico, Sepsetentas, 1976, pp.128-125
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the bullfighters’ controversy had aroused between Mexico and Spain, which had 
degenerated in a boycott of Mexican bullfighters by Spanish toreros’.
The bullfighters’ strike derived from the great success that summer of two 
Mexican matadors who were fighting a mano a mano that year. Newspaper 
references suggesting that Mexicans were braver than Spaniards caused 
resentment and criticism of the large number of contracts gained by 
foreigners. Bullfighters therefore decided to strike until the authorities 
undertook to control the work contracts given to Mexicans.41
The dispute, jingoistically inflamed by the sensationalist press, provoked a new 
wave of Hispanophobia in Mexico with radical groups calling for an ejection of 
Spanish “undesirables” as a retaliation against discrimination of the Mexican 
bullfighters. At the insistence of Gordon, the new Spanish authorities tried to solve 
the problem, although little was accomplished. So, on the eve of the Civil War 
ancient antipathies and aggravating new issues threatened to disrupt the renewed 
cordiality between Republican Spain and Mexico.42
An excitable man, given to verbal excesses and mercurial reactions, Gordon 
soon won the animosity of the Spanish community and the conservative press 
through his outspokenness and imprudence. In fact, Powell suggests that he came 
very close to being removed for his incompetence, and hints that Cardenas himself 
asked for this withdrawal.43 Azana validates this conjecture in his War Memoirs 
stating that in 1938 the Council of State, without consulting Azana, had appointed 
Indalecio Prieto to replace him.44 Nonetheless, Gordon managed to remain as 
Ambassador throughout the war, taking part in crucial episodes, such as the arms 
purchases in the U.S., as will be seen later. In his defence it should be said that 
frequently he had to take initiatives and responsibilities unaided by the Republican 
bureaucracy which repeatedly left unheeded his ever more desperate requests. 
Cardenas often praised the Ambassador and distinguished him by inviting him as 
guest of honour to several official events. Gordon’s own testimony hints at a close 
relationship with Cardenas.
41 Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p. 166.
42 Felix Gordon Ordas, op. cit., pp. 141-147.
43 T.G. Powell, op. cit., p.56.
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As many other Republican diplomats, Gordon Ordas had to confront an internal 
revolt from his own staff and had to enforce his control over the Spanish Embassy. 
On July 29, First Secretary Pujadas attempted to question his authority and take over 
the Embassy backed up by dispatches from the Burgos Junta, which “dismissed” 
Gordon and appointed Pujadas as new Ambassador. As Gordon refused to hand on 
his investiture, Pujadas “transferred the Embassy’’ to his private address. Next, he 
turned up at the Foreign Ministry, presenting the dispatches he had received from the 
rebel zone in order to accredit himself before the Mexican government. A note from 
Pujadas accompanied the affidavit in which he stated:
I have the honour of informing His Excellency that a new Spanish government 
has been established in Burgos. The aforementioned government has adopted 
the title of National Defence Junta. The president of the Junta, General Miguel 
Cabanellas, has commissioned me to convey the Mexican government the 
Junta’s sincerest desire to continue the same constant and cordial relations 
between Mexico and Spain.45
Minister Hay at once dismissed the documents, jotting down in them “Shelve 
document as no legal authority may be given to the signatory.”46
The Mexican government’s official mouthpiece, El Nacional, went further 
expressing the view that ‘only sheer civility’ from the Ministry had spared Pujadas 
from receiving a more compelling response:
The question raised yesterday by Mr. Pujadas is beyond the faintest 
consideration. The Mexican Government does not recognise and may not 
recognise any other government in Spain than the legitimate one, led by Mr.
Azana 47
Other newspapers tried to exact a further official pronouncement from the 
Minister to no avail. Excelsior reported that several members of the Spanish 
community had established contacts with Pujadas. The attempt by Pujadas to replay 
in Mexico the Generals’ usurpation of the legitimate representation of the Republic
44 Manuel Azana, Memorias de Guerra 1936-39. Barcelona, Grijalbo. pp. 390-392.
45AHSRE, exp. III-764-1.
46 Ibid.
47 El Nacional, July 30, 1936.
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was the most resonant case, but certainly not the only one. Gordon ousted the 
Spanish vice-consuls in mid-August 1936. Two of them went to some lengths by 
sending letters to Excelsior stating that they had quit their positions before being 
fired, on grounds of utter disagreement with the policies of the Azana government.
Thereafter, the conservative press began to label the Spanish government as 
communist. The Spanish Embassy threw further fuel to the debate. In a rather inept 
declaration, Gordon Ordas referred to the Fascist leanings of the insurrection and 
carried away by his enthusiasm declared “true Republicans would rather let 
Communism come before accepting a military regime.”48 The Mexican conservative 
press would subsequently invoke this pronouncement in order to justify their 
propagandists onslaughts against the Republic.
T h e  D e c is io n  t o  a id  t h e  R e p u b l ic
In 1936 military coups resulting in the establishment of new governments took place 
in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Paraguay. Mexico reacted to those events by strictly 
applying the Estrada Doctrine, without pronouncing itself over the changes of regime 
that had taken place in those countries. The customary diplomatic practice of the 
Mexican government limited itself to the summoning of the Ambassador posted there 
“for consultations.” and abstention of judgment over the political change that had 
taken place.49 Why was Mexican reaction to Franco’s uprising in Spain so 
dissimilar?
Various relevant studies, particularly those originating from Mexican 
officialdom have attempted to explain Cardenas’ choice on grounds of righteousness 
and altruistic advocacy of the principles of democracy and international justice.50 
Israeli historian, Tziv Medin has characterized Cardenas’ foreign policy as anti­
imperialist, in the sense that his socio-economic policies led him necessarily to a 
confrontation with foreign interests that had been predominant in the Mexican
48 Excelsior, July 27, 1936.
49 See Introduction note 20.
50 See for example Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Alberto Enriquez Perea(compiler)Aferico y  
Espana: solidaridady asilo politico 1936-1942. Mexico, 1990. pp. 11-39.
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economy.51 Always according to Medin, Mexican diplomacy was also anti- 
totalitarian, in the sense that it consistently opposed aggression by totalitarian 
expansionism regardless of its ideology. Mexico and the USSR were the only two 
countries that supported decisively the Republican camp in Spain. But that did not 
prevent Mexico from denouncing Soviet aggression in 1939, when the USSR 
invaded Finland.52 This belied the accusation often levelled by his detractors that 
Cardenas was in connivance with the Soviet Union and that he aimed to take Mexico 
under the aegis of communism.
Even an observer so unlikely to sympathise with Cardenas as Powell has 
admitted that in spite of taking a strong ideological stance on the Spanish question, 
the Mexican government:
...also protected Mexico’s own best interests whenever certain forms of aid to
the Republicans would have jeopardized these interests.53
The Cardenas-Calles showdown of 1935-1936 might also help to elucidate 
Cardenas motives in coming to the Republic’s rescue. In 1934 Calles sought to put in 
office yet another pawn, but against all expectations Cardenas defied him shortly 
after being elected. The former Revolution’s strongman was subdued and cast into 
exile, but the menace of a coup d’etat plotted by him and his clique loomed many 
months after his banishment. Only three months after Calles’ expulsion from Mexico 
Franco challenged the Republic with an armed uprising. The virtual simultaneity 
between both processes might contribute to explain Cardenas decision to aid the 
Republic
A more doctrinal approach would suggest that the decision to aid the Republic 
was taken exclusively by Cardenas. There are juridical bases to this view, as the 
Constitution of 1917 bestows ample powers to the Mexican presidency concerning 
the design and implementation of foreign policy.54 Thus, it is hardly surprising that
51 Tziv Medin, Ideologia y  praxis politica de Lazaro Cardenas. Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1972. 
pp. 190-91 and 195-200.
52 Isidro Fabela, Neutralidad. Biblioteca de Estudios Intemacionales, Mexico, 1940. p.273.
53 T.G Powell, op. cit., p.58.
54 Article 89 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution.
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Cardenas has received all the credit for Mexican support for the Republic. On August 
10, 1936 he noted in his diaries:
The Spanish Republic has requested through its Ambassador, Felix Gordon 
Ordas, the supply of the highest number of arms as may be possible for its 
defence. The Ministry of War and Navy has been instructed to place in 
Veracruz to the orders of the Ambassador twenty thousand 7 millimetre rifles 
and 20 million cartridges of same calibre. All of them Mexican made.55
Cardenas explained his motives:
The government of Mexico is obligated to the legally constituted Republican 
government of Spain, presided over by Manuel Azana...Our responsibility is 
to serve Spain... Moreover, the Republican government of Spain is 
sympathetic to the revolutionary government of Mexico. President Azana 
represents the desire for the moral and economic emancipation of the Spanish 
people. Today Spain is embroiled in a bloody and difficult struggle, caused by 
its privileged castes.56
The purported idealism and moral righteousness of the Mexican President have 
been monotonously used and abused to explain the coherence of Mexican diplomacy 
in an age of abdication. Dante Puzo considers in his celebrated book:
There was little if  anything that Mexico could have hoped to gain either in 
political influence or strategic position or economic advantage by her pro­
loyalist course. Thus Mexico was not motivated by ulterior purposes but 
solely by sympathy with the Madrid regime.57
Yet the international repercussions of such a stance posed great challenges to 
the viability of his administration. His pro-Republican stance, in particular, caused 
several diplomatic reversals for his government. The support of the Republic had 
been aimed at furthering a dominant Mexican objective: to get the U.S. and other 
powers committed to the principles of non-aggression and anti-imperialism. Sadly, 
Mexico made few, if any, converts abroad. Foreign powers, especially Britain and the
55 Lazaro Cardenas Obras 1. Apuntes 1972,1, p.354.
56 Ibid., p. 355.
57 Dante Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers 1936-1941. New York, Columbia University Press, 1962.
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U.S., were adverse to Cardenas’ military assistance to the Republic and pressed the 
Mexican President to keep this aid to a minimum or to discontinue it altogether. As a 
result Mexico’s diplomatic isolation deepened, leaving it with Spain as its only 
friend. Cardenas’ Spanish policy was consistently endorsed by the Mexican military, 
which nevertheless resisted all attempts to reproduce the meddling of trade unions or
CO
political parties in the realm of the Army.
While it is unquestionable that his personal disposition towards the imperilled 
Republic was the determining factor in this decision, other officials in his 
governments exercised considerable leverage towards the fulfilment of such a policy. 
It would be incorrect to construe Mexico’s international linkages solely from the 
vantage point of the Presidency. By 1934 the Mexican State was far too large and 
complex for Cardenas to conduct its entire operation. Undoubtedly, Cardenas 
delegated many of his economic and diplomatic prerogatives to a government of 
experts. The revolutionary bureaucracy in its institutionalisation had engendered a 
State policy that predated Cardenas and which, in any case was enriched by his 
idealistic personal diplomacy. The result was an organised effort, however modest, to 
engage Mexico in affairs far removed from American dominance.59
Mexican exchanges with foreign countries were conceived of and executed by 
Mexican bureaucrats and technocratic professionals. The technical and economic 
expertise necessary to run a state in such a complex context should not be 
underestimated. Hence the need to consider the role of other actors in the design of 
Cardenas’ Spanish policy.
Following the 1935 crisis that led to the purging of Callistas on the cabinet and 
the expulsion of Calles himself, Cardenas replaced Emilio Portes Gil with General 
Eduardo Hay in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hay, an old Maderista, was largely 
unenthusiastic about the Republic yet functioned rather as a figurehead. Cardenas did 
not trust the old General, whom he deemed far too conservative, and often bypassed 
him in favour of junior officials.
58 cf. Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism. The political rise and fall o f the Revolutionary Army 1910- 
1940. Albuquerque, The University of New Mexico Press, 1968. pp. 127-128 and T.G.Powell, op. cit., 
pp.xi-xii.
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This was the case of Foreign undersecretary, Ramon Beteta, who was actually 
in charge of international matters. The youngest member of the Cardenas 
administration, he was credited with having a greater influence with Cardenas than 
any other single person in his cabinet. He was also one of the few in the President’s 
inner circle to have studied abroad. A graduate of the University of Texas in 1923, 
with high honours, the young technocrat may be credited largely with the design of 
Mexican diplomacy of the time. As a lawyer, he was ascribed with having drafted the 
replies to British and American notes on oil expropriation. Although married to an 
American woman, he developed a violent antipathy to the United States. Because of 
the leverage he exerted over the President, many of Cardenas more drastic actions are 
attributed, rightly or wrongly, to Beteta.60
The Mexican representative to the League of Nations, Isidro Fabela, also 
played an instrumental role in Cardenas’ decision to help the Republic. Fabela 
believed that Spain gave Mexico an opportunity to prop up its own declining 
international position. Accordingly he held that through the advocacy of Spain, 
Western powers could be persuaded that the Spanish war was yet another instance of 
external aggression against weak nations that endangered world peace (“fascism on 
the march”).61
Historical experience gave Mexico a stake in the promotion of the policy of 
collective security. The United States had already agreed to non-intervention at the 
Pan-American conference in Buenos Aires. If this view could be persuasively 
conveyed, then the powers might commit themselves to saving the Republic and at 
the same time agree to oppose in principle any imperialistic intervention by one 
country in another’s affairs. Such a development would clearly benefit Mexico, 
whose policies of economic nationalism made it highly vulnerable to foreign 
aggression.
Long before the Spanish Civil War Mexico had been lobbying in the League of 
Nations for collective resistance against imperialism. When Mexican representative
59 Schuster has suggested that Mexican diplomacy of the time was “an efficient effort that procured 
and secured national interest.”
60 Frank Kluckhohn, The Mexican Challenge, New York, Doubleday, 1939. pp. 243-245. See also 
Evelyn Waugh, op. cit., pp. 182-195.
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before the League, Narciso Bassols urged assistance to Ethiopia, Cardenas issued a 
series of decrees in November 1935 to comply with the League’s sanctions against 
Italy. After Ethiopia’s fall Bassols clarified Mexican position during the Abyssinian 
crisis in terms that may be applicable in explaining Mexico’s later stance before the 
Spanish Civil War:
It is not merely attachment to the abstract principles of international law that 
compelled us to act the way we did. Throughout their history as an 
independent nation, Mexican people have, more than once, come to know the 
brutal meaning of imperialism’s conquering invasions. For that reason, respect 
for the independence and territorial integrity of a nation is an essential 
element of our national sensibility and a fundamental exigency of our 
people.62
Interestingly, throughout the protocol and rhetoric of the time may be seen the 
emphasis placed on agrarian reform by Mexican officials to depict their rapport with 
Republican Spain. Such identification by choice had few grounds in the specific issue 
of land reform.
There was certainly an ideological and even emotional component in the 
Mexican response to the Spanish civil strife. Alleged similarities between the coup 
that ended in the assassination of President Madero in 1913 and the foreign 
sponsored uprising against the Spanish government were often evoked. Then, the 
machinations of the American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson-together with the 
complicity of most of the diplomatic corps accredited in Mexico-had been 
instrumental in bringing down a legitimate government. Now, the actions of 
Germany and Italy appeared to be fundamental in achieving Franco's victory. The 
analogy was to be reiterated, time and again, by Mexican officials, whenever asked.
In that sense it is striking to note the number of Huerta’s former associates that 
actively opposed both Cardenas’ reforms and the Spanish Republic. Men like 
Querido Moheno, Nemesio Garcia Naranjo or Rodolfo Reyes had all served in 
Huerta’s cabinet and all of them wrote vicious attacks against the Republic in El
61 Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, op. cit., pp. 22-25.
62 Memoria de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. 1934-1935 y 1935-1936, 2 volumes. Mexico, 
1939, Volume II, pp. 89-117.
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Hombre Libre and Excelsior. These conservatives used the same analogy to compare 
the new Republic with Madero’s idealistic attempt to establish a democracy in 
Mexico, if only in opposite direction. In the wake of the Republic’s proclamation, a 
leader of the conservative El Universal summarized this view :
1931 Spain closely resembles Mexico in 1911. Mexico plunged into anarchic 
violence. Spain seems likely to do that too.63
For the Mexican government this was not a typical attempt at a coup d’etat. 
The division between the two Spains transcended its local nature. Flagrant German 
and Italian involvement in Franco’s rebellion had all the appearances of a foreign 
aggression. On that account, the “new” Spain represented democracy together with 
the legitimacy of an attacked government, whereas the “old” Spain stood for Fascism 
and aggression. It remains unclear whether Cardenas would have shown much 
interest had the struggle not been in part between fascism and socialism. Since this 
was the case, in his view, and as a Fascist victory in Spain could give rise to a 
reaction from conservatives against the advance of socialism in Mexico, it seems 
clear why he aligned his regime with the Republic so intensely.
For officials such as Beteta, Bassols and Tejeda there was a remarkable 
resemblance between the aims and objectives of the Republic and those of the 
Mexican Revolution. To allow the sacrifice of the Spanish ‘Revolution’ could set an 
ominous precedent for the Mexican social movement, always vulnerable to foreign 
intervention. In that sense, a report by Mexican Ambassador to Spain, Ramon P. 
Denegri to Cardenas in 1937 might also contribute to elucidate the rationale behind 
Cardenista’s espousal of the Republic as a pre-emptive action destined to offset a 
similar turmoil in Mexico:
The bond between the Spanish capital and the Spanish Church with its 
Mexican counterparts is so strong, that the Spanish struggle projects itself 
onto our country. In this precise moment the Mexican capitalists and Catholics 
are in connivance with their Spanish peers to undermine, and, if possible, 
overthrow, the popular government of Mexico. A victory by Franco would 
immediately unleash a mighty offensive against all of Mexico’s revolutionary
63 El Universal April 15, 1931, p. 3.
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forces. The Mexican government, by helping Spain, is not only abiding by 
legality, justice and the Mexican popular tradition, but it is also sustaining its 
cause in the vanguard of the peninsular struggle. For that reason, Franco’s 
government, is not, and may never be, even if it succeeds, other than the 
seditious and the historical enemy. A battle in the Jarama or a cannonade in 
the Mediterranean may resound before long in Mexico.64
Similarities between the Spanish Republic and the revolutionary governments 
of Mexico, most particularly the Cardenas administration, have often been cited. 
Both countries were economically backward societies with small pockets of 
industrialization, in the midst of semi-feudal rural areas. Both had relatively small 
middle classes and their levels of illiteracy remained enormous, national unity was 
weak or nonexistent. Local bosses or caudillos still dominated regional politics; 
democratic institutions were weak. Bitter conflicts between anticlericals and 
Catholics reflected deep societal divisions on such issues as religious tolerance.
The two reformist regimes strove to implement radical social agendas in order 
to extricate their countries out of backwardness and dependency. Although Cardenas’ 
programme was far more radical than the measures the Spanish Republic intended to 
adopt, both governments closely identified with each other, for they shared a 
common goal, that of social redemption.
Last but not least, there existed the cultural element of a common language and 
a shared heritage. It may well be argued that there were more differences than 
similarities, yet the striking nature of the parallel situation remains. Arnold Toynbee 
considered Mexico the most ideologically congenial country to the Republic,65 while 
Samuel Guy Inman suggested that the 1931 Spanish constitution had been modelled 
after the Mexican 1917 document.66 Perhaps such assertions, both by contemporary 
observers, were overtly exaggerated; nevertheless these common identities between 
both elites remained. If figures like Calles, Cardenas or Bassols opted to believe that 
the Republic was following the Mexican path, many among the Republicans, -true to
64 AHSRE, Exp. III-765-1 (4th part) Confidential report.
65 Arnold Toynbee, op. cit p.212.
66 Samuel Guy Inman, Latin America. Its Place in World Life. Chicago, Willett, Clark and Co., 1937. 
pp. 301-302.
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the paternalism Spaniards have always attempted to exert over Latin America- 
believed the opposite to be truth.
At any rate, more recently, other scholars such as Sedwick (1963) and 
Tamames (1973) have reiterated the view that the Spanish Constitution was greatly 
inspired by the Mexican written law.67 Carlos M. Rama shares this opinion stressing 
that the Constitution of Queretaro constituted a “valuable precedent of social and 
political reconstruction.” The Mexican constitution together with that of Uruguay 
(also from 1917) represented the “only two liberal democratic guidelines to be found 
in the Hispanic world.”68 Again according to Rama, the Spanish lawmakers borrowed 
from the Mexican Constitution those aspects that stressed welfare provision by the 
State, the guarantee of individual rights, the incorporation of social rights (articles 27 
and 123 of the Queretaro Constitution), and the separation of Church and State. Other 
common features such as the nationalization of certain branches of the productive 
process or the ambitious agrarian programme enshrined by the Mexican code were 
not originally included.
F u r t h e r  In st a n c e s  o f  S u p p o r t
The sympathies of the Cardenas administration towards Loyalist Spain were 
expressed in manifold ways. In addition to the arms supplies, diplomatic sustenance 
and the remittance of money, medicines and foodstuffs, refuge was given to 500 
Spanish war orphans and Republican intellectuals. Moral support was given at every 
opportunity.
Mexico went as far as to allow Spanish ships to fly the Mexican flag.69 Several 
Spanish officials were supplied with Mexican passports to cover their activities 
abroad from their enemies or to travel safely through countries sympathetic to 
Franco. Undersecretary of Navy and Air, Colonel Angel Pastor Velasco, was given a
67 Ramon Tamames, La Republica. La Era de Franco. Madrid, Alianza Universidad, 1979 Frank 
Sedwick The Tragedy o f Manuel Azana and the Fate o f the Spanish Republic. Ohio, State University 
Press, 1963.
68 Carlos. M. Rama, La crisis espahola del Siglo XX. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1976 
(Third Edition), p. 113.
69 AHSRE, III/ 618 (44-0) October 16-22, 1936.
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Mexican passport under the name of Alfredo Palacios to cover his activities abroad in 
connection with the Republican arms purchase commission.70 In Paris, Minister 
Tejeda furnished Juan Simeon Vidarte a Mexican passport so that he could make his 
many wartime journeys safely. Vidarte thus became Juan Valdez of Veracruz, a made 
up character.71 As late as June 1940, Juan Negrin, Francisco Mendez Aspe and 
Santiago Casares Quiroga were able to leave occupied France bound to England 
under fake Mexican passports.72
Most of the Republic’s foreign service personnel overseas defected to Franco. 
In many cases, Mexico took over the diplomatic representation of Spanish 
Republican interests. After Uruguay’s severance of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic in February 1937, Mexico took charge of the Spanish legation’s archives 
there in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the factious. 
Furthermore, Mexico assumed the representation of Republican interests in 
Montevideo.73 Mexico also took custody of Spanish diplomatic missions in Costa 
Rica and Peru.74 When feasible, Mexican diplomats and consular agents acted as 
couriers for the Republicans if their own communication channels had become 
blocked. Mexico also tried to protect Republican interests in Germany, Italy and 
Portugal, but this soon proved to be an impossible task. With virtually no friends 
abroad Republicans eagerly accepted Mexico’s aid.
A token of such attempts may be seen in the hostility faced by Daniel Cosio 
Villegas (1899-1976) during his tenure as Charge d’affaires ad interim in Portugal. 
Cosio Villegas would be the brain behind the idea of bringing Spanish intellectuals 
and academicians to Mexico to pursue their research tasks away from the staggering 
conflict. At Portugal, from the beginning, he faced the hostility of the Portuguese 
authorities and the press who scornfully referred to him as O Ministro Vermelho, the 
Red Minister. His chauffeur and housekeeper pried on him and his every move. 
When the Portuguese government froze Spanish Ambassador, Claudio Sanchez
70 Marina Casanova, La diplomacia espanola durante la guerra civil. Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, Biblioteca Diplomatica Espanola. Section Estudios No. 13. 1996. p.168.
71 Juan Simeon Vidarte, op. cit., p.601.
72 Luis I. Rodriguez, Ballet de Sangre. La caida de Francia. Ediciones Nigromante, 1942. pp. 140- 
142.
73 Alberto Enriquez Perea (compiler), Reyes y  el llanto de Espana en Argentina 1936-1937. Mexico, 
El Colegio de Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998. p.174.
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Albomoz’s accounts, the Mexican government sent money and instructed Cosio 
Villegas to pay the Spanish personnel, thus averting Salazar’s relentless stalking of 
Sanchez Albomoz.75
On February 1937 Cosio Villegas sent a cable to the Mexican Foreign Ministry 
in which he stated that prominent Falangists together with the Consul of Guatemala 
in Lisbon had approached him requesting Mexico’s good offices to aid in facilitating 
peace talks with Azana. Naively, the Mexican diplomat advised that it was 
worthwhile to support this petition. The Mexican Foreign Ministry reacted swiftly 
with the categorical response that any attempt at mediation by Mexico would 
constitute an inadmissible meddling in the internal affairs of Spain. Furthermore, 
secrecy was altogether out of the question, as Azana’s government might rightly 
consider the whole affair inimical and a tacit recognition of the rebels as 
belligerents.76
Another example worth of mentioning is that of Mexico Ambassador in 
Buenos Aires, Alfonso Reyes who openly and consistently supported his Spanish 
colleague, Joaquin Ruiz Canedo, in the face of Argentinian unmitigated hostility. In a 
breach of diplomatic protocol Reyes attended several acts in support of the Spanish 
Republic, more damningly a mass rally organised by the Argentinian Communist 
Party at Luna Park.77 Reyes supported Ruiz Canedo in the negotiations that resulted 
in the repossession of the merchant vessel, Cabo San Antonio that had been seized by 
the Argentinian government.78
S p a n is h  R e s p o n s e s  t o  M e x ic a n  S o l id a r it y
Republican Spain manifested her gratitude to these gestures through the press, in 
public demonstrations, and by sending distinguished men as envoys of appreciation
74 New York Times, April 25, 1938, and Cosio Villegas, op. cit.
75 Daniel Cosio Villegas Memorias. Mexico, Grijalbo 1976. pp. 163-166.
76 Alberto Enriquez Perea, Daniel Cosio Villegas y  su mision en Portugal 1936-1937. Mexico, El 
Colegio de Mexico/Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998. pp. 127-135.
77 Monica Quijada, Aires de Republica, Aires de Cruzada: La Guerra Civil Espanola en Argentina. 
Barcelona, Sendai Ediciones, 1991. pp. 63-65.
78 Alberto Enriquez Perea (Compiler), Alfonso Reyes..., op. cit., p. 116.
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and to nurture further the already sympathetic attitude of her former colony. The 
extent of such deference may be seen in the decision by the Republican government 
to name a battalion in the Loyalist Army in honour of President Cardenas. When the 
request for his consent reached him he replied true to his proverbial modesty:
While I appreciate profoundly the honour that has been offered to me, I beg 
the commander of the division that he permit me to decline it. I am convinced 
that final judgment cannot be made concerning men who are still exercising 
responsibilities of a public character until their task has been finished and 
history has thoroughly judged it.79
Mexicans who travelled to Spain were warmly welcomed, celebrated and even 
flaunted by the Republican rank and file. Popular wartime ballads often referred to 
Mexico’s pro-Republican stand:
Today is a day of celebration, comrades,
Mexico, brotherly nation, sends us its rifles,
victorious in Villa’s revolution,
in Zapata’s agrarian explosion
Long live the Mexican people!
Three hurrahs for the Mexican people
and three cheers for Cardenas,
the soldier, the worker,
and the peasant’s champion.80
Or:
Spain do not fear,
although they hurl the Italian against you
79 William Cameron Townsend, Lazaro Cardenas. Mexican Democrat. Ann Arbor, Michigan, George 
Wahr Publishing Co. 1952 pp. 185-186.
80 Patricia W. Fagen, Transterrados y  Ciudadanos, p. 136.
117
Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. Material Aid and Diplomatic Solidarity
Justice is with you, 
as are all the Mexicans.81
Throughout the war, organisations at all levels of the Loyalist zone sent 
greetings and messages of thanks to Mexican fraternal organisations and government. 
Salutes to the “noble” Mexican people were repeatedly conveyed. Several homages 
were celebrated; streets were named after Mexico to show appreciation. Barcelona’s 
city council asked Cardenas his consent to rename a city street in his honour. Once 
again he declined proposing that Catalans should instead choose some Mexican 
historical figure for that purpose. At the suggestion of Consul Jose Ruben Romero
Q*y
they chose Benito Juarez. A battalion was named after Pancho Villa.
The Republican government itself made many formal demonstrations of 
gratitude to the Mexicans. In September 1937, the Spanish and Mexican governments 
co-sponsored an exhibition of Mexican Art to commemorate Mexican independence. 
Multitudinous acts were celebrated to “pay homage” to Mexico. Among the most 
celebrated we may cite those, which took place at the vast Palacio de la Musica 
Cinema,83 at the Teatro de la Zarzuela, the Palau de la Musica Catalana and at the 
Teatro Principal of Valencia.84 At these rallies and festivals, according to various 
newspapers of the time, the populace “heartily” chanted vivas for Mexico and 
General Cardenas. The Popular Front launched a Society of Friends of Mexico, 
affiliated to the Propaganda Department, which had several sections all through 
Republican territory. According to several Mexicans who were in Spain during the 
war being Mexican became tantamount to a safe-conduct or a sort of “open sesame.”
On December 11, 1936 the Spanish Cortes thanked the Mexican government 
and people for their unconditional aid and solidarity. The declaration stated:
The Spanish parliament, gathered in Valencia, has agreed unanimously, 
amidst clamorous demonstrations in support of Mexico, to express to the 
Mexican people its deep gratitude for its exemplary conduct of international
81 Alejandro Gomez Maganda, Esparia sangra, p.77.
82 See Andre Malraux, L'espoir, Paris, 1938. and Mary Bingham de Urquidi, Misericordia en Madrid. 
Mexico, B. Costa-Amic, 1975. pp. 295-296.
83 El Sol Diario de la Manana del Partido Comunista, November 24 and 29, 1937. Ano I No. 156.
84 ABC, Madrid, November 14, 1936.
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solidarity and the selfless support given to Spain. A Spain that fights today for 
the defence of the same ideals of liberty and peace, which are norm and 
essence of the “great Mexican nation.” The President of the Cortes. Diego 
Martinez Barrio.85
Moral support took yet another guise with the sheltering of 500 Spanish 
children from the horrors of war by the Mexican government. As the hostilities had 
not spared even the civilian populations, producing instead unprecedented carnage, 
several parents were only too eager to have their children evacuated. Moreover, the 
conflict had left many children orphaned or with no one to look after them. From 
1937 the Spanish authorities began to transfer these children toward other countries. 
Almost 1500 went to the Soviet Union where many would forcibly stay well beyond 
the war. Five hundred approximately were sent to Mexico.86 Other less important 
groups were sent to Belgium, Britain and France.
The children arrived in Mexico on June 1937 receiving a great attention from 
the public, not always favourable. Nonetheless, many Mexican families offered to 
adopt them. Even some wealthy families of Spanish origin with no sympathies for the 
Republic offered to take care of them. However, the Mexican government decided to 
keep the tutelage of these children to itself and to educate them under the leftist 
values for which their parents had fought or where still fighting.
Michoacan’s governor, Gilberto Magana, offered lodging and education for the 
children in the state capital of Morelia and Cardenas accepted his offer. An old 
convent was rehabilitated as boarding school, “Colegio Espana-Mexico,” with the 
Spanish staff that had escorted the children from Spain together with local teachers 
acting as tutors to the youngsters. Most of these children came from very destitute 
backgrounds, making it very difficult for them to adapt to their new environment. 
There has been endless debate about the success or failure of the affair as these 
children presented disciplinary problems and failed to integrate into the subsequent 
Spanish exile, and in fact were regarded by it as an unruly lot.
85 Excelsior, December 12, 1936.
86 Vera Foulkes, Los ninos de Morelia y  la escuela Espana-Mexico. Consideraciones analiticas sobre 
un experimento social. Mexico, UNAM, Facultad de Derecho, 1953.
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A month later, a further step towards the reception of Republicans in Mexico 
was taken when Cosio Villegas made public on behalf of Cardenas an invitation to 
Spanish intellectuals and scientists to come to Mexico so they could carry on with 
their intellectual pursuits away from the hardships of war. Cosio Villegas and 
Republican Undersecretary for Education, Wenceslao Roces, devised the plan.
An academic institution, La Casa de Espana, was to be established by 
Presidential decree to that end. Many of these academics were not contributing to the 
war effort and in fact represented a financial and logistic burden to the government of 
Valencia. Cosio’s plan got a warm reception from Mexican intellectuals such as 
Alfonso Reyes, Eduardo Villasenor and Genaro Estrada, which, as mentioned had 
developed close friendships with many. Unsurprisingly, Cardenas appointed the two 
first, together with Cosio as members of the Casa’s advisory board. Mexico agreed to 
pay for their transportation and upkeep. In return, the scholars were required to teach 
at Mexican universities and to give special lectures and courses at La Casa de 
Espana.
In all, 35 Spanish scholars came to Mexico under this scheme during the Civil 
War.87 In 1940, when it became clear that Franco would not be easily unseated from 
power, the charter of La Casa de Espana was revised. Renamed El Colegio de 
Mexico, it was removed from governmental control. Structured teaching staffs of 
Mexican and Spanish academics were hired on a permanent basis to provide regular 
courses and degree programmes. Throughout the ensuing years, El Colegio de 
Mexico was able to recruit distinguished intellectuals from Spain, Mexico and Latin 
America. It has since become one of the most respected centres of research and 
higher education in Latin America.88
87 Daniel Cosio Villegas, Memorias, pp. 169-178.
88 Jesus Mendez, “Foreign Influences and Domestic Needs in Intellectual Institution Building: The 
Gestation of the Casa de Espana/ Colegio de Mexico,” in Secolas Annals; Journal of the South-eastern 
Council of Latin American Studies, Vol. 21 (March 1990), pp. 5-23.
120
Mexico and the Spanish Civil War. Material Aid and Diplomatic Solidarity
T h e  M e x ic a n  E m b a s s y  in  M a d r id
Relations between Spain and Mexico had been far from cordial during the so-called 
‘Black Two Years’. However, in spite of the emergence of a kindred regime through 
the Popular Front victory, Cardenas did not send a new Ambassador to Spain. The 
Mexican Ambassador, General Manuel Perez Trevino, had been sent to Spain in 
January 1935 and remained there until he was replaced exactly two years later. With 
Perez’s appointment Cardenas honoured the old revolutionaries’ practice of assigning 
embassies to potential dissidents as a way of keeping them away from domestic 
politics or coaxing them to remain loyal by retaining them in under the national 
budget.
When the uprising began Ambassador Manuel Perez Trevino was, as the rest of
O Q
the diplomatic corps, spending his summer vacation at San Sebastian. His first 
reaction was to establish provisionally the Embassy at Fuenterrabia, where he waited 
for more precise instructions. Perez Trevino was impeded from returning to Madrid 
through the same route that he had taken, as Navarra had fallen in the hands of the 
insurrectionist General Mola.90 From Fuenterrabia Perez Trevino instructed his staff 
to ensure the protection of Mexican nationals on Spanish soil. Among them, there 
were the members of the delegation that had attended the 1936 Berlin Olympics, who 
had been trapped in La Coruna, while en route to Mexico.
The first confidential report sent by Ambassador Perez Trevino to Mexico gave 
a thorough account of the murders of the conservative deputy Joaquin Calvo Sotelo 
and the Socialist chief of the police Lieutenant Castillo. In turn he received the 
instruction from the Chancellery to return to Madrid, where he arrived on August 24, 
1936. He was the first Ambassador to re-enter the Spanish capital.91 He came back; 
travelling through French territory from Hendaye, where the headquarters of 
international diplomats posted in Spain was established, to Barcelona and Valencia. 
In fact, the only governments whose heads of mission remained aupres the Spanish 
Government throughout the conflict and followed them from Madrid to Valencia and 
then to Barcelona were those of the USSR and Mexico. The rest of the countries
89 Claude Bowers, My Mission in Spain, op. cit.
90 Excelsior, July, 29, 1936.
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which had relations with the Republic limited themselves to leaving charges
Q9d’affaires in their Embassies or Legations at Madrid.
At that point several Mexicans resident in Spain were seeking to escape the 
hostilities. Diplomatic shelter was given to them as well as to Spanish aristocrats and 
people with known, or suspected, links to the rebellion. An interesting case, was that 
of Rodolfo Reyes. As was previously mentioned he was the eldest son of General 
Bernardo Reyes. Following his father’s death, Reyes supported Huerta, serving even 
as his Minister of Interior.
A renowned lawyer, Reyes undertook the defence of several aristocrats and 
conservatives, who felt under arrest after July 18. According to their captors, the 
prisoners had obtained “unconditional release” (i.e. ascended to heaven) When Reyes 
protested against the “savagery of Republican justice,” the assault guards retorted 
that this was the ‘Revolution’, and that he as a Mexican should know that. Reyes 
rejected the riposte by saying that although in Mexico there had been cruelties, “even 
Villa killed in broad daylight and always stating the reason why he did it.”93
On September 1936, Reyes was arrested in his office because he ‘appeared in 
several photographs in company of generals, barristers and bishops, and because he 
had books ‘written by bourgeois and aristocrats, many of them autographed.’ Reyes 
explained that the pictures belonged to a gathering of the National Union of Lawyers, 
which he had attended as a prominent member adding somewhat provocatively: ‘If 
being a lawyer who makes his living out of the bourgeoisie makes me a bourgeois, 
then yes, I am a bourgeois.’
After being released Reyes obtained protection inside the Mexican Embassy 
together with his family. Reyes had four sons, two of who had been bom in Mexico 
and two in Spain. The contrast between them could not have been starker as the 
eldest was a member of the Mexican Foreign Service while the two youngest were 
outspoken Falangists. These sought haven at the Mexican Embassy, becoming a
91 El Nacional Revolucionario, August, 25, 1936.
92 Arnold Toynbee, op. cit., p.272.
93 Rodolfo Reyes, La bi-revolucion espanola. Vol. Ill of Memorias politicos, p.460.
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permanent source of problems for the legation because of their Fascist leanings.94 By 
October 1936, 800 people had secured cover at the Mexican embassy, while as there 
were as many as 25,000 people-most of them fascist or with fascist leanings-inside 
30 other embassies at Madrid.95
T h e  R e f u g e e  C r isis
As was to be expected, the asylum issue brought a crisis between the Embassies and 
the Republican government. The Spanish government insisted that, in the case of a 
military uprising the right of asylum did not apply and requested that all asylees be 
turned over to Spanish authorities. In the streets there was soon talk of a “Fifth 
Column” conducting operations against the Loyalists from within the Embassies 
shielded by their diplomatic immunity. Some refugees were actually armed and 
carried out espionage and terrorism under diplomatic cover.
In a famous incident, the militiamen stormed the Finnish Embassy giving rise 
to vigorous protests from the Diplomatic corps, among them, very notoriously Perez 
Trevino. On December, 1936, Alvarez del Vayo, in his capacity of Minister of State, 
cast aside the proposal of the League of Nations to evacuate the refugees from the 
embassies. The crisis reached its climax after Luis Araquistain, then Spanish 
Ambassador in France, published a note in which he questioned the legitimacy of the 
diplomatic shelter:
This is not a humanitarian question as Mr. (Wladimir) D’Ormesson pretends.
It is an inconceivable and unprecedented abuse of the so-called right of 
asylum. It is not the case of two or twenty men defeated in a revolution, and 
seeking haven, as the traditional practice of asylum dictates. A right, by the 
way, virtually in disuse in Europe and now only practiced by some South 
American nations. Therefore, when a diplomat’s residence protects 1, 000 
enemies of a government this ceases to be asylum to become a garrison. In 
addition, when a diplomatic zone protects 5, 000 people hostile to a
94 Mary Bingham de Urquidi, op. cit., p.317.
95 Javier Rubio, Asilos y  canjes durante la guerra civil espanola. Barcelona, Planeta, 1979. pp. 23-40
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government, then this zone becomes a military stronghold. This is an act of 
intervention by the Diplomatic corps accredited in Madrid.96
In truth, the doctrine of asylum, a long established tradition in Latin America 
postulated by such hemispheric agreements as the Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 or 
the resolutions of the Pan-American conference at Havana of 1929, was far from 
universal. The Latin American Ambassadors at Madrid asked the Spanish 
government to uphold such a right, although Spain had never ratified those 
agreements. This gave rise to increased tensions between the Republican government 
and the Mexican Embassy.
The right to asylum traditionally applied to Heads of State overthrown by 
revolutions or military coups as well as to leaders or outstanding personalities. Such 
was not the case of the refugees at the foreign embassies in Madrid. At best, they 
were wealthy people, who feared for their lives because of what they saw as the 
Terror unleashed by the revolutionary ferment in the Republican zone. At worst, they 
were known supporters of the insurrection and under reasonable suspicion of 
conspiring against a legitimate government. Many cases amounted to overt breaches 
to the right of asylum even as it was understood in Latin America.
From inside the embassies radio transmitters were fitted, espionage was 
coordinated, the black market was funded, arms were stockpiled, shots were 
fired, while the refugees ate and drank far better than elsewhere.97
Nevertheless, Perez Trevino zealously defended the right to grant protection to 
these individuals in spite of the estrangement this would ultimately suppose to him 
vis-a-vis Cardenas.
After the capital came under siege, several prominent Republicans also sought 
refuge at the Mexican Embassy. Among the most prominent should be counted 
Ramon Menendez y Pidal, Gregorio Maranon, who later deserted the Republican 
cause, Pedro Rico-former mayor of Madrid-, and the sister of Undersecretary of War 
Jose Asensio. The arrival of Republicans brought about clashes with those
96 ‘Cuando el numero de refugiados es excesivo, el derecho de asilo cae por su propia base’. Luis 
Araquistain. AHREM Archivo de la Embajada de Mexico en Francia. Box number 217.
97 Andres Iduarte, En el fuego de Espana, Mexico, Joaquin Mortiz, 1978 p.230.
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conservatives already inside the Mexican legation that echoed those taking places at 
the trenches.
With disputes rising in tone, Perez Trevino began to fear the prospect of a 
bloody confrontation inside the Embassy. Outside, discontent in Madrid against what 
was perceived as the pampering of the refugees in the light of much deprivation 
endured by the besieged capital, was such that the Ambassador felt obliged to make 
clarifications through the press. In a paid statement, published in Madrid’s ABC, 
Perez Trevino declared that the granting of asylum implicated no meddling in 
Spanish affairs, and gave assurances that the asylees inside the Embassy had no arms, 
nor were engaged in subversive activities. To emphasize his words he declared:
My condition of Mexican revolutionary and my firm conviction as a friend of
popular causes is a further guarantee of my loyalty towards the people of
Spain.98
On November 6, 1936 as the government left Madrid and moved to Valencia. 
Aurelio Nunez Morgado, Chilean Ambassador and dean of the diplomatic corps, 
proposed the evacuation of the Embassies together with the refugees to the port. The 
move was considered unacceptable by the Republican government. Following his 
Foreign Ministry’s orders, Perez Trevino opposed Nunez Morgado’s initiative and 
refused to leave the capital. This proved insufficient to persuade the Republican 
government of the alleged justice of the Mexican position with regard to diplomatic 
asylum."
Having given sanctuary to more than 1,000 refugees, the Mexican Embassy had 
them spread in various domiciles in Madrid. The militias accused these refugees of 
assisting the Fifth Column and began to exert pressure upon the Embassy threatening 
to take it by storm. Among these refugees the most notable were Emiliano Perez 
Iglesias, Lerroux’s Ambassador to Mexico, Alberto Martin Artajo who would go on 
to be Franco’s foreign minister and Josefa de Iraola, close friend of General Franco, 
who even gave birth to a girl inside the Embassy. Seemingly, the then submarine
98 ABC, Madrid, December 6, 1936.
99 Aurelio Nunez Morgado, Los sucesos de Espana vistos por un diplomatico. Buenos Aires, Talleres 
Graficos Argentinos L.J. Ross, 1944.
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commander, Luis Carrero Blanco-future Head of Govemment-also found briefly 
shelter there before reaching Nationalist territory in San Sebastian on June 1937 
through Toulon.100
When the Embassy building, located in number 17 Fortuny Street, proved 
insufficient to host such a number of people, new premises were fitted out as a 
shelter under Mexican protection in 3 Hermanos Becquer Street. The mansion, which 
currently houses the Madrid offices of French bank Paribas, belonged to the 
eccentric Spanish-Mexican aristocrat, Carlos de Beistegui (1894-1970) who had left 
to a self-imposed exile in Biarritz. There, several hundreds were crammed. Inside the 
Embassy the overcrowding and squalor grew worse. Epidemics of typhoid fever and 
diphtheria broke out.
The refugee crisis exhibited the disagreements within the Cardenas 
administration, as well as the lack of coordination of its different instances over this 
particular issue. On the one hand, Mexico had historically honoured the right to 
asylum-if only under the provisos alluded to by Araquistain-and several Mexican 
officials-chiefly those of the Foreign Service-considered the protection of refugees 
irreproachable. On the other, most Mexican leftists, officials like Beteta and, more 
importantly, the President himself, deemed the protection of notorious fascists, 
unacceptable, yet could not retract without losing face before the rest of the Latin 
American governments.
Chile and more crucially, Argentina, through her Ambassador, the 1936 Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Carlos Saavedra Lamas, not only resisted the pressures of the 
Republican government, but also threatened a joint Latin American rupture of 
diplomatic links with the Republic.101
While it is certain that the Mexican government supported such a course of 
action it is equally clear that it did not want to alienate itself further from its regional 
counterparts. Thus, the asylum question placed Mexico on an ambiguous and 
dangerous equilibrium: on one hand it was aiding the Republic through all means at
100 David Wingeate Pike, Les Franqais et la Guerre d ’Espagne. Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne- 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1975. p.250.
101 Arnold J.Toynbee, op.cit. pp.388-390.
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its disposal, while, on the other it was protecting her enemies in its own Embassy. In 
that sense, the decision to grant indiscriminate diplomatic asylum to anyone who 
asked for it, was taken directly by Perez Trevino himself through “considerations of 
sheer humanity.”
Cardenas’ relations with Perez Trevino were far from cordial. After all, Perez 
Trevino had been a notorious Callista and as such had the ill reputation of a 
conservative and counterrevolutionary. Moreover he had been Cardenas’ main 
opponent for the Presidency in 1933, and as such had been sent to Madrid as a way of 
cutting him off from Mexico. Their divergences increased further over the 
embarrassing question of the refugees. Not surprisingly, Perez Trevino was 
ignominiously transferred to Chile in the middle of the refugee crisis, leaving Spain 
on December 17, 1936. After the Republic’s defeat, left-wing writer, Andres Iduarte, 
wrote a serious indictment against Perez Trevino’s tenure, accusing him of partiality 
in favour of the Francoists:
In Malaga, the Mexican consulate hid 200 enemies of the Republic. The 
Francoists deliberately forgot this after they captured the city. Some leftist 
intellectuals that had obtained asylum at the consulate were forcibly taken out 
and shot. What a pity that General Perez Trevino could not exert then, in 
opposite direction, his Franciscan vocation.103
Back in Mexico, the refugee crisis brought about a curious effect: the premiere 
of Alejandro Galindo’s film “Refugiados en Madrid” which narrated in a 
melodramatic guise the lot of a group of asylees in an undesignated embassy in 
Madrid.104 There is no way of knowing if the film was a success or not, but at any 
rate it is revealing of the way the war impacted urban Mexicans.
After protracted correspondence between Mexico and Spain, the Spanish 
government partially yielded and agreed to evacuate to France some asylees housed 
in the Embassy’s compounds. A first round of refugees was evacuated and
102 AHREM ‘Asilados espanoles en la Embajada de Mexico’ 1936, pp. 34-35.
103 Andres Iduarte, op. cit., p. 231.
104 Alfonso del Amo Garcia, Catalogo General del Cine de la Guerra Civil. Madrid Catedra/Filmoteca 
Espanola, 1996. p.699.
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transported to France by the vessel Durango, which had been built in Spain, and paid 
by exports of chickpea from Mexico.
Amidst the refugee crisis, as the war entered a new stage, Cardenas appointed 
Ramon P. Denegri, on February, 1937, as new Ambassador. The reason of this choice 
remains unclear, although it must surely have had to do with Perez Trevino’s 
handling of the asylum issue. Contradictory versions depict Denegri either as a 
cunning communist agent, a Nazi agent, an influence peddler and a corrupt careerist 
in the Mexican administration or a honest official.105 From Madrid Denegri reported 
to Cardenas the ‘scandalous’ attitude shown by various refugees, which had 
conspired with impunity from inside the Embassy, were armed, had built barricades, 
and expressed themselves in denigrating terms about the Spanish and Mexican 
governments, while practicing inside the Embassy all sorts of religious practices, thus 
betraying “unashamedly” the right of asylum.
They threaten to expose us anytime to a conflict similar to that, which took 
place inside the Finnish legation. You may rest assured that I shall act 
energetically to put an end to this embarrassing situation.106
From his arrival, Denegri’s brief tenure (January 1937 to July 1937) was 
riddled with scandals. In an act of utter diplomatic discourtesy, Denegri let more than 
2 months elapse before arriving at his new post. At the presentation of his 
credentials, Denegri outraged the formally dressed Republican by appearing in street 
clothes, accompanied by two thugs, dressed as Mexican rancheros, boasting pistols. 
Pretending to be a radical and a fellow traveller, the new Ambassador indulged in 
harassing refugees with Rightist leanings. It was widely rumoured that Denegri 
engaged in acts of corruption and blackmail, issuing Mexican official passports to 
cronies while attempting to extort money from wealthy Spaniards that had taken 
refuge at the Embassy, toward smuggling them out of Spain under Mexican 
protection.107 According to various testimonies, Denegri fell under the malign
105 Compare Salvador Novo, op. cit., pp. 34-35 or Siqueiros, op cit., p. 360 to T.G. Powell, op. cit.,
p.86.
106 AHSRE, exp. III-764-1 (2a parte) Denegri to Cardenas. January 8, 1937.
107 AHSRE, “Informe confidencial sobre la actuation del Sr. Embajador en esta Embajada de Mexico 
en Espana”. June 11, 1937 and “Memorandum relativo a la gestion del Sr. Embajador Ramon P. 
Denegri al frente de la Embajada de Mexico en Espana.”
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influence of his stepson, Carlos, who indulged in frantic drunkenness and fits of
108violence, which may have even resulted in a murder inside the Embassy.
During his tenure, Denegri held several appointments with Azana, at which a 
crucial issue was discussed. They met in Valencia shortly before being summoned by 
Cardenas to brief him on the Spanish situation. Denegri asked Azana without 
circumlocution if he wanted to send a message to Cardenas and he queried what 
could Mexico do on behalf of the Republic, not only by its own means, but also in 
consensus with other American republics and the U.S. He made it clear that Mexico 
was, thanks to Roosevelt, in good terms with the “yanks.” Azana replied that it was 
necessary to stop the war as the Republic should not rely blindly on the prospect of 
defeating Italy and Germany. This could prolong war, thus consuming all Spanish 
energies until there remained nothing but ruins. The first step should be the 
repatriation of all foreign fighters; then, a suspension of hostilities could be declared. 
This in turn might bring about an initiative by a Spanish-American republic or 
Roosevelt himself to pacify Spain. Not a mediation or an intervention, but an appeal 
to pacification aimed not only at Spaniards but also to the European powers, based on 
humanitarian grounds and on sentiments of Spanish-American fraternity. The 
Spanish President stressed that no agreement that implied the liquidation of the 
legitimate Republic could be accepted.109
Denegri offered to convey these ideas to Cardenas so he could later transmit 
them to Washington. Furthermore, Denegri admitted that the outcome of the Spanish 
war could greatly affect America, and that a victory of Franco could unleash a similar 
fascist movement in Mexico.110 They met two days later setting forth in detail the 
aspects of their previous conversation. On October 9 Azana mused on the Roosevelt 
speech and recalled his conversation with Denegri, of whom he had not heard ever 
since. Thus the alternative of an arbitrated solution seemed to have evaporated.111 No 
record of the conversation exists in the Mexican archives, so it is impossible to infer
108 Mary Bingham de Urquidi, op. cit., p.261.
109 Manuel Azana, Memorias de Guerra, op. cit., p. 170.
110 ibid.
111 The 1996 Grijalbo-Mondadori edition of his Memorias de Guerra 1936-1939, wrongly refers to 
Denegri as Tejeda, although this dignitary would only be appointed as Ambassador to Spain in 1938. 
p. 169-170.
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what the response of the Mexican authorities to Azana’s proposal was, if any were 
made.
Ultimately, 807 refugees were evacuated from the Embassy on March, 14,1937 
by 40 lorries of the Madrid Junta and of the Department of Security, facilitated by 
General Miaja “in spite of the war necessities”, and only because “it concerned 
Mexico” and escorted by 200 Assault Guards in motorcycles to Valencia.
At the last moment worker’s organisations demanded four refugees, accused of 
serious charges by the revolutionary justice, to be handed to them. They were 
Antonio Montes Castanola, former aviation Lieutenant and air-instructor, Jose 
Molina Castiglione, former high-ranking official at the Ministry of Navy, the 
Marquis Jose Alonso Pesqueira and a certain captain “Santiago”, recorded as “former 
Director General of Security under the government of Lerroux, and one of the main
119police officials responsible for the repression that followed the Asturian rebellion.”
The four officers were already on board and 120 refugees still had to be 
embarked. As the discontented workers threatened to stage a riot, Denegri himself 
went on board the ship and convinced the three to come down and stay in Valencia 
under his custody. Denegri personally oversaw that the refugees did not take with 
them military secrets to give to the Francoist camp. Finally, he regretted deeply the 
‘lamentable circumstances of having to protect the people’s enemies,’ yet assured 
Cardenas that he would offer them all sorts of guarantees. Thus he put them under his 
protection and took them back to Madrid, where they were forced to remain for 
several months.
The remaining 803 refugees left on the French steamship Medi Segundo bound 
to Marseilles and escorted by a French warship. Manned by French and Italian
• • 1 1 3communists, the refugees were harassed until they arrived to their final destination. 
Once in Marseilles the refugees continued their way to nationalist Spain, thus 
disowning the pledge they had made to Denegri.
112 AHSRE,III/510 (46-00/2, III-1246-6. It is unclear whether it was captain Vicente Santiago 
Hodsson, mentioned indeed by Azana as: “(...) former Chief of the Intelligence Bureau. Collaborator 
of Valdivia; rewarded by by Lerroux with the General Direction for Security.”, (see Manuel Azana, 
Memorias de Guerra, op.cit. p. 16), or Captain Agustin Santiago Romero, cited by Paco Ignacio Taibo 
as one of the main repressors after the 1934 uprising.
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On April 30, Spain refused again to allow the four officers, who by then had 
expressed their wish to emigrate to Mexico, to leave the country. By then Mexico had 
closed all but one small building in its official complex in Madrid and the Mexican 
ambassador had followed the Republican government to Valencia where a 
provisional embassy had been established. This made in turn extremely difficult for 
Mexico to house, feed and provide security to the asylees. At long last, on August 7, 
1937, the Spanish government gave Mexico and other nations that still provided 
diplomatic asylum its assent to evacuate to France or North Africa all remaining 
persons housed in their embassies. Mexico was thus able to include the four officers 
among the evacuees.
Thereafter, each of the embassies and legations was forced by the Republican 
government to close its facilities for housing refugees. Most of the governments had 
already closed their embassies in Madrid and only a handful followed the 
government to Valencia.
It must be said that many Mexican diplomats were shocked by the prevalent 
terror in Madrid during the early stages of the war. Death squads roamed the streets, 
often attacking persons they suspected of being fascists. Although the Republican 
government did not condone the violence, many diplomats, including Perez Trevino, 
believed that it did little to stop it. The Mexican government chose publicly not to 
rebuke the Spanish government but privately urged the Republicans to curb the 
violence.114
Shortly after the asylees’ evacuation, the Foreign Ministry hastily recalled 
Denegri to Mexico, leaving General Leobardo Ruiz as charge d ’affaires. Again, it is 
a matter of speculation why Cardenas decided to remove Denegri; whether if it had 
been on account of his breaches of diplomatic etiquette or because of his apparent 
ideological over-zealousness. In any case, it would appear that Cardenas did not feel 
thoroughly represented by the diplomat.
On October 25, 1937 Ruiz visited Azana to present him with the decoration 
that the Mexican government had conferred on him, and to reassure him of the
113 Mary Bingham, op cit., p.459.
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goodwill of Cardenas towards his regime. He also delivered the letter that Cardenas 
had given him instructing him of the precise nature of his political duties as charge 
d’affaires.115 Ruiz performed his tasks efficiently and seems to have enjoyed a great 
esteem in the Republican zone.
In a widely publicized episode, Ruiz left his mission in Valencia a month later, 
accompanied by his staff, to visit ‘the martyr city “of Madrid with the declared aim of 
fraternizing with its “heroic masses.” Ruiz went to the working class districts of 
Vallecas and Carabanchel to learn first hand of the onslaughts of fascism and to 
convey his sympathy for the wounded and the bereaved. While on Madrid, Ruiz also 
visited the front, paid his respects to, and exchanged decorations with, Miaja. Ruiz 
also visited the Mexican volunteers fighting in the ranks of the Republican army. 
This visit, according to the local papers of the time “endeared further the Mexican 
diplomatic mission with the people of the Republican zone.”116
When the question was finally raised about who should be the Mexican 
Ambassador, Cardenas first thought of designating Narciso Bassols. According to 
Siqueiros, Cardenas asked him to intercede to this end. When asked by Siqueiros, 
Bassols furiously refused evoking an incident at Geneva, when as Mexican 
representative to the League he had been discussing with Litvinov a possible 
resumption of diplomatic links between Moscow and Mexico. On that occasion, 
Litvinov had angrily protested against the Mexican decision to grant political asylum 
to Trotsky. The Mexican Chancellery had not informed Bassols of this arrangement. 
It was through Litvinov that Bassols would learn of Cardenas’ decision. Then, 
Bassols, a philo-Soviet, had quit his post. Now, true to his explosive nature the 
delegate was reported to have replied:
Tell him (Cardenas)to look for another idiot. He won’t do it to me again.117
114 ibid. See also AHSRE ‘Denegri a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores’ April 1, 1937.
115 Manuel Azana. Memorias de Guerra, op. cit., p.340.
116 See El Heraldo de Madrid, November 20, 22 and 24, 1937 and El Sol. Diario de la Mariana del 
PCE, November 25 and 27, 1937.
117 David Alfaro Siqueiros, Me llamaban el coronelazo. Mexico, Grijalbo, 1976. pp. 341-342.
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C o m m u n ist s  a g a in s t  C a r d e n a s
From 1937, relations between Mexico and the Spanish government, increasingly 
under the ascendancy of the PCE, cooled as a result of Cardenas’ decision to grant 
political asylum to Leon Trotsky. Hounded by Stalin’s secret service the “disarmed 
prophet” was compelled to leave Norway with unknown destiny. Prompted by Diego 
Rivera, as well as by humanitarian considerations, Cardenas announced his decision 
on December 7, 1936 to grant official protection to the fallen Bolshevik.118
The Mexican Left reacted with dismay to the measure. Both the PCM and the 
CTM opposed it sternly. Lombardo became very vocal in its opposition to Trotsky’s 
permanence in Mexico, thus alienating himself from the President. Predictably the 
PCM, through its mouthpiece, expressed, in a rather blunt way, its position regarding 
the right of asylum: Will Mexico offer next diplomatic protection to Franco, Queipo 
de Llano or Mola?119 The accusation was clearly malign and consistent with Stalinist 
practices of demonization of adversaries.
The reaction in war-torn Spain was no less caustic. Following the provision of 
Soviet aid, the hitherto negligible Spanish Communist Party began to gain control 
over the Republic. Thereafter, the communists displayed open hostility to the 
Mexican representatives, deprecating Mexican aid in contrast to Soviet solidarity. 
Hence, when Mexican journalist, Blanca Trejo tried to interview La Pasionaria, she
1 9 0was rudely turned down with the following message: ‘For Mexico, Nothing!’ The 
hostility of the Communists towards Mexico reached grotesque proportions. Every 
member of the party had to acknowledge Russia as the “sole motherland”: ‘We shall 
not permit that any other country beyond Russia appear to be as the paradigm of 
revolution.’121
Despite Communist resentment against the Mexican government for having
1 9 9given shelter to Trotsky, CNT militants remained largely sympathetic to Mexico.
In that line the Communist-controlled ABC, or Frente Rojo, published in Valencia,
118 Excelsior, December 8, 1936.
119 El Machete, December 5, 1936.
120 Blanca Lydia Trejo, Lo que vi en Espana. Mexico, Editorial Polis, 1940, p.79.
121 ibid.
122 David Alfaro Siqueiros, op. cit., p. 116.
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echoed the remarks of Pravda and L ’Humanite. However, there were voices like that 
of General Miaja, who recalled that Mexico had been “the first and selfless nation to 
give its aid to Spain.”123
Back in Mexico, the net result of Trotsky’s asylum was to split the Mexican 
Left. After a second successful attempt against Trotsky’s life in which several 
Mexican and Spanish Communists were involved, Cardenas declared as traitors to 
Mexico those who had murdered the Russian revolutionary. This in turn also made 
the prospect of a nationwide Mexican leftist coalition, comparable to that in Spain, 
more remote. Any suggestion in that direction became thenceforth unthinkable.
It remains an irony that a Spanish exile, Ramon Mercader, who received 
asylum from the Cardenas administration, had taken the life of the old Bolshevik. 
The signing of the German-Soviet pact in August 22, 1939 further discredited the 
Mexican Communists.
At long last, on December 1937, Colonel Adalberto Tejeda, former Minister to 
France who had been instrumental in Mexican aid to the Loyalists, was appointed as 
Ambassador to Spain. By that stage the bilateral relation was not exempt of friction, 
as shown by several incidents. In spite of Tejeda’s request to present his credentials 
to Azana since January, three long months elapsed before the ceremony could finally 
take place. The slowness of the Spanish authorities to comply with the diplomatic 
protocol seems to have partially derived from Denegri’s scandals. The determining 
factor, however, seems to have been the ill will between Tejeda and the Spanish 
Ambassador to Mexico, Gordon Ordas. Enervated by the delay, Tejeda revealed his 
decision to give up the post. Ultimately, Tejeda was only able to present his 
credentials on March 6, 1938. At the ceremony, Tejeda gave an impassioned speech 
on which, yet again, he expressed once again the identity of purpose between the 
Republic and the Mexican Revolution:
Spain and Mexico follow convergent paths towards an identical ideal (...) In 
this struggle the defenders of the Republic are at the same time those of 
human liberties. Thus, it is expected that their heroic sacrifices, will decide 
the democracies to rectify the criterion imposed to them by a shallow analysis
123 ibid. pp. 65-66.
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of the motivations and nature of the present conflict (...) I may not finish 
without expressing to His Excellency, (...), the most sincere vows for the 
triumph of the Republican arms, as the necessary conclusion of this glorious 
chapter of its history. A chapter, written with the generous and fruitful blood 
of the valiant Spanish people. A nation that struggles for the advent of an era 
of peace and progress based on justice and on the rights of the working 
class.124
In spite of all good will, Tejeda’s diplomatic tasks during those days remained 
largely ceremonial: confining himself to the customary visits to factories, hospitals, 
schools, as well as sending careful reports to Cardenas concerning the Spanish 
situation. Mexican aid to Republican Spain had by then all but ceased.
T h e  M e x ic a n  O il  E x p r o p r ia t io n , S p a in  a n d  t h e  Im p e n d in g  W o r l d  W a r
Twelve days after Tejeda’s appointment as Ambassador to Spain, Cardenas 
nationalised Mexican oil from British, Dutch and American concerns, in what has 
been considered the greatest milestone of his administration. It may be probable that 
no other Mexican President has ever enjoyed, before or since, such widespread 
support of the citizenship as Cardenas had in the wake of the expropriation act.
Even the Church, the historic antagonist of the Revolutionary governments, 
backed the President, with the Archbishop of Mexico prompting his parishioners to 
contribute to the popular collection set to pay the demanded compensation by the oil 
companies. The oil companies, most particularly, the British Eagle Corporation 
deemed the action illegal and the nationalisation a “robbery under law” to paraphrase 
the words of its paid propagandist, the notorious pro-Francoist writer, Evelyn Waugh, 
and imposed a stringent blockade against Mexican oil.125
In the evening of May 13, 1938, the Mexican government surprised many by
• • • 19Aannouncing that it had broken off diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The
124 AHREM, e.10-1611, fol. 23-113. March, 6, 1938.
125 Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero. 1917-1942. Mexico. El 
Colegio de Mexico, 1972. pp. 359-381.
126 The Times, May 15, 1938.
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move came as a result of an acrid exchange of diplomatic notes. In an ill-famed 
message, the Foreign Office sneered at Mexican pledges to pay immediate 
compensation for the expropriation, “ when it could not even pay the unsettled debts 
caused by damages to British property during the Revolution’s disturbances.” The 
following day Minister Hay summoned British Minister, Owen O’Malley St. Clair, 
and presented him with a cheque for the exact sum of Mexico’s debt to Britain and a 
note which reminded the Foreign Office of Britain’s arrears regarding its own debt to 
the United States, while informing him that Mexico was withdrawing its diplomatic
1 97representation from London.
American responses to the expropriation, however, were far from uniform. 
Thus, while American conservatives, oil interests and the Catholic lobby called for an 
old style armed intervention to right Cardenas misdeeds, Liberals in and out of the 
administration called for restraint in order not to imperil the Good Neighbour Policy.
Roosevelt’s cabinet appeared divided between those who wanted retaliation 
against the measure and those who desired instead to persevere with the policy of 
non-intervention and rally hemispheric support in the face of the upcoming world 
conflict. Among the former stood out Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Treasury 
Secretary, Henry Morgenthau and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels. 
All three, fearful of the breakthroughs of international fascism and the possible take­
over of Mexico by it, persuaded Roosevelt to reverse the reprisal measure, fearing 
that the Axis would step in if the U.S. allowed its relationship with its southern 
neighbour to regress.128
After the oil expropriation, the economic pressure on Mexico was 
overwhelming; both foreign and Mexican capital fled the country, the oil companies 
imposed an asphyxiating boycott that soon was observed by the shipping and 
insurance companies. It was only by chance that the government survived this 
onslaught in those first few months.
127 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras. I. Apuntes 1913-1940. (May 12, 1938) p.394. The full text of the British 
notes is to be found in AHSRE, L-E600 and 601.
128 David E. Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. 
p.190.
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In an attempt to break the blockade, Eduardo Villasenor, head of the Bank of 
Mexico travelled to Spain and France. To all appearances, Republican Spain seemed 
to be a good choice. The Republic owned seventeen tankers that could transport 
Mexican oil around the world. The Republican government owed the Cardenas 
administration more than a political favour on account of the Mexican support in the 
League and the Mexican arms deliveries. However, soon after his arrival in war 
ravaged Spain, Villasenor understood that the besieged Republic was completely 
engrossed by the war effort and seemed in no position to assist Mexico in breaking 
its isolation.129 Cardenas himself gave a hint of the importance bestowed to the 
relation with an ideologically akin government amidst a sea of hostility. In a 
somehow cryptic entry to his diary he wrote on July 1938:
My government is entrusted with the mandate of directing the development of 
the oil industry under Mexican hands, and towards that end I shall devote all 
my efforts. Perhaps Spain may help us by selling our oil. This would appeal 
all Spanish-American people. Should Mexico be forsaken in this struggle 
against capitalism, the political and economic revolution that is taking root on 
all American nations would perish, and this would seriously harm Republican 
Spain. Today I wrote to Mr. Azana regarding this situation.130
Possibly at that stage, months before the collapse of the Ebro front, Cardenas 
thought the Republic still capable of winning the war. A victorious Republic might 
use its prestige and contacts to break the blockade and assist in the consolidation of 
the Mexican oil industry. It goes without saying that at that point, the Republic was 
not capable anymore of helping Mexico. And yet, the annotation is revelatory of the 
material importance that the President still conferred to the relation with Spain. It 
seems extraordinary that in the face of the blockade Mexico continued its aid to 
Spain albeit in ever more modest proportions.
On account of the blockade and of the Spanish difficulty to agree to the 
operation, Mexico accepted an offer from Nazi Germany to buy its oil. A first 
transaction amounted to $17 million in exchange for much-needed hard currency and
129 Eduardo Villasenor, Memorias-Testimonio. Mexico,Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1974. pp. 116- 
118.
130 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras. I. Apuntes 1913-1940. (July, 17, 1938), p.397.
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manufactured goods. A paradoxical situation arose by which Mexico was supplying 
Republican Spain with arms and food, while at the same time furnishing Franco’s 
allies with a strategic war commodity. It has even been suggested that at this stage 
Mexican oil began to flow to the Nationalist side through Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy.131
This case fully illustrates how Cardenas foreign policy was guided by 
pragmatic consideration rather than by ideological motives and how it had to walk a 
fine line between commitment to Spain and its own survival. Mexican policy-makers, 
in spite of the ideological repugnance they may have felt, came to regard German co­
operation and investment as a way to development without dependency.132
It does not follow in any way that the Mexican regime had become pro-Fascist 
or pro-German as many at the time claimed. It simply shows how compelled by 
economic exigencies it did not allow ideological considerations to take over practical 
needs. In fact, the German-Mexican bilateral relation became chilly owing to 
Mexican position regarding Spain, and was further cooled by Mexican condemnation 
of the annexation of Austria on March 1938.133 Furthermore, Cardenas openly 
refused a decoration by the German government.134
When Marshall Petain questioned Mexican Minister Luis I. Rodriguez about 
Cardenas’ determination to help the Republicans at all costs, he instantly replied to 
himself without waiting for a response: “Too much sentiment, and scant international 
experience.”135 Without doubt, the Mexican position towards Spain was determined 
somewhat by emotion rather than by reason. Mexican support for Republican Spain 
had been driven by a shared cultural and historical heritage, a fresh ideological 
affinity and purported similarities in both government’s aims and objectives. Still,
131 Frank Kluckhohn, op. cit., p.296.
132 Friedrich Schuler, op.cit., pp. 102-107.
133 Mexican condemnation of the Anschluss was deeply resented by German diplomacy. The German 
Minister in Mexico tried to explain Cardenas’ position in the following terms: “Mexico’s newfound 
self esteem, which has impudently exhibited itself in Geneva, no doubt encouraged by the so-called 
“Good Neighbour” policy, may well reach a point in which General Cardenas may feel tempted to co- 
direct the destiny of the world, in order to please his leftist captive audience.” in AHSRE, C-6-2-4 (2) 
Diaries of Rudt von Collenberg, March, 1938.
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this support never allowed sentimentalism to take precedence over objective 
imperatives or put in jeopardy Mexican national interest. Far from that, it redounded 
to Mexico’s benefit, albeit in unforeseen ways, as will be seen below.
139
CHAPTER FOUR
MEXICAN ARMS FOR REPUBLICAN SPAIN
“Mexico was, from the start, our most faithful ally, one that 
without any objection lent its decisive aid in our direst 
moments. What is more this support sought no ulterior interest 
of predominating in our country’s affairs.”
Commander Jose Melendreras of the Republican Air Force
All in all, the riskiest and most committed response of Cardenas administration 
towards the Republic’s tribulations came in the form of furnishing it with arms at a 
moment when every other country denied such aid. From the very beginning, the 
Mexican government put at the Republic’s disposal the entire production of its 
National Arms Work. Every piece available at the army’s warehouses was delivered 
at once, and even complete units of artillery of the Mexican army were dismantled in 
order to be taken to Spain.1 The Mexican military factories increased the number of 
workers and the work shifts to deliver more machine guns, rifles and ammunition.
When this proved insufficient, Mexico acted as a cover for Republican secret
purchase operations with third countries. This support would carry on, in varying 
degrees, throughout the entire conflict, leaving Mexico as the sole dependable arms' 
purveyor to the Spanish Republic besides the USSR.
The exact volume of this aid remains unascertained as information on that 
regard is muddled. Hugh Thomas estimated it in U.S. $ 2 million. In turn, Powell, 
basing himself on Cardenas’ 1937 State of the Union address, reckoned that Mexico 
sold arms to Spain valued at over 8 million pesos (or, at the then prevailing exchange 
rate of 3.60 pesos per dollar, U.S. $ 2,225,000).3 This estimate, however, covers only 
arms deliveries for the period running between September 1936 and September 1937,
1 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit. p.769. “Memoria escrita por el Comandante Jose Melendreras de la 
Comision Militar de Compras enviada a Norteamerica y Mexico.” In Francisco Olaya Morales, El Oro 
deNegrin. Mostoles, Ediciones Madre Tierra, 1990. p. 418.
2 Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p. 797.
3 T.G. Powell, op. cit., p. 74.
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leaving unaccounted for all other shipments made between September 1937 until 
October or November 1938.
Otherwise, the Mexican government’s determination to sell arms when 
everybody else refused to do so may also be considered as a policy designed to set a 
moral precedent for other countries to follow suit. In this last endeavour, though, it 
must be said that the Cardenas administration failed utterly. Despite the many 
appeals his government made through its emissaries at diverse international forums, 
no other country, beyond the USSR, which already did, showed any willingness to 
sell arms to the Republic, at least overtly.
After the initial onslaught by the insurgents and the corresponding resistance of 
the Loyalist forces on July 1936, a virtual stalemate between both sides followed. 
The Nationalists held about one third of Spanish territory, with the Republic in 
uncertain control of the remaining two-thirds. Equipment and arms enough to reduce 
the adversary with a single blow, let alone to conduct an out and out civil war, were 
in short supply. With no immediate prospect of overturning the impasse in view, and 
with no hope of reaching a compromise, both contenders soon sought aid abroad.
From the outbreak of hostilities, the rebels could count on the military aid of 
Italy and the backing of Portugal. Only three days after the uprising started, they were 
able to secure German support, which initially came in the form of 20 Junker 52 
heavy transports. With these, an air bridge was established between Tetuan and 
Seville to overcome the blockade imposed by the Republican fleet on the bulk of the 
Nationalists’ troops, which had been stranded at the African garrisons. Massive 
support soon followed.4
In these earliest hours of the Civil War, the Republican government sought 
military help from the ideologically congenial government of neighbouring France in 
order to suffocate the military uprising. So as to justify the legality of its request the 
Spanish government recalled a Franco-Spanish agreement, signed in 1935, which 
stipulated under a secret proviso that Spain would buy twenty million francs worth of
4 See Angel Vinas, La Alemania Naziy el 18 de julio. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1974.
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French armament.5 At first, the French appeared to have agreed to this request, but 
soon the combined effects of internal disputes in the Blum cabinet, a vicious 
campaign by the native right-wing press and the unabashed coercion of the Baldwin 
government made them abjure of their earlier pledges.
Yielding to these pressures, Blum retracted his earlier pledge and denied the 
requested arms to Spain. Blum personally conveyed to Cardenas’ envoy, Isidro 
Fabela, his agony over the decision and the risks which honouring his commitment to 
Spain might entail for his country:
Yesterday, the British Ambassador came to let me know that should the 
French government deliver arms to Spain, Britain will observe strict 
neutrality in case of a European conflict.6
A row had broken out within the Blum cabinet between those, like Air Minister 
Pierre Cot, who insisted on keeping France’s engagement and those like Defence 
Minister, Edouard Daladier, who not only abhorred the Spanish government in 
particular, but also wanted to keep France removed from a new war. An alternative 
solution was found to both appease the domestic opposition and the conservative 
press and still dispatch the promised planes. The sale would ostensibly be called off, 
while orders might be sent secretly through an amenable government such as that of 
Mexico, so far the only government in the world to have openly declared its support 
for the Spanish Republic.
In the intervening time, Fernando de los Rios, who had been hastily appointed
as Spanish Ambassador to France, approached the Mexican Minister in France, Col.
Adalberto Tejeda, to make a formal request for the Mexican government to buy arms 
and ammunition in France on behalf of the Spanish Republic. The purchase would
n
appear as made by Mexico although in reality bound for Spam. Without poor 
consultation, Tejeda sent a cable to the Mexican Foreign Ministry informing Hay of
5 Michael Alpert, A New International History o f the Spanish Civil War. op. cit., p.22.
6 Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, p. 29.
j|{
Owing to the defection of Spain’s former envoy, Juan Francisco de Cardenas, to the Francoist side.
7 AHSRE, exp. III-764-1.
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the urgent inquiry posed by De los Rios.8 Days later the response came. The Mexican 
Foreign Ministry fully authorised the enterprise, although upon the condition that 
there were no international complications of any nature with the French government. 
The communique stressed, “Under no circumstances are we to deceive friendly 
governments.”9
On August 1, 1936 the Mexican government received through Tejeda yet 
another request from the Spanish government, this time to buy arms either in 
Belgium or Britain. The solicited material included 10 to 12 bombers, 25,000 bombs 
1,500 machine guns and several million cartridges. The request had been also made 
by Fernando de los Rios. Again, the purchase would appear as made by Mexico.10
In the first instance, the transaction flopped as on August 26 Britain 
categorically refused to issue licenses for the sale of an unspecified number of rifles, 
machine-guns and ammunitions to Mexico for fear that they would re-exported to 
Spain, in spite of the assurances given by the Mexican Minister in London, Primo 
Villa Michel that this material was solely for the Mexican army.11
About the Belgian connection, the very secrecy of the operation makes it
difficult to determine with certitude its outcome. On September 19, the Belgian
police broke into the headquarters of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, where they
found documentation implicating Mexican Minister in Brussels, Carlos Dario Ojeda,
with an order of 200,000 hand-grenades, which had been sent to Spain. The
fortuitous discovery led to a search three days later of the SS Raymond, which
uncovered a cargo of several crates containing 800 rifles, bayonets, 320 carbines and
210,000 cartridges, ostensibly arranged by the Mexican legation for ultimate 
1 0shipment to Spain. Beyond this instance, there are no official records, either 
Mexican or Belgian confirming other undertakings, and we can only infer that more 
of them took place through the indirect testimonies of the actors directly involved in 
their implementation.
8 AHSRE, Cable no. 42 de Ministro Adalbert© Tejeda al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Eduardo 
Hay. July 26, 1936.
9 Ibid, Cardenas to Tejeda.
10 AHSRE, Tejeda to Hay, Paris, July 29, 1936.
11 Public Records Office, Kew. (Henceforth PRO) Foreign Office (FO) 371 W9883/9549/41.
12 The Times, 22-25 September 1936.
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As far as the French operation is concerned, it is known with certainty that 
Mexican diplomats approached French Air Minister, Pierre Cot, obtaining his 
complete approval for the deal.13 Ultimately, on August 2, 1936 through Mexican 
cover, thirty reconnaissance aircraft and bombers, fifteen fighters, and ten transport 
and training planes were sent to the Republic. The bombers were Potez 54 class.14 
There are conflicting versions over the actual number of planes that ultimately 
arrived in Barcelona. Thomas names 55 altogether, Schwartz speaks of 37 between 
the end of July and August 17. Miguel Sanchis lowers the figure to twenty-five Potez 
54 bombers, thirteen of which had been taken by sea on July 26, the rest by air.15
Explicit reference of the arrangement is made in Cardenas’ Diaries, on the 
August 20,1936 entry:
The Spanish government has requested Mexico to acquire armament and 
airplanes, in order to set up two regiments, that they badly need, and as the 
French government has consented to this operation, authorization has been 
given to our minister in Paris, Col. Tejeda, to purchase on their behalf the 
required armament.16
This has been proverbially considered the first instance of Mexican support. 
New evidence would suggest that Mexican aid encompassed more dealings than was 
previously believed. On August 15, the Mexican government bought with Republican 
money through the demarche of the captain of the gunboat Durango, Manuel 
Zermeno Araico, who had been in the area evacuating Mexican citizens away from 
the Spanish conflict, an Algerian hulk of 1700 tons, the Berbere, docked in the port 
of Marseilles. The vessel had been built in 1891 and had been wrecked in the French 
port for some months. Renamed Jalisco the ship would smuggle arms repeatedly 
from France into Republican Spain. Six days later, it set sail to Alicante taking a 
clandestine arms freight, containing 150 Brandt trench mortars and 45,000 mortar-
13 Pierre Cot, Les evenements survenus ...(Rapportfait au nom de la commissionparlementaire 
charge d ’enqueter sur les evenements survenus en France, 1933-1945:Les temoignages.) Vol.l, 
no.2344, pp.215-29. (Audition de M.Leon Blum July 23, 1947).
14 Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p.305. Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain. London, John Murray, 1998. p. 25
15 Fernando Schwartz, La internacionalizacion de la Guerra Civil Espahola, julio de 1936-mayo de 
1937. Barcelona, Ariel, 1971. p.56; Miguel Sanchis, Alas rojas sobre Espana Madrid, Publicaciones 
Nacionales, 1956. p. 11.
16 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras I. Apuntes 1913-1940, First Volume, Mexico, UNAM, 1972, pp. 354-355.
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grenades.17 A further consignment took place on September 10, this time conveying
1 X50 Oerlikon 20 millimetre anti-aircraft cannons and 75 shells.
It was precisely at that moment that the idea of launching a non-intervention 
policy was first conceived. Indeed, on September 9, 1936 a Committee for Non- 
Intervention was established in London under Anglo-French auspices with a 
somewhat peculiar interpretation of what non-intervention meant, immediately 
establishing surveillance over Spanish borders and coasts. Thenceforth the French 
government refused to assist the Republic. France closed its border with Spain to all 
military traffic on August 1936, opening it intermittently in 1937 and 1938.
In the name of peace and with the purported desire of avoiding a new world 
conflagration, the scandalous evidence of an overt foreign intervention led by 
Germany and Italy was overlooked. The creation of the Committee ensured thus that 
the only party adversely affected by its prescriptions was the legitimate government 
of Spain. In fact, the Committee denied the aid that, according to International Law, 
Madrid could expect, at least from the members of the League of Nations. By early
$September, nine European countries had signed the declaration of non-intervention.
Of these, two, Germany and Italy, openly breached the agreement by continuing to 
provide considerable aid to the rebels, while a third, the Soviet Union would soon 
break its earlier commitment to the accord by supporting the Republic. Ultimately, 
twenty-seven nations adhered to the pact in a greater or lesser degree.19
Most early Mexican arms cargoes to Spain were secret, and there is no way of 
knowing their precise amount and value. Sources diverge, even concerning 
documented shipments. We have notice, albeit fragmented or unofficial, of several of 
these freights. In September 25, 1936, according to the Parisian newspaper Le Temps, 
the steamship America under Mexican flagship, left Antwerp, officially to Veracruz, 
but in reality bound to a Spanish port. According to the same source, the freight had 
embarked 1116 metric tons of potassium chlorate, 1,400 of sulphuric acid, 310 of
17 Gerald Howson, op. cit., p. 103.
18L'Action Frangaise, September 14, 1936.
These were Belgium, Britain, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the USSR.
19 Norman J. Padelford, International Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife. New York, Macmillan, 
1939, pp. 53-118.
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phenol, all of them of Soviet origin, as well as 25 tons of copper scrap. These 
commodities were purportedly destined to the Madrid government for the
Of)manufacture of explosives.
A fortnight later, the French torpedo boat Vauquelin telegraphed the French 
Ministry of Navy reporting that the Jalisco had violated the arms embargo by taking 
yet another arms cargo from Marseilles to Alicante. The Jalisco had already four 
acquittals on counts of illegal arms smuggling, but was authorized to depart with an 
arms load which was purportedly intended for the Mexican Ministry of War via 
Veracruz. The freight included one case containing aeronautical motors, 60 cases 
containing an unknown numbers of pieces of ammunition, 16 cases containing 
machine guns, with 134 cases of matching cartridges, and several motorcycles, all 
worth 2, 295, 160 French Francs.21
According to the American military attache in Mexico City, the same gunboat 
Durango, that had evacuated several stranded Mexicans and Spanish refugees, which 
had earlier taken shelter at the Mexican Embassy in Madrid, transported 8 million 
cartridges and 8,000 rifles to an undisclosed Spanish port on September 1936.22 
Various airplanes were also smuggled from the U.S. into Mexico, concealed in the 
port of Veracruz, fitted with arms to convert them into bombers, and then sent by 
ship to Spain, as will be seen below.
It has also been suggested that Mexican diplomats also engaged in espionage 
activities on behalf of the Republic, trying to counter Axis attempts to influence 
European chancelleries in favour of the rebels. Simeon-Vidarte reports on how the 
General Consul in Paris, Epigmenio Guzman, a junior diplomat named Mejias and 
Tejeda himself were able to carry out counterintelligence in Berlin and smuggle
'y'xmillions of cartridges of German and Austrian manufacture into Spain. Elena Garro 
gives a degree of plausibility to this version by recounting in her memoirs how this 
same Mejias had told her in Paris that he had become involved in intelligence
20 Le Temps, Paris, October 25, 1936.
21 Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres B/28/1, Paris, October 24, 1936. Contrebande d’armes par le 
Vapeur “Jalisco” Designation des pieces.
22 Marshbum September 18, 1936 MIDNARA WDC, 7456 G2RMID 2657 G 768/ 111.
23 Juan Simeon-Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables. Testimonios de un socialista espanol. Mexico,
Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1973. p.566.
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gathering activities in Berlin and Rome, taking advantage from his diplomatic 
status.24 For obvious reasons, there exists no evidence for such claims in the Mexican 
official documentation.
Despite the lack of official documentation concerning many of those arm 
freights, there is considerable photographic evidence of Mexican shipments to Spain, 
particularly originating from Francoist propaganda sources, which, ironically, 
attempted to link the Republic with foreign intervention in Spain. In these 
catalogues and other suchlike leaflets, Mexico was repeatedly accused of having sent 
to Spain substantial amounts of dum-dum expansive bullets in infringement to the 
Convention of Geneva, which had them banned a decade earlier.
O p en  E n g a g e m e n t :  T h e  E x p e d it io n  o f  t h e  M a g a l l a n e s
On August 23, 1936 an allotment of 20,000 Remington rifles and 20 million 7 
millimetre cartridges, all of them Mexican made, was sent to Spain. The war 
provisions were taken in 15 train wagons to the port of Veracruz, and then embarked 
on board the Spanish vessel Magallanes. The cargo came as a presidential response 
to the Republican government’s appeals for help. Cardenas responded to the plea 
without waiting to fix a sale price with the Republicans. The whole operation was 
implemented under maximum secrecy.
The Spanish Ministry of State had instructed Gordon-Ordas to explore the 
possibility aupres the Mexican government of going beyond the cover up 
transactions and obtaining arms supplies directly from Mexico. The lack of a sizeable 
Mexican merchant fleet obviously complicated the scheme. Circumstances, anyhow, 
facilitated the operation as a Spanish vessel, from the Compania Trasatlantica 
Espanola, the Magallanes, reached Veracruz performing routine passenger service.
24 Elena Garro, Memorias de Espana 1937. Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1992. pp.127-128. The 
New York Times delved briefly over these suggestions. See New York Times, June 4-5, 1937.
25 Pictures of Mexican arms cargoes and inventories may be found in the following volumes: Pierre 
Hericourt, Les soviets et la France foumisseurs de la revolution espagnole. Paris, Baudiniere, 1938. 
Servicio de Recuperacion de Material de Guerra, Catalogo de material cogido al enemigo. Exposicion 
de Guerra. San Sebastian, 1938 (III ano triunfal).
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The liner was bound to Havana, New York, Cadiz and Barcelona.26 Normal 
service ended on August 12 when the Republic seized the Company. The Magallanes 
had been expected to arrive in Veracruz from Coruna since the 13th but only got 
there until the 16th. Upon landing the passengers declared to an eager Mexican press 
their alarm at the rebellion and the difficulties they had faced to leave Coruna. The 
ship had been stopped there before being allowed to depart. The rebels had intended 
to confiscate it, but somehow let it depart.
Sensing an opportunity Gordon-Ordas persuaded his government through the 
Ministry of State to confiscate the Magallanes. The Trasatlantica was yet another 
hurdle that had to be avoided. The Consul in Veracruz and Argtielles tried to reach a 
friendly settlement with the company’s manager to no avail. To make matters worse, 
the local press disclosed the meeting, making public the manager’s decision not to 
take responsibility. Fearing desertions, the Embassy put confidentially under 
investigation two of the radio-operators, the first and third officers as well as the 
ship’s priest. Suspected of being disloyal to the Republic, they were conclusively 
dismissed.
Once in Veracruz, the Magallanes’ crew paraded on the port’s streets, staging a 
rambunctious demonstration before the Spanish consulate, where they demanded the
77Republican flag to be flown. The next day, the ultra-right-wing Confederacion de la 
Clase Media (CCM), protested irately against what it considered a “shameless and
752intolerable provocation by foreign agitators.” The warm reception given by 
communists and trade unionists to the Spanish passenger ship in Veracruz raised 
suspicions among conservatives over the extent of the Mexican government’s 
entanglement in the Spanish conflict. The rumour that Cardenas was selling arms to 
the Republic increased. That same day the CTM rejected local rightists’ accusations
70connected with the purported arming of worker’s militias.
During that convulsed week, the Magallanes was converted from a passenger 
ship into a cargo under maximum stealth. The tourists were taken to Mexico City
26 Excelsior, August 2, 1936.
27 Excelsior and El Universal, August 17, 1936.
28 Excelsior, August 18, 1936.
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with all their travel expenses covered by the Spanish Embassy. There, they received 
lengthy explanations from the Embassy’s officials about the risks entailed in going 
back to Spain in a ship transformed in a war vessel and reassurances that fares would 
be provided for other ships as well as payment for extra costs incurred. Only 16 
passengers were allowed to return with the ship. The rest were redirected on the 
Orinoco bound for Havana and the French port of Le Havre.
Convincing Cardenas of agreeing to the sale had not been an easy task. When 
Gordon-Ordas first parleyed with the President over the issue, he had found Cardenas 
heavily influenced by the “fable skilfully spread from Burgos” that the military had 
rose in defence of the Republic. The Ambassador dissipated his doubts stating the 
“facts”:
And so, I was pleased to hear from him that Mexico would lend all its 
support to the legitimate government in Spain in compliance with an 
international obligation that it had never refused.30
Gordon-Ordas’ request had come amidst appeals from the Mexican trade 
unions to the Mexican government to arm the workers, and form militias in order to 
safeguard the “conquests of the revolution.” These overtures caused considerable 
disquiet among Mexican military, namely among the more conservative senior 
officers, which began to voice openly their opposition to the scheme, forcing the 
government to disavow it.31 Nevertheless, while Cardenas refused to arm the 
Mexican workers he still seemed ready to do so with the Spaniards. Thus on August 
10, 1936, the same day that the arming of the Mexican workers had been refused by 
his government, Cardenas wrote down in his diary:
The Republican government of Spain has requested the Mexican government 
through its Ambassador Felix Gordon-Ordas to supply as many arms as 
possible for its defence. The Mexican War Ministry has been instructed to 
put at the Ambassador’s disposition 20,000 7-mm rifles and 20 million
29 Raquel Sosa, Los codigos ocultos del cardenismo. Mexico, UNAM/ Plaza y Valdez, 1997 pp. 112- 
113.
30 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p.618.
31 Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism. The political rise and fall o f the Revolutionary Army 1910- 
1940. Alburquerque, The University of New Mexico Press, 1968. pp.127-128.
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cartridges of the same calibre of national manufacture in the port of 
Veracruz.32
A letter from Cardenas to the Minister of Defence, Manuel Avila Camacho, 
conveyed the request of Gordon-Ordas: “In the understanding that the Ministry in 
your command shall fix the prices of the aforementioned supplies.” At first, the 
Cardenas government made every effort to keep the whole affair secret, fearing its 
potentially explosive repercussions, both in the international and domestic scenes. 
Thus, Cardenas instructed Avila Camacho to handle the matter under absolute 
confidentiality. One thing was to act as an intermediary for a friendly government 
with the connivance of the selling party, and yet another to sell directly one’s own 
armament.
With full presidential support, Gordon-Ordas approached next the Minister of 
Communication, Francisco Mugica, asking him to provide two replacements for the 
suspected radio-operators, as well as a short wave transmitter. Mugica agreed 
immediately and thus, two telegraphers from the Ministry, Salvador Tayaba and 
Alfredo Marin joined the expedition.34 By this time, the Mexican government had 
become fully engaged in the project of furnishing with arms Republican Spain, and 
preparations were well under way. Cardenas wrote on August 20, 1936:
Two trains with thirty-five wagons left today for the port of Veracruz taking 
the weapons and ammunition that have been sold to the Spanish government.
The Magallanes, a vessel of the Spanish navy, which is currently stationed 
in Veracruz, will transport them to Spain. The shipment will be under the 
direct supervision of Mr. Jose Maria Argiielles, secretary of the Spanish 
Embassy, a citizen of firm revolutionary conviction and a loyal collaborator 
of the Republican government.35
Back in Spain the lack of armament for the defenders of the Republic was 
extreme. The government forces, though superior in numbers, had suffered heavy 
losses, while Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy rapidly supplied Franco with substantial
32 Lazaro Cardenas, Obras. Apuntes. 1913-1940 First Volume, Mexico, UNAM, 1971 p.354.
33 ibid.
34 ibid. pp. 621-622.
35 Lazaro Cardenas, op. cit., p.354.
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consignments of war material. After July 18, the Republic had only limited and 
obsolete arms material at its disposal. Naive courage tried to make up for the lack of 
artillery in the Republican side. Calls for arms at whichever price grew more 
desperate by the day as the Nationalist forces relentlessly moved towards Madrid.
Spurred by the urgency of their “proletarian comrades”, the stevedores’ union 
of Veracruz helped in speeding up the process of loading the cargo without charging 
a penny for loading the holds of the ship with 20,000 rifles and the 20,000,000 
rounds of ammunition. Moreover, they also donated one day of their salary to buy 
additional food to be shipped to Spain.
Finally, the Magallanes set sail at 6:45 p.m. of Sunday August 23.37 No one 
knew where the ship was really heading for. Excelsior reported that its radio-operator 
had remained on land “for fear of reprisals”, but little else.38 The Mexican 
conservative press speculated that its captain, Manuel Morales, had received an 
envelope from the Spanish embassy containing instructions that should not be opened 
until the ship sailed in high seas.39
On board the ship, entrusted with guarding the precious cargo, was Jose Maria 
de Arguelles, First Secretary of the Embassy, invested with special powers. Despite 
the Mexican government’s hopes of keeping the affair secret, every single detail 
appeared to have been leaked to the press even before the Magallanes’ departure, 
giving rise to vehement protests from conservative editorialists.
Even now, in the face of heavy criticisms, the Mexican government remained 
silent over the issue and there was no official response to the press’ allegations. 
Insisting on the affair, Excelsior interviewed on August 21 an “unidentified” 
Mexican official concerning persistent rumours about Mexican shipment of arms for 
Spain. The official who “lent himself’ to be interviewed over the issue declared:
I ignore whether the materials embarked in the steamboat Magallanes are
precisely arms and ammunition, although I consider this highly improbable,
36 Gabriel Cardona, La Batalla de Madrid Noviembre, 1936- Julio, 1937 . Madrid, Historia 16/ Caja 
de Madrid. 1996.
37 Excelsior, August 24, 1936.
38 Excelsior, August 24, 1936.
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as Mexico has never been an arms trader. To this I would add that it is well 
known that President Cardenas decided that the National Arms Works be 
transformed into a factory for agricultural machinery. What I may assure you 
is that negotiations did take place in order to send the Spanish government 
items, which under normal conditions, make up the bulk of our exports to 
Spain.
The anonymous informant considered that such an attitude from the Mexican 
government was by no means suspect, given the:
...undeniable ideological identity of both governments, as both embody the 
longing for betterment of the working class, and especially the redemption of 
the peasantry.
He also pointed that Azana’s government had lifted the tariffs imposed by the 
previous administration-formed precisely by those “same elements that are today up 
in arms”-on the chickpea, of which marketing was vital for the producers of Sonora 
and Sinaloa. According to the same informer, Azana’s government had also shown 
greater understanding concerning the well-known bullfighter’s conflict, less 
important than the chickpea issue “but more spectacular.” “For all these reasons,” 
ended the unnamed informant “there is nothing questionable about Mexican 
economic cooperation with Spain.”40
It was true that Mexico sold beans, livestock, coffee, asphalt and forage to 
Spain. From Spain, it imported wine, olive oil, spirits and cider, cigarette paper, 
canned seafood, books, almonds, olives and firearms. It followed that there was 
nothing exceptional in Mexico wanting to even up its trade balance with Spain. Even 
Mexican conservatives could not oppose the reasoning used by the bureaucrat to 
justify the legality of the transactions.
However, the fact that the dealings made Mexican officials feel uneasy about 
possible international repercussions is underlined by the fact that on August 25, as a 
pre-emptive step to avert complaints from other governments, and to widen its 
margin of manoeuvre, the Foreign Ministry issued an unwarranted note stating that
39 ibid.
40 Excelsior, August 21, 1936.
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Mexico had not signed any agreement preventing American nations from selling 
arms to Spain, nor that it had not received any communication over the matter from 
the American government.41
Pujadas issued an “official” communique condemning the Mexican 
government for selling arms to the Republicans, setting up a volunteer Mexican 
legion to fight in Spain, and for breaching “the neutrality that European countries had 
attempted to establish.”42 Over a week later, the Spanish Rebels themselves sent a 
formal note of protest to the Mexican government concerning the sale of weapons to 
the Republic. Miguel Cabanellas, leader of the insurgent Junta de Defensa Nacional, 
accused the Mexican government of violating the doctrine of non-intervention by 
aiding the “Communists”, and announced that his government would not honour any 
agreement between Mexico and the Spanish Republic.43
These complaints went unanswered as Cardenas only acknowledged the sale at 
his State of the Nation address before the Mexican Congress on September 1, 1936, 
when the Magallanes was already on the high seas; giving even precise information 
about the volume and value of the materials it carried. The announcement prompted 
an ovation from the Mexican deputies to Gordon-Ordas, who sat glowing in the 
assembly’s gallery. Cardenas’ speech had an immediate international resonance, with 
most leading newspapers carrying out the message.44
In spite of the manifold difficulties that Gordon-Ordas had to cope with, the 
journey started under good auspices. Back in the ship, it turned out that the sealed 
envelope referred to by the press contained ciphered codes so the vessel might 
communicate with the Republican government or with Loyalists ships, as well as 
precise instructions about the conduct that its crew should follow so as not to fall into 
the hands of the insurgents. To avert such a contingency the Ministry of State decided 
on a straightforward route with only one stop in Curasao to restock the steamship 
with fuel and water before continuing on to Cartagena bound for Barcelona.
41 El Nacional, August 26, 1936.
42 AHSRE, Ramon M. de Pujadas al Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City, August 13,
1936.
43 AHSRE “La Junta de Defensa Nacional a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores”, Burgos, August 
21, 1936.
44 See, among others, New York Times, September 3, 1936; The Times, September 4, 1936.
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The crossing of the Straits of Gibraltar was the expedition’s critical moment. 
Argiielles later described that during the passage he heard one of Queipo de Llano’s 
nightly broadcasts on the radio. The histrionic General ominously proclaimed:
The reds say we shall not pass. Let me say this. It is the Magallanes that 
shall not pass. We have located it and tomorrow we shall soon be updating 
you about its capture.
Argiielles had strict orders to sink the ship before letting it fall into rebels’ 
hands.45 Providentially, a loyal ship, the Cervantes, came across, its crew “noisily 
roaring ovations for Mexico and Cardenas.” Without further delay, the destroyer 
Sanchez Barcaitzegui escorted the Magallanes through the Straits. The crossing 
started at 8 p.m. and from Ceuta a powerful searchlight beamed over them. At 8:15 
a.m., two German airplanes flew at an altitude of 4000 metres over the convoy, well 
out of reach of the Sanchez Barcaitzegui1 s anti-aerial artillery and dropped bombs at 
the Magallanes, which was able to elude them by steering in zigzag. By the evening, 
the Magallanes was subject to new bombings; this time by Italian bombers, which 
dropped 16, further bombs.46 Although the Associated Press gave the false version 
that the ship had been captured at Vigo,47 the ship arrived safely in Cartagena, where 
the unloading of armaments took place amidst cheering crowds hailing Cardenas and 
Mexico.
The Mexican arms arrived at a crucial stage of the war when the Nationalists 
had opened the route to Madrid. The amount of arms sent by Mexico was by no 
means negligible taking into account the relation of forces at that stage. At the battle 
of Madrid, in early November, 15,000 to 20,000 militias opposed 30,000 rebels
AO 9
according to General Rojo. Toledo, where the only ammunition factory existed, was 
in the Republic’s hands, but Lugones, the provider of cartridges, was isolated and in
45 El Nacional October 6, 1936.
46 El Nacional, October 7, 1936.
47 Excelsior, October 4, 1936.
48 Vicente Rojo Asi fue la defensa de Madrid. Aportacion a la historia de la guerra de Espana 
Mexico, Editorial Era, 1969 pp.42-43. Hugh Thomas credits the populace of Madrid with the defeat of 
a well-equipped army of 20, 000 Moroccans, op. cit., pp.409-412.
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any case, the factory’s capacity was not enough to furnish the Republic’s needs.49 
The powder factories of Seville and Granada had already fallen to the Nationalists.
On the word of Simeon-Vidarte, the Mexican rifles served to arm the numerous 
contingents of volunteers and the newly formed International Brigades.50 The fact 
that these arms were of standard quality made them all the more valuable, 
considering that other rifles at hand were old, miscellaneous, and sometimes even 
perfectly useless. George Orwell, fighting as a volunteer at the Aragon front with the 
POUM’s militias, had ample praise for the Mexican cartridges, which because of 
their quality were “saved for the machine guns.”51 According to the Manchester 
Guardian's correspondent in Spain, Frank Jellinek, the Mexican rifles were: 
“Excellent, lighter than the Spanish Mauser type, carrying two magazines of five 
cartridges.”52 Largo Caballero distributed the rifles himself.53 Other versions suggest 
that Commander Vittorio Vidali (Carlos) himself distributed these rifles at the 
Cuartel de la Montana in Madrid. As few or none of the improvised soldiers knew 
how to use the rifles, it became necessary to train militias in their use. Apparently, 
some Mexican officers cooperated in the drills.54 Again, according to Jellinek, by 
September 22 new reserves arrived from the provinces, among them, the Durruti 
Column:
The new troops were flung straight into the Tagus Valley, amid frantic 
cheers. This had been made possible by the arrival of arms from Mexico.
The Mexican arms had enabled Madrid to throw the reserves against the 
Tagus front and to hold the rebel advance for a month.55
According to Alpert most of the Mexican rifles were lost in the rout of the 
Spanish militia that summer and autumn.56 More significant, perhaps, than the actual
49 On September 28, 1936, Toledo fell to the Nationals and the militia fled leaving behind the entire 
contents of the arms factory. See Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p.363.
50 Juan Simeon-Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1973, 
pp.426-428 and 787-788.
51 George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia. Middlesex, Penguin, 1988.
52 Frank Jellinek, The Civil War in Spain. London Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938. p.489.
53 Manuel Azana, “Articulos sobre la guerra de Espana” in Obras Completas Vol.III, Mexico, Oasis, 
1967. p.489.
54 Santiago Alvarez, Historia politico y  militar de las Brigadas Intemacionales. Madrid, Compania 
Literaria ,1996. p. 288.
55 Frank Jellinek,op. cit., p.489.
56 Michael Alpert, op. cit., p. 108.
155
Mexican Arms for Republican Spain
number of guns was the symbolic importance of their timely arrival: the arms landed 
in Spain when everybody else was denying them to the Republic.
I n t e r n a t io n a l  R e a c t io n s  t o  M e x ic a n  I n v o l v e m e n t  in  t h e  S p a n is h  W a r
The Mexican government was criticised internationally for its role in supplying 
weapons to the Spanish Republic. President Justo of Argentina and his chancellor, 
and that year’s Nobel Prize for Peace winner, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, privately 
deplored the operation yet stopped short of a formal protest.57 Brazil received the 
news without surprise as it considered Mexico, Russia and Spain “the advance guard 
of international communism.”58 The Chilean government appeared to have been far 
more disturbed by an arms sale, which it regarded as a “shameless service to the 
Soviets.”59 The Mexican Ambassador in Santiago, Ramon P. Denegri warned the 
Mexican government about an imminent rupture of diplomatic relations between 
Mexico and Chile, due to the strong feelings that Mexican aid to the Republic had 
aroused there.
From Lisbon, the Mexican charge d’affairs, Daniel Cosio Villegas, informed 
the Mexican Foreign Ministry that relations with Portugal were becoming “strained” 
due to Mexican aid to the “Reds.” Furthermore, he stated, the Portuguese newspapers 
frequently published derogatory articles against Mexico, making Mexico’s position 
in Portugal “untenable.”60 Predictably, Nationalist Spain reacted with anger to 
Mexican support of the Republic. In one of his nightly broadcasts from Radio 
Seville, Queipo de Llano lashed out at the Mexican government:
The Mexican people is subjugated by a gang of brigands comparable to that, 
which dominates Madrid. Thus it does not surprise me in the least that
57 Alberto Enriquez Perea (compiler) Alfonso Reyes y  el llanto de Espana en Buenos Aires 1936-
1937. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico/Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998. pp.28-30.
58 AHSRE (Mexican Ambassador to Brazil), “Jose Ruben Romero a la Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores”, exp. Ill- 548-2.
59 AHSRE “Denegri a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, III 1510 (46) “37/1”, February 10, 1937.
60 A flyer circulated widely in Lisbon depicting a woman, allegorically representing Spain, being 
stabbed with daggers that distinctly displayed the names of Mexico and the Soviet Union. See 
AHSRE, III 516 (46-0) 9731 no. 10, “Cosio Villegas a Eduardo Hay”, November 7, 1936.
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Mexico sympathises with the Reds as it is ruled by a government that 
murders and steals from its people as much as it can.61
Unlike the German government, which, owing to its aims to challenge 
American hegemony in the Western hemisphere, wished to improve the bilateral 
relation, and boost further its already rising position in the Mexican economy by way
A 9  • • • •of diplomatic courtesies, the German press harshly criticised the Mexican position. 
An article titled Mexican Perversities attributed Mexico’s stance to the fact that its 
ideology was identical to that of the “Spanish Bolsheviks”:
...Although Mexico support the reds, pretending them to be the authentic 
government of Spain, the Non-intervention Committee shall see to it that this 
will not be the case.63
On repeated occasions throughout 1937, German Minister in Mexico, Rudt 
Von Collenberg had to come forward and refute persistent rumours, which implied 
that Germany was about to sever its diplomatic links with Mexico on account of that 
country’s support to the Republic.64 Privately, in his communications to the 
Wilhelmstrasse, Von Collenberg ridiculed Mexican backing of the Republic, 
attributing it to the “Indian blood” of the President and to the “widespread aboriginal 
mentality, which is so difficult to fathom for a white man.”
The Italian government was far more outspoken in its criticism of Mexican 
involvement in the Spanish War, issuing a note through its Ambassador in London, 
Dino Grandi, warning Mexico not to meddle in affairs in which it had no concern, 
and thus preserve peace in Europe.65
61 AHSRE, III-510 (46) 36-III-766-1.
62 Brigida Von Mentz, et al, Los empresarios alemanes, el Tercer Reich y  la oposicion de derecha a 
Cardenas, vol. II, pp. 86-88.
63 Dortmunder Zeitung, April 1, 1937 cited in AHSRE, “Azcarate a la Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores”III-510 (46) 37-III-769-3.
64 AHSRE, II-766-2, Alemania, actitud ante la rebelion de Espana, Rudt von Collenberg to Foreign 
Minister Eduardo Hay, February 3, 1937.
65 By covering up illegal trafficking for the Communists, Mexico is disturbing European Peace”. 
Italian Ambassador to London, Dino Grandi, in Giomale di Italia, March 24, 1937. p.l See also 
Popolo di Italia and II Messagero, same date “Mexico, a country which has notoriously become the 
main agent of Soviet and French contraband of war materials and volunteers to Spain, thus overtly 
favouring Red Anarchy’.
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The sale was ill received by the Great Britain, which considered it 
acrimoniously as an act of inadmissible intervention by a lesser Latin-American 
nation in strictly European affairs. British-Mexican relations were far from 
harmonious and had been steadily deteriorating over Cardenas’ backing of the petrol 
workers’ trade union against British-owned oil concerns in Mexico, which would 
ultimately lead to the expropriation of those interests by the Mexican government. 
Within the British Foreign Office there existed among officials directly concerned 
with Mexican affairs a deeply ingrained bias against the Mexican revolutionary 
regime, comparable to the preconceived notions that the chancellery held against the 
Spanish Republic, if only compounded by overt racial prejudice.66
Thus, the Foreign Office not only refused to sell Mexico 30 thousand rifles and 
30 million cartridges, for fear that their ultimate destination was Spain, but also 
brusquely demanded a ‘clarification’ of what it deemed as contradictory aspects of 
Mexican policy towards the Civil War: on one hand, the promotion of non­
intervention, which Mexico had vehemently advocated at the Buenos Aires Pan- 
American Conference, and on the other, its actual aid to the Republican government. 
Mexican Minister in London, Narciso Bassols, then serving as Mexican Minister to 
London, notified Hay that the British government considered these policies as being 
“mutually incongruous and diplomatically confusing.” In a formal protest, Britain 
expressed, without any diplomatic restraint, its alarm over the September 1936 arms 
sale. Furthermore, Britain warned the U.S. of Mexican intentions in connection with 
the Spanish conflict.67
More gravely perhaps, the United States found Mexican transhipment of 
American arms to Spain through its territory “unfortunate” and contrary to its own 
neutrality. The prevailing isolationist mood was a reaction to American involvement 
in the First World War. During the Abyssinian crisis of 1935, Roosevelt secured 
from Congress the endorsement of a neutrality law by which it was declared unlawful 
for American citizen to sell arms to any nation at war. By early January 1937, this
66 For a thorough account of Anglo-Mexican relations in the first half of the Twentieth Century, with 
references aplenty of British imperial arrogance against the Mexican Revolution see: Lorenzo Meyer, 
Su Majestad Britanica contra Mexico. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1993.
67 PRO, FO 371/20634. See also AHSRE III-510 (46) 37-3-770-5.
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ruling was extended to civil wars in order to avoid American involvement in the 
Spanish conflict.
Several officials at the State Department such as the American Ambassadors to 
Spain and Mexico, Claude Bowers and Josephus Daniels, or the Undersecretary 
Sumner Welles himself were pro-Republican. Notwithstanding, the Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, was averse to any kind of American involvement in the conflict, 
as he thought any such move might compromise the Good Neighbour policy by 
putting at loggerheads the Spanish-American nations with each other, and it was
iTQ
ultimately his view that would prevail inside the cabinet. Moreover, both 
Conservative Republicans and the Catholic lobby-a key reserve of votes for the 
Democrat ticket- sternly opposed any American cooperation with the Republic in an 
electoral year, driving Roosevelt to pursue an isolationist course.
In early January 1, 1937, it was reported that several American planes bought 
by Mexican middlemen had been re-licensed, converted into military planes and 
resold to the Spanish Ambassador in order to be sent to Spain.69 A political scandal 
ensued. The Washington Herald of the Hearst press group played up the story, 
accusing the Mexican government of “arming the Reds” and of violating the 
American neutrality act by way of contraband and transhipment through Mexican 
facilities. Under severe pressure, Mexican charge d’affairs in Washington, Luis 
Quintanilla, published a statement refuting these versions and declared that Mexico 
had not purchased any sort of ammunition in the U.S. for re-shipment to Spain. He 
then reported to the Mexican Foreign Ministry that: “the good name of Mexico is 
being gravely affected here.”70
Since the commencement of the Spanish war, Cardenas had attached special 
importance to convincing the United States of the justice of the Republican cause. On 
several occasions, the Mexican President wrote personal letters to Roosevelt asking 
him to intervene on the Republic’s behalf. As late as June 17, 1937 Cardenas still
68 Claude Bowers, My Mission to Spain. New York, 1945. p. 60-62; Richard P. Traina, American 
Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War Blooomington, Indiana University Press, 1968, pp.153-155.
69 New York Times, January 1, 1937.
70 New York Times, January 3, 1937.
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71suggested Roosevelt to use his country’s moral prestige to stop fascist intervention. 
The United States, however, maintained its neutrality policy, endorsing the Non­
intervention Committee. Far from heeding Cardenas’ intimations, Roosevelt, firmly 
intent on avoiding domestic strife over the issue, coolly urged Cardenas to stop 
transhipment of American weapons and aircraft to Spain.
Until January 8, 1937, the shipment of arms from the U.S. had been lawful. 
However, licenses issued to dealers in armaments for the exportation of war materials 
to third countries expressly forbade their re-shipment to Spain. Still, it would have 
been perfectly legal for a third nation to re-export American material from its 
territory on grounds of sovereignty. The State Department itself acknowledged that 
no base existed for a diplomatic protest to Mexico on that score. Yet, even if no 
infringement of Mexican law was involved, nor any act incompatible with any 
Mexican-American agreement, Cardenas yielded to American pressure, no doubt 
anxious that a refusal to do so might bring about harsher reprisals, including renewed 
armed intervention.
In response to Roosevelt’s exigencies, Cardenas set a limit to his policy: 
Mexico would serve as an intermediary only with the express consent of the third 
party involved in the operation. A presidential statement in that sense was issued on 
January 3, 1937:
The Mexican government has in fact supplied war materials of its own 
production to the government of Spain. Notwithstanding, with regard to war 
materials of foreign origin, it has been its firm position that it would not 
serve as intermediary if the government of the nation concerned did not 
grant its full consent thereto. In accordance with this line, Mexican 
authorities will not authorize airplanes or any other military equipment 
whatsoever coming from the United States to be sent to Spain through 
Mexico, even in the case of purchases made by corporations of private 
parties.72
New evidence has shown that despite this claim, Mexico did partake in covert 
operations. Cardenas’ apparent conformity to these pressures, notwithstanding,
71 Friedrich Schuler, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
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provoked a negative response among many officials within his government, many of 
whom considered it an unacceptable limitation to Mexico’s legitimate aid to Loyalist 
Spain. In an extreme case, the head of the Mexican Air Force, General Roberto Fierro 
Villalobos reportedly resigned when Cardenas refused to ship a load of previously 
purchased American planes to the Republican government.
M is c e l l a n e o u s  S h ip m e n t s
Most previous studies of the Spanish Civil War have limited themselves to making 
passing reference to the Mexican arms remittance of September 1936 as a token of 
Mexican support towards the Republic. In fact, there were several other deliveries. In 
defiance of criticism abroad and dim support at home, the Mexican government 
continued to succour Republican Spain. In the wake of the Magallanes ’ success, 
other expeditions were launched. Some would be equally fortunate; others never left 
ground and yet others ended in tragic failure as will be seen next.
Prompted by the safe arrival of the Magallanes, Gordon-Ordas set out to 
arrange new arms shipments. An opportunity arose as the former prison-ship, Sil, 
arrived at Veracruz becoming readily available for the haulage of arms consignments. 
On January 12 1937, the Sil transported from Veracruz to Santander three Lockheed 
aircraft, (among them, the Anahuact presented by Fierro Villalobos) 2, 000 Mexican 
made Mauser 7mm rifles, 100 Mendoza type machine guns, 8 million cartridges, 100 
Mendoza machine-rifles and 24 cannons-types unspecified-with 15, 000 shells.74 
The vessel had left Veracruz on December 22, 1936, transporting in addition 600
*JC
metric tons of sugar, and thousands of uniforms for schoolchildren.
Arms deliveries continued on a steady rhythm, and a month later the French 
Minister in Mexico reported to the Quai d ’Orsay that Mexico had sent to Spain an 
extra 5,000 Mexican-made Mauser rifles, model 1934, 2 million 7mm cartridges, 13, 
000 hand-grenades, 65 “Mendoza-B” machine-guns, 7 artillery batteries (of which 2 
“Mondragon T.P.” 80 calibre type, 4 S. Canet 7mm calibre and 1 S. Vickers) for a
12 El Nacional, January 3, 1937.
73 New York Times, June 4, 1937, p.l 1.
74 Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain, op. cit. p. 172; Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p.770,
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total of 33 million and a half million French francs, or U.S. $ 638, 095.23, without
• 76revealing the name of the ship which had carried the freight or its port of arrival.
Amid these successes, other ventures were aborted due to the Spanish 
Embassy’s continuous lapses of security, the consequent leaks of confidential 
information and the relentless campaign of the Mexican conservative press against 
the Spanish Ambassador. In several cases Excelsior and El Universal made public 
precise details of planned undertakings, thus hindering Gordon-Ordas’ activities and 
exposing them to the Republic’s many enemies.
In February 1937, the Republicans asked for food and gasoline, which were to 
be exchanged for crude oil that the Spanish government had purchased before the 
war and was not able to refine, because most of the refineries had fallen into the 
hands of the rebels. Mexico sent at once 15,000 sacks of chickpea and other amounts 
of food, including sugar, butter and flour. Although Mexico agreed to the exchange 
scheme, the operation was rendered impossible since the British-owned refinery of 
Tampico refused to supply the Republicans because of the Non-intervention Pact 
resolutions.77
As the Republic expected more arms purchases to take place, it sent Gordon- 
Ordas through Paris and New York an initial instalment of six million dollars to pay 
for them. To his chagrin, Excelsior made the “sensational” revelation that since 
November 1936 the Spanish Ambassador had 9 million dollars deposited at the 
Banco Nacional de Mexico. Gordon-Ordas had been in effect empowered to procure 
second hand American aircraft-mostly transport and civil planes-to be adapted to 
war usage. Excelsior stressed the fact that the deposits had been placed under his 
name and not under the Embassy’s orders to suggest that the deposit had other uses
• 70beyond the normal expenses of the diplomatic representation. To make matters 
worse, the Midland Bank in London held back the deposit arguing that the Spanish 
Government had misspelled the last letter of the Ambassador’s second surname. The
75 Daily Worker, New York, December 1, 1936.
76 Ministere des Affaires Etrangers, B/281 No. 10. M. Henri Goiran, Ministre de la Republique 
fran?aise au Mexique a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangers. Paris February 
15, 1937.
77 AHSRE, III 1510 (46) 37/lb, “Valencia a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,” February 5, 1937 
“La Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores a Denegri, III 1510 (46) 37/1, February 16, 1937.
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order had to be made out again. The minute blunder, however, caused the collapse of 
several deals that had already been settled.79
On December 10 1936 the steamship Motomar had been confiscated by the 
Spanish State, as it travelled from Buenos Aires to Edyewater, New Jersey 
transporting a cargo of linseed.80 As its former holder, Garcia Diaz had filed a 
lawsuit against the Republican government in the U.S. on behalf of the Compania 
Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, the Spanish authorities ordered the ship to change 
course toward Veracruz to avoid legal action. The State Ministry notified Gordon- 
Ordas that as soon as it arrived in the Mexican port it should remain under his charge.
Q I
The Motomar reached Veracruz on December 31,1936.
From its arrival the steamship-which owing to breakdown had to stay a long 
time in Veracruz- was subject to the intrigues of Francoist Spaniards resident in that 
port. As a result of these intrigues, two officers and a steward deserted. Alarmed at 
the prospect of further desertions, Captain Dicenta advised the Ambassador to 
convert of the transatlantic into a war vessel subject to military discipline. Thus, a 
new transport became readily available for further covert ventures.
Two arms purchases arranged by Gordon-Ordas, one from Japan the other with 
Canada, had failed, while the American “moral embargo” held back the loading of 
the airplanes stationed at the Tejeria airdrome, making the departure of the Motomar 
unattainable. By August 1937, three airplanes had been loaded “discreetly.” 
However, fresh difficulties arose as the Motomar needed long overdue scraping of its 
hull and the closest dry docks where such operation could take place were in 
Galveston Texas and Bermuda. Owing to Garcia Diaz’s litigation, the American 
government offered no guarantees in the event that the vessel arrived to their coasts, 
making that choice implausible. The British Admiralty, in turn, granted permission 
for the vessel to enter into its colony to undergo repairs.
78 Excelsior, December 30, 1936.
79 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., pp.709-712.
80 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p.736.
81 PRO FO 371/21320 W1507.
82 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p. 740.
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Once in the Bermudas the naval authorities found out that the ship had a cargo 
of arms and munitions presenting the Captain with a perplexing alternative: to enter 
the dry dock the ship had to unload all war materials, but once these were unloaded 
they would be seized in view of its infringement of the law of arms exportation. A 
more pressing problem arose when Garcia Diaz appeared at Bermuda with the 
intention of claiming the Motomar back for his Company. As a result, Captain 
Fernando Dicenta left hastily to Veracruz where he arranged for divers to clean the 
Motomar by hand. The ship arrived on September 27, 1937 and was able to leave 
only on May 17, 1938 furtively to Antwerp. The boat was able to conceal the 
cannons it carried from the Belgian authorities, arriving ultimately in Barcelona. For 
15 months and 18 days, the Motomar was placed under the command of Gordon- 
Ordas.83
Shortly before, the Mexican government had offered Gordon-Ordas the 
services of an arms expert, Colonel Jesus Triana, to provide him technical support in 
his dealings in Bolivia. Several war implements left over from the Chaco War were 
on offer, and after Triana inspected their quality and condition and gave his approval, 
a sale was fixed on September 18 1937. The cargo left the Peruvian port of Mollendo 
on a Japanese transport the Florida Maru, bound for the Mexican port of Manzanillo 
in the Pacific. From Manzanillo a sealed train escorted by two platoons took the 
equipment to Veracruz where it was loaded in the Motomar and sent to Spain.84
T r a n s h ip m e n t  o f  A m e r ic a n  A ir c r a f t  t h r o u g h  M e x ic o
On September 28, 1936, Fernando de los Rios arrived in Washington as new Spanish 
Ambassador to Washington due to yet another diplomatic defection to the Francoist 
side. Along with him came a purchasing commission under Colonel Francisco Leon 
Trejo. At once, the delegation, which included Commander Jose Melendreras and 
Sergeant Francisco Corral, travelled to New York City with the aim of purchasing 
airplanes and war material in general. Through a Republican pilot resident in New 
York City, Captain Agustin Sainz Sanz, they entered in contact with an agent of
83 ibid, p.744.
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American Airlines who had nine Vultees stationed in New York City itself and five 
further in airports in the vicinity. The merchant offered all 14 aircraft at a price of $ 
22, 000 each. Although the Commission conveyed the proposal to the Ministries of 
Air and Navy and that these instances pledged to send the due funds, the money 
never arrived, thus bringing down the transaction. The significance of this failure is 
underlined by the fact that it was precisely at that crucial stage that the Republic lost 
its supremacy.
The arrival of the commission to the United States also meant that the 
Republicans were duplicating efforts aimlessly. Lack of coordination and 
communication between the different governmental instances caused Gordon-Ordas 
and Leon Trejo to act separately, without each other’s knowledge and, occasionally, 
even competing for the same aircraft and war material, a situation that which
or
American arms traffickers and brokers exploited to their own benefit. A turn for the 
worse occurred when the Spanish Air Ministry formed yet another commission, 
independent from those already operating under Gordon-Ordas and Trejo. This 
delegation, formed by Socialist deputy Alejandro Otero, the journalist Corpus Barga 
and Luis Prieto, had no success. For all their skill and dedication to the cause, theses 
men could barely discern a piece of artillery from another and were far from able as 
procurers. In one decisive occasion, they allotted astronomical sums to arms dealers
OiT
in exchange for war materials that never arrived.
Gordon-Ordas wrangled with both De los Rios and Alvarez del Vayo over the 
issue and demanded the Ministry of State exclusive authority over arms purchases 
made in the United States, basing his claim on the fact that the contracted arms 
would depart from Mexico. At first, Alvarez del Vayo rejected Gordon-Ordas 
arguments, ordering the two Ambassadors to settle their differences among 
themselves, but soon appeared to have yielded to the evidence that the duplication of 
efforts was backfiring.
Thus, on October 10, 1936 Melendreras was transferred to Mexico City and 
placed under Gordon-Ordas’ orders in an apparent effort to establish a single
84 Felix Palavicini, op. cit., p.265.
85 Gerald Howson, op. cit., p. 167.
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commission. At first, Melendreras contemplated the possibility of purchasing aircraft 
belonging to the Mexican Air Force, and duly approached Col. Fierro Villalobos. In a 
frank response, Colonel Fierro laid open before Melendreras the sorry state of the 
Mexican Air Force and the low speed of its planes.
The Mexican Air Force, in fact, had only thirty Corsair reconnaissance planes 
with an acceleration of only 150 kilometres per hour, and nine ‘consolidated’ two- 
engine planes, which could reach the same speed, lacking bombers or pursuit planes 
of any importance. Beyond the military aviation, there existed three Lockheed 
aeroplanes in Mexico, which could be converted into military use. On one of them, 
the Anahuac, Colonel Fierro had established a new record for a non-stop flight 
between Mexico City and New York, the former belonging to Amelia Earhart. The 
other two belonged to a German pilot, Fritz Bieler, which had acquired the Mexican 
citizenship, and to an unnamed Mexican General. The first could reach a speed of 
200 to 210 miles per hour, while the remaining two roughly 180 miles per hour.
A sale was agreed. Fierro and the commission fixed the price of the two latter 
planes at 70, 000 dollars while presenting his own to the Republic as a gift. The three 
planes were loaded on board the Sil and sent to Spain, together with an additional 
arms cargo that comprised motors, propellers and aeronautical radio equipment. All 
this material was loaded without any advance payment, as Colonel Fierro took full 
responsibility for its reimbursement, and, according to Melendreras “had no objection 
in collecting the debt after the shipment’s arrival in Santander, if the Spanish 
authorities ever decided to settle it.”
Once it became clear that Mexico could not provide for the Republic’s aerial 
requirements, Gordon-Ordas and Melendreras turned their attention to the U.S. as a 
potential source of arms supplies. To ensure the attainment of their dealings there 
they appealed for the assistance of Mexican authorities, which gladly obliged. 
Mexican Foreign Minister, Eduardo Hay, submitted accordingly a plan to the 
American Ambassador in Mexico City whereby the U.S. government would 
acquiesce to sell bombing planes to the Mexican Air force, which in turn would sell 
its available planes to the Republic. Daniels flatly turned the proposal deeming it at
86 Hugh Thomas, op. cit. p.337
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odds with American neutrality. A few weeks later the Mexican government insisted, 
this time through its Ambassador in Washington, Francisco Castillo Najera, who 
asked whether the State Department would simply permit the transhipment of 
American arms through Mexico. The Ambassador was “politely” informed that this 
would not be allowed and that the U.S. would stop any such effort by refusing to 
issue export licenses.87
Once the legal channels seemed exhausted, Melendreras and Gordon-Ordas 
decided with the seeming complicity of certain Mexican authorities to secretly 
purchase several aeroplanes and smuggle them into Mexico by illegally flying the 
planes across the border. Melendreras moved quickly and was able to close several 
deals with American aircraft brokers:
As soon as the funds arrived, I set out to procure a deal. I acted with the 
greatest possible haste as the American Prohibition Law had not been passed 
yet and because we had Cardenas’ promise that any war material in transit 
could freely leave the country. I was able to acquire immediately an Elektra 
which could speed 320 kilometres per hour, had a great bombing potential 
and was one of the most modem in the States, 6 twin-engine Condors, 
specially designed for night-bombing, 3 brand new Spartan reconnaissance 
planes, with a speed capability of 350km per hour; 3 large two-engine 
Boeings-, 2 Beecrchaff Bresse and a Seversky with a speed of 500 kilometres 
per hour. Altogether 28 planes were bought in great haste, some deceiving 
the vigilance of the American authorities, as the last ones were acquired 
after the passing of the prohibition act.88
Two flying aces, Cloyd Clevenger and Fritz Bieler together with other 
anonymous Mexican pilots were able to fly surreptitiously several planes from San 
Antonio, Texas and Calexico, California into the Veracruz airdrome of Tejeda. 
Altogether, 28 planes were smuggled in this fashion.
In the following months, the Treasury Department detected several cases of 
planes flown to Mexico to be sold without having been licensed, and begun an
87 Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War. Blooomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1968. p.78.
88 Jose Melendreras in Francisco Olaya, op. cit. p.414
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investigation over its whereabouts. American intelligence soon discovered the nature 
of the stratagem. By December 1936, so many planes of American manufacture had 
come into Gordon-Ordas’ possession that officers in the State Department referred to
OQ
them as “the Spanish Ambassador’s private collection.” These sources conveyed 
the information to the State Department, which in turn grimly threatened the Mexican 
government with ‘economic retribution’ if it did not put an end to the Spanish 
Embassy’s illegal dealings. Luis I. Rodriguez, Secretary of the Presidency, visited 
Gordon to inform him on behalf of the President that he should suspend immediately 
all deliveries of aircraft to Spain as the American Ambassador had officially 
demanded this.90
In the intervening time, the name of a certain Robert Cuse, “junk dealer from 
♦Jersey City,” starthngly splashed across the headlmes of most American
newspapers. On the previous day, the State Department had announced the granting 
of two export licenses to Cuse for the direct exportation to Bilbao of $ 2, 777, 000 
worth of airplanes, engines and spare parts.91 Cuse had ignored the moral 
admonitions and patriotic appeals of the U.S. government and chose instead to stress 
his legal rights. Cuse’s bold move portended the collapse of the American 
government’s “moral embargo.” There was reasonable alarm in Washington that 
others might seek to emulate his conduct. The American government’s response, 
accordingly, was swift and irate. At a press conference, President Roosevelt, 
denounced Cuse’s dealings as a “thoroughly legal but unpatriotic act.” He then 
announced that he had given his full consent to plans by congressional leaders to 
amend the American Neutrality act, making it extensive to civil conflicts, and, in 
consequence, to the Spanish situation.92
On January 1, 1937, Gordon-Ordas hastily travelled to Washington in an 
attempt to settle the damning consequences caused by Cuse’s announcement. In a
89 Richard P. Traina, op.cit., p.78.
90 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op cit., p. 759.
a|e
An Estonian, naturalised American, Robert Cuse was President of the Vimalert Company of Jersey 
City, founded in 1925. Cuse had sold air-engines and second-hand aircraft to the USSR in the early 
thirties, giving rise to wild speculations about him being a Soviet agent.
91 New York Times, December 28, 1936; Washington Post, same date.
92 New York Times, December 30, 1936.
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vain attempt to keep a low profile in the face of unwanted attention, he travelled 
accompanied by his wife and daughter on one of the commercial planes he had 
bought to convert in military aircraft and that he had stationed at the airport of 
Tejeria in Veracruz. The plane, flown by Cloyd Clevenger, almost crashed near 
Brownsville, Texas. The incident was given wide publicity by the Mexican press, 
making it extremely difficult for Gordon-Ordas to undertake further ventures.93 The 
Mexican government also came into the spotlight bringing about renewed pressure 
from the American government to stop the transhipment scheme.
In view of the annulment of the American link, Colonel Fierro Villalobos, 
proposed and persuaded Gordon-Ordas to open a Seversky aircraft factory in Mexico 
with Republican subsidy. In due course, a representative of the Seversky Company 
travelled to Mexico to close the deal. Even before the settlement particulars could be 
formalised, the Ministry of Navy rejected the proposal, asking instead, against all 
rationality, for the delivery of more American aircraft. Gordon insisted that it was 
impossible for the company to export directly to Spain from the U.S., but that 
Cardenas had agreed to authorise the remittance of parts to be assembled in Spain 
provided that they were made in Mexico. Gordon insisted that production in Mexico 
could be more beneficial due to the cheaper work force there. Alvarez del Vayo 
rejected the proposal deeming the entire scheme “far too complicated and onerous.”94 
Thus a cheap, imaginative and legal solution to the Republic’s aerial needs, which 
might also have collaterally contributed to the development of a Mexican air 
industry, was called off.
F a i l e d  E x p e c t a t io n s .  T h e  J o u r n e y  o f  t h e  M a r  Ca n t a b r ic o
The merchant ship Mar Cantabrico had left Valencia on August 1936 bound to New 
York. Upon orders from the Ministry of State, it stayed there for several months 
awaiting Gordon-Ordas’ attempts to secure arms deals in the United States. Gordon- 
Ordas was trying to load the ship with American arms material, when preparations 
for a decree banning all arms shipments to Spain began at the American Congress. A
93 Excelsior, January 2, 3 and 4, 1936.
94 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p. 757.
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race thus began the Spanish buyers and the American legislators, with the 
Magallanes’ crew hurriedly loading as much provisions as possible, with the view of 
proceeding onward to Veracruz, where the freight was to be supplemented with 
Mexican arms material.
On January 6, 1937, the Mar Cantabrico left New York to Veracruz with a 
cargo of armament. That same day, urged by Roosevelt, two American Congressmen, 
Senator Key Pittman and Representative McReynolds, presented drafts of law by 
which arm shipments to Spain would henceforth be banned.
Further obstacles for the Spanish scheme arose when two American pilots who 
deserted the Republican cause, Bert Acosta and Gordon Barry, both of whom had 
served as legionnaires in the Republican Air Force under the so-called “Yankee 
Escadrille” on autumn 1936, claimed (falsely) that the Republic owed them 1,200 
dollars in back pay. On these grounds, the American pilots convinced the port of 
New York authority to serve a writ against the Captain of the Mar Cantabrico.95
Offered with such an unexpected opportunity to delay further the ship’s 
departure before the resolution was passed, American conservatives pressed the 
authorities, which obliged and detained the vessel. By way of a faulty case, the ship 
narrowly avoided the last hurdle as the port controller, Harry Duening, dropped the 
writ deeming it inapplicable.96
A technical error in the Senate had prevented the resolution from becoming law 
until the 7th, and on the 8th the Mar Cantabrico left New York in great haste, lest the 
law would be passed, leaving behind the bulk of Cuse’s original cargo. Hours later 
the new arms embargo, promoted by Pittman and Mac Reynolds, went into effect. By 
then, Cuse had already loaded the vessel with 11 airplanes, food and clothes. 
According to the Times' correspondent, the Cantabrico carried merchandise, planes
07and motors from the Vimalert Company of Jersey City valued at 2,777,000 dollars.
The ship arrived at Veracruz on January 13, where it was put under the custody 
of the Spanish Embassy. On the bridge, its sailors spread out a banner that
95 Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain pp. 182-183.
96 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p.427.
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• OR * •proclaimed Glory to Mexico. Anti-fascist Spain salutes you. The boat’s political 
delegate, Jose Otero, sent through the Mexican official paper El Nacional a 
“Message o f Gratitude to the Mexican Nation” drawing further attention to the ship’s 
presence in Veracruz."
Such a bombastic display could not help either the Republican cause or the 
Cardenas government. There was a justified alarm among Mexican official circles 
about possible American reprisals. In the U.S., Mexican support for the Loyalist 
cause had already provoked a political scandal spearheaded by the Hearst press, 
which questioned alleged breaches of U.S. neutrality in the Spanish conflict, finding 
an immediate echo among American conservative circles.
While on the surface it appeared as if Cardenas had given in to Roosevelt’s 
request of cancelling the delivery to Spain and promising not to send American made 
weapons through Mexico in the future, evidence suggests otherwise. In spite of 
Gordon’s refutations, and assurances given by the Mexican government, an 
additional cargo of assorted Mexican arms and munitions was loaded in the Mar 
Cantabrico.10° Gordon-Ordas performed the operation with the full connivance of the 
Mexican Minister of Defence, Manuel Avila Camacho.101 Avila Camacho helped the 
Spanish Ambassador while Cardenas was temporarily away from the capital in one of 
his frequent nation-wide tours. In that same course, the War Minister also agreed to 
allow an undisclosed number of planes to be embarked on board of the Ibai. The Ibai 
left Veracruz on December 29, 1937. The remaining aircraft, eighteen planes, which 
included six Curtis Condors and three Boeing 247s remained in Mexican territory, 
and were later sold to pay for the support of Spanish Republican refugees arriving in 
Mexico.102
Despite all the precautions taken by the Mexican military authorities, the 
imprudence displayed by the Spanish crew during the entire operation was so great 
that even the slightest details of its contents and schedule were accurately leaked.
97 cf. The Times, January 6, 1937 with Excelsior, December 30, 1936, and Hugh Thomas, p.426.
98 Excelsior, January 14, 1937.
99 El Nacional, January 17, 1937.
100 Gerald Howson, op cit., p. 183.
101 T.G. Powell, op cit., pp. 72-73.
102 http://www.fuerzas armadas.mx.com
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According to several newspapers, various Mexican communists had embarked on the 
Mar Cantabrico,103 At first, it was decided that it should set sail by February 17. On 
the 13th, it went to Tampico where it loaded oil, returning to Veracruz on the 16th. 
An inquisitive press closely monitored each and every of its movements.
Unsurprisingly, when it finally set sail on the 19th its freight was no secret to 
anyone. Excelsior reported on February 20, 1937 that the vessel carried 14 million 
7mm cartridges, aircraft and war material bought in New York, 50 cannons of 
diverse calibres and a group of volunteers of different nationalities. 18 unassembled 
planes, clothes, uniforms, shoes, medicines, foodstuffs, medical instruments, gas 
bombs, radio transmitters, machine guns, rifles and 25 million expansive bullets were 
loaded in Veracruz. The near coincidence of these figures with those advanced by 
Gordon-Ordas fully attests to the clumsiness with which the whole operation was 
conducted.104
Like other ships performing analogous missions, the Mar Cantabrico carried 
precise instructions as well as secret codes of transmission to communicate with 
Santander, Bilbao and the Republican fleet. As with the Magallanes, Gordon-Ordas 
had the ship fitted with a powerful short-wave transmitter to keep personal contact 
with Captain Santamaria. The Ambassador received radiograms on the 21 and the 23 
stating that everything went ‘as planned’. He replied that he had received the 
messages and wished them luck in the enterprise. The ship had set sail originally 
bound for the Mediterranean port of Cartagena. While on route, it received an order 
to change course and go north to the port of Bilbao. Apparently, it established contact 
with a coastal station without revealing its identity, asking for a plane squadron to 
escort it into the port. This alerted the Nationalist fleet, which set out immediately 
after the transport.105
On the 25th, the Mar Cantabrico informed Gordon that they had flown the 
British flag, in what would ultimately prove a vain attempt to baffle the rebel fleet. 
Moreover, the crew painted the ship to disguise further its identity. Under
103 El Universal and Excelsior, February 7 and 8, 1937.
104 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op cit., p. 751.
105 Jose Luis Paz Duran, 28 meses a bordo del Canarias 1936-39, La Coruna, Edicios do Castro, 1991
p.118.
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instructions from Alvarez del Vayo Gordon-Ordas authorised the stratagem but told 
Santamaria to hoist the Spanish flag as they approached the Spanish coast in order to 
avoid impoundment by British or French ships enforcing the non-intervention 
agreement. There was considerable anxiety about the ship’s route, as the Franco- 
British blockade would go in effect on March 3.
That precise date the Magallanes sent a cable to Mexico City wire reporting 
“all quiet, bad weather.” Everything appeared to be on schedule. Barely twenty-four 
hours had elapsed though when Gordon-Ordas caught an unintelligible message 
signed by the Captain “but not credibly drafted by him”, causing him to suspect the 
outbreak of a mutiny on board.106 Two days later Gordon received yet another 
message- in what would turn out to be the last-also clumsily encoded. Out from the 
gibberish Gordon was able to infer that the ship would not arrive as had been 
scheduled, asking instead to arrive to Santander by night. The unintelligible wire also 
asked the Republican Air Force not to fly over the vessel in order to avoid drawing 
the Nationalists’ attention. In turn, Gordon radioed the Ministry of Navy requesting 
the Republican fleet to escort the ship towards a safe port. As on many other 
occasions, the plea went unheeded.
On March 9, the newspapers carried the publication of vague and contradictory 
reports. Some papers conjectured that the Mar Cantabrico had been sunk. Others 
asserted that distress signals had been received in Santander from a mysterious ship 
that was being attacked by a Nationalist vessel. According to an account originating 
from London, a British destroyer, the Echo, had crossed communication with the 
Canarias by which the rebel cruiser had informed its captain that the Mar Cantabrico
1 0 7had sank in the Gulf of Biscay and that they had rescued its crew. Another version 
published the day after by El Nacional speculated over “authoritative reports” that its 
burden had been conveyed to other Loyalist ships in high seas, and that the rebels had 
only managed to sink an “empty nutshell.”108
On March 10, Excelsior reproduced information originating from London’s 
Evening Standard confirming that the Canarias had captured the Mar Cantabrico
106 Felix Gordon-Ordas, 1965, p.747.
107 Excelsior, March 9, 1937. El Universal, March 9, 1936.
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and escorted it back to Ferrol together with its crew. Warned by the excessive 
publicity given to the affair and by the Portuguese Navy intelligence reports, the 
Nationalists had established a blockade with the Canarias, the Espana and the 
Velasco at the Cantabrian Sea. Captain Salvador Moreno of the Canarias had precise 
instructions to capture the ship ever since its very departure from Veracruz. Thanks 
to Francoist secret agents in Mexico, the naval officer had precise information about 
of its outline, the contents of its freight and its planned course. Furthermore, he had 
been alerted that the vessel would attempt to pass for the Adda. The Canarias 
positioned itself off Bordeaux, where it was notified about the “suspicious” 
movements of a “mysterious” ship. Once alerted over its presence, three Nationalist 
ships rushed towards the designated area.
On March 8, the Canarias stopped a merchant ship suspected of being the Mar 
Cantabrico. The latter tried to deceive the Nationalist flotilla by transmitting reports 
in English. This did not deter Moreno who ordered the merchant to surrender. As 
there was no reply to its signals, the Canarias fired a warning shot which stroke the 
prow of the Mar Cantabrico, instantly sparking a fire inside the ship’s compartments. 
The disguised ship was still able to send an SOS to the British fleet seeking 
protection. By sheer coincidence, the appeal was caught by the Aba of the Elder- 
Dempster Company. The British ship re-transmitted the plea to a flotilla of British 
destroyers, which rushed to its rescue. Still, the poor repainting of the ship was not 
enough not deceive the captain of the Canarias, Salvador Moreno, who no doubt 
helped by the ship’s calls for help in pidgin, moved on to seize it. The first appeal for 
help said literally: “We are in danger stoped (sic) by unknown battleship. In danger 
we neeks halp.”(sic)109
Four English destroyers-the Echo, the Eclipse, the Escapade and another not 
identified-a French gunboat, the Cameleyre, and several fishing boats arrived at the 
scene in an attempt to rescue the embattled vessel. After an hour or so of 
consultations with Moreno, the British officers politely accepted his explanation that 
the steamship was not the Adda but the Mar Cantabrico and left the area. In defiance
m  El National, March 10, 1937.
109 Michael Alpert, La guerra civil espanola en el mar. Madrid, Siglo XXI de Espana Editores, 1987, 
pp.216-217.
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of the British flag and the name it displayed, the Canarias had sided round the ship 
twice, comparing its profile with that of the described Mar Cantabrico. From the 
nationalist ship, signals were conveyed and warnings were made through a 
megaphone. As no one replied, Moreno ordered a warning shot to be fired and when 
there was no reply, the captain sent an advance guard to board it.
The Republic’s daring attempt to conceal the vessel’s identity under an English 
name provoked the wrath of the British Parliament, with several Conservative MPs 
protesting on the 15th against what they deemed an inadmissible hoax. The Foreign 
Office replied to these objections by saying that the attempted stratagem had been a 
ruse de guerre that was perfectly justified by International Law.110
Five Italians and five Mexicans travelling on board as “passengers” were 
arrested and taken along to the nationalist-controlled port. Months later Excelsior 
revealed the ultimate fate of the imprisoned Mexicans. The only survivor from the 
carnage, a Mexican woman named Socorro Barberan, went to tell what had really 
happened. After their arrest, on March 15, the four Mexicans were subject to court- 
martial, and sentenced to death in spite of requests for clemency made by the 
honorary Consul of Mexico at Coruna, the Portuguese authorities and the professed 
assurances given by Franco himself. At the trial, the prosecutor referred to the 
Mexicans as “freebooters” who had left their country “to plunder Spain” On the 
other hand, the prosecutor asked Barberan’s life to be spared on account of her 
gender and the requests for clemency of the Mexican honorary consul in Coruna. In 
due course, she was confined at the Navy’s Hospital in Ferrol before being deported 
to Portugal shortly after.111
Four Mexican citizens, Manuel Zavala, 21 years; Carlos Gallo Perez-both from 
Guadalajara-and Ricardo Solorzano, from Ameca and Alejandro Franco from 
Mexico were held as prisoners in Ferrol. In due course, they were sentenced to death. 
An official statement issued through the press by the Mexican Foreign Ministry 
reported that the three men were subject to torture and untold humiliation before
110 ibid., p. 218.
111 Excelsior, July 19, 1937.
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being executed. They were displayed in a cage over a lorry, and paraded through the 
streets of Ferrol with the cage bearing a sign that proclaimed:
These are the Mexican Communist invaders" The boys took all these 
mistreatments with great serenity and courage, even before being cowardly 
shot by a firing squad in front of a vile mob.112
General Queipo de Llano, true to his style, tried to deride the cargo deeming it 
useless:
We found on board of the ship a Douglas motor, which had been used for 
more than 800 hours. The motor set off when we tried to put it in one of our 
planes. We found also twelve cannons that date from the time of the Deluge 
and which will only come in handy as ornament for our gardens.113
Queipo’s mocking words notwithstanding, the material on board seemed to 
have been considerable, and ultimately put to use against the Basques in the Battle of 
Bilbao judging by the testimony of Jose Luis Paz Duran, officer of the Canarias who 
wrote down about the impounded materials:
This is the best seizure made by our squadron. The Cantabrico carried arms 
material worth of 300 million pesetas. With this blow, no doubt, the red 
resistance in the North will come to an end.114
A good measure of the disorganisation and lack of coordination that pervaded 
the Republican zone may be deduced from the fact that even though all newspapers 
carried the complete details of the capture, the Minister of State, Alvarez del Vayo, 
still expected its arrival four days later.115
The expedition of the Mar Cantabrico gave many Mexicans, across all sections 
of the political spectrum, an unprecedented sense of active engagement in world 
affairs. The day to day coverage given by all Mexican journals to the voyage had all 
the elements of a novel by instalments, and produced accordingly a large following, 
even among people who did not use to read the papers Thus it turned out to be a
112 El Nacional, July 29, 1937.
113 El Nacional, April 5, 1937.
114 Jose Luis Paz Duran, op. cit., p.l 19
115 Felix Gordon-Ordas, op. cit., p.747
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mass-media event of its time. Furthermore, its capture and the ensuing execution of 
the Mexican volunteers aroused a wave of nationalist indignation and a widespread 
demand for the search of culprits. For the first time since the war began, white-collar 
workers and university student organisations-at the time more commonly associated 
with conservatism-marched along with trade unionists in protest against the 
execution of the Mexican volunteers.116
On April 8, Lombardo Toledano sent a message to the Mexican General 
Attorney, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, accusing the Italian consul in Veracruz, Gustavo 
Della Luna, of charges of espionage. According to Lombardo, confidential reports 
sent by Della Luna in connivance with local Falangists had enabled the rebels to 
capture the Mar Cantabrico. The New York Times ’ correspondent in Mexico, Frank 
Kluckhohn, had propagated this version, which was investigated, albeit briefly, by 
the Mexican Ministry of the Interior falling soon into oblivion. Far from dampening 
Mexican policy towards Spain, the vessel’s capture compelled Cardenas to publicly 
and unequivocally reaffirm Mexico’s commitment to Spain at a moment when 
American pressures towards his administration were becoming ever more intense:
Mexico shall continue to support Spain with arms and munitions in the same 
determined way it has done until now. Spain has received from the Mexican 
government all the aid it has requested. It is my government’s duty to defend 
all legally constituted governments that may be imperilled. Any other nation 
in a similar predicament may rest assured that it may count with Mexican 
aid.
Thus, in spite of the Mar Cantabrico's flop, new covert expeditions were 
launched from Veracruz. On March, the Mexican government sent a large shipment 
of arms worth U.S. $ 1,791,166 to the Republican government. Part of the shipment 
originated in Mexico and part was bought in Czechoslovakia with Republican funds 
through Mexican diplomatic agents. The arms included rifles, ammunition, grenades, 
machine guns and a few artillery pieces. Several hundred thousand kilos of Mexican 
sugar accompanied the weapons.117
116 El Nacional, July 29, 1937, El Universal, July 31, 1937.
117 AHSRE, “Denegri a la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,” III 1510 (46) 37/1, March 7,1937.
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T h e  C z e c h  C o n n e c t io n  
Czechoslovakia was not only the world’s largest arms exporter it was also a
110
democratic government of leftist leanings. Thus, it soon attracted the Republic’s 
attention as a potential source for arms. Enemies of the Republic, however, 
surrounded Czechoslovakia: Austria, Hungary, Poland, Germany and Romania. 
Moreover, Czechoslovakia was an adherent to the non-intervention pact. The most 
that the Republic could therefore hope for was to appeal the Czech authorities over 
the heads of the Non-intervention Committee so they might agree to sell her arms 
discreetly.
Col. Angel Pastor Velasco, one of two Republican sub-secretaries for Air, was 
thus sent to Prague in September 1936 with the view to acquire arms there. Mexican 
Minister in Paris, Col. Adalberto Tejeda furnished him with a Mexican passport 
under the name of ‘Alfredo Palacios’ to spare him from unwanted publicity, so he 
might travel unhampered, and to avert the possibility of him being captured by the 
Gestapo, in case of a unanticipated landing in either Italy or Germany on one of his 
continuous joumeys across Europe.119
Once in Prague, Palacios established a close rapport with several Czech 
officials, namely the Social Democrat Party’s leader, Antonin Hampl, who offered 
him to sell armament to the Republic, provided he could find a cover to get the arms 
out of Czechoslovakia without the Non-intervention Committee’s knowledge. The 
fulfilment of that condition proved no difficulty as the Republic could count with 
Mexico and the USSR, as well as the crude interest of arms smugglers, always eager 
to seal a transaction.
In due course, Luis Jimenez de Asua, Spanish Minister in Prague, approached 
his Mexican peer, Agustin Lenero, to obtain his government’s conformity to the plan.
1Czech-Mexican relations were moreover excellent, making the scheme highly
118 Angel Vinas, La guerra civil 50 anos despues, Barcelona, Labor, 1985. Isidro Fabela, op. cit. p. 161 
Gerald Howson, op.cit., p. 153.
119 Juan Simeon-Vidarte, op. cit., p.589.
120 Fourteen Czech institutions maintained close ties with organisations in Mexico. The Czech Minister 
in Mexico gave several lectures at Mexican cultural institutions, donated and organised various 
concerts with Czech musicians. Correspondingly, Cardenas named an important avenue in Mexico 
City after Jan Masaryk. Friedrich Schuler, op. cit., p. 139.
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feasible. As with the French transactions, Mexico agreed immediately to provide 
cover to the arms purchase and to appear as the ostensible buyer of the material. A 
network that involved, both direct shipments to Spanish ports and complicated 
transhipments via Veracruz, was thus successfully established. Through this circuit, 
an indeterminate number of materials were transported. We can only guess, as the 
absolute secrecy with which the entire operation was carried out left few traces 
beyond confidential diplomatic reports that refer cryptically to the scheme.121
It is known with certainty though, that the steamship Azteca left the Polish port 
of Gdynia on September 1936, with a cargo of Polish arms, which were later, 
unloaded in Bilbao and Santander.122 The former diplomat turned into Francoist 
agent Gaspar Sanz y Tovar made this information available to the British and French 
governments causing the embarrassment of the Czech government and conceivably a 
reprimand from London to Prague. In any case, the unwanted publicity generated by 
the Azteca's successful expedition ruined the prospects of further enterprises. 
President Benes and his Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta where upset to learn through 
press reports that an arms cargo ordered by Mexico had ended in Bilbao instead, and 
imposed a ban was on further arms sales to Mexico.123
The situation complicated further on December 5, 1936, when the Czech police 
arrested ‘Palacios’ for use of a false passport. Jimenez de Asua asked Lenero to 
intercede on behalf of ‘Palacios’ before the Czech authorities, alleging that under the
j|{
Spanish Constitution he could hold double nationality. ‘Palacios’ was released on a
bail of 30, 000 Czech krons, aided by Lenero, but his arrest received wide coverage 
from the Francoist and Italian press, damaging for a while the viability of the 
connection.
Between January and April 1937 Jimenez de Asua turned his attention to a 
Turkish middlemen, who offered him to cover a new deal with Czechoslovakia. The
121 See, among others AHSRE, III-165 (316).
122 Francisco Olaya, El oro de Negrin. 1990. p.82.
123 Gerald Howson, op.cit., p. 154.
Disregarding the fact that under Mexican legislation he could not. Not to mention that the usage of a 
false identity invalidated such claim. See Marina Casanova, La diplomacia espanola durante la 
guerra civil. Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Biblioteca Diplomatica Espanola. Section 
Estudios No. 13.1996.
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whole affair turned out to be a complete swindle, and large sums of Republican 
money were lost in vain. During this same period, lack of coordination between the 
Ministries of Air and Navy, the Paris purchasing community and the Republican 
diplomats brought down several deals.
By May, Jimenez de Asua sought to revive the Mexican cover that had been 
cancelled as a consequence of the Azteca affair, and duly approached Lenero.124 He 
prudently waited for ‘Palacios’ to leave the country and wired to Prieto asking to 
send a new envoy in order to contact possible purveyors.
On May 8, 1937, Cardenas authorized the acquisition of additional Czech 
armament for Spain. Four days later, Lenero had an interview with Minster Krofta at 
which conveyed the Republic’s precise request. Both parts, notwithstanding, took 
great care to conceal the negotiations from the London Committee’s vigilance. 
Although Krofta was aware of the precise nature of the project, he demanded 
Cardenas to underwrite that the arms would not be re-exported to Spain. Lenero, 
following instructions from his government, replied on the 21st that Mexico deemed 
imperative the Czech government’s conformity to the deal, regardless of the ultimate 
destination of the war material. Thus, negotiations between both parts stagnated.
In a bold move, Jimenez de Asua took advantage of a brief absence of Lenero 
to persuade the Mexican charge d’affairs, first secretary Daessle, to wire President 
Cardenas notifying him that the Czech government had accepted his conditions. The 
telegram, however was drafted in such ambiguous terms, as it stated that the Czech 
government’s response could be “interpreted” as being favourable, that the Mexican 
Foreign Ministry decided to put it on hold and to postpone the official request of 
purchase.
As a last resource, Jimenez de Asua organised an interview between the 
Mexican Military Attache, Alamillo and the head of the political section of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zdenek Fierlinger. Fierlinger turned Alamillo to General 
Cizek, who immediately raised all sorts of excuses to avoid closing the deal. So great 
was his interference, that Fierlinger himself had to assure him that the granting of the
124 AMAE. RE-60. Informe 25.
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permit for the exportation of arms was the express wish of President Benes. In the 
intervening time, the Italian Ambassador called upon the Czech Foreign Ministry, 
complaining about the “established fact” that Republican agents had secured the 
cover of Mexico for the purchase of arms in Czechoslovakia. Thus, when Cizek took 
at last the relevant communication to the Council’ President, Milan Hodza, for his 
approval, the latter flatly refused to do so in order to spare his country from 
“international disrepute.”
Five months later, Jimenez de Asua approached the Mexican delegate at the 
League of Nations, Isidro Fabela, who was on tour in Prague, representing Mexico 
before the International Labour Office’s Council, in a new attempt to revive the affair 
near Kamil Krofta. The Spanish Minister explained Fabela how the combined effect 
of Portuguese denunciation of a projected transaction before the Non-intervention 
Committee, and the lack of discretion of Bolivian diplomats agents with regard to 
another contract had brought down the whole connection.
Fabela gave assurances to Jimenez de Asua in the sense that he would 
undertake every conceivable effort to reiterate to Krofta “the Mexican government’s 
goodwill to aid the government of Valencia”, while reminding him, that Lenero was 
the official Mexican representative in Prague. Lenero himself had warned Fabela 
how Krofta had unequivocally expressed his refusal to engage in any ulterior 
operation.
Notwithstanding, an opportunity arose as Krofta offered a banquet to all 
visiting delegates. Before Fabela could utter a single word, Krofta told him almost 
apologetically that Czechoslovakia could not acquiesce in selling any sort of 
armament to Spain, via either Mexico or any other country in the world, as the 
international situation was “extremely critical” and since all of its neighbours,-  
avowed enemies of the Republic-warily monitored their every move. Moreover, 
Krofta explained to Fabela, the British and Portuguese governments had set a special 
vigilance over Czechoslovakia. Lisbon had even severed its diplomatic relations with 
Prague, out of spite, as they realized that the Czechs were going to sell arms to the 
Azana government while having refused to do so with them. “Under these
125 AMAE. RE-60. Informe 34.
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circumstances”, he concluded, “we have no option other than to refuse the Spaniards 
the aid we were willing to lend them only a short while ago.” Fabela inquired 
whether such decision could vary provided the circumstances changed, to which 
Krofta replied that everything depended on the disposition of Britain and France.126
Three days later, Jimenez de Asua offered a reception in honour of Fabela at 
which the Czech Minister of Social Welfare, Necas, an avowed supporter of the 
Spanish cause, was the main guest. Among those present stood out Dominois, friend 
of Leon Blum and his itinerant envoy to various countries of Central Europe. At the 
function’s end, Jimenez de Asua convened Fabela, Dominois and Necas privately to 
announce them that President Benes had unilaterally cancelled a deal, carried out by 
the Mexican government, which had been already sealed and paid for. The supplies 
included 5,000 machine-guns, 10, 000 rifles and “several” pieces of anti-aerial 
artillery, worth one million pounds sterling.
Necas expressed his regret over his government’s attitude while trying to justify 
it in view of the precarious position of his country. Necas admitted, notwithstanding, 
that a victory of Francoist forces in Spain would be highly detrimental for 
Czechoslovakia, at which moment Fabela went out of his way and boldly asked 
Necas: “If that is your conviction then why not use your influence near Benes or 
whomever you may deem appropriate, so Spain may be aided once and for all?” To 
which Necas replied by offering his intercession near Krofta. Fabela then lashed out 
against Britain and France for having “temporised” with Germany and Italy, and for 
their repudiation of the League of Nations’ framework. Dominois assumed the 
harangue, and promised in his turn to urge Blum to revise French policy towards 
Spain.127
A loose compromise emerged from that gathering whereby a tripartite scheme 
seemed to be taking form. Fabela learnt that both Dominois and Necas had kept their 
commitments. The former had been touring Eastern Europe, briefing Blum about the 
“ominous” repercussions that an abandonment of Spain by France might have upon 
Czechoslovakia and on the regional balance of power. Regarding Necas, Jimenez de
126 Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, op. cit., p.45
127 ibid. pp. 47-48.
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Asua informed Fabela that he had conferred with Krofta to no avail. Jimenez de Asua 
then visited Krofta to try to persuade him to keep his government’s commitment. 
Initially reluctant, Krofta agreed once he learnt of the French government’s 
willingness to pass the cargo through French territory. Fabela then travelled to Paris 
where he parleyed with Blum and Auriol over the issue, apparently obtaining their 
complete agreement to the deal.128 After this, however, no further reference of what 
the fate of that specific cargo exists, either at the French archives, the Mexican 
records or within Fabela’s letters to Cardenas, leaving us to guess what might have 
been its outcome.
T h e  M e x ic a n  L e g a t io n  in  P a r is : P r o c u r e r  o f  A r m s  f o r  S p a in
In July 1936, Cardenas instructed the Mexican Minister in Paris, Col. Adalberto
Tejeda, to purchase arms for the Republic-namely aircraft and ammunitions-in other
1 0 0European countries and deliver them into Spain. These orders were carried out, 
albeit with considerable exertion. As a result, covert purchases were made by 
Mexican diplomats assigned in Paris and Brussels in Poland, Belgium, and France 
and, apparently, even in Germany.130 A front company under the name SOCIMEX 
(Societe Mexicaine) was established in 55 Avenue Georges V, with the hidden 
objective of channelling arms to Spain via Mexico.131
As early as August 1936, Mexican diplomats assigned to the Legation engaged 
the purchase of 50, 000 bombs and 200, 000 hand grenades from an arms workshop 
in Liege. The sales agreement allowed the Mexican part to cede contract rights to a 
third party, which it did appointing Antonio Fernandez Bolanos, an agent of the
119Republic’s purchasing commission, as beneficiary. Two months later, Tejeda 
informed the Mexican Foreign Ministry of further purchases of military hardware 
from companies in Switzerland and Poland, adding that that payment had been made
128 ibid. pp. 52-54.
129 Romana Falcon and Soledad Garcia, La semilla en el surco, Adalberto Tejeda y  el radicalismo en 
Veracruz, 1883-1960, Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, Gobiemo del Estado de Veracruz, 1986, 
pp.377-378.
130 AHSRE, III-166-15, Compra de pistolas y equipo militar en Alemania.
131 PRO, FO 371 14177.
132 AHSRE, III-746-1 Minister Adalberto Tejeda to Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay, Paris October 10, 
1936.
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“in a way that will not incriminate our government.”133 It is uncertain if Tejeda acted 
with the blessing of the French government or without its knowledge. Franco- 
Mexican relations at the time were friendly and instructions on that regard were 
strong and clear: there should be no antagonising of the French authorities 
whatsoever.
Tejeda pursued his assignment for the duration of his tenure, and when 
transferred as Ambassador to Spain, his deputy, charge d’affairs Jaime Torres Bodet, 
carried on the venture.134 Despite the secrecy under which the operations were 
conducted, Gerald Howson has recently established that the Mexican legation in 
Paris was able to send, among others, the following materials:
• 300,000 hand-grenades; 200 PWU28 Polish-made Browning automatic rifles; 10,
000 Polish-made Mauser M98 carbines; 10, 600, 000 Mauser cartridges (old) and 2,000, 000 
Mauser cartridges (new). The cargo was worth U.S. $ 111, 787. These commodities were 
sent through the Azteca on September 9,1936.
• Nine, 300 PWU 29 kbk Polish-made Mausers worth U.S. $ 39, 804.
• 100 PWU 28 Polish-made Browning automatic rifles; 35,000 shells 75mm; 500,000 
Mauser cartridges (new); 5,000 Chauchat machine-rifles (old) and 15, 000, 000 French 8mm 
cartridges (old). Materials for a value of U.S. $203, 940. Sent on October 7, 1936 through 
the Silvia.
• Eight Russian-made Schneider 76.2mm M1904/09 Mountain and guns, 15,000 
matching shells and 1,500 ‘ 3 lusek’ detonators. Wares for a value of U.S. $ 33, 520.
• 60,000 Shells, 75mm Worth U.S. $173, 200, and 100, 000 kilograms of Trotyl,
worth U.S. $ 22,000. Sent through the Rona on November 16, 1936.
• 105, 5 tons of cartridge power, worth U.S.$62, 000.135
At his State of the Nation speech of September 1, 1937, Cardenas 
acknowledged before the Mexican Congress that Mexico had sold to Spain more than
133 AHSRE 111/510(46) “37” Tejeda to Hay, Paris, October 10, 1936.
134 AHSRE III/146 (46) 1, Torres Bodet to Eduardo Hay, Bmssels, February 3, 1938.
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eight million pesos worth of arms in the preceding year. The president stressed that 
Mexico had made clear its position concerning Spain in the League of Nations and 
reiterated his government’s determination to keep aiding the Republic. Reactions 
to the speech were mixed. While officialdom had ample praise for a policy that was 
“inspired by a lofty sense of humanity”, the conservative press made a thinly veiled 
criticism of the government through its portrayal of the Republic as a “murderous 
lot.”137
The Spanish war provided a focal point for the Mexican radical Right to vent 
its opposition against Cardenas’ radical domestic agenda. It also allowed it the 
chance to rally its otherwise dispersed forces. From the start, the Mexican fascists 
condemned the shipments when they became public knowledge in early 1937. Thus, 
El Hombre Libre vigorously denounced an aid that: “impedes the ability of the 
Spanish people to resolve their own conflicts”, noting that other states and the 
League of Nations honoured the arms embargo “in spite of having more at stake in 
the Spanish situation than Mexico does.”138
At the international plane, criticism also mounted. Cardenas, realising this 
would be the case, summoned under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ramon Beteta 
to give him instructions concerning the peace conference in Buenos Aires. In the 
course of the interview, Cardenas asked Beteta’s opinion about the advisability of 
sending a diplomatic note to the League of Nations as well as to all other countries 
with whom Mexico maintained diplomatic relations, outlining Mexico’s position 
towards Spain.
Accordingly, on March 30, 1937, the Mexican Chancellery issued a note to all 
countries with which Mexico had diplomatic ties, urging the termination of the Non­
intervention Committee and requesting international support for the Republican 
government of Spain. The note was met with either indifference or hostility. Few 
nations bothered even to reply, let alone respond favourably. In Latin America only
135 Gerald Howson, op. cit. pp.261-267.
136 El Nacional, September 2, 1937.
137 Ibid. See also El Universal, September 3-6, 1936; and Excelsior, September 2-6, 1936.
138 El Hombre Libre, 1937.
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Cuba and Colombia supported Mexico’s stance, albeit rhetorically.139 Clearly, this 
must have increased the sense of Mexico’s international isolation among many inside 
the administration. Yet, perhaps, precisely for this reason many inside it intensified 
their efforts on behalf of what they deemed a politically allied government in a 
context of increased international uncertainty.
By late 1937, it became evident that Mexico’s attempts to terminate the Non­
intervention pact and to rally support on behalf of the Spanish Republic among the 
League’s members had been futile. The Republic’s isolation became everything but 
complete after French closure of its border. This meant that arms shipments through 
her border ceased. On June 13, Daladier, under British pressure once again closed the 
border. Free arms supplies into Republican Spain became thus ever more difficult. A 
year later, the blockade imposed by the London Committee and the persistence of the 
U.S. neutrality law made it almost impossible for Mexico to continue in the same 
measure its assistance to the Republic. Furthermore, a combination of bad weather, 
labour discontent, spiralling inflation, pressures by the foreign oil companies and a 
rapidly strengthening political opposition caused the Mexican economy to contract. 
The Cardenas administration faced bankruptcy and consequent political collapse. All 
these constraints, however, did not diminish Cardenas’ commitment, and new 
endeavours were undertaken to prolong the aid, albeit in ever more modest 
proportions.
Further indication that in spite domestic and external pressures arms traffic 
under Mexican cover is found in a report published by the New York Times which 
stated that a Dutch ship had arrived at Veracruz carrying 1000 tons of American 
munitions to be re-shipped to Spain aboard a Loyalist ship.140 On another instance, 
the motorship Cabo Quilates, renamed Ibai, left Veracruz on December 27,1937 and 
arrived safely at Le Havre on January 13, 1938, carrying the Bolivian arms bought by 
Gordon-Ordas and Triana together with an additional freight of Mexican arms, albeit 
too belatedly to cross the border before it was closed.141 As late as December 1938,
139 AHSRE “La nota mexicana,” III 1510 (46) “3674050, March 30, 1937.
140 New York Times, November 5, 1937.
141 The cargo consisted of 15,000 Mauser rifles, 111 Vickers Machine-guns and 40 million 7.65mm 
cartridges, 80 Bergman and Schneider light machine-guns, eight Schneider 75mm field-guns with 
6450 matching shells, Six Krupp 7,65cm M-16 field-guns and 1792 shrapnel shells, four Krupp 60cm
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with the fall of Catalonia almost imminent, Narciso Bassols, then acting as Mexican 
Minister in Paris, wired the Foreign Ministry requesting authorisation to furnish 
Mexican cover for a Republican acquisition of ten airplanes in the Netherlands, 
obtaining immediate approval for the covert transaction.142
Mexico was the sole reliable alternative to the Soviet Union that Republican 
Spain had to supply herself with weapons. Other than that, there were was nothing 
more than the murky deals with unscrupulous and, worst of all, undependable, arms 
traffickers, whom often swindled, without any mercy, the professorial envoys of the 
Republic, turned overnight into arms procurers.
It is evident that set against Soviet military aid to Republican Spain, or, all the 
more so, compared to German and Italian armed support to Franco, Mexican arms 
handouts to Valencia would appear as pathetically modest. To put matters in such 
fashion, however, would be unfair. All three other nations were first-rank military 
powers with arms industries capable not only of supplying the rebels with a quantity 
and quality of weapons far beyond Mexico’s ability, but also of launching and 
sustaining during a prolonged period a large-scale war over different fronts, as would 
be patent a couple of years later. Mexico was a marginal nation, which could barely 
produce arms enough to sustain its defence force’s needs, let alone to compete with 
top arms producing nations.
Yet, paradoxically, in this resides the significance of its commitment to Spain; 
despite its manifold limitations, the Mexican government went out of its way and 
sustained, in the measure of its possibilities, Republican demands for arms. It is 
understood that Mexican arms did not make a crucial difference in the war’s ultimate 
outcome. But they certainly went far beyond the hackneyed refrain of “20, 000 
Remington rifles and 20 million 7-millimetre cartridges” tiresomely repeated by 
historians of the Spanish Civil War to account for the Mexican contribution to the 
Republic’s war effort.
Cannons and 1208 shells, 30 105mmtrench-mortars and 6, 000 mortar-grenades. See, Felix Gordon 
Ordas, op. cit., p.769.
142 AHSRE III/146 (46) 1 Narciso Bassols to Eduardo Hay December 8 1938; III-1325-5 Eduardo Hay 
to Narciso Bassols January 19, 1939.
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What is more, unlike German and Italian arms shipments, which were able to 
flow unhindered into the Nationalist zone, Mexican freights were largely constrained 
by the erratic opening or closing of the French border, giving their undertaking an 
added merit. That such a country had been able to engage in a feat beyond proportion 
to its size, wealth and political influence is altogether remarkable.
Last but not least, there remains the question of the quality of the aid given. In 
spite of its burdensome financial difficulties, the Mexican government always 
accepted Republican pesetas in payment. The Soviet Union, in turn, demanded 
payment in gold for goods sold to Spain, and capriciously fixed the exchange rate to 
its convenience.143 More damningly, it exacted onerous political influence in 
exchange for its aid. No black market, no intermediaries and no Bank of Spain gold 
were necessary whenever Mexican purchases were concerned. Republicans of all 
persuasions amply acknowledged this fact.144 Of all these testimonies, an article by 
Luis Araquistain is one, which perhaps best summarizes the moral facet of Mexican 
aid to Republican Spain:
Of all the intermediaries who offered to help us, the only one that did not rob 
or swindle us was Mexico. Only the Mexican government ordered its 
diplomatic agents to place themselves entirely at the disposition of the 
Spanish Republic, with no further personal or official profit. This they did, 
those who lent us their very competent and disinterested collaboration, and 
of this I was a first-hand witness during the time I served as Spanish 
Ambassador in Paris. For these vital services, Mexico never charged us 
anything, either as way of commission or in political usury. Its generosity 
with the Spanish Republic was absolute, without any utilitarian view, nor 
any ambition of influence or power.145
143 Gerald Howson, op. cit., pp. 146-152.
144See, among others, Marcelino Domingo, El Mundo ante Espana: Mexico Ejemplo. Paris, La 
Technique du Livre, 1938. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, The Last Optimist. London, 1950. Juan Simeon 
Vidarte, op. cit. Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, La Espana de mi Vida, Autobiografia. Buenos Aires, 1945.
145 Excelsior, October 23, 1945.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. MEXICAN DEFENCE OF SPAIN AT THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Mexico rendered a further service to the Spanish Republic in the diplomatic stage by 
consistently giving its moral support in the debates of the League of Nations, where it 
virtually became a spokesman for the Loyalist cause.
Hobsbawm characterises as milestones on the road to war the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931; the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the German and 
Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War; the German annexation of Austria and 
the dismemberment under German pressure of Czechoslovakia. Conversely, he 
identifies these same instances as the failure of the League of Nations and of France 
and Britain to respond to aggression by the post war malcontent powers.1 Mexican 
diplomacy reacted consistently before all those episodes, denouncing the aggressors 
and calling for the enforcement of international law, and collective security.
Mexico joined the League of Nations only in 1931 but since its accession 
became an outspoken proponent of the organisation and its aims. In a more practical 
approach, Mexico utilised the League of Nations as a forum to pursue its foreign 
policy beyond the realm of American hegemony that were the Pan-American 
conventions, and to press for the acceptance by the major powers of its principles of 
self determination, non-intervention and collective security which were the pillars of 
its international action.2 In so doing, Cardenas’ main aim was the promotion of a 
fairer international order.
1 Eric Hobsbwam, Age o f Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, p.37.
2 Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y  el Mundo. Historia de sus relaciones exteriores, Tomo VI, Mexico, 
Senado de la Republica, 1991.
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T h e  M e x ic a n  R e v o l u t io n ’s F o r e ig n  P o l ic y . It s  P r in c ip l e s  a n d  
H is t o r ic a l  A n t e c e d e n t s
During the Revolutionary process (1910-20) Mexico’s position became increasingly 
vulnerable, owing to the lack of a stable centralised government and to the radicalism 
espoused by the revolutionary factions themselves. A blueprint designed largely to 
counter the isolation of successive revolutionary governments soon evolved into an 
established diplomatic practice, that sought to maintain an autonomous course and 
voice for Mexico within the framework of the international system.
By the time the Constitution of 1917 was enacted, a reconstruction of a central 
power, after a decade of aimless tumult, had already begun. At that point, the Great 
Powers had their concerns not in the Mexican Revolution, but rather in Europe where 
the Great War was still unfolding. After the Armistice the victors held Carranza 
under suspicion for having toyed with an alliance with the Kaiser, proposed in the 
notorious Zimmerman Telegram, and withheld recognition to his government.
Furthermore, the enactment of radical legislation, contemplated by the 
Constitution, on issues such as land tenure and national control over natural 
resources, namely petrol, became thenceforth a permanent source of conflict with 
both USA and Britain, as investments in Mexico were largely in the hands of those 
countries’ nationals. The policy of the ‘Great Stick’ inaugurated by Theodore 
Roosevelt’s administration opened the way to American intervention in the continent. 
From 1898 onwards the US invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, 
etc., while threatening to do the same in Mexico.
That the Mexican Revolution was highly vulnerable to foreign intervention had 
been amply shown by the occupation of the port of Veracruz in 1914, and the 
Pershing expedition of 1916; both under instructions of, that purported idealist, 
President Wilson. As late as 1927, an attempt to enact the article of the 1917 
Constitution raised again the spectre of an American invasion.
3 In January 19, 1917, the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman sent to his plenipotentiary 
Minister in Mexico a ciphered message containing overtures to President Carranza inviting him to a 
German-Mexican alliance. The note stated that Germany would offer military assistance and promised 
Mexico the recovery of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Friedrich Katz has rendered this story in his 
now classic The Secret War in Mexico. Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution. 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1981, pp. 350-378.
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Thus, the impending fear of non-recognition, let alone, outright intervention, 
compelled the fragile revolutionary governments to defend themselves, out of sheer 
despair, through the appeal to international law. For the next ten years lagging debts, 
land seizures and damage to foreign interests became the main sources of dispute 
with the Great Powers. Diplomatic blockade forced the need to strengthen Mexico’s 
international position, through a diversification of links. Such an urgency took 
Mexico to establish relations with the USSR in 1924.4
The net result of these pressures was largely the design of a lasting body of 
doctrine that has led Mexico’s diplomacy since Carranza. Considering the principles 
of non-intervention, self-determination and a staunch defence of national sovereignty, 
Carranza launched new body of civil service that would replace the ancien regime's 
foreign service. This diplomatic custom not only acknowledged Mexico’s historical 
experience with repeated external aggressions, but also was consistent with the 
Revolution’s social and economic goals.
For many years Mexico had taken the stand that no nation should interfere in 
the internal affairs of another sovereign state. The intervention of American forces in 
Mexico during the administration of President Wilson and in the case of the so-called 
“punitive” expedition against Villa had left a bitter legacy. Therefore, Mexico viewed 
comparable intrusions in other countries with utmost hostility. As a result of the 
clashes between the revolutionary forces and foreign powers, a series of principles 
that condensed the grand vision of Mexican revolutionary nationalism began to take 
shape. A standard of conduct emerged that would condition Mexican foreign policy 
for many years to come. In the main, most contemporary revolutions have been 
subject to external pressures. To the same extent, most revolutionary regimes have 
formulated foreign policies designed to safeguard the fledging revolution through the 
expansion of its zone of influence, either actual or ideological.5
It is clear that the ability of a peripheral nation like Mexico, placed aside of a 
major world power, strongly inhibited the possibility of developing an international 
activism. Yet, it was precisely for that same reason that the new Mexican regime was
4 See above Chapter 3, note 1.
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so categorical in its conception of a series of general principles of an essentially 
defensive and anti-imperialist nature. Moreover, Mexico sought to convince the other 
Latin American nations to adopt these principles.
Hence, the so-called Carranza Doctrine, of which the main tenet was the need 
for economic emancipation of peripheral nations through the repossession of the 
control over their natural resources-then at the hands of foreign interests-and the 
exigency of following a rapid industrialisation.6 As a corollary of this proposal, 
which demanded the express political will of the other Latin American nations, a new 
international system might emerge based on the respect of three key principles: 
juridical equality of states, non-intervention in the internal affairs of a nation by 
another, and the right of all nations to self-determination.
The fall of Carranza in 1920 signalled a new era in American intervention on 
Mexican affairs that was characterised by the manipulation of diplomatic recognition 
over the different Mexican governments. Back in the U.S. most Democrats and 
Republicans prescribed a hard line on dealing with the “Mexican question.” 
Diplomatic recognition was thus conditioned upon the provision of securities to 
American investment and properties, which may have been affected by the provisos 
of the 1917 Constitution. Furthermore, the administrations of Wilson and Harding 
demanded from the Mexican government payment of reparations over American 
interests destroyed or expropriated during the Revolution.
In the second half of the 1920s Calles developed an aggressive anti-U.S. policy 
in Central America that actively opposed “gun-boat” diplomacy. Thus, when 
Americans marines intervened in Nicaragua, Mexico raised its voice in 
condemnation while supplying Sandino with materials and military aid.7 The biased 
stance in favour of Sandino constitutes the most visible precedent of the Mexican 
conduct before the Spanish Civil War; yet not the only one: Revolutionary Mexico
5 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia and 
China.
6 Antonio Manero, Mexico y  la solidaridad latinoamericana. La doctrina Carranza, Madrid, 1918.
7 David R. Mares, “Mexico’s Foreign Policy as a Middle Power: The Nicaraguan Connection 1884- 
1986.” in Latin American Research Review, 23:3 (1988), pp. 81-107. See also Gregorio Selser, El 
pequeiio ejercito loco. Operacion Mexico- Nicaragua. Havana, Imprenta Nacional de Cuba, 1960.
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covertly intervened in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, taking sides with 
Leftist dissidents in those countries.
Moreover, Mexico had a historic experience of foreign aggression, which, 
among other things, had resulted in the loss of half its territory, violation of territorial 
sovereignty as in 1914 and 1916, and the continuous vulnerability of Mexican 
administrations to the good will of successive American governments.
During the revolution, counter-revolutionary emigres had repeatedly plotted 
and launched incursions into Mexico from American territory. A case in point was 
that of General Gonzalo Escobar’s rebellion of 1929. On March of that year a clique 
of disaffected Obregonista generals together with sundry rightist opposition figures 
dictated a manifesto, the so-called Plan de Hermosillo. 30,000 troops under Escobar 
were mobilised to overthrow the government of Emilio Portes Gil. Calles himself 
took the portfolio of War Minister and oversaw military operations. The Escobar 
rebellion was quickly checked. A conclusive factor was the American government’s 
decision to decree an arms embargo. Furthermore, the American authorities refused 
to have anything to do with Escobar’s envoy to Washington, Gilberto Valenzuela, 
siding decisively with the Mexican government as it quashed the rebellion.
Thus, the Revolutionary regime had been preserved only through a prohibition 
placed by President Coolidge upon export of arms to Mexico, except to the 
recognised government of Mexico.8 U.S.-Mexican tensions had eased dramatically 
and the Escobar insurrection provided Washington with an opportunity to improve 
relations, avoid chaos along the border and ostensibly “promote” democracy abroad.
The question of recognition, however, had been historically an American tool 
to manipulate and coerce successive Mexican governments in order to advance its 
interests there. By lifting the arms embargo or suspending the exclusion of third 
parties, the American government was in a position at almost any moment to threaten 
the life of the Mexican administration; this gave to their negotiations a considerable 
leverage.
8 G.M Gathome-Hardy, A Short International History o f International Affairs 1920-1939.
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The doctrinal distinction between recognition of a state and recognition of a 
government is a recent one. But in actual practice this distinction was somewhat 
blurred. In truth strong states were the only ones in a position to grant or deny 
recognition. The very step of stating a diplomatic recognition revealed the strength 
and capacity of a nation to influence international affairs. The recognition of 
belligerence or insurgency was given accordingly by way of convenience. In this
sense, political recognition has been more a political practice rather than a juridical
9one.
Several doctrines have sought to resolve the vexed question of recognition. 
Developed from the American independence and of Latin American continuous 
change of governments during the Nineteenth Century, the practice of diplomatic 
recognition came to be used by the U.S. as an instrument of pressure. During the 
Mexican Revolution the so-called Wilson Doctrine March 11, 1913 prescribed 
diplomatic recognition only to governments founded on law and not over arbitrary 
force; a recognition based on the “consent of the governed.” In that sense it was 
impracticable for the Wilson administration to grant recognition to a government that 
emanated from a revolution. At any rate the American government was never 
consistent in applying the Wilson doctrine, using it only when it deemed it 
convenient. Thus, there remained always the menace of American intervention, 
dependent upon the whims of every new administration.
World depression caused a reorientation of American policy towards Latin 
America. Under the Hoover administration the foundations for the “Good 
Neighbour” policy were laid and direct interventionism began to wane. The 
economic contraction of the US forced Mexican diplomats to seek alternative 
markets in Europe and Asia. After ten years of forced isolation Mexican diplomats 
were ready to become active in issues pertaining to Europe, Africa and Asia.
As fascism advanced, American concern with its potential spread to the 
Western Hemisphere led the Roosevelt administration to make friendly overtures to 
the Latin American republics. This new approach known as the Good Neighbour
9 See, MJ. Peterson, “Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System.” in 
World Politics, Volume 34, 3 (April, 1982) pp. 324-352.
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policy which exchanged overt intervention of the “Colossus of the North” in the 
internal affairs of its southern neighbours for increased cooperation and common 
consultation in case of disagreement found precise expression in the Pan-American 
conferences of Montevideo in 1933, Buenos Aires in 1936 and Lima in 1938.
The Good Neighbour Policy lined up American policy to pay at least lip service 
to the spirit of the Estrada Doctrine of Non-Intervention. Most Mexican uprisings had 
started in the north, where there had been easy access to guns and munitions. The 
Good Neighbour policy did in fact put an end to the smuggling of arms across the 
border.
From the time of its accession to the League Mexico maintained a complete 
attachment to the strictest orthodoxy of International Law. A standard Mexican study 
on Mexican Foreign policy has aptly shown how weak countries, lacking any other 
means in the face of the powers’ greater force, adhere to legality as the only resource 
available to them so as to further their interests in the international sphere.10
This was clear in the Mexican attitude with regards to the Chaco War and 
before the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. In both cases Mexico addressed the League’s 
Council and Assembly demanding their immediate intervention to apply the 
Covenant swiftly and drastically. Unfortunately, Mexico entered the League at the 
moment of its decadence. England and France dreaded the prospect of a new war and 
were unwilling to confront the totalitarian menace. Moreover, Germany and then 
Italy left the League depriving it of any significance as a forum for world peace.
M e x ic o  a n d  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  N a t io n s  1931-1939
When the League of Nations was established in 1920 Mexico was excluded from 
becoming a member of the organisation. This may have been largely due to American 
leverage as its relations with Mexico were tense owing to Mexican seizure of 
American-owned land and interests during the Revolution. The Foreign Office’s 
attitude towards Mexico was equally disheartening. Lord Balfour’s belief was that
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Great Britain could hardly favour Mexico’s admission to the body, since that country 
was in default of its financial obligations and that it was precisely for this reason that 
London felt disinclined to recognise its government. Mexican diplomatic activity in 
Europe remained marginal throughout the 1920s.
In 1923, the League offered admission to Mexico but that country declined on 
grounds that it was not diplomatically recognised by Great Britain. Past strains in 
Mexican-American relations had made Mexicans somewhat intransigent regarding 
any international matter that they considered might, in the slightest way, affect 
Mexico’s national dignity and self-esteem. Nevertheless, by 1928 the fervour of the 
Revolution had subsided and this time the Mexican Foreign Ministry itself raised the 
question of entering the League again.
The pretext was a minor international congress of harmonisation of statistics to 
which Mexico was invited. In due course, Antonio Castro Leal was accredited as an 
observer to the League with the mission of exploring the possibility of full accession. 
A skilled negotiator, Salvador Martinez de Alva, succeeded Castro Leal.
Many Mexican diplomats saw no use in joining an organisation that could not 
guarantee its rights against American intrusion, since the League accepted the 
validity of the Monroe Doctrine and, consequently abstained from intervening in 
Latin American affairs. The government’s mouthpiece, El Nacional demanded that 
before acquiescing in the League’s overtures something was done to right “The Paris 
insult of 1919." In addition, Martinez de Alva raised the possibility of making a 
reservation to the Monroe Doctrine, pointing out that the aforesaid principle had 
never been recognised by his country. Alarmed by a measure that could cause the 
disgust of the U.S. the League refused to accept such step, and upheld 
acknowledgement of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Mexican 
response to this refusal was, to say the least, acrimonious and all negotiations ceased 
overnight.11
10 Mario Ojeda Gomez, Alcances y  limites de la politico exterior de Mexico. Mexico, El Colegio de 
Mexico, 1976.
11 Friedrich Schuler, op. cit., p. 12.
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In early September 1931, Spain submitted a resolution to the League’s 
Assembly which pointed out that Mexico had not been included in the League’s 
original members and proposed to “repair the unjust omission” by inviting her to 
accede to the Covenant. The Assembly passed the motion unanimously. Days later, 
the Mexican President publicly explained that Mexico appreciated the gesture and 
had the will to have a friendlier attitude towards the League than had previously been 
the case.
On its acceptance to the offer Mexico put forward, however, a reservation, in 
which it declared that Mexico had never taken recognisance of the regional 
understanding- the Monroe Doctrine cited in Article 21 of the Covenant.12
Mexico’s entry to the League took place precisely in the moment that the body 
entered in frank decline, due to its inadequacy to confront the challenges posed by the 
powers that were disaffected to the status quo.
Difficulties developed within a year after Mexico’s admission to the League. In 
late September 1932 plans were announced to withdraw from the League because the 
money expended could, in view of the world financial crisis, be better employed for 
education and other public works in Mexico. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria 
and the timorous response given by the League to this aggression made several 
Mexican civil servants dismiss the international organisation as a tool in the hands of 
Great Powers. The political benefit of Mexico’s association with the League was 
widely questioned.
The Mexican Minister of Finance, Alberto Pani, sternly opposed Mexico’s 
continuance in the body on financial grounds. In response to the ongoing depression, 
the funds for the Mexican legation in Geneva were cancelled. As a result, the 
Mexican delegate to the League moved to the Mexican Embassy in Paris and had to 
commute to Switzerland in order to attend the body’s deliberations. In late May 1932 
a reversal of opinion among the revolutionary elite took place and Mexico renounced 
her withdrawal from the League.
12 The Times, London September 11, 1931.
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For Cardenas instead, the League afforded Mexico a European forum where it 
could adopt a firm stand against the United States and counterbalance its hemispheric 
domination. The Foreign Ministry gained more influence as a result of the
• 13President’s reinstating of Mexico’s membership in the League of Nations.
Elements within the Senate have been debating about the convenience of 
Mexico withdrawing from the League of Nations. My criterion is that 
Mexico’s accession to the League represents one of the most brilliant 
successes of our diplomacy. The government of the United States has 
undoubtedly resented the international position reached by Mexico at this 
forum. Those who support the move towards Mexican departure from the 
League serve, perhaps unwittingly, the interests of whom thus would result 
benefited, i.e. imperialism. Among the many powerful reasons that justify 
Mexico’s permanence within the League, there is a conclusive one: to hold a 
tribune from where our denunciations against the dominance of our 
neighbours may be heard.14
In many ways Cardenas’ pursuit of diplomatic initiatives resembled and 
updated Porfirio Diaz’s scheme of counterpoising Europe against the United States in 
a concerted effort to maximise Mexican sovereignty and margin of manoeuvre. Not 
surprisingly Cardenas’ ambassador to the League of Nations, Isidro Fabela had 
learned his diplomatic practice under the Presidency of Venustiano Carranza.15
By the time of Cardenas accession to power Mexican diplomacy had undergone 
a thorough process of reorganisation and professionalization. According to Schuler 
under the aegis of Puig Casauranc the Mexican Foreign Ministry was transformed 
into a “modem economic intelligence service.”16 During the first years of the 
Cardenas administration Minister Hay fostered the reorganisation by expanding the 
Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic departments from three to six: Diplomatic Personnel,
1 n
Treaties and Conferences, League of Nations. This professionalization created an
13 Friedrich Schuler, op. cit., p. 15.
14 Lazaro Cardenas, Apuntes, 1972, p. 350
15 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico. Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution. 
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
16 Friedrich Schuler, op cit., p. 14.
17 ibid., p. 16.
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efficient diplomatic organisation “that generated critical information and an
1 8understanding of international relations with great speed.”
Well before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War Mexico had championed 
collective resistance to imperialist aggression in the League of Nations. During the 
Abyssinian crisis of 1935 the Mexican delegate, Marte R. Gomez, played a leading 
role by presiding the Committee that originated the only sanction imposed upon Italy 
as the aggressor nation: the oil embargo. His successor, Narciso Bassols urged 
assistance to Ethiopia and complied fully with the League’s sanctions against Italy. 
However, the League recoiled before Italian threats of withdrawal and the sanctions 
were lifted. On July 4, 1936 sanctions against Italy were dropped with the key 
collaboration of the British Foreign Office, in an action that foreshadowed British 
passivity before the threats of the dictators.
M e x ic a n  D ip l o m a t ic  S u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  R e p u b l ic
When the Republican government, through the direct appeal of President Giral 
himself, requested the aid of the French Government, the incumbent Ambassador, 
Juan Francisco de Cardenas, leaked the dealings to the French conservative press and 
joined the Nationalists’ side. With the negotiations made public the Radicals, junior 
partners of the French Popular Front coalition, pressed Blum to halt all arms sales to 
Spain. Sharp divisions and a chronic political crisis already tore France. Blum was 
also aware that open aid to Madrid would alienate Britain, with whom relations were 
already tense. London pressed Paris stating unequivocally that should the French 
government help Madrid Britain would remain neutral in case of a European conflict.
The Non-Intervention Committee originated in an exchange of diplomatic 
notes by the Quai d’ Orsay and Whitehall. In its preamble, the note referred to the 
unfortunate Spanish situation, and declared that both countries would rigorously 
refrain from any sort of involvement, either direct or indirect, in Spanish internal 
affairs. In due course, they would forbid any exportation from their countries of any
18 ibid. T.G. Powell differs from this view, as he alleges that: “Mexico lacked an effective intelligence- 
gathering operation overseas.” See T.G. Powell, op. cit., p.66. The creation of a secret infrastructure
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sort of arms, machinery and war material to Spain. Moreover, any pre-existing 
contract involving such commodities would become void, even if it was already on 
its way. The two chancelleries invited the rest of the European nations to join an 
“International Committee for the Application of the Non-Intervention in Spain 
Agreement.” Twenty-six nations joined the Committee through notes of adhesion.19
Days after the French note was issued, the Spanish Ambassador, Alvaro de 
Albomoz sent a note to the French Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, stating his 
country’s displeasure with it. Albomoz emphasised the fact that the Spanish 
government did not accept the principle of non-intervention inferred by the note. He 
declared that the Spanish conflict could not be compared to an international conflict. 
It was a question of the national domain, that is, the uprising of a fraction of the 
Army against the established order. For this reason, the Spanish government did not 
want to leave this interpretation pass unnoticed.
The Spanish question was first posed before the League of Nations on 
September 25, 1936. In a scandalous incident, Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, the 
Argentinian president of the Assembly sought with the collusion of other Latin 
American nations to prevent Alvarez del Vayo from speaking. There, the Spanish 
delegate, Alvarez del Vayo, summoned the League to intervene on behalf of the 
legitimate government under the provisions of Article 11 of the League’s Covenant. 
His speech stated that Spain was the first episode of an unfolding war, the clash 
between two competing ideologies, two mentalities, and two opposed conceptions of 
life: democracy and oppression. Hence when talking about collective security it was 
absolutely indispensable to protect States from the risk of internal subversive 
movements, sustained from abroad as was happening in Spain.
“It is necessary-stressed Alvarez del Vayo-that the members states be aware of 
this new modality of foreign intervention and try to unite themselves to save world’s 
peace from the dictatorships’ provocation.” Alvarez del Vayo deplored the 
“monstrosity” of the Non-Intervention policy, which placed on an equal footing a
that was able to smuggle arms into Spain would give the lie to this view.
19 Norman J. Paddleford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife New York, The 
Macmillan Co., 1939. pp. 53-120.
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legitimate government with a group of seditious and to the “dangerous innovation” 
that this policy might imply for the rules of International Law.
By international principle the Republic was lawfully entitled to buy arms 
abroad while the rebels were not. It followed that an authentic non-intervention 
policy would imply unfettered freedom for the Spanish government to buy arms, a 
right that the Non-Intervention Committee refused to grant.
The Mexican delegation wholly agreed with Alvarez del Vayo’s stance, 
particularly in what pertained to the definition of non-intervention and to the 
possibility that other governments would compromise with the rebels, professedly, in 
order to avoid war. Bassols warned: “The nations that through a cause or another 
have decided to save the juridical abyss that separates a legitimate government from a 
mutinous group, may end up falling prey to the same evils they have propitiated.” 
Then, Bassols summed up Mexican position concerning the Spanish conflict along 
the following terms:
1. Mexico holds that the Spanish Republican government represents the will of 
the people of Spain, as expressed in a free election.
2. Mexico rejects non-intervention policy as it denies the legitimate defence to 
a legally constituted government confronted by a military insurrection.
3. Mexico believes that the crisis should be dealt within the framework of the 
League, and not by an agency created outside of its jurisdiction, that is the Non- 
Intervention Committee.
4. In view of the League’s failure to maintain the integrity and independence of 
member states, Mexico deems imperative a transformation of its procedures. When 
the League refused to act, Bassols called for an overhaul of the organisation and its 
procedures in order to restore its integrity and independence. Furthermore, Bassols 
castigated the:
The powerlessness o f  the League o f  Nations to perform its primary and most
decisive task-which is sustaining the integrity and enjoyment o f  their
independence by the states composing it-has led us to recognise the need o f
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revising its existing machinery. For, whatever the causes of failure may have 
been, it would be absurd to expect that if we keep the same factor in play, 
results would tomorrow or the day after, in the face of a new conflict, be any 
different to what they were before.20
5. Mexico believes that the League’s failure to adhere to international norms 
strictly might allow the dispute to spread rather tan confine it. Bassols admitted 
before the organisation that his government was following a policy of material 
collaboration with the Spanish government, and maintained that such policy was 
amply justified under international law. Cardenas had already made public the initial 
transaction weeks before.21
Bassols declared that the Mexican government advocated the strictest 
application of international doctrines regarding aggression. Bassols referred 
specifically to Article X of the League’s Covenant by which all member states 
committed themselves “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members.”
As Mexico was not a member of the League’s Council, the delegation could do 
little else but voice its protest. Thus, from the rostrum, Bassols censured the London 
Committee and the weakness of the League by considering both a true regression, a 
step backwards, “as we have fallen from the heights of the ideals consecrated by the 
Covenant into an abasement that.”
During that same session, delegates Delbos of France, Litvinov of the USSR 
and Monteiro of Portugal referred to the Spanish question. Unlike Bassols all of them 
defended the Non-Intervention agreement as “indispensable to the maintenance of 
world peace.” The Portuguese delegate, however, went well beyond this by 
questioning the legitimacy of the Republican government itself.
As the Seventeenth Assembly failed to produce any resolution on the Spanish 
case, once again, several voices demanded Mexico’s withdrawal from the League.
20 Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, The Mexican Government in the Presence o f Social and 
Economic problems. Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1936. pp. 20-21.
21 Narciso Bassols, Discurso pronunciado en Ginebra, ante la XVII Asamblea General de la Sociedad 
de las Naciones. Informe de la Delegation de Mexico. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. AHSRE: 
III/381 (S-N)/51. III-487-2.
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Mexican Foreign Minister, Eduardo Hay, rejected those claims clarifying Mexico’s 
aims at the League:
Mexico strives for a positive development of the League because by its 
historic destiny it is one of the countries that most vividly interested is that 
the force of law may prevail over the law of force.22
M e x ic o ’s A d v o c a c y  o f  S p a in  in  t h e  R e a l m  o f  t h e  I n t e r -A m e r ic a n  Sy s t e m
In December 1936, a new Pan-American Conference convened in Buenos Aires 
under the heading of “For the Consolidation of Peace”, a direct reference to the 
recent Chaco War. At the opening session, Roosevelt, who travelled to Buenos Aires 
to stress the importance bestowed by him to the conference, pointed to the need of 
common consultation against the threat of extra-continental powers which “driven by 
war madness or land hunger might seek to commit acts of aggression against us,” 
an obvious reference to the Axis Powers. Distrust in Latin America of American 
intentions, however, ran still deep, and it was only with great difficulty that the 
Conference arrived at a non-committal resolution prescribing mutual consultation in 
the event of a threat to the Americas.
In Buenos Aires, the Mexican delegation headed by Ramon Beteta referred to 
the Spanish conflict, stating its motives for having come to the aid of the Republic 
and tried to rally continental support for Valencia.
Regarding the Spanish case Mexico has remained constant to the duties 
imposed by its diplomatic relations. Selling war materials and lending moral, 
and material, support to a friendly government, legitimately constituted, is in 
perfect conformity with the roles of ethic that preside the life of international 
relations. To act differently would be tantamount to grant belligerency to a 
military insurrection, clearly contrary to Mexican popular sentiment.24
22 Eduardo Hay Discursos pronunciados en su caracter de Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores (1936- 
1940), Mexico, SRE, 1940.
23 New York Times, December 2, 1936.
24 El Nacional, December 8,1936.
203
The Diplomatic Front. Mexican Defence o f Spain at the League o f Nations
In spite of these overtures, the Conference refrained from commenting or 
debating the merits of the Mexican position regarding Spain. Sentiment at the 
Conference over the Spanish conflict was “highly combustible”, as Secretary Hull 
observed, and this threatened to put Latin American governments at odds with each 
other. Several Latin American countries under conservative administrations regarded 
both the Spanish Republic and Mexico with unconcealed ill will. Furthermore, some 
were already flirting with Fascist-like solutions in which the causes of the old 
conservative groups were updated with the “modem” methods of en vogue 
totalitarianism.
In this sense, as Hull saw it, the Spanish Civil war could pose a direct threat to 
the Good Neighbour policy as the conflict accented and aggravated divisions among 
American nations and within them as well. The American delegation rightly feared 
that the pursuit of a pro-Loyalist stance could easily antagonise those same 
governments, endangering accordingly the Good Neighbour edifice, which was so 
painstakingly being erected.25
Under a Mexican initiative the Eighth Pan American Conference at Buenos 
Aires of 1936 passed an additional protocol on Non-Intervention which stipulated 
explicitly: “no country shall intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, either 
directly or indirectly.” Mexico had attempted at the previous Pan-American 
conferences of Havana 1928 and Montevideo 1933 to pass this resolution.26 On 1933 
the U.S. had finally consented to follow this principle. Still Hull made on that 
occasion two reserves on American commitment to the non-intervention principle: 
Firstly, that such observance would limit itself to Roosevelt’s tenure and secondly, 
that the U.S. reserved in that regard “the rights that are due to it in accordance with
97the law of nations.
Mexico alleged that in addition to the external dangers to be confronted there 
still existed the impending menace of the United States vis-a-vis its weaker, southern 
neighbours. In that sense, Mexico attached great importance to American conformity
25 Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War. 1968. pp. 146-147.
26 Felix F. Palavicini, op. cit., pp. 220-223.
27 J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960. Austin, The 
University of Texas Press, 1965. p. 104.
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to the postulate since the US was not member of the League. On the other hand, the 
US was greatly interested in coordinating a hemispheric policy with their southern 
neighbours to confront the growing hostility of the totalitarian powers. American 
concern for continental security was epitomised by the presence of President 
Roosevelt himself at the Conference. In return for their acceptance of a continental 
mechanism of defence the U.S. were forced to accept unconditionally the principle of 
non-intervention.
Paradoxically, this very tenet was the averred argument utilised by the 
American government to deny military aid to the Spanish Republic, alleging that 
such an engagement could constitute an unnecessary meddling in the affairs of 
another country. In effect, when Spanish Ambassador asked U.S. Secretary of State 
to come to his country’s aid, to aid democracy against totalitarianism, Hull evoked 
the Montevideo Convention of 1933 to justify his country’s inaction. Thus, the 
agreement established a moral precedent, which the United States would have to 
follow, if only for consistency’s sake.28
Such a pronouncement debilitated further Cardenas’ endeavours to rally the 
American government’s support towards the Loyalist cause. In that sense, it is also 
interesting to note that the only other instance of American refusal to furnish war 
materials to an established government with which to quell a revolt had been 
precisely Mexico. This legal precedent took place in 1912, when the Wilson 
administration denied the Huerta regime the sale of military means to defend itself 
from the onslaught of the revolutionary forces.29 All this supposed a predicament for 
the Mexican administration, in the sense that it could not push too far its legalistic 
approach without persuading the American government about the insincerity of its 
case.
28 Dante A.Puzzo, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
29 Norman J. Paddleford, op. cit., p. 179.
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U n f l a g g in g  Su p p o r t : I s id r o  F a b e l a ’s U p h o l d in g  o f  S p a in  B e f o r e  t h e
L e a g u e
On December 10, Alvarez del Vayo presented the Republic’s case before the 
League’s Council. The Spanish delegate demanded the League to condemn Germany 
and Italy for having granted diplomatic recognition to the rebels. He made reference 
to the fact that foreign warships had attacked Republic merchant vessels in the 
Mediterranean, that the rebels used Moorish troops, that the war in Spain was a 
general danger to European peace and that the Non-Intervention Committee had 
shown its incompetence. British and French delegates, Lord Cranbome and Pierre 
Vienot, rejected the accusation and appealed to the Council to adopt the Franco- 
British mediation plan. In conclusion, the Council passed a resolution condemning 
intervention, urging its members to adhere to non-intervention and endorsing 
mediation as the only way out of the crisis. Both the Republic and the Francoist zone 
rejected any sort of mediation and thus the plan was abandoned.
At the beginning of 1937 Isidro Fabela replaced Bassols as Mexican delegate to 
the League by appointment of President Cardenas and the Foreign Ministry. 
Mexico’s advocacy of the non-intervention principle at the Pan American Conference 
of 1936 was used by its critics to decry its defence of the Republic as ambiguous and 
inconsistent. Several nations went as far as to accuse Mexico of intervention in 
Spanish affairs. This took Cardenas to instruct Fabela to clarify Mexican position on 
Non-Intervention. The Mexican president contended that Mexican aid to the 
Republic did not contradict the principle of non-intervention, because the denial of 
aid was, in fact, an indirect aid to the rebels. In consequence, Mexico’s support of 
Valencia was “the logical result of a correct interpretation of the doctrine of Non- 
Intervention.”
Fabela confided to Cardenas what he considered an absurd error by Alvarez del 
Vayo, who after having denounced the policy of Non-Intervention as an aberration 
had legitimated it, when he added:
30 “Carta de Lazaro Cardenas a Isidro Fabela” quoted in Mexico y  la Republica Espanol, ed. Centro 
Republicano Espanol, pp. 27-28.
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We shall accept, nonetheless, a rigorous policy of non-intervention.31
A statement by which the League’s Council gave full recognition to the 
Committee. Spain by subscribing such agreement voluntarily renounced to the rights 
that Articles 10 and 11 lawfully granted her. What is more, Azana ratified his 
government’s stance in a public speech on January 21, 1937, on which he declared:
The Republican Government has agreed to make certain sacrifices regarding 
her rights in order to limit the scope of war. It has given in to the inspection 
or control of arms import in Spain. We have always advocated the principle 
of intangibility of the right of a legitimate Government to trade with other 
countries. We affirm such principle. Yet it has been said to us: “It is 
convenient for world peace not be overly intransigent,” and we have 
compromised.32
Fabela judged this as a risky lapse of judgement by the Republican government, 
which by accepting the regulation of the Non-Intervention Committee had abdicated 
from the very Covenant’s principles that authoritatively guaranteed its defence. 
Nevertheless, Fabela justified Spain’s acquiescence to the Committee’s arbitration on 
grounds of the tremendous pressure that London and Paris had exerted over Valencia.
It goes without saying that Mexico could be more determined and intransigent 
in its advocacy of International Law and of its implications for the Republican cause 
than Valencia was ever able to be. Without a doubt, this had to do with the larger 
autonomy enjoyed by Mexico on account of its geographical situation. Mexico was 
beyond the menaces that the Spanish situation posed for Europe, and thus could 
express its convictions with relative ease.
On the contrary, the Spanish leaders could not invoke International Law in its 
purity. It was important for them to maintain and consolidate their diplomatic 
relations with France and Britain, and not to exacerbate tensions unnecessarily. 
Spanish diplomats had to be far more accommodating and understanding; they were 
forced to take in account the vital interests of the European powers. Therefore, 
Fabela advised Cardenas not to be “more papist than the Pope.” In its defence of the
31 Isidro Fabela, Cartas alPresidente Cardenas, pp. 16-17.
32 Ibid.
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integrity and the compliance of the Covenant, argued Fabela, Mexico was going 
“against the entire world and even against Republican Spain itself.”33
In London, the Committee for Non-Intervention, considering what it deemed its 
victory of December 12, 1936, when it had been granted recognition by the League’s 
council, decided to invite all the body’s members to convey their governments its 
will to extend the Non-Intervention agreement beyond its original body of members , 
and thus insure the cooperation of non-European states.
In view of this initiative, Mexico-considering that such a move had the object 
of limiting the freedom of action of Latin American countries, instructed its delegate 
in Geneva to deliver a note to Joseph Avenol, Secretary General of the League, on 
which Mexico’s international position was clearly defined. The note, which due to its 
importance must be quoted at length, stated that:
The universality of the Covenant of the League of Nations-to which Mexico 
adhered in 1931, with the sincere hope of collaborating to preserve world 
peace-not only calls our government to take an interest on events that may 
endanger collective security, but also obliges it to consider the arduous 
circumstances that prevail in Spain from the higher perspective of humanity 
and justice. My government deems a duty to offer all means at its disposal 
on behalf of world peace, and especially to put an end to the armed struggle 
that has afflicted the Spanish Republic eight months ago. Considering that, 
my country avows itself to appeal to the sentiments of humanity of all 
members state, as the manner and timing by which it has been attempted to 
implement the policy of so-called Non-Intervention has not had any 
consequence other than to deny Spain the aid that in accordance to 
International Law the legitimate government of that country could rightfully 
expect; especially from those countries with which it maintains diplomatic 
links.34
In the note, the Mexican Government denounced the Non-Intervention 
Committee claiming that any pretence of neutrality should clearly distinguish 
between attacked governments, which can rightly expect all sort of material and
33 Ibid. pp. 23-25.
34 Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Memoria, September 1936-August 1937, Tomo I, pp. 29-30
208
The Diplomatic Front. Mexican Defence o f Spain at the League o f Nations
support and aggressor groups to which it is unlawful to provide any sort of aid for 
that would only prolong a bloody conflict.
In response to attacks against its advocacy of the Spanish Republic which many 
deemed ambiguous,35 the Mexican Government hurried to clarify that the Spanish 
case did not represent any departure from the principle of non-intervention which 
was at the core of its foreign policy. Certain European nations have followed a policy 
that lessens the principle of non-intervention, as the isolation of the Spanish 
government implies an indirect support to the rebels.
Fabela recalled that Article 10 of the Covenant clearly expressed the duties to 
which all states had committed to of preserving and respecting the territorial integrity 
and the political independence from all sort of aggression. As its proposals fell on 
deaf ears Mexico decided to clearly state its position over the Spanish conflict, 
making it clear that it had lent material and moral support as much as it had been 
possible to a friendly government. That this had been done overtly and legally 
without recourse to secret conventions or conniving. The note made clear that 
Mexico in so doing had complied with International Law and with the dispositions of 
the Pan-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States in case of Civil 
Struggles, signed in Havana in 1928.37 A treaty that “taking its inspiration from the 
basic principle of Non-Intervention, prescribes the material assistance to legally
no
constituted governments banning it to the seditious elements.”
However, Fabela forgot, or deliberately omitted on that occasion, that Spain 
could not be entitled to the Convention’s benefits as this treaty had been signed 
solely among the Latin American countries. In any case, the Mexican note was 
widely commented in the European press with the French newspaper La Tribune des 
Nations stating:
35 Britain demanded a clarification of what it considered Mexican double standards. See AHSRE III- 
510(46) 37-3-770-5.
36 Excelsior, April 2, 1937.
37 The Convention on the Rights and Duties o f States in the Event o f Civil Strife. In its first article, the 
agreement stipulated: All signing states take it upon themselves to ban the traffic of arms and war 
material, except when such materials are destined to the legally constituted government and when 
belligerency is not acknowledged. Since Mexico had not recognised the rebels as belligerents, it had 
lawfully given its assistance to Azana’s government.
38 Isidro Fabela, op. cit., p. 12.
209
The Diplomatic Front. Mexican Defence o f Spain at the League o f Nations
It may be said that that the Mexican government defends the cause of the 
Republican government with more determination and intransigence than the 
own spokesmen of Valencia.39
For its part, the Swiss paper, Journal des Nations, lauded Mexico as “the only 
state loyal to the Covenant.”40
In early March, Cardenas sent a personal note to the Secretary General of the 
League of Nations, Joseph Avenol, stressing Mexico’s support for the League and 
international peace. The note strongly denounced the non-intervention policy adopted 
by several nations, especially in the face of documented German and Italian aid to the 
insurgents. Cardenas stated that the lack of cooperation with the legally constituted 
authorities in Spain was cruelly prolonging the war and increasing the risks of a 
larger international conflict. He reminded the Secretary General that Article 10 of the 
League’s Covenant made a clear distinction between a constitutional government that 
was legally entitled to receive aid and arms and aggressors who were due nothing 41 
Avenol politely overlooked the admonition. Despite unenthusiastic international 
response to its stance, Mexico continued her unyielding support of Spain in the 
League of Nations. In response to a British initiative to extend the Non-Intervention 
pact to non-European states, Cardenas sent another letter to Avenol rejecting the plan 
and asking instead for League’s cooperation with the legal authorities of Spain:
Mexico cannot admit that while she is being asked to lend her assistance in 
solving world problems, an attempt should be made to reduce the scope of 
her peacemaking action and to circumscribe European problems by a method 
which, if successful, would undermine what is left of the foundations on 
which the League is built.42
As may be seen, Mexico emphasised on juridical grounds its defence of the 
Republic at both the bilateral and multilateral level with the third countries 
concerned. On March 30, Mexico sent a note to all countries with which it had
39 Isidro Fabela, Cartas..., op. cit., pp. 18-19.
40 Ibid.
41 “Nota dirigida a la Sociedad de las Naciones con motivo del caso de Espana” quoted in Jose 
Antonio Matesanz(editor), Mexico y  la Republica Espafiola, Centro Republicano Espanol de Mexico 
pp. 28-29.
42 Quoted by Norman J. Padelford, op.cit., pp. 625-626.
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diplomatic relations, urging the termination of the Non-Intervention Pact and 
requesting international support for the Republican government. Few countries 
bothered even to reply, let alone respond favourably; only Cuba and Colombia agreed 
to send whatever aid they could. Other nations, such as Argentina and Chile were 
overtly hostile to Mexico’s request.43 Britain went further demanding a clarification 
of what it deemed an incongruous Mexican position regarding non-intervention.44 
The very principle of non-intervention, postulated at Buenos Aires by the Cardenas 
administration, to prevent American hemispheric interference was been retracted to 
assist the Azana government. Thereafter, the Foreign office shunned all discussion 
with Mexican diplomats with regards to the Spanish conflict or Non-Intervention 
policy, either at the bilateral level or at the realm of the League of Nations.
Apparently a contradiction of its foreign policy, Mexico’s chancellery hastily 
clarified the motives of its aid to Republican Spain in impeccable legal grounds. On 
May 31, 1937, Mexico issued a note to the League, in which it defined its criteria in 
the interpretation of international neutrality in the Spanish case. The message claimed 
that neutrality, by equating a legitimate government, which had a lawful claim to 
international aid, to an insubordinate army, only benefited the latter. This only served 
to prolong the struggle, and make it bloodier. In fact, Cardenas’ administration 
considered that the European powers were using this principle as a mere excuse for 
not helping the legally constituted government of Spain. Furthermore, the 
communique stressed that in the Spanish case, the rebels received considerable 
support from forces alien to Spain’s internal affairs. The Mexican government held 
that Germany and Italy had attacked Spain, a member state of the League, and that 
therefore the non-intervention constituted in substance an intervention by omission.
That same day, the Spanish government requested the League ‘s Council to 
deal urgently with the question of foreign intervention in its territory. Alvarez del 
Vayo, spoke eloquently of German and Italian flagrant involvement in the Spanish 
conflict. He expressed his doubts as to whether Non-Intervention enforcement would 
really prevent the influx of arms and agreed to a unilateral withdrawal of volunteers.
43 La nota mexicana, AHSRE III 1510 (46) “36”/4050. March 30, 1937. For the reaction in Argentina, 
see also, Alberto Enriquez Perea, Alfonso Reyes..., op cit., p. 177.
44 AHSRE, 111/510(46) 37/1 Villa Michel to SRE, London, April 13, 1937.
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At the Council’s session Litvinov supported the Spanish case arguing that Spain was 
being submitted to “aggression in its crudest form” and to “foreign invasion and 
violation of its territorial integrity and political independence.” He pleaded with the 
Council to take action lest inaction created a precedent and promotion of subsequent 
intervention of a similar sort.45
In his turn, Alvarez del Vayo requested the League’s intervention stating that 
this would be “its last opportunity to intervene.”46 For all response to his pleas, the 
Council unanimously adopted a sterile resolution by which it expressed its hope that 
“all international efforts to put an end to the struggle may be successful.” Its only 
meaningful statement on that occasion was to condemn the bombing of civilian 
targets 47
The real power brokers at Geneva, Delbos and Eden, expressed their 
“complete confidence” that the Committee had made considerable progresses since 
its establishment.
Their policy both at the conference table and in the corridors was, as ever to 
keep the matter in a low key so as not to drive the Germans or Italy from 
impatience out of the Non-Intervention Committee.48
In the meantime Britain introduced to the Committee a new plan through which 
it showed its intentions of acknowledging the belligerency of the rebels. After the fall 
of Bilbao, on June 19, 1937, the so-called Eden Plan as it was called intended to 
grant the status of belligerency to the rebels as the zone, now controlled by the 
“Nationals,” produced much of iron ore that Britain imported.49 In July, the Non- 
Intervention Committee endorsed a plan under which belligerency to the insurgents 
would have been recognised by all parties of the Pact. This proposition elicited 
impassioned denunciations from Ambassador Fabela. In the end, the League did not 
accept it as it entailed the approval of both warring factions involved in the Spanish 
conflict.
45 Norman J. Padelford, op. cit., p. 130.
46 Excelsior, May 29, 1937.
47 Norman J. Padelford op cit., p. 130.
48 Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p.563.
49 Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, op.cit., p.34
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The Eighteenth General Assembly of the League of Nations convened on 
September 13, 1937. In its opening session Negrin who had been appointed as new 
Republican delegate, requested the League to examine the Spanish conflict. 
Somewhat ironically, Negrin conceded that the Spanish conflict being a civil war was 
beyond the League’s concern but as a war of conquest was not. He went on arguing 
that:
We have always considered that the greatest risk of the Spanish Civil War 
becoming a European conflagration lay, and still lies, in the fact that 
international law instead of being applied, has been sacrificed to the 
demands of those who have made blackmail by war an instrument of their 
foreign policy.50
Once again, Negrin demanded the demise of non-intervention to no avail. Eden 
claimed that non-intervention by confining the conflict within Spanish borders had 
prevented a European war. Spain was not re-elected member of the Council due to 
the lack of prevision of its own delegation and to the fact that Franco had already sent 
to Geneva representatives, which had lobbied among several representatives 
convincing them that to vote for the Republic was to vote for a communist 
government.51
The isolation of the Mexican delegation in that assembly was highlighted as the 
rest of the Spanish American nations rapidly heeded the Francoists’ exhortations and 
deliberately ignored the defence of legality implicit in the Havana Convention of 
1928.
On September 20, Fabela addressed the Council again castigating overtly the 
Non-Intervention Committee and its concomitant policy. Fabela denounced the 
violation of international treaties, which, in his view, threatened with the complete 
breakdown of the Covenant.
50 Norman. J. Padelford, op. cit., p. 133.
51 AHSRE, III/381 (S-N)/53. Delegacion de Mexico, Informe de la Delegacion de Mexico ante la 
XVIII Asamblea de la Sociedad de las Naciones. Mexico, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores.
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The present moment is particularly despairing as two of the League’s 
members China and Spain are being confronted with the horrors of violence 
inflicted on their soils by foreign aggression against their will.52
The Mexican Delegate urged the League’s members to form a united front by 
reminding the Council that beyond the causes that may had originated the conflict 
this had trespassed the borders of the merely local, acquiring international 
proportions.
Fabela evoked how after the world had faced the bitterness of the wars of 
conquest it had endowed itself with a legal instrument to banish forever the spectre of 
war. And how by abdicating of those founding principles, the League of Nations 
carried in itself the seeds of its own destruction.
Hence, the Mexican government saw no other choice but to deal with the 
Spanish conflict within the framework of the League of Nations “where it should 
have been dealt with since the start, with the utter exclusion of any other body.” In 
other words, the Mexican government demanded the complete dissolution of the 
London Committee and the total, disavowal of its resolutions.
Fabela warned that if the League continued to witness passively aggression, 
this would revert unto the other member states:
There may not be any compromise with the principle of collective security.
The larger European nations, from which the rest of Europe expects an 
initiative, are paying, and shall pay, dearly the failure of having let the 
notion of collective security vanish from the minds and hearts of free men. I 
earnestly dread that one day their renunciation will force them to employ, 
under graver conditions, the very force which to-day they have clearly feared 
to use.53
For all his verve, Fabela’s denunciations were largely unheeded by a body 
dominated by Britain and France.
52 Isidro Fabela, Discurso pronunciado en Ginebra 20 de septiembre de 1937. AHSRE HI/381 (S- 
N)/53.
53 ASHRE, exp. 111-488-2.
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Fabela took the rostrum, again, on September 28. The Spanish delegate had 
made a clear denunciation of German and Italian intervention solidly based on 
incriminating evidence such as documents seized from imprisoned enemy soldiers 
and photographs. “Before such confirmation”, denounced Fabela, “it is no longer 
possible to ignore the aggression against Spain, unless we want the truth to be 
concealed.” That sort of offence fell under the provisos of Article 10 and its 
obligations. “Consequently”, added Fabela, “this war has become an illegal war.”54 
At that stage, the international press had amply acknowledged German and Italian 
involvement in the conflict. These countries had tried to justify their actions through 
the absurd expedient of presenting their soldiers as volunteers.55
Another cardinal point of Mexican position at the League was that the ongoing 
conflict was not merely a civil war, but rather an international struggle, and that, in 
that sense, the Spanish Republic was the victim of a flagrant external aggression.56 
The Mexican delegate demanded accordingly the application of international 
doctrines regarding aggression as expressed in Article 10 of the Covenant. This laid 
upon members the duty not only to respect the territorial integrity and the political 
independence of member states but also to preserve them; a proviso, which according
cn
to Fabela, implied the unrestricted supply of arms to the Spanish government. Thus, 
Mexico demanded immediate restoration of the Republic’s right to buy arms freely. 
When the resolution was finally voted, 32 delegates voted in favour, 4 voted against 
and there were 12 abstentions. Notwithstanding, as Article 5 of the League’s 
Covenant demanded unanimity for resolutions to be passed, the declaration was 
dropped.58
This outcome caused many in Mexico to demand the immediate withdrawal 
from the organisation. To counter those accusations Cardenas was forced to publish 
an open letter to the Mexican delegation that was published in all Mexican 
newspapers, defending its conduct.
54 Isidro Fabela, Discurso pronunciado en Ginebra, September 20, 1937.
55 Philip C. Jessop, “The Spanish Rebellion and International Law, in Foreign Affairs, January 1937. 
Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 260-279.
56 Isidro Fabela, Neutralidad, pp. 263-264.
57 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement, no. 175, p.60-62.
58 Ibid. pp. 64-65.
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Once again, Alvarez del Vayo appeared before the League’s Council on May 
13. He demanded reconsideration of non-intervention as it had blatantly proved its 
ineffectiveness. The new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, anxious to 
concentrate his efforts on the unfolding Czech crisis, swiftly reacted and pressed for a 
hasty vote on the question. Spain and the Soviet Union voted in favour of the 
resolution calling for immediate action. France, Poland and Romania voted against 
while the other nine states of the Council abstained. The massive increase in the 
number of abstentions reflected the growing suspicion over the Dictators’ designs.
On September 1938, Negrin presented his plan before the Nineteenth General 
Assembly for the evacuation of foreign combatants from its soil. Germany had 
annexed days before Austria. The presence of the International Brigades in Spanish 
soil had been used as a pretext to question the national character of the Republican 
cause. Negrin asked the League to establish immediately a commission that would 
verify this step. In so doing he demonstrated his contempt for the non-intervention 
committee.
On that same occasion, the new Mexican delegate, Primo Villa Michel 
reiterated Mexico’s stance to no avail.59 Villa Michel urged the League Munich 
Treaty to enforce the withdrawal of Germans and Italians supporting Franco as a 
congruent response to the Republic’s unilateral gesture. Once more he denounced the 
futility of the Non-Intervention Committee and called the League to take urgent steps 
to preserve Spain’s legitimate government. Villa Michel also contended that 
collective security established by Article 16 had failed in Ethiopia, the Far East, 
Austria and that the time had come to rescue the principle and apply it to Spain.60 
The 19th General Assembly closed amidst growing apprehension about the 
imminence of a general war.
The 8th Pan-American Conference took place on December 1938. Cuba 
presented an initiative by which the Conference should offer its good offices as 
mediator in the Spanish conflict. The draft was submitted to vote being rejected by 
18 votes against three. Only Mexico and Haiti supported the Cuban initiative.
59 AHSRE, exp. 111-170-33; III-491-6.
60 Ibid.
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In Mexico, Cardenas diplomacy was highly criticised. Several voices protested 
against what they described as intervention in internal European affairs. Furthermore, 
international indifference to Mexico’s approach had amply demonstrated the futility 
of its presence in Geneva. The Spanish case, said these critics, was alien to Mexico 
and Mexico should abstain from entangling ‘in godforsaken affairs.’61
It seems evident that Mexican chances to go beyond the moral condemnation of 
the aggressors were limited, or null. However, it was in Mexican interests not to omit 
any opportunity to reiterate publicly its adhesion to the basic principles of its foreign 
policy: the peaceful solution of controversies, non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of another nation and, consequently, self-determination.
The validity of those principles was deemed imperative as a framework for 
Mexican relations with the U.S. and the European powers. In a candid defence of 
Mexican diplomacy, Beteta acknowledged that Mexico’s stance had not kept 
Ethiopia from being invaded by Italy nor had it ended the Spanish War. Nonetheless 
it had unequivocally asserted before Great Powers the principle of absolute legality 
that Mexico had promoted since its independence.62 Apparently an ill-fated stance, 
Mexico’s position was to be subsequently vindicated by the demise of fascism, when 
the U.N., under a Mexican initiative, prescribed a severance of links with Franco in 
1946.63
Crucially, Mexico’s undeviating anti-totalitarian diplomacy contributed 
decisively to communicate the Roosevelt administration Mexico’s dependable 
alignment with regards to the approaching world conflict. Following the oil 
expropriation, the huge increase in barter trade between Mexico and Nazi Germany, 
and the concomitant reduction of cash and credit commerce with the United States 
had raised the alarm in Washington. American anxieties over alleged Nazi 
machinations south of the border mounted. Carleton Beals repeatedly voiced his 
concerns about fascist threats to the subcontinent.64 He was not alone in these 
warnings. Others, such as Herbert Southworth and former New York Times'
61 Excelsior, October 11, 1938; El Universal, September 27, 1938.
62 Ramon Beteta, “Los principios de Mexico en su vida intemacional." In Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores. Memoria September 1937-1938. Tomo I, pp. 24-29.
63 See Chapter Eight.
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correspondent, Frank Kluckhohn denounced the fascist penetration of Latin America 
as the next foreseeable stage after Franco’s destruction of the Republic.65
Several American newspapers, mainly the Hearst press but also the Wall Street 
Journal, began to call for armed intervention in Mexico, alternately calling Cardenas 
a fascist or a communist. Any governmental action that affected American interests 
became liable in the eyes of those newspapers of being Nazi-sponsored, or implied 
that Mexico was playing the German card against the U.S. Inspired, perhaps, in the 
antecedent of Carranza’s Germano-philia and the Zimmerman telegram incident, the 
American press gave in to wild reports about alleged submarine bases in Campeche, 
aerodromes built by the Germans in the north of Mexico, or Japanese submarine 
bases in Baja California.66
At first, Roosevelt’s administration retaliated by suspending the silver 
purchases that the U.S. Treasury had been carrying out in Mexico since 1935, in what 
amounted to a decisive blow against the Mexican economy.67 Notwithstanding, the 
State Department’s concerns about Mexican national security and the possibility that 
instability could fulfil the direst prophecies of Fascist take-over there ultimately 
weighed more, and the Roosevelt government gradually took a more flexible line 
with regard to Mexico. American oil companies were accordingly urged to settle their 
grievances with the Mexican government through negotiation. 68
Roosevelt was fully aware that Mexico had initially offered its oil to the 
democracies. After his failed deal in Valencia, Villasenor had travelled to Paris to 
offer oil surplus production to the French government already engaged in the build­
up of a strategic reserve for an expected war with Germany. After an initial 
agreement the French government recoiled under pressure from Whitehall.69 Then 
Mexico offered its oil to the Scandinavian countries. All turned down the offer,
64 Carleton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America. London, Jonathan Cape, 1939.
65 Herbert Routledge Southworth, “The Spanish Phalanx and Latin America” in Foreign Affairs Vol. 
18 no. 1 (Oct. 1939) pp. 148-152. For a British perspective on the alleged Nazi penetration of Mexico 
see, N.P., Macdonald, Hitler Over Latin America. London, Jarrolds Publishers Ltd., 1940.
66 Archivo General de la Nacion, Fondo Lazaro Cardenas, exp. 704.1/124.
67 Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y  los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero. Mexico, El Colegio de 
Mexico, 1972. pp. 374-388.
68 David E. Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1960.
pp.200-201.
69 Eduardo Villasenor, op. cit., pp. 121-124.
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preferring to stay away from a deal that could compromise their relation with Britain. 
It was only then that Mexico had been forced to accept the German proposal. And 
even then Cardenas clearly stated his government’s position:
We have always insisted we would always sell oil to the democracies if 
possible. However, if they will not buy and boycott our oil, we are forced to 
sell wherever possible.70
Although the American position regarding Spain in 1936 had been equivocal, 
subsequent events showed Roosevelt that Spain had been the testing ground of the 
Axis. By 1939 the American administration had come to regret its attitude towards
71the Republic. Officials within the Roosevelt administration, such as Treasury 
Secretary, Henry Morgenthau and State Department Under-secretary Sumner Welles 
were prominent in convincing the American President about the wisdom of 
upholding the Good Neighbour policy and not destabilising Mexico. The American 
Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels, played a key role in that course, warning 
Roosevelt that Mexico could become the “next Spain.”72
Daniels reminded Roosevelt the way that the Cardenas government had been 
invariably in favour of the democracies, having supported the causes of Ethiopia, 
Czechoslovakia, Republican Spain, Austria and China, both at home and at Geneva, 
and had repeatedly condemned Germany, Italy, Japan and Nationalist Spain for wars 
of aggression. According to Daniels, by supporting Spain, Cardenas had evinced his 
commitment to the Allied cause, thus disproving those voices, which had tagged his
n't
government as Communist or accused him of flirting with the Axis. In this sense, it 
may be said that, in no small measure, Mexico’s position before Spain afforded 
Cardenas Washington’s trust and support.
Mexican-German co-operation would culminate in 1939 only to stop a year 
later under the combined effect of the English blockade of the northern Atlantic and
70 Frank L. Klukhohn, op. cit., p.74.
71 On March 1939 Roosevelt told Claude Bowers: “We have made a mistake; you have been right all 
along.” Shortly after, Cordell Hull wrote: “In the long history of the foreign policy of the Roosevelt 
administration, there has been, I think, no more cardinal error than the policy adopted during the civil 
war in Spain.” See Dante A. Puzzo, op.cit., p. 162.
72 Josephus Daniels, op.cit. pp. 77-83; David E. Cronon, op. cit. pp. 230-234. See also Lorenzo 
Meyer, Mexico y lo s  Estados Unidos, op.cit., pp. 374-375.
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increased co-operation with the United States. By the end of Cardenas tenure, his 
administration’s stance in the face of the approaching conflict was unmistakable. 
Despite the opposition of large sections of the Mexican public opinion, the Mexican 
government took sides with the Allies.74 From Cardenas’ perspective, the defence of 
the workers and peasants, which he deemed the core of national interest, demanded 
the defeat of the Axis Powers. The explicit embracing of the Allied cause would still 
take some time to materialise. And yet, the decision to fight alongside the Allies had 
been taken years ago when Mexico had given its active support to the Spanish 
Republic.
73 Friedrich E. Sculer, op.cit., pp. 201 and 206.
74 On August 26, 1939 Mexico agreed to the American proposal of activating the Inter-American 
Consultation Mechanism, signed at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, which prescribed Pan- 
American reciprocal defence in case of an extra-continental aggression, a thinly-disguised reference to 
the Totalitarian Powers. See, Lazaro Cardenas, Obras I. Apuntes, op. cit., p .429.
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DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE WAR
Beyond the “appropriation” that Mexican authorities and certain sections of the 
Mexican society, such as the intellectuals and the trade unions, made of Spanish 
events, the War produced unforeseen repercussions in the domestic scene, which 
threatened to unleash a similar standoff. Extremists of diverse hues contemplated 
Spanish affairs in Mexican terms while considering its developments as viable for the 
domestic scene. Thus while local conservatives dreamt of a Creole Franco who could 
restore tradition, law and order by way of a ‘crusade’ against bolshevism, Mexican 
radicals sought to organise armed militias and to “exacerbate the contradictions of 
capitalism” as preliminary steps towards the thorough establishment of socialism in 
Mexico.
Prior to further examination of the reactions provoked inside Mexico by the 
Spanish Civil War certain hard facts of the Mexican society of the 1930s need to be 
qualified. In 1936 Mexico had an illiteracy rate of 50%.1 This meant that most 
Mexicans were not capable, let alone interested, in reading the press. The pressing 
urgencies of daily survival meant their requirement for information and knowledge 
took a second place. Hence when we refer to the Mexican public opinion we clearly 
mean the section of educated Mexican population that was interested in foreign 
affairs and was conscious of its possible impact upon Mexican events.
Having said that, it is clear that the Mexican people were largely apathetic 
about the Spanish Civil War. Few were interested in foreign affairs, especially in 
events that had little or no effect on their daily lives. Conversely, most members of 
the public administration, leaders of the labour unions and many intellectuals heartily 
supported Cardenas stance and recognised the relationship he had drawn between 
events in Spain and potential national and international repercussions for Mexico.
1 Luis Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 116.
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Yet, many Mexicans who were more directly related to Spain by reason of 
origin, commercial, cultural or religious exchanges sided with the insurgents. This 
group included most businessmen, leaders of the Catholic Church, and middle-class 
political moderates and conservatives who opposed Cardenas “socialist” policies. 
The Spanish rebellion encouraged “reactionary” opinion to express itself more 
openly than it had hitherto deemed prudent. Groups whose interests had been 
affected or were threatened by the socialistic policies of the Cardenas administration 
began to look forward with “ill-disguised impatience” to an outbreak of active and 
armed opposition.3
Conversely, the most enthusiastic support for the government’s policy toward 
Spain came from the civil service and the labour’s union leadership. As a rule 
members of the PNR supported the government’s stance with regards to the Spanish 
War. Unsurprisingly, most of the private funds for Republican Spain raised in 
Mexico were collected by the CTM. The Spanish war had thus the effect of 
polarising Mexican society in a way unprecedented since the end of the revolutionary 
armed struggle. So great the antagonism its outbreak brought about, that according to 
Fuentes Mares for three long years, Mexico became the “ultramarine stage of the 
Spanish Civil War.”4
A r m e d  M il it ia s  in  M e x ic o
The clash between rightist and leftist forces in the Spanish war reverberated very 
deeply in domestic factions. Would Mexico end as Spain? was the most frequent 
asked question in the Mexican press. While the war progressed such probability 
began to seem conceivable as home-grown radicals from both the left and right 
strove to replicate the Spanish conflict in Mexico. An example of this prospect was 
the threat by CTM radicals to form popular militias to defend “popular conquests 
from the reactionary attacks” and the immediate response it generated from the Right.
2 PRO Kew, FO 371 20532, Minister Rodney Gallup from British Legation in Mexico City to the 
Right Hon. Anthony Eden, Foreign Office, August 9, 1936.
3 PRO, Kew, FO A8119/196/26 South and Central America confidential, Murray to Eden, Mexico 
City, September 30, 1936.
4 Jose Fuentes Mares, op. cit., p. 161.
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By the end of July, the Mexican section of the Spanish Popular Front was 
founded.5 On July 26, a meeting was celebrated at the Teatro Principal of Mexico 
City with Lombardo Toledano and Gordon Ordas taking part along with 
representatives of the CNT, Action Republicana, the PSOE, the PCM and the PCE. 
Among other resolutions the assembly approved to convey the Spanish government 
and the Popular Front the solidarity of the Mexican proletariat, and to congratulate 
the government “for having armed the militias.” According to the assembly, the 
Republic, by this action: “had set an example to the world in the struggle against 
fascism.”6
The declaration alarmed the Mexican military establishment, which took 
immediate action to prevent any such move. At the gathering, Ramon Garcia Urrutia, 
of the PCM spoke against the Spanish residents who conspired against the Republic, 
demanding the Mexican government to deport them under Article 33, and called for 
a boycott against their businesses. Moreover, he denounced the existence of a fascist 
group, the Falange Espanola de Mexico, merged within the Spanish community and 
offered to make their names available to the CTM, the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.
Lombardo apologised for the tardiness of the CTM’s reaction, justifying it by 
the electricians’ strike. Carried away by his personal excesses, Lombardo Toledano 
first suggested arming the workers and forming militias to prevent a Fascist uprising 
and called the government to undertake such a measure. He menacingly stated that 
while the CTM had not tolerated the existence of the Golden Shirts, it would bear
o
less the intrigues of Spanish rightist organisations. Lombardo agreed with Urrutia 
on calling for the expulsion of the rightist Spaniards and announced that the Spanish 
Embassy had assured him that far from resisting such action it would wholeheartedly 
sanction it. Gordon confirmed this view.
5 El Universal, July 30, 1936.
6 Excelsior, July 27, 1936.
7 “The Federal Executive shall have the exclusive power to compel any foreigner whose remaining it 
may deem inexpedient to abandon national territory immediately and without the necessity of previous 
legal action. Foreigners may not, in any way, participate in the political affairs of the country." 
Constitucion Politico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
8 El Nacional, August 3, 1936.
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Following the trend already established, a week later the Mexican communists 
and the Frente Popular Mexicano held another rally at Zocalo Mexico City’s main 
square. More than 4,000 people took part according to El National, among them 
various unions belonging to the CTM, the FPM, bureaucrats, intellectuals and 
students, the PCM, PSOE and it was broadcast live by a state owned radio station. 
There were nine speakers, among them, two deputies, Jacinto Riva Palacio and David 
Arizmendi, belonging to the so-called Left Wing of the Congress.
First, to speak was Jose Maria Benitez of the FPM who announced, somewhat 
dramatically, that: “the fate of humankind is being decided on the fields of Spain.” At 
that point, Miguel Velasco, a communist who held the CTM’s Secretariat of 
Organisation seized the juncture offered by the rally to advance his interests within 
the syndicate and proposed that the CTM should arm militias and hit squads in all 
factories as to prevent any attack from the “reaction.” These militias should: “choke 
the Fascist Golden Shirts and the Confederacy of Clase Media in their own blood.”9 
From the makeshift podium Luis Capelo, a Spanish worker, emissary of the Spanish 
Builders Trades Union of the UGT, broadened the proposal and blatantly tried to 
arouse the crowd: “those governments that proclaim themselves to be revolutionary 
should arm the workers.” To add insult to injury, the gathering ended with the crowd 
chanting the Internationale.10
The situation was tense. An industrial lockout had just ended in Monterrey, 
while in Yucatan there was restiveness amongst the sisal plantation owners. One 
thing was to support the Spanish militias yet another was to arm the Mexican 
workers. Cardenas’ administration could hardly afford to polarise further an already 
strained atmosphere. The conservative press seized the opportunity to accuse the 
unions of attempting a communist take-over.
Thus, on August 10 Excelsior loudly announced to have discovered the 
existence of the first such militias, organised by the workers of the Government’s 
National Print Works, the Teachers’ Trade Union, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Communication and Transport, the Communist Party and Youth, and the Mexican
9 ibid.
10 Excelsior, August 3, 1936.
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Popular Front itself. The daily went on to describe how the workers carried machines 
guns, assault rifles and pistols and set guards at their premises awaiting an attack by 
the Golden Shirts. Although the Vice-Commander of the First Military Zone, General 
Othon Leon denied the existence of such groups and the CTM published a lukewarm 
denial on August 11, the conservative press carried on its denunciations.
Having been outlawed a year before, and with their leader, General Rodriguez, 
in exile, the Golden Shirts seemed an improbable opponent. The whole idea of a 
Fascist uprising appeared far-fetched, yet the Spanish war gave credence to those 
versions amidst a context that began to be paranoid.
Against that background, there were voices among the Right, like the 
influential Union Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolution Mexicana (UNVR), which 
tried to stir the situation further by increasing the polarisation. Formed in 1935, the 
organisation had been initially devoted to secure land concessions for its members.11 
Soon, their staunch defence of private property and their self-avowed anti­
communism put them in direct clash with the government’s agrarian reform, and 
more specifically against the ejido.
This group, part of the secular radical Right, was particularly menacing for the 
government owing to the potential leverage it could exert over the army, to which, in 
fact it tried to appeal to through its condemnation of the purported armed workers’ 
militias. As a whole, the UNVR was unambiguously pro-Franco. General Rios 
Zertuche, leader of the organisation wrote to Cardenas with an eye to the army:
The Russian paid demagogues have accused the National Army of being 
incapable of defending the public institutions. This intolerable offence 
should be dealt with, in an uttermost and drastic manner.12
Many Mexican army officers supported the President’s Spanish policy, 
especially those of the middle ranks. In fact, some of the Republic’s most staunch 
supporters belonged to the army as illustrated not only by the various Mexican 
soldiers who fought for the Republic, but by prominent officers who served as top
11 Hugh G. Campbell, op. cit., p.60; John Sherman, op. cit., p. 104.
12 AGN, FLC 556/1, Daniel Rios Zertuche to Cardenas Mexico, August 10, 1936.
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• • 1 ^  ,officers in the Republican army and exerted their leverage in supporting it. Still, m 
spite of their allegiance to the Republican cause, the army as whole was appalled by 
the political wrangling within the Popular Army and did not want to see partisan 
interference recurring in Mexico. Hence, many officers became incensed by what 
they saw as the union leader’s demagogy. As a result, they publicly voiced their 
discontent against the idea of organising the labour force as an alternative armed 
force and accused Lombardo of seeking the dissolution of the revolutionary army and 
its replacement by the militias.
The CTM and the Senate’s Left Wing protested against the UNVR and rejected 
the accusations, trying to appease public opinion. On August 11 the trade union 
published an extensive document trying to placate public opinion and private 
enterprise as well as to check the unruly extremists within its realm who saw the 
moment ripe to advance ‘their’ revolution. The text denied that a general strike was 
about to occur. Furthermore, it stated that all strikes that had broken out aimed solely 
to serve the betterment of the working class. Finally it denied categorically the 
existence of workers’ militias.
A deceitful account has been published purporting that the workers are 
organising militias to replace the army. The purpose of this rumour is 
perfectly clear: to arouse the mistrust of the army against the proletariat and 
to increase the public anxiety of which the conservative class is solely 
responsible. We deny categorically and emphatically such assertion. The 
Mexican Labour Confederacy has complete trust for President Cardenas and 
in the high sense of duty of the National Army.14
13 Approximately 800 Mexicans fought for the Spanish Republic between 1936 and 1939. Most were 
military and trade unionists. Most fought in the Popular Army Units rather than among the 
International Brigades because of obvious linguistic reasons. Although there was no secrecy to their 
dispatch, as Mexicans enrolled in the Republican army with complete presidential approval, no official 
records were kept of their participation. Many Mexicans who wished to volunteer to aid the 
Republican army were discouraged from doing so by the high cost o f transportation to Spain. See, for 
further reference, Carl Geiser, Prisoners o f a Good Fight. The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 Westport 
Conn., Lawerence Hill & Co. 1986. p.253; Andreu Castells, Las Brigadas Intemacionales Ariel, 
Barcelona, 1974. p.377; Michael Alpert El ejercito Republicano en la guerra civil. Madrid, Siglo XXI 
de Espana Editores, 1989, pp 345 and 351, and Roberto Vega Gonzalez, Cadetes Mexicanos en la 
Guerra de Espana. Mexico, Compania General de Ediciones S.A. 1954.
14 Excelsior, August 12, 1936.
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At this point it should be remembered that Cardenas had armed the peasants in 
order to consolidate the agrarian reform by helping them to defend from the attacks 
of the former landlords and their white guards. This fact encouraged the version that 
workers militias were being formed under presidential patronage. As Amaldo 
Cordova has stated, by way of his ‘mass politics’,15 Cardenas leaned on the workers 
to rid himself of Calles’ tutelage and to implement his radical agenda, but not to hand 
on power to them. In this sense, it seems highly unlikely that Cardenas could have 
approved such a measure. He wanted the workers as junior partners in the support of 
his own policies, yet he was not prone to tolerate the workers’ organisation to be too 
independent. This may be corroborated by the fact that the so-called Left Wing 
faction of the Congress led by deputies Emesto Soto Reyes and Candido Aguilar, 
which championed the arming of the workers, dissolved presumably owing to 
Cardenas “recommendation.”16
A potentially dangerous incident took place on November 1936 when 
following the early diplomatic recognition of Franco by the governments of 
Guatemala and El Salvador, angry mobs attacked the embassies of those countries in 
Mexico City and set fire to the latter. The Mexican conservative press at once 
accused Valencia of sending unruly elements to destabilise Mexico and unleashing in 
the country a “red terror” comparable to that which prevailed in Republican Spain.17 
The Mexican government, in turn, announced that those responsible for the attack 
would be punished.
Aside from the UNVRM, the ARM, the CPRM and the CCM countless other 
radical rightists groups surfaced in that period. This should not, however, be taken as 
a proliferation of letterheads without following. Far from it, all these groups were 
interrelated, often through blurred links, as their covert activities demanded. All of 
them counted upon the financing of the great entrepreneurs and the activism of
15 See Amaldo Cordova, La politico de masas del cardenismo, Mexico: Editorial Era, 1974. In a 
major departure from previous scholarship, Cordova first suggested that far from being a social 
revolution, the Mexican revolution was merely a political one with populist undertones. What emerged 
was a Leviathan like State capable of co-opting opponents and controlling society.
16 Raquel Sosa, Los codigos ocultos del cardenismo. Mexico, UNAM/Plaza y Valdez, 1998. pp. 221- 
222 .
17 Ultimas Noticias November 12, 1936; ABC Sevilla, November 14, 1936.
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middle class cadres to pursue their aggressive activities. Ultimately they would come 
pretty close from securing their objective.
T h e  S p a n ish  C o m m u n it y  a n d  t h e  R e b e l l io n
The Spanish colony of Mexico constituted the largest foreign community in the 
country, representing nearly 35 % of the total foreign population.18 Their interests lay 
in diverse concerns ranging from banks, mines, movie theatres, department stores, 
grocery stores, mines, and textiles to the publishing domain. They exerted an 
influence far beyond their relatively small numbers. Most of them dwelled in Mexico 
City, although there were also large concentrations of Spaniards in towns such as 
Veracruz, Puebla, Tampico, Merida, San Luis Potosi and Guanajuato.19 Liberal and 
radical Spaniards gathered in lesser social clubs such as the Orfeo Catala.
Most of the 50,000 strong Spanish community was wealthy, deeply 
conservative, and at least sympathetic to Franco. A host of Fascist organisations 
sprung from the community such as the Asociacion Espanola Anti-Comunista y Anti- 
Judia, led by the Spanish engineer Francisco Cayon y Cos.
This small organisation published a leaflet, Vida Espanola from May 1937 to 
April 1938, which disappeared as a result of financial problems and scarce diffusion. 
From its inception the AECAJ closely associated to the native right-wing 
organisations such as the UNVR and the CCM. Furthermore, in May 1937 Cayon y 
Cos wrote to Franco assuring him that the majority of the Spanish colony supported 
him, and explained the lack of more assistance to his cause on interference by the 
Cardenas government and the Spanish Embassy.20 Subsequently, in September of 
that year, the group dissolved in order to merge with the Mexican section of the 
Falange Exterior.
18 Moises Gonzalez Navarro, Los extranjeros en Mexico y  los mexicanos en el extranjero. 1821-1970. 
Vol. III. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico. 1994. p. 28.
19 Juan de Dios Bojorquez, La inmigracion espanola de Mexico. Mexico 1932. pp. 1-13.
20 Manuel Fernandez Boyoli and Eustaquio Marron de Angelis, Lo que no se sabe de la rebelion 
cedillista., Mexico, Grafi-Art, 1938. annexe.
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The formal founding of the foreign section of National’s Spain new official 
party, the FET de las JONS had taken place, in April 1937. Beyond its avowed 
purpose of rallying towards the National cause all the communities of the Spanish 
emigration it also devoted itself to an intense propaganda effort on behalf of the Axis. 
According to FBI records, the Falange’s expense on propaganda was substantial. 
Franco’s secret service in Mexico spent 40,000 pesos (10, 000 dollars) per month.21
The FE published more than 15 reviews in Latin America. To attract a 
following among Spaniards and Hispanic Americans the Falange opened sections in 
most Latin American capitals. These branches organised fund-raising, raffles, 
dancing teas and luncheons with the money collected sent to Francoist Spain.
In Mexico, the Head of the Section was Augusto Ibanez Serrano, a Spanish 
merchant who had taken the Mexican citizenship, self-proclaimed “Franco’s personal 
representative in Mexico.” Ibanez was in fact appointed representative of the Spanish 
“National” State but only on January 9, 1938 and he would remain in that capacity 
until 1950, in spite of the continued unwillingness of Mexican governments to grant 
recognition to Franco throughout forty years.
The chapter assembled at the Casino Espanol-the community’s foremost club- 
and represented the interests of those Spaniards in Mexico who had pledged their 
allegiance to the National cause through the Portuguese Embassy in Mexico City. 
Ibanez had received the Spanish Embassy’s archives from Pujadas shortly before he 
was expelled from Mexico, thus depriving Gordon Ordas of much needed contacts 
and information regarding the Spanish community. More importantly, Ibanez 
possessed connections among top officials inside the Mexican administration, 
namely at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior. This may explain why the 
Falange’s undertakings were largely tolerated by the Cardenas administration as 
compared to Nazi or Fascist meddling, in spite of the continuous protestations of 
Gordon Ordas.
Thus Ibanez’s activities in Mexico were manifold: he conducted unofficial 
consular duties through the Portuguese Embassy, implemented and co-ordinated
21 Allan Chase, Falange. El ejercito secreto del Eje en America. La Habana, Editorial Caribe, 1944.
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propagandistic activities of the Falange, served as middleman between prominent 
members of the Spanish community which has taken sides with the rebellion and 
Mexican authorities, and sent reports concerning the Mexican political situation as 
well as of Falangist activities in the country, both to Madrid and to the Francoist 
representative in Washington, Juan F. Cardenas.
Several renowned merchants and industrialists resident in Mexico such as 
Adolfo Prieto, Angel Urraza and Arturo Mundet contributed with a minimum of 
1000 pesos each to the cause. The Ministry of Interior estimated that forty thousand, 
out of forty-seven thousand individuals of Spanish origin living in Mexico, had 
joined the Falange, According to a U.S. military intelligence report there were 1600 
militant activists among thirty thousand members.
Furthermore, Ibanez clandestinely recruited both Spanish residents in Mexico 
as well as Mexicans to enrol in the Francoist army. According to some sources of the 
time Ibanez enlisted more than 100 youths to serve under Franco and sent them to
j'y
Spain from Veracruz aboard the German transatlantic, Orinoco. Some authors go as 
far as to associate him with Nazi espionage in Mexico. It is an established fact that he 
sustained close contacts with the German Legation in Mexico City.
The activities of the Falange in Mexico became notorious thanks to the 
denunciations of the American press, which by then had become concerned with 
Axis penetration in the Americas. A great deal of pro-Falangist demonstrations had 
taken place in Mexico City, often ending in violent brawls. The Spanish shopkeepers 
sympathetic to the rebellion started dressing their window shops with the yoke and 
the arrows while Francoist paraphernalia became valued mementoes among certain 
sections of the capital’s population.
pp. 159-160.
22 Excelsior November 5 and 7, 1937; El Universal, November 6, 1937. AMAE Legajo R996, exp. 20.
23 Archivo General de la Nacion, exp. 551/14 and Evelyn Waugh, pp.39-40.
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T h e  C e d il l o  R e b e l l io n . A  M e x ic a n  F r a n c o ?
Soon after Calles was exiled Cedillo moved to occupy a position as leader of the 
Right. Among other measures, Cedillo turned his fiefdom of San Luis Potosi into a 
safe haven for the Mexican Church for half of Mexico’s priests in 1935. 
Consequently, the Right increasingly looked to him as its champion. Having been 
ousted from the cabinet, Cedillo planned to run for president as an opposition 
candidate in 1940, but was forced into rebellion as he watched his position 
consistently weakened by the Mexican government. In 1937 the War Ministry closed 
an aviation school set by Cedillo in San Luis Potosi and stationed federal troops 
there. In a last attempt to curb the General, Cardenas appointed him to command 
Michoacan military zone. Cedillo deemed the assignment tantamount to political 
banishment and chose to revolt instead.
Cedillo had enjoyed links with the German legation in Mexico City long before 
his uprising began. This gave rise to all sorts of wild suggestions trying to link the 
rebel of San Luis Potosi to machinations of the Axis. Thus, it was suggested that 
Nazi Germany backed Cedillo to overthrow a Communist regime in Mexico just it 
was aiding Franco to sweep the ‘Reds’ out of power. In this plot Jorge Ubico, 
Guatemala’s dictator would play against Mexico the same role that Salazar had 
played in assisting Franco, by stabbing the ‘Red’ from the back.24
The strongest “evidence” produced to give weight to the Nazi-Cedillo 
conspiracy claim was the General’s close relationship with Ernest von Merck, a 
German citizen that acted as instructor of Cedillo’s private army, and who had 
transformed San Luis Potosi’s garrison into a modem military unit. It was also 
alleged that Sonora state’s governor was implicated in the conspiracy, and that he 
received arms and funding from Japanese and German agents.26
Available sources on the affair are vague, making difficult to discern actual 
Axis involvement from deliberately mystifying propaganda. Racist propaganda 
distributed by the Cedillistas, namely anti-Semitic pamphlets give some credibility to
24 La Prensa, May 21, 1938.
25 J.H. Plenn, Mexico Marches, p.91.
26 La Prensa, May 19, 1938.
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the claims of Nazi involvement. After all Cedillo claimed through his Manifesto to 
the Nation that he had risen against the “Judaic ideal”, while accusing Cardenas of 
“disguising Communism under the name of Collectivism.”27 Rumours were strong 
enough to convince the American press and congressmen of a Nazi involvement in 
Cedillo’s largely anticipated uprising. Congressman Jerry O’Connell predicted a 
“Nazi insurrection in Mexico,” and claimed to have proof of German supply of arms 
and ammunition to General Cedillo.28
Although there may have been some German involvement in the rebellion, it 
would be more accurate to attribute Cedillo’s funding to the disgruntled oil 
companies. There was open talk of the corporation’s representatives of their 
willingness to pay one million dollars “or more” to whomever attempted the 
overthrow of Cardenas’ government.29 Cedillo himself defined the companies’ 
“legitimate” demands of restitution of their expropriated possessions, as one of the 
main aims of his uprising.30
The Cedillo rebellion of 1938 actualised the fears and fantasies that the Spanish 
Civil War could be replayed in Mexico. When asked by reporters if the United States 
would remain neutral before the Mexican conflict, as they had done in Spain, 
Roosevelt replied that the U.S. would actively support the established Government.31
Cardenas himself appeared in San Luis Potosi offering full amnesty to any 
Cedillista that put down its arms. Most accepted the offer. 8, 000 soldiers were 
shifted to San Luis Potosi, where they engaged in sporadic skirmishes against 
Cedillista forces. Encircled by the Federal Army, Cedillo was gunned down in an 
ambush on January 1939. This was to be the last important rebellion of Mexican 
military against the federal government. Henceforth, the Mexican army kept its 
loyalty to the Revolutionary State.
27 Manchester Guardian, August 31, 1938.
28 New York Times, January 30, 1938.
29 David Cronon, op. cit., pp. 210-211.
30 Nathan and Sylvia Weyl, op. cit., p.300.
31 Manuel Fernandez Boyoli and Eustaquio Marron de Angelis, op. cit., p. 190.
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In  s e a r c h  o f  t h e  M e x ic a n  P o p u l a r  F r o n t : T h e  P a r t y  o f  t h e  M e x ic a n
R e v o l u t io n  (P R M )
In the throes of the oil expropriation a most remarkable political development took 
place: the transformation of the ruling PNR into the PRM. Under the spell of the 
Spanish Civil War and the Blum Government in France, enthusiasm for the new 
popular front tactics took hold of the leadership of the Mexican labour movement. 
At its inaugural congress on February 1936, the CTM had pledged itself to work for 
the establishment of a Mexican Popular Front in close co-operation with the
' X ' XCommunist party. In like manner, close advisers of Cardenas were impressed by the 
example of France and favoured a broad coalition of the national mass organisations 
in a Mexican Popular Front. Lombardo Toledano then proposed a popular front type 
alliance between the CTM, the government sponsored peasant confederation (CNC), 
the Communist party and the PNR to counter the extreme right offensive. Cardenas 
himself seemed amenable to the plan. The plan however collapsed apparently 
because the PNR’s bureaucracy sternly opposed the inclusion of the Communists.
After several failed attempts to reach a compromise, Cardenas opted to broaden 
the official party instead of coalescing the existing organisations. In March 1938, the 
PNR was transformed into the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM). Four 
autonomous sectors -Labour, Peasant, Popular and Military-were fused into a single 
political entity. It was, as Amaldo Cordova has pointedly stated, a defence of the 
Mexican Revolution following the strategy of the Popular Front. Cordova notes that 
the programme of these popular fronts also coincided with the revolutionary regime 
in that it was deemed necessary to develop the nation economically and safeguard its 
security from external threats before arriving to an egalitarian society.34
Within the framework of domestic agitation of the Cardenista period, the war 
in Spain had encouraged the Mexican rightist groups who saw in the outlook of the
- i f
Falangists an applicable solution to Mexico. The hopes of Mexican conservatives
32 J.H. Plenn, op. cit. pp. 331-333 and Tziv Medin, op. cit., pp. 116.
33 Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico, CTM, 1936-1941, Mexico 1941. pp.16-30.
34 Amaldo Cordova, La politica de masas del cardenismo. op. cit., p. 176.
35 Jorge Alberto Lozoya, El Ejercito mexicano. El Colegio de Mexico, 197. p.65.
233
The Republic’s Downfall and its Effects on the Mexican Revolution
rose with every victory of Franco in Spain. The appearance of the Sinarquismo in that 
juncture was therefore no coincidence.
Moreover, the oil companies and multinational interests that aimed at stopping 
Cardenas reforms began sponsoring all those groups opposed to the Mexican 
government, raising further fears of a repetition of Spanish events in Mexico. In fact, 
despite the military reorganisation launched by Cardenas, the oil companies were 
able to drive a high-ranking General, Satumino Cedillo, to revolt against Cardenas.
In words of Lozoya, Mexican Conservatives had seen in the Francoist uprising 
an “attainable and applicable solution for Mexico.” In the presence of this threat 
Cardenas government faced the imperative of reorganising the national political 
forces by widening the popular front that the official party intended. At stake was the 
own survival of the regime and of the achievements of the post-revolutionary 
governments.36 It is in this precise sense that the transformation of the PNR into the 
PRM in the summer of 1938 must be understood. The party’s Constituent Assembly 
stated in its letter of convocation the incorporation to the party of the social classes, 
which had been “benefited by the regime’s reforms.” To achieve this end, the party 
would be forthwith structured along four sectors: Labour, Peasant, Popular (state
'XHbureaucrats and middle class) and Military.
In December 18, 1937 Cardenas announced the historical transformation. The 
most important innovation consisted in the incorporation of the military (and the 
middle class) into the party. The juncture was too critical and the government could 
not eschew the military. The ideological implications of enrolling the military into a 
political party were, however, all too controversial. Many viewed as risky the 
incorporation of the military due to the possible parallels it may draw with the Fascist 
Party in Italy.38
The reorganisation of the PRM, however, meant ultimately a further reduction 
of the generals’ political influence and a corresponding increase of the agrarian sector 
and organised labour’s leverage within the regime. Since its founding by Calles in
36 Jorge Alberto Lozoya, op. cit., p.65.
37 Partido de la Revolution Mexicana, Pacto Constitutive), declaracion de principios, programa y  
estatutos. Mexico D.F, 1938.
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1929, the official party had been an amalgam of local political machines, largely 
dominated by the military. With the transformation, geographic representation (i.e. 
regional caudillismo) was replaced by occupational representation. The CTM was by 
far the dominant force. The army now could be outvoted by the other sectors. 
Moreover, Cardenas and Defence Minister Avila Camacho encouraged young 
officers to join the labour, peasant and popular sectors. Thus, any aspiring general 
who might wish to mutiny against the regime’s radical agenda might have to face the 
possibility of fighting against its own subordinates and troops.40
The fact that Cardenas had Spain in mind when deciding the transformation of 
the governing party into an all-embracing Popular Front type of organisation may be 
inferred from his own words at a private meeting with the Republican Under­
secretary of State, Juan Simeon-Vidarte:
I have studied thoroughly and with affection the Republican process in Spain 
and I consider that among your many and excellent successes you have 
committed two mistakes, at least from my perspective: first not having 
created a truly Republican army, purging the unreliable elements from 
positions of command. In Mexico we did it and to-day the Mexican army is 
the staunchest bulwark of the Revolution and its conquests. The Republic’s 
peaceful and bloodless advent seemed to you, and to the world, a grand and 
unique historical event. We, for our part, hailed it without hesitation. 
Nonetheless this very fact made you overconfident. The other was to not 
have implemented an all-embracing agrarian reform from the Republic’s 
initial stages. This would have given the peasant classes a vested interest 
that would have aided in countering the onslaught of the propertied classes.
You were a few years in power, while we have been in this revolutionary 
process almost thirty years.41.
38 Jorge Alberto Lozoya, op. cit., pp.65-66.
39 At the time of its establishment the PRM claimed nearly four million member, which under the new 
sector arrangement were divided as following: Labour Sectror 1, 250, 000; Peasant Sector 2, 500, 000; 
Popular Sector 55,000 and Military Sector 50, 000.
40 Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism. The Political Rise and Fall o f the Revolutionary Army. 1910- 
7940. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1968. p. 126.
41 Juan Simeon-Vidarte, Ante la tumba de Cardenas Mexico, Luz Hispanica, 83, Editorial Valle de 
Mexico 1971.
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Cardenas, in effect, took great care to tame the military by integrating them into 
the revolutionary party and by relieving suspected generals away from the command 
of strategic military zones. Moreover, the arming of the peasants in order to “defend 
the conquests of the agrarian reform”, meant that a conservative uprising backed by 
insurrectionary generals could now be resisted, if not quashed. The agrarian reserves 
became indeed a presidential counterbalance to the army.
T h e  F a l a n g e  in  M e x ic o
The Cedillo rebellion of May 1938 brought about renewed speculation about the 
activities of the Falange in Mexico, especially over Francoist support to the 
insurrection. These rumours also affected, bizarrely, the Spanish Embassy in Mexico 
as by early July 1938, Excelsior published an article, which tried to implicate Gordon 
with the sale of armament and aircraft to the General of San Luis Potosi.42
In fact, the Ambassador’s former pilot, Cloyd Clevenger was entangled in the 
Cedillo affair, charged with the clandestine purchase of military aircraft and 
ammunition.43 The American pilot sold and delivered two Howard DGA-8 airplanes 
to the rebel general. As result of the transaction, Clevenger received a $700 
commission from the Howard Aircraft Company, and flew himself one of the planes 
from Chicago to San Luis Potosi. Clevenger found himself indicted by the U.S. for 
illegal export under the Neutrality Laws, along with Cedillo. Clevenger turned in and 
was given a suspended sentence and fined.44 At once, Nicolas Rodriguez disappeared 
from his confinement in Mission, Texas. Colonel Von Merck accompanied him and 
it was said that both had been trying to purchase arms and planes in southern US for 
Cedillo.45
Soon after the oil expropriation act and the Cedillista rebellion, a State led anti- 
Fascist offensive began. This took several forms as the administration took earnest 
measures to close ranks against the mounting menace.
42 Excelsior, July 9, 1938.
43 NAUS State Department Memorandum. Conversation between Cloyd Clevenger and Gibson 
Washington, May 13,1938 SD, NARA, WDC, 812.00 Revolutions 284.
441 owe this information to the kind advice of Gerald Howson.
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These apprehensions were not far-fetched as various episodes attest. On the 
summer of 1938 two representatives of the Franco regime, Juan Jose Ruano and the 
Jesuit dignitary Julio Vertiz, arrived in Veracruz with the assignment of “setting the 
stage” for a future recognition of the Francoist regime by the Mexican authorities. 
Once in Mexico City Vertiz set up the Escuadra Tradicionalista, yet another agit-prop 
organisation bent on promoting the National cause in Mexico and furthering a 
likewise take-over. Coinciding with their arrival several editorials appeared in the 
Mexican press demanding diplomatic recognition for Spain. At that point, the famous 
landscapist Dr. Atl wrote an open letter to the President insisting, “The time has 
arrived for Mexico to recognise the vanquisher of Communism in Spain.”46
Not surprisingly, the Mexican Right greeted the Republic’s defeat on April 1, 
1939 with unconcealed enthusiasm. For many it was the first great defeat inflicted on 
Communism and as such the dawning of a new era in which Christianity would rule 
the land. The conservative press gave in to boastful proclaims. Thus, for instance, El 
Universal's leader irrepressibly stated, “It is said and rightly so that communism has 
met its tomb in Madrid.”47
Emboldened and boastful by Franco’s crushing victory, supporters of the 
National cause within the Spanish colony began to act more openly, indulging in a 
series of public acts in spite of the warnings of the Mexican Ministry of Interior. 
Events reached their climax, when, on the first of April a group of thugs threw stones
AQ
at the Ambassador’s automobile, hurting his chauffeur and aide de camp.
A tumultuous gathering was summoned the next day at the Casino Espanol to 
celebrate Franco’s victory and to allow the Falangists to admonish the colony on 
future directives. The pretext was the so-called Plato unico, a luncheon held weekly 
by the Falangists to raise funds. On Sundays the Spanish community gathered to eat a 
single dish to reflect the “austerity of the time.”
On that precise occasion, three thousand attended, cramming the halls of the 
Casino, which proved insufficient to provide room for so many people. Presiding the
45 New York Times, May 26, 1938.
46 Excelsior, February 6, 1939.
47 El Universal, April 2, 1939.
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ceremony were Augusto Ibanez Serrano, emissary of the new Spanish State, 
Alejandro Villanueva Plata, visiting inspector of the Falange, and Genaro Riestra, 
sectional Head of the Falange in Mexico. All the directors of Spanish organisations 
in Mexico, such as the Orfeo Catala, The Centro Asturiano, Circulo Vasco Espanol 
and the Casa de Galicia were also present. Conspicuously, at the table of honour were 
the Axis Ambassadors, Count Alberto Marchetti di Muraglio, from Italy, and Riidt 
Von Collenberg, from Germany, as well as representatives of Japan and Portugal. 
Ibanez sternly made clear that from then on, Spanish residents in Mexico must act in 
accordance to the doctrines espoused by the Caudillo:
Spain does not yeam, nor has any interest, to re-conquer by force the 20 
nations over which long ago it extended its dominion. Yet indeed it wishes 
to recover the spiritual ascendancy over them with affection, love, good 
reasons, education and intelligence.49
Then came Villanueva, who prudently warned the Spaniards in Mexico not to 
meddle in Mexican affairs. Furthermore, in order to comply with the new Spanish 
reality all centres would have to dissolve and merge into one. As in Spain only one 
party existed, the Movimiento Nacional, thus in Mexico only one Spanish centre 
should exist under the firm control of the Spanish government. In spite of 
Villanueva’s precautions a number of Falangists disobeyed their chiefs orders and 
went half drunk to hail Franco and shout death to Lombardo in front of the CTM 
building. These acts were prone to cause the wrath, not only of the Mexican Left but 
also of the Mexican government itself.
The Mexican government retorted firmly. On, April 3, 1939 the Ministry of 
Interior published a bulletin that stated that by agreement of the President of the 
Republic the Mexican authorities acknowledged no legal personality to the Falange. 
The very wording of the prohibition is revelatory of the Mexican government’s 
heartfelt stance during the Spanish conflict, and the measure of Cardenas’ fears about 
the potential consequences for Mexico of a Francoist victory in the Spanish war:
48 El Nacional April 2, 1939.
49 El Universal, April 3, 1939.
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The Falange seeks the imperial fulfilment of Spain through its expansion on 
Spanish America, aiming to unify her cultural, economic and political realms 
under her aegis, with the character of “spiritual axis” of the Hispanic world.
In consequence, the Mexican government considers-without abjuring of the 
historic legacy of the Old Spain in the New World, or of the necessary 
exchange of spiritual and commercial values between nations-, it essential to 
its sovereignty and its democracy to educate its generations, organise its 
economy and constitute itself politically, free from any foreign interference 
or imperialist penetration.
The document also warned or threatened that:
As the members of the Falange have been operating in connection with 
individuals and groups that are notoriously opposed to our social reform, and 
as they are a fraternity that has pledged allegiance to its chiefs, the Ministry 
reaffirms that Mexican hospitality is conditional upon respect to our 
Republican institutions.50
Thus, the statement called on foreigners to refrain from subversive activities 
either individually or under the cover of groups. Next, the Mexican government 
announced that Villanueva Plata, Riestra and Celorio had been arrested and taken to 
Veracruz to face deportation. The same day they were forcefully embarked in a ship 
that took them to the United States. This, apparently, put an end to Falangist 
activities, although the movement would resurface later using other, somewhat more 
clandestine methods, as shall be seen.
T h e  M e x ic a n  R ig h t  a n d  F r a n c o ’s  C r u s a d e
In the eyes of the Mexican middle and upper classes the “Terror” unleashed by 
Spanish extremists was seen as a corroboration of their own likely fate if the PNR 
carried on its anti-religious and extremist course. In Mexico the attraction of Franco’s 
movement was felt immediately among rightist circles. For Mexican Conservatives, 
however, Franco’s coup came almost too late to reverse the social transformations
50 Excelsior April 5, 1939.
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spearheaded by Cardenas’ administration. Yet, at the same time, German and Italian 
involvement in the Spanish conflict induced many Mexican Hispanistas to believe 
that their struggle might be becoming part of a larger effort to “check the Red tide.”
The Mexican Radical Right grew out of the religious conflict that pervaded 
Mexico throughout the 1920s. The enforcement of the Constitution’s secular 
legislation led the Catholic Church to mobilise its parish against the “heretical 
government.” Among the middle class, the formation of secret societies and pressure 
groups such as the Asociacion Cristiana de la Juventud Mexicana and Liga Nacional 
Defensora de la Libertad Religiosa multiplied. At grassroots level the millenarian 
peasant movement known as La Cristiada led to a ferocious civil war waged in 
Central Mexico’s countryside between 1926 and 1929.
However, these groups were far from homogeneous and one of its most salient 
features was clearly their fragmentation and their utter inability to secure enough 
cohesion as to become a serious threat to the revolutionary administrations. Only 
during the later years of Cardenismo, coinciding with the Spanish Civil war did these 
groups appear to be making serious breakthroughs, as shown by Sinarquismo that 
achieved a considerable growth following.
An organisation that became especially active during those days was the 
Revolutionaries Veteran Organisation (UNVR) a fiercely nationalistic group 
comprised of disgruntled veterans that began to play a key role in political agitation 
by 1937. The UNVR public pronouncements raised deep concerns in the 
Administration about the impact they could have on the Mexican army. Only three 
months after the outbreak of the Civil War, the UNVR approached the Treasury’s 
under-secretary Eduardo Villasenor, and asked for his support to create a Mexican 
fascist movement. Alluding to Spain, the group argued that only a fascist movement 
could prevent “Mexican Communists and foreigners from plunging Mexico in a civil 
war.”51
The diffuse popular conservatism that had manifested in acts such as the 
murder and mutilation of rural teachers took shape in the Sinarquista movement
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founded to preserve the faith and Hispanic tradition. Sinarquismo claimed over half a 
million followers at the height of its power in the early 1940s. Its spectacular growth 
owed much to the impact that the Spanish Civil war had had on Mexican domestic 
politics.
Set up in May 1937 in the central state of Guanajuato by Salvador Abascal, 
Manuel Zermeno and Jose Antonio Urquiza. Within a year Urquiza was murdered 
and became the official martyr of the movement. Thus by a strange coincidence 
Sinarquismo boasted a martyr called liked Falange’s Jose Antonio. It has been 
suggested that a Nazi agent, Helmuth Oskar Schreiter, a chemical engineer who held 
chair as Language professor at the University of Guanajuato played a key role in its 
foundation.
Sinarquismo also shared several features with conservative Hispanismo, such 
as the staunch defence of Catholic faith, the upholding of family and tradition, and 
thus predictably exhibited a distinct ardour towards Franco’s “crusade.”
The movement’s origins remain obscure. Apparently it sprang out of La Base a 
Catholic secret society aimed at penetrating all aspects of secular life, much in the 
fashion of the Opus Dei and in like manner structured in cells. Smarquistas 
considered Mexico to have originated in the Spanish conquest, and that consequently 
the Spanish heritage outweighed the Indian past. Therefore, they repudiated the very 
Indigenismo upheld by Cardenas. They considered Heman Cortes rather than Miguel 
Hidalgo as Mexico’s authentic founding father.
Without doubt, the Sinarquistas aped the fascist ways of saluting and dressing 
in military fashion. However, Abascal was far from being Der Mexikanische Fiihrer, 
as rather than the Nazis he admired and emulated the Falange, more akin to his 
cultural background than the remote Teutonic code of Hitler cohorts. All in all, the 
organisation was a combination of middle class leaders and a massive popular base 
of peasant followers.
51 AGN, Fondo Lazaro Cardenas, Exp. 120/1482, Union Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolution, 
“Carta a Villasenor”, September 14, 1936.
52 Allan Chase, op. cit., p. 172
53 Hugh G .Campbell, La derecha radical en Mexico, Mexico, Sepsetentas, 276, 1976, p. 44 passim.
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Like the Spanish Falangists whom they favoured, Sinarquista ideologues 
advocated a model of authoritarian corporate social organisation; unlike the Spanish 
Fascists, the Mexican millenarians were profoundly Catholic and sought their golden 
age in a pre-modem past. Concerning their connection with what many consider their 
natural predecessors, the Cristeros, there is still great debate over whether there 
existed continuity or overlap between both movements. It would be more precise to 
say that Cristeros resembled Carlistas. Both organisations were rurally based and 
upheld a fundamentalist sense of religiousness and tradition that longed for a sort of 
medieval corporatism.54 Derived from Greek, Sinarquismo purported to be the 
antithesis to the anarchy that their creators felt was sweeping Mexico. Above all, the 
Sinarquista movement was an organisation devoted to promote the interests of the 
Catholic Church and to defend and recover the privileges it had enjoyed before 
secularisation.
The Nationals victory in Spain in April 1939 had great impact in the 
Sinarquistas growth.55 Not surprisingly, Francoist agents took a keen interest on 
Sinarquismo and tried to lure it in their own interests. Despite the great numbers it 
secured, Sinarquismo faded away as it renounced all form of political action and later 
as Avila Camacho outlawed it.56
The extent of Axis influence on and manipulation of Sinarquismo to foment 
subversion before and during World War II will probably never be clearly known. 
Many of them organised themselves in agrarian colonies in, from a Second World 
War vantage point, strategically crucial Lower California raising the alarm of the 
U.S. State Department. The Mexican government, too, was firmly of the opinion that 
the movement constituted an Axis’ “Fifth Column”, and it was directly as a means of
54 Jean Meyer, Le Sinarquisme. Un Fascisme Mexicaine? 1937-1947, Paris Hachette, 1977. pp.106- 
147.
55 ibid., p. 114.
56 Jean Meyer, op. cit., pp.270-271.
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keeping Sinarquismo under check that an espionage law was enacted in September 
1941.57
Discontent with Cardenas’ radical policies encouraged too the growth of the 
Partido Accion Nacional (PAN). The PAN’s programme called for the establishment 
of a corporatist state in Mexico and advocated the unabashed promotion of the cause 
of Hispanidad. The new party had such strong links with the Catholic Church that the 
revolutionaries dismissed it as a confessional party. It has been suggested that it 
received a subsidy from Falange Exterior. What is true, anyhow, is the existence of 
close links between Gomez Morin with Jose Maria Peman and Carlos Peroya, two of 
the main Falange’s propagandists.58 According to its founding father, Manuel Gomez 
Morin:
In 1938 an intolerable situation prevailed in Mexico: an impending threat of
the loss of freedom, which made indispensable the creation of the party.59
This “intolerable” situation was the “spread” of Marxist socialism which 
threatened to “take over Mexico’ just as it had done in Spain before Franco “had law 
and order fully restored.”60
Although all radical rightist groups were deeply ultra-nationalist, anti-Marxist 
and anti-liberal, religion was the crucial factor that would ultimately divide them. A 
second variant of the radical right was the secular right. After the debacle of the 
Cristero movement, the Church sought reconciliation with the Mexican State. The 
ACJM and the LNDR were thus dissolved. A modus vivendi was reached, first under 
Rodriguez, then under Cardenas.
The widespread use of Marxist terminology by the Cardenas administration led 
many observers, local and foreign, to believe that the government was taking Mexico 
to communism. The urban middle classes were to drift farther and farther to the right
57 Harold E. Davis, “Enigma of Mexican Sinarquism” Free World V (May 1943), 410-416; Donald J. 
Mabry, Mexico’s Accion Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 
University Press, 1973), pp.32-35.
58 Allan Chase, op. cit., p. 171.
59 Soledad Loaeza, op. cit., pp. 60-62.
60 ibid.
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during Cardenas tenure. Alienated by the belligerent unionism of the CTM and 
soaring inflation they made up the nucleus of the secular radical right.
A specifically Fascist organisation Accion Revolucionaria Mexicanista, 
founded in 1933 as an anti-Semitic and anti-Communist paramilitary organisation 
under ex-Villista General Nicolas Rodriguez, reached its heyday coinciding with the 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Also known as Camisas Doradas in opposition to 
Garrido Canabal’s Camisas Rojas, the Golden Shirts emerged as a consequence of 
the Communist growing influence under Cardenas. Their first actions included strike 
breaking and random attacks against the headquarters of the Mexican Communist 
Party (PCM). The Golden Shirts found valuable inspiration in European fascism 
adopting many of its most salient features, mainly vicious anti-Semitism, anti- 
Communism as well as paramilitary attire and regalia.61
The ARM represented in its ideology, the extreme reaction of Mexican middle 
class against the ascent of the urban proletariat in the mid-thirties and the hopes of 
the incipient capitalist class to obtain protection from foreign competition. 
Predictably, the group was extremely nationalist, anti-Marxist and anti­
parliamentarian. Its motto was “Mexico for the Mexicans”, while they considered the 
middle class: ‘the principal component of our nationality.”
The group represented the extreme response of the middle class to what they 
perceived as a scheme to implant communism in Mexico. Their continuous 
denunciations of an alleged Jewish-Communist conspiracy to subvert Mexican 
tradition and nationality are yet another feature of their fascist inclinations.63 In the 
Mexican context, it was clearly a reaction against the social aspirations promised by 
the Mexican Revolution.
In their view, the emergence of labour demands in the guise of the increasing 
number of strikes that shook Mexico obeyed to the espousal by the Mexican 
government of an alien ideology: Russian communism.
61 PRO FO. 1936; 371/19793 Activities of Golden Shirts organisation A2307/196/26.
62 Excelsior, January 1, 1936.
63 Cf. Juan B. Linz, Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical 
Perspective. In Walter Laqueur, Fascism A Reader’s Guide. Middlesex, Penguin, 1976. pp. 13-80.
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In consequence, they demanded Cardenas to limit stringently the number of 
Jews living in Mexico, to strip them of Mexican citizenship, that they were barred 
from political participation, and that all factories and commerce in their hands be 
seized and passed unto Mexican hands. The Golden Shirts soon gained increased 
popular support among disaffected shopkeepers and small property farmers. 
Rodriguez then turned his attention to big business setting briefly his headquarters in 
Monterrey, Mexico’s chief industrial town. There he would obtain considerable 
funding from the business elite.
In a well-known episode, the Golden Shirts clashed with the Communist taxi- 
drivers’ trade union on November 20, 1935 in Mexico City’s main square. The 
scuffle left a balance of three dead and more than 50 injured, among them Rodriguez 
himself.64 As a result of this clash, Cardenas outlawed the group and Rodriguez went 
to exile in the U.S., whence he continued to engage in conspiracies against “Mexican 
bolshevism.”
As with Calles, American Ambassador, Daniels helped Cardenas to exile 
Rodriguez to the U.S., thus effectively removing him from Mexican politics. 
Nevertheless, his departure did not spell the organisation’s demise. The Golden 
Shirts continued to harass Jews, Communists and trade unionists throughout 
Cardenas’ term of office. A phoney organisation, the Vanguardia Mexicana Nacional 
served as a cover organisation for the banned ARM, while several Golden Shirts 
infiltrated the UNVR.
During the early stages of the Spanish Civil war a group organised in Mexican 
university campuses, the Confederation de la Clase Media, an umbrella organisation 
headed by Gustavo Saenz de Sicilia, was especially active at raising political alarm. 
The group circulated pamphlets that attacked trade unions and warned peasants about 
the State’s intentions of becoming the new master. The CCM was successful in fund­
raising among employers’ organisations. It was also able to build a popular 
following, in spite of the continuous harassment it had to endure from the 
government. As early as 1936, the CCM declared its adhesion to the Francoist cause:
64 Excelsior, November 21, 1935; El Universal, November 21 and 22, 1935.
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Mexico lives difficult days, similar to those experienced by the mother 
country in the moments prior to the emancipating movement. Here as there, 
the party of demagogy aims to destroy everything that is worthy in our 
traditions; here as there they strive to establish a regime of barbarity. It is our 
wish in addressing Your Excellency that the clamour of conscious Mexico, 
which acclaims with jubilation the victory of Hispanidad, may be known in 
Spain. The liberation movement in Spain is ours in the same proportion that 
Spanish blood flows through our veins. We believe in the triumph of your 
cause, which is our cause, and we shall undertake, provided that the 
opportunity arrives, to follow your example, your courage and your decision 
in the re-conquest of the immortal fatherland.65
The CCM, linked to the infamous leader of the Golden Shirts, Rodriguez, 
wrote to Francisco Franco, congratulating him on the occupation of Bilbao.66 This 
support would come to its fruition after Franco’s victory when the conservative 
students of the National University launched a pro-Axis crusade, opposing Mexico’s 
co-operation with the Allies and demanded that Hispanidad, to link Mexico with 
Franco’s Spain, be substituted for the Pan-Americanism in Mexico’s foreign policy. 
Dr. Mario de la Cueva, the University’s rector, who supported such programme, was 
quoted by the Falange Espanola de Mexico’s official publication as saying:
The National University of Mexico, proud of its glorious past and conscious 
of the high mission that it fulfils as the centre of culture in the nation, is 
identified completely with the Spanish nations and opens its doors to 
Hispanidad. Everything that promotes the ideals of our race and the belief in 
the destiny of our nation will meet with all of the aid, the comprehension, 
and the good will of which we are capable. But for anything that denies or 
goes against Hispanidad, our doors are permanently and inexorably closed.67
The magazine concluded its interview with the rector by saying that Dr. De la 
Cueva represented:
65 Manuel Fernandez Boyoli and Eustaquio Marron de Angelis, op. cit., p.212.
66 Ibid. pp. 221-223.
67 Hispanidad, March 7, 1941.
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...the cultivated and sincere youth of Mexico, which is not contaminated 
with the virus of Jewishness and the bastardly interests of those who are paid 
by Yankee imperialism.68
To this day, the National University of Mexico unwittingly maintains the 
slogan ‘For my Race shall the Spirit speak’ as its motto; most students and professors 
ignore the true nature of this formula, proverbially attributed to Vasconcelos’ 
authorship, but, indubitably, owing a great deal to Francoist propaganda.
Formed by the Spanish merchants resident in Mexico, the Falange Espanola 
Tradicionalista had the avowed aim of neutralising the consistent support given by 
Cardenas to the Republicans. As mentioned before, the group was outlawed in 1939.
In November 1938 a priest in the Santo Domingo church, Mexico City, blessed 
a flag of the Spanish Fascist Falange, which was to be taken to Spain by a group of 
recruits for the Franco army.69 The authorities discovered a widespread pro-Franco 
Fascist organisation in the Spanish colony with an associated youth organisation 
Juventud Obrera Nacional Sindicalista. Investigating these activities, the secret police 
stumbled in their headquarters on 120 General Prim Street, blocks away from the 
Ministry of the Interior. Their bank accounts showed they had contributed 
considerable amounts of military and monetary aid to the Francoist cause. They were 
expelled from Mexican territory under the provision of Article 33 of the Mexican 
Constitution. Among them, there was Genaro Riestra Diaz who would later serve as 
Military Governor of the province of Vizcaya.70
Contrary to what has been believed, Cardenas foreign policy received only 
limited approval from the Mexican common folk. Most educated Mexicans rejected
71it. Furthermore, the government loyalist sympathies angered not only the middle 
class and business circles, but also the devout Catholic peasantry. Thus, for instance 
in February 1937 rural Fascists chanting Viva Franco! disturbed the constitution
• 77  •anniversary celebrations at Bajio. Oddly enough, the Catholic hierarchy, seeking to
68 Betty Kirk, op. cit., p. 145.
69 J. H. Plenn, Mexico Marches, p. 210.
70 Erik Suaffer, Un mexicano en las garras de Franco. Mexico, Editorial Tepaliztli, 1961, pp.37-40.
71 Marcelino Domingo, Mexico ejemplo: El mundo ante Espana. Paris, 1938. p.40.
72 El Nacional, February 6, 1937.
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accommodate with the Revolutionary regime refrained from taking part in these 
attacks against the Republic, even after receiving a letter on July 1937 from their 
Spanish counterparts asking them to condemn the Republican government.
The rightist opposition was counterrevolutionary in the sense that it had a 
restorationist agenda. Its aim was to return to a mythical golden age of 
authoritarianism and hierarchical class structure. In this yearning they appealed to the 
most backward and traditional sections of Mexican society. In truth, millions of 
Mexican peasants despised Cardenas and his broader project.
Vasconcelismo marked the beginning of the Right’s earnest electoral challenge 
to the Revolutionary regime, a challenge that resurfaced cautiously in 1934, 
resolutely in 1940 and continues under the influence of the PAN today. Vasconcelos’ 
campaign attracted large segments of the Mexican Right. His failure catalysed the 
disillusionment of the right with electoral competition. Due to its divisions, the right 
had displayed a relative weakness at the 1934 contest. The Conservatives had 
abhorred the prospect of Cardenas becoming even a stooge President given his 
antecedents of radical reform and leftist leanings. Their fears were largely justified.
Once in power, Cardenas’ incorporation of Mexico’s workers and peasants into 
the national political system, the revival of socialist education, the implementation of 
large-scale land redistribution in the Laguna region and Yucatan, as well as the 
exaltation of Mexico’s indigenous tradition in the official image of Mexican 
nationalism, irreconcilably antagonised the Mexican Hispanistas.
The Mexican Right was further reinforced by the dissension of former 
revolutionaries, which infuriated with Cardenas radical approach rallied to the forces 
of opposition. In some instances the administration would be able to deactivate their 
potential by way of co-optation, in others with outright defamation.
On December 1938, General Perez Trevino issued a manifesto to “the Mexican 
citizenry” charging that the PRM had been modelled after the Soviet Union’s 
Communist Party, designed with the intention of subverting democracy. In due 
course he called for the formation of a new party, the Partido Revolucionario Anti-
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Comunista (PRAC) to prevent Mexico from falling into the “wreck of communism.” 
The PRAC strove to be an umbrella organisation of the right, incorporating four 
lesser groups into its ranks.
The most important among them were the Partido Social Democrata Mexicano 
(PSDM) and the Vanguardia Mexicana Nacional (VNM). The former had been 
organised in mid-1937 by the editor of El Hombre Libre, Diego Arenas Guzman, and 
after his decease had passed into the hands of Jorge Prieto Laurens. The party’s 
programme, published in El Universal on August left no doubts about the 
organisation’s ultra-rightist views. The document opened with an incendiary attack 
against Marxism, although it tried to disguise it under the tenets of classic liberalism. 
The determination to frighten further the already dismayed middle classes is evident 
as the text lashed on the evils of Marxism-Leninism:
A doctrine that aspires at the destruction of the bourgeoisie, as the proletariat 
aims to exterminate the last man, woman and child of the wretched middle 
class. Moreover the Communist regime aims at the destruction of the family. 
Communism must destroy the homestead, because as long as family ties 
endure it will not be able to thoroughly take over men’s heart and minds.74
It should be remembered that been the more conservative General Manuel 
Perez Trevino had been Cardenas’ chief rival for the PNR’s presidential nomination 
Although he exerted considerable leverage inside the party structure he failed to 
canvass successfully among other instances of power, namely the congress, which 
strongly opposed his aspirations.
On March 8, 1939 General Joaquin Amaro issued a manifesto against the 
“communistic tendencies in the granting of communal land holdings and the false 
labour policy based upon demagogy.”75 On that same occasion he declared: “we must 
turn our attention to our own affairs and we must cease a boastful international 
policy. Let us respect all the nations of the world...while working modestly ourselves 
upon our own real internal problems. Thus we shall earn the respect of all nations.”76
73 Excelsior, December 8, 1938.
74 El Universal, August 24, 1937.
75 Excelsior, March 8, 1939.
76 El Universal, March 8, 1939.
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El Nacional, the official organ of the government swiftly retorted on March 10th, 
reminding General Amaro of his obscure role in the political assassination of General 
Francisco Serrano at Huitzilac in 1929. Thereafter, Amaro plunged into obscurity
Franco’s victory of and the concomitant fascist model in Spain revived 
Hispanista dreams in Mexico and strengthened the most organised social mass 
movement against Cardenismo and the post-revolutionary state. Furthermore, 
Franco’s Spain sent secret services and agents provocateurs to destabilise Mexico. 
Through the Falange and with German financing, they exacerbated Mexican social 
tensions. Mexican conservative and Catholic circles contemplated. It was alleged that 
the Francoist Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM) and the Falange had by 1940
7714,736 agents operating on Latin America and that they had penetrated the Mexican 
government. This would explain why they could act unhampered until Mexico’s 
entry to the war. Allan Chase considered that Mexico had the most powerful 
concentration of Falangists in the Western Hemisphere. Chase reckoned that the FET 
de las JONS had over 50,000 active members in Mexico.78
Only the Hitler-Stalin pact would effectively stifle what seemed the irresistible 
ascent of the Mexican right. It provided the Cardenas administration with a much- 
needed respite. Without it, the course of the elections would have been influenced by 
a stronger, better-organised, foreign supported Rightist coalition.
W o m e n ’s  S u f f r a g e  in  M e x ic o  a n d  t h e  S p a n is h  W a r
The Spanish Civil War may have had another hitherto unconsidered repercussion for 
Mexican politics: the denial of the right to vote for women. There is ample evidence 
that Cardenas initially favoured the idea of granting the right of women’s suffrage. In 
his 1933 candidacy acceptance speech Cardenas stated that women were: “beings 
eminently aware of human problems and sufficiently generous to seek the general
77 Betty Kirk, op. cit., p.245
78 Allan Chase, op. cit., p. 173
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interest.” However, he later qualified his remarks by stating that women’s rights
70would be granted gradually and over an unspecified period of time.
Women participated extensively in his campaign, and he complied with some 
of his electoral pledges by including some women in national political posts. 
Mexican women obtained the right to vote within the PRM and had the right to run 
for public office.80 Cardenas had espoused a movement to give them the franchise, 
but several left wing leaders, who pointed out that Mexican women were 
conservative, uneducated and superstitious, opposed this reform.81
Thus, Palma Gullen was appointed as Mexican Minister to Colombia in 1934, 
making her the first Latin American woman to be commissioned as female diplomat. 
Concurrently to these measures, incipient feminist organisations pressed to obtain 
women’s suffrage. By the end of August 1936 the Union de Mujeres Americanas sent 
a note to the Mexican Congress demanding political rights that the Constitution 
prescribed for them as citizens. The Union righteously declared that:
History has shown that truly revolutionary governments have consecrated
equality in their constitutions, whereas only the reactionaries and the
conservative opposed women’s equality before men.82
As the mid-term elections of 1937 approached, the pressure to obtain the 
extension of ballot to women increased. Thus, the so-called United Front for the 
Rights of Women through its representatives, Margarita Robles and Esther Chapa 
both from the Frente Unico Pro Derechos de la Mujer announced its presence at the
O'}
ballot boxes: “as women tend by nature to be more legalistic than men.” For all 
official response the front was incorporated to the popular sector of the PRM.
Both, Robles and Chapa, had been arguing in favour of women’s civil and 
political rights since 1930. Paradoxically, it was the secular Right that first advanced 
the cause. From 1929, the Partido Nacional Antirreleccionista had debated the issue
79 Anna Macias, Against all Odds: The Feminist Movement in Mexico to 1940. Westport Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press, 1982. p.139.
80 Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, op. cit., p. 353.
81 Ibid. pp.353-354.
82 Luis Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 119.
83 Ibid.pp. 120-121. Salvador Novo, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
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of woman’s suffrage.84 The role of women in the Catholic Right was so pronounced 
that some government officials viewed them as a sort of “clerical fifth column” and
o c
the regime was clearly nervous about their national enfranchisement.
Ultimately, the regime’s reluctance to enfranchise women had, beyond doubt, 
much to do with the outcome of Spanish events. The defeat of the Spanish Republic 
by Francoists deeply affected the mood among the revolutionary elite causing them to 
become extremely cautious. The Republic first introduced legislation extending 
electoral suffrage to women in Spain. Spanish women had voted for the first time at 
both the municipal and national level in 1933. It was an important novelty as not 
even Republican France had enacted it. The measure produced a distinct uneasiness 
among republican deputies of centre and left, most of which had not voted for it. Out 
of a total of 470 deputies only 188 voted in favour. Among those who opposed the 
measure stood out important personalities such as the socialist Prieto. Even some of 
the first women deputies in Spanish history backed the refusal to grant women the 
right to vote.86
For the most part, a conservative disposition was attributed to Spanish women 
as they nurtured the ranks of the Catholic Right (40% of Madrid’s CEDA members 
were women, whereas only 5% of the Radicals).87 The Spanish Church, fighting 
bitterly against the anticlerical reforms of the hated Republic, openly exerted its 
influence over female voters who in some places marched directly from the churches 
to the polling booths.88
After the Republic’s demise and with the ensuing conservative shift in Mexico 
caused partly by Franco’s victory, the participation of women in Catholic Church 
sponsored organisations, and their support for the campaign of conservative 
candidate, Juan Andreu Almazan, further convinced Mexican authorities to drop the 
initiative.
84 John W. Sherman, op. cit., p. 23.
85 Ibid., p.44.
86 Javier, Tussel, Historia de Espana en el Siglo XX. II La crisis de los afios treinta: Republica y  
Guerra Civil. Madrid, Taurus, 2000. p.58.
87 ibid. p. 59.
88 Ward W. Morton, Women Suffrage in Mexico. Gainesville, Fla., The University of Florida Press, 
1962. p.23.
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As a matter of fact, Mexican women first voted for President in 1958, long 
after most of their counterparts in Latin America. Cardenas had set a constitutional 
amendment through Congress in 1938 but the states failed to ratify it. Both Cardenas 
and the PRM’s hierarchy were well aware that a majority of women supported the 
opposition. Women were indispensable to the project of the Right and targets to its 
rhetoric on preserving home and family. To all appearances, in 1940 they would have 
disproportionately voted for Almazan.89
T h e  M e x ic a n  P r e s s  a n d  t h e  F r a n c o is t  U p r is in g
Cardenas’ presidential period witnessed a degree of freedom of press that had not 
been enjoyed since the days of the late President Madero. The fact that the majority 
of the newspapers were clearly aligned against his government and policies amply 
confirms this claim. Some of Cardenas advisers counselled him to close the lid 
before the “reactionaries” could undermine the government just as they had done 
before with Madero, unleashing a prolonged period of bloodshed. Regardless of these 
overtures, Cardenas refused to restrain even the loudest publications. This freedom 
gave rise to grievous excesses from the newspapers. As the Republican Ambassador 
to Mexico attested:
The regime that presides over the Mexican press has no paragon in the 
world. There is no code that regulates the press, for that reason, even the 
President of the Republic may be gravely libelled and insulted without any 
accountability.90
The Revolution had marked a new journalistic era in Mexico. In 1914 El 
Impartial, the leading journal of the late Porfiriato, shut down, but it was soon 
followed by two newspapers who sought to inherit its place: Excelsior and El 
Universal. Felix F. Palavicini founded El Universal in late 1916. Excelsior appeared 
in March of 1917 established by Rafael Alducin. Excelsior, "was bom as an imitation 
of the new American press, even its format was very similar to that of the New York
89 John W. Sherman, op. cit., p. 137.
90 Felix Gordon Ordas. Mi politico, fuera de Espana, p.739.
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Times."91 They were certainly much removed from the polemical papers of an earlier 
era. Both El Universal and Excelsior were of conservative political leanings by the 
time of Lazaro Cardenas’ administration (1934-1940). Editorial articles and opinion 
columns in both were in self-restrained opposition to the issues of land reform and 
labour policy. Perhaps most telling as to the political persuasions of the two leading 
newspapers was their position on Jewish immigrants who were then seeking exile in 
Mexico. Excelsior was laden with editorials decrying the admission of "undesirables" 
into Mexico while El Universal, altogether a smaller newspaper, made comparable 
remarks though not with such a stridency of tone.
Lombardo Toledano accused in several occasions the mainstream papers of 
defending fascist interests in Mexico. With regards to Excelsior he wrote literally:
The Spanish war has served Mexican newspapers, especially Excelsior, and 
its evening edition, Ultimas Noticias, to defend fascism, not there, but here, 
thus arousing local fascists, so that they may persevere in their defiant 
attitude and may secure here what they have achieved elsewhere.92
A close examination of the Mexican press of the day shows that all the 
mainstream papers, including the former as well as La Prensa and Novedades from 
Mexico City and El Dictamen from Veracruz were overtly anti Republican and pro- 
Franco. Of all nation-wide newspapers, only the governmental El Nacional and the 
CTM’s El Popular were consistently pro-Republican. Furthermore, El Nacional 
opened its pages to regular contributions by noted Republicans, and even launched a 
special supplement devoted entirely to Spain.
The conservative press, however, had an exceedingly larger circulation than 
those papers. Thus, whereas Excelsior and El Universal had an edition of 80,000 
daily issues, El Nacional and El Popular could barely reach 40, 000 copies. The 
same was true concerning the Spanish community’s publications. Whereas the far 
more conservative Vida Espahola and El Diario Espahol had each a circulation of
91 Yolanda Argudin, Historia del periodismo en Mexico desde el virreinato hasta nuestros dias. 
Mexico, Panorama Editorial, 1987. p. 123.
92 Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico, CTM 1936-1941, Talleres Tipograficos Modelo, 
Mexico, D.F. 1941. p.615.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE REPUBLIC’S DOWNFALL AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
D e f e a t  a n d  E x o d u s
On September 1937, Prime Minister Negrin called Juan Simeon-Vidarte, then Under­
secretary of State, to Geneva to entrust him with a delicate mission near President 
Cardenas. Under the pretext of settling the transaction of the ships bought by Mexico 
in 1935, Simeon-Vidarte had the assignment of sounding out Cardenas about the 
possibility of accepting a massive immigration of Spaniards in anticipation of a 
Republican defeat.1
Negrin made no bones about the gravity of the situation: the war was almost 
lost and safe haven had to be secured for several people who otherwise would end up 
facing Franco’s fire squads. Thus, the mission had to be confidential so as not to 
dampen the troops’ morale at the front. Simeon-Vidarte left on October 1 on board 
the Normandie, where he met Gordon-Ordas who was coming back to his Embassy 
after having attended a series of parliamentary sessions. Simeon-Vidarte took good 
care of not revealing Gordon-Ordas the purpose of his journey. Once in Mexico, 
Simeon-Vidarte met with Cardenas, who immediately gave his pledge to take in a 
massive immigration, in the “remote event of a Republic’s defeat.”
In a desperate attempt to exert pressure on the democracies so that they would 
demand the withdrawal of German and Italian troops from Spanish soil, Negrin 
decided to unilaterally discharge the International Brigades and order their 
evacuation. On October 25, 1938, shortly after the Munich Pact had sealed the 
Republic’s fate, Rafael Loredo Aparicio, interim charge d’affaires of the Spanish 
Embassy, handed Cardenas a message from Alvarez del Vayo requesting diplomatic
1 Juan Simeon-Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables.Testimonio de un socialista espafiol. Mexico, Fondo 
de Cultura Economica, 1973 p.765-768.
The Republic’s Downfall and its Effects on the Mexican Revolution
asylum for the “foreign volunteers repatriated from our ranks, who are original of 
countries to which they may not return due to their political ideas.” At once, 
Cardenas acquiesced, and plans were devised to settle the ex-combatants in 
agricultural colonies in sparsely populated areas such as Baja California.
Imprudently, Lombardo made public the decision to welcome the ex­
combatants triggering a hostile response from the Mexican Right. There was an 
immediate uproar. In a typically jingoistic response the conservative press contrasted 
the warm welcoming of foreign communists with the lack of attention given by the 
government to the migrant workers who were being expelled from the U.S.4
Rumours circulated that Mexico was about to receive 1, 200 brigadiers. In an 
unsigned editorial, Excelsior disparaged against: “the adventurers of various 
nationalities, without scruples or principles, always willing to engage in agitation and 
discord,” while lamenting the lot of those “thousands of Mexicans that die of 
starvation in the United States, which face the threat of expulsion. However, since 
they are not Reds, nor serve to the secret designs of communism, they may well die 
abroad or come here to beg.”5
The Mexican Right dreaded the prospect of Spanish Republicans bringing into 
Mexico the class struggle that had shred the Peninsula. “The Reds”, they claimed 
through their dailies, “have the intention of transferring into Mexico the civil war 
they have lost in Spain.”6 Furthermore, they feared that their presence might reinforce 
the ranks of the Mexican Left. Altogether, this segment of the Mexican society 
regarded the refugees as individuals without any moral quality: that is, little more 
than church-bumers and priest and nun slayers.7
The arrival of the volunteers was expected to take place in Veracruz by the first 
week of February. The Spanish community reacted negatively too against the arrival
2 ibid. pp.786-789.
3 Felix Gordon Ordas, op. cit., p.780.
4 Excelsior, January 5, 1939.
5 Excelsior, January 17, 1939.
6 Inmaculada Cordero Olivera, “Exilio espanol e imagen de Espana en Mexico.” In Leviatan. Revista 
de Hechos e Ideas. Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, Inviemo de 1995 no. 62 epoca I I ; p. 125.
7 Excelsior, June 3, 1939.
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o
of the Republican exiles. Official recognition of the plan came only on January 17, 
when the Interior Minister Ignacio Garcia Tellez had a release published in all 
national newspapers confirming the controversial governmental decision.9 Protests 
followed and threatened to get out of hand. Tumultuous meetings took place. As a 
result, the scheme was called off. Cardenas declared that the agreement to accept the 
Volunteers had been cancelled by the abrupt fall of Barcelona and not because of “the 
pressure of the street.”10
As early as 1938 Cardenas had transmitted the Republican authorities through 
Tejeda his willingness to welcome 60,000 refugees. Cardenas asked his overture not 
be made public until it was strictly necessary so Republican morale would not be 
weakened under the ongoing struggle.11 Bassols, who before being appointed as 
Mexican Minister in France had been actively working in Spain for the Negrin 
government, had amply informed Cardenas of the predicament faced by the 
Republicans.
By February 9, the Francoists held the entirety of Catalonia. In Southern 
France, nearly half a million Spaniards crammed in a series of concentration camps 
set by the French government. Isidro Fabela continuously briefed the Mexican 
President over the situation experienced by the refugees.
Bassols was entrusted with the task of lending the necessary assistance to offer
1 9asylum to all Spaniards who wished to immigrate to Mexico. This infuriated further 
the Mexican Right who saw its archenemy in charge of bringing the unwelcome 
“Reds” into Mexico. The Mexican Minister in France announced that Mexico would 
accept an unlimited number of refugees provided that the Republican authorities 
could pay their transportation and placement in Mexico. At this stage Cardenas had 
clearly taken sides with Negrin’s position of “resistance at all costs.” Furthermore, 
Fabela warned Cardenas on February 23 that recognition by France and Britain of
8 Mauricio Fresco, La emigracion republicana espanola: una victoria de Mexico. Mexico, Editores 
Asociados, 1950. p. 29.
9 El Universal, January 18, 1939; El Nacional, same date.
10 El Nacional, January 31, 1939.
11 Marcelino Domingo, El mundo ante Espana p.254.
12 Excelsior, February 1, 1939.
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Franco might impede the Republican government from paying the transportation of 
the refugees to Mexico.13
On early February the Republican Cortes met for the last time on Spanish 
territory at Figueras castle in order to analyse their precarious position and to layout 
the immediate strategy to be followed. Following the meeting, Azana, Martinez 
Barrio and several other government officials crossed the border into France. Britain 
and France officially recognised Nationalist Spain on February 27.
Azana’s resignation as President of the Republic, on February 28, had puzzling 
legal implications for the Mexican government, which insisted on recognising a 
regime that appeared to possess no longer any legitimacy, let alone to exist. 
Nonetheless, the Mexican Chancellery announced in an unprecedented move that it 
would maintain a representative in Spain as long as “the representative authorities of 
the Republic existed.” As the Loyalist forces lost ground, the Mexican Ambassador 
followed the Republican government in its retreat through various towns and 
villages.
At some point between March 8 and 10 of 1939 Tejeda left Spain accompanied 
by his family, bringing with himself the Embassy’s archives. Shortly before, he 
accorded the Embassy’s personnel with due immunities.14 The very 28 of March, 
Mexico City learnt through a special edition of Ultimas Noticias of the fall of 
Madrid. That same day, the Spanish community began a series of boisterous 
celebrations. On April 1, all members of the Spanish Embassy in Mexico asked for 
political asylum, which was at once granted by the Mexican government.15
Even now, the leaders of the exiled Republic were quarrelling fiercely among 
themselves, blaming each other for their debacle. A meeting of the permanent 
Committee of the Cortes in Paris ended amidst mutual recriminations.16 Sharply 
divided among themselves, Republican factions exacerbated their differences in exile 
and took them into Mexico. Fuelled by these disagreements, the co-ordination of 
efforts to set up a body to aid and canalise the flow of immigrants proved impossible.
13 Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cardenas, op. cit., p. 127.
14 “Acta de Entrega de la Embajada en Espana”, AHSRE, III-166-21 Clas. Ill / 101.5 (46-0)/10114.
15 Excelsior, April 3, 1939.
265
The Republic’s Downfall and its Effects on the Mexican Revolution
The estranged leaders Indalecio Prieto and Juan Negrin set up their own 
organisations to provide relief to the refugees, each one claiming for itself the sole 
legitimacy. Although Negrin had under his charge the funds of the vanquished 
Republic, Prieto managed to establish a financial autonomy owing to his skilful 
manoeuvring in the Vita affair.
On the verge of the Republic’s collapse, Negrin decided to export a part of the 
Spanish treasure in order to save it from falling into the hands of the Nationalists, and 
to finance the eventual transportation and settlement of Spanish refugees in case of a 
defeat. Cardenas secretly agreed to keep in custody the cargo until Negrin or his 
appointees could collect it. By the end of March, a recreational yacht, the Vita,
1 7“mysteriously” arrived to Veracruz amidst the most complete official silence. Later 
it would be known that it had arrived packed with precious stones and other 
valuables, mainly confiscations from Nationalist sympathisers at the start of the Civil 
War.
Without further explanation it proceeded to Tampico. Presidential envoy, 
General Jose Manuel Nunez, welcomed a number of Basque officials who had come 
with the ship. Utter reserve surrounded the entire operation. An armoured car left for 
Mexico City, replete with enormous cases that contained gold bars “for an
1 Rapproximate value of $14,000,000 and public papers.” The sailboat had been 
loaded in the French port of Le Havre with over 100 suitcases as well as with an 
undetermined amount of boxes which contained jewels, masterpieces, gold bars and 
coins valued in over 50 million dollars.19
Negrin had entrusted former President of the University of Valencia, Dr. Jose 
Puche with the custody of the treasure. Puche, however, never turned up. Faced with 
uncertainty, the Vita's commander, Captain Jose Ordorika, and the treasure’s 
custodian, Enrique Puente, decided to proceed to Mexico City, in order to hand on 
the valuables to the Mexican authorities.
16 Hugh Thomas, op cit., p.757.
17 Although both the craft’s registry as well as the crew were ostensibly Spanish, it flew an American 
flag. See Excelsior, March 31, 1939.
18 Excelsior, April 1, 1939.
19 Salvador de Madariaga, Espana. Ensayo de historia contemporanea. Buenos Aires, Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1950. p.589.
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Prieto had been touring Latin America after his official visit as guest of honour 
to the new President of Chile’s inauguration.20 Somehow Prieto managed to persuade 
Cardenas that he had a claim to the treasure. How was Prieto warned about the 
presence of the Vita in Veracruz and what took Cardenas to hand the valuables to a 
man he knew was an irreconcilable rival of the Spanish Prime Minister are questions 
that have been a matter of endless speculation over the years. Be that as it may, 
Prieto’s impoundment of the treasure had the effect of aggravating the already sharp 
divisions among the Republican exile, giving rise to bitter controversies for many 
years to come.
With the money thus obtained, Prieto established a committee known as the 
Junta de Auxilio a los Republicanos Espanoles (JARE).21 By the end of March, 
Negrin had set in his turn the Servicio de Emigration para los Republicanos 
Espanoles (SERE),22 to co-ordinate the emigration to Mexico with Bassols’ 
assistance.
On April 17, 1939 Gordon Ordas quit as Ambassador following Azana’s 
resignation. He left First Secretary, Jose Loredo Aparicio, as charge d’affaires. The 
Cuban Embassy in Mexico took over the Spanish interests issuing passports for those 
Spaniards residing in Mexico as well as performing consular duties. On April 12, 
1939 the Foreign Ministry rejected reports that Mexico planned to establish 
diplomatic relations with Franco.23 Moreover, the Mexican government suspended 
all commercial contacts with Spain. Imports of wine, olive oil and cigarette paper 
from Spain were banned, as were exports of chickpea, oil and other commodities.24 
The controversy arose as whether the withholding of recognition was in accord to the 
spirit of the Estrada Doctrine. It is clear that Cardenas’ commitment to the Republic 
had by this stage surpassed even legal and doctrinal considerations.
On April 22, the French transatlantic Flandres arrived with the first wave of 
refugees who were greeted with an official ceremony of reception. Among them
20 El Nacional, February 19, 1939.
21 Patricia Fagen, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
22 ibid, pp. 38-41.
23 El Nacional, April 12, 1939.
24 Felix F. Palavicini, ed., Mexico: historia de su evolucion constructiva Mexico, Distribuidora 
Editorial Libro S. de R.L., 1945, Vol. IV, p. 265.
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stood out General Sebastian Pozas and his family, and Fernando Dicenta, former 
captain of the Motomar.25 Two days later, the steamship Orizaba arrived in Veracruz 
bringing General Miaja, who was welcomed as a hero of epic proportions.
Back in France, Negrin and Bassols engaged themselves with the task of 
organising the exodus of refugees from France. In order to monitor the Spanish 
multitude that had taken refuge in France a list was compiled and contingents 
assembled for emigration to Mexico.
The major problem faced by Mexican officials in complying with Cardenas 
wishes was, no doubt, lack of transportation. Mexico had no significant fleet and 
could hardly bear by itself the financial burden of chartering vessels from third 
countries. In June 1939, acting on instructions from his government, Bassols 
approached American Ambassador in France, William C. Bullitt, requesting that 
American ships be made available to transport Spanish refugees to Mexico. The 
American government refused apparently because it did not want Spanish
77Republicans in Mexico since it considered them to be Communists. Providentially, 
aid was forthcoming from various relief organisations operating with private funds, 
such as the British Committee for Refugees from Spain.
The first and most celebrated expedition was that of the SS Sinaia. A French 
vessel, whose usual route was to take pilgrims to Mecca, the Sinaia was chartered by 
the SERE. It could hold about 2,000 passengers. The Duchess of Atholl, Wilfred 
Roberts MP, and the Mexican Ambassador, Tejeda, who was going to travel with the 
refugees, made farewell speeches. Government figures accompanied Negrin. The
70
Sinaia arrived in Veracruz in June 1939 carrying some 1, 800 refugees.
Two luxury liners moored in Veracruz harbour were conditioned to lodge the 
Spanish children. A large warehouse was cleared and fitted up with beds and showers 
for the arriving men and women. Different agencies and personalities assisted in 
providing food, clothing and lodging to the newcomers. An inter-ministerial 
commission was set up in May 1939, to co-ordinate all activities of the Mexican 
government in matters relating to the Spanish exiles, such as reception, settlement
25 Excelsior, April 22, 1939.
26 El Nacional, May 26, 1939; Excelsior, same date.
27 Lois E. Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans, p. 237.
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and integration. This body was composed of Minister of the Interior Garcia Tellez, 
Minister of Agriculture, Jose G. Parres, Minister of Economy Efrain Buenrostro and 
Minister of National Defence Manuel Avila Camacho. Each of these ministries 
contributed toward getting the refugees established.
Of all Mexican non-governmental organisations engaged in behalf of the 
refugees, the CTM was undoubtedly the most prominent. The trade union organised 
committees to aid in the landing of the exiles, their immediate care, and their access 
to the labour market. Moreover, the Confederacy gave assistance in the form of 
subsidies, direct provision of material necessities and placement in remunerative 
activities. Both the PRM and the PCM were also active in the pro-refugee campaign,
*3 1
undertaking programmes of their own for direct aid to the Spaniards.
Contemporary observers could not fail to remark the stark contrast between the 
warm reception offered to the Spaniards and the cold shoulder afforded to the Jews. 
There were only about 18, 000 Jews in Mexico, 8,000 of which resided in Mexico 
City, a capital, then of a million and a quarter inhabitants. Most of these Jews had 
come to Mexico on the invitation of former strongman Calles. The CCM had set off a 
vicious anti-Semitic campaign since 1937, denouncing that the government 
immigration quotas for 1938 for countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia would 
encourage “a new wave of Jewish immigration.”32 When anti-Jewish riots took place 
in Mexico City early in 1939, promoted by those same ultra-right wing organisations, 
the government reacted swiftly defending the Jewish community and having the 
perpetrators arrested. However, on May 24 the Ministry of the Interior acknowledged 
through a press bulletin that as a compensation for the welcome of Spaniards the 
doors of Mexico had been closed to 200,000 Jewish applicants for immigration.33
Certain legal obstacles had to be removed so the refugees could take certain 
jobs in Mexico. In the concrete case of doctors there was staunch opposition from the 
Surgeons’ Trade Union of Mexico City, which objected that their Spanish peers be 
allowed to work in large towns, and accused them of “disloyal competition,” because
28 El Nacional, June 14, 1939.
29 El Nacional, May 24, 1939.
30 Ibid, June 4, 1939.
31 Excelsior, July 9 and 26, 1939.
32 New York Times, December 2, 1937.
33 Excelsior, May 24, 1939.
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some, they alleged, charged extraordinary fees.34 Others, like Salvador Novo, initially 
criticised the faculty of the Casa de Espana on account of their high wages and for its 
purported meddling in Mexican politics.35
Cardenas’ decision to welcome the Spanish exiles was far from popular. The 
Mexican conservative press and its patrons were openly opposed to the perspective of 
thousands of anti-clerical leftists setting in the country. Such consistent propaganda 
had the effect of arousing the wrath of sectors of public opinion otherwise indifferent 
to the Republicans. Thus, even moderate liberals within the administration dreaded 
the prospect of unruly extremists, who had won the upper hand in the Republican 
zone, coming into Mexico and strengthening the position of domestic radicals. Those 
same extremists who had snatched the supremacy of the ill-fated Republic away from 
its founding fathers could well, once in Mexico, expect to do the same.
In particular, they feared, rightly, the fact that Bassols, a well-known radical, 
had been chosen to select those exiles that would be admitted into national territory. 
As it would turn out, Bassols would indeed favour the entry of leftists above anybody 
else.36 Other critics dreaded the possibility of the Spanish Civil War being waged 
from Mexican soil, putting Mexico in an awkward international position. Last but not 
least, there was the concern that Spaniards would compete with Mexicans in an 
already sagging labour market. Although the trade union’s leadership was solidly 
pro-Republican the rank and file were not easily convinced that the Spanish 
“brothers” would not pose a threat to their jobs. Such was the workers’ hostility to 
the scheme that the CTM felt impelled to organise special meetings to dispel such 
fears and ease the fears of its followers.
Among the peasants, hostility against the Spanish inflow was even more 
marked than among city dwellers. The fact that the Mexican government had insisted 
in bringing into Mexico qualified farmers and land labourers in order to develop the
34 Excelsior, April 3, 1939. p. 3.
35 Moises Gonzalez Navarro, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
36 Several refugees accused Bassols and Fernando Gamboa of being Communist agents, with a strong 
bias against CNT, POUM and PSOE affiliates. It was claimed that many applications for emigration to 
Mexico were refused by these Mexican officials to outspoken adversaries of Negrin and the PCE. 
While conceding that some of these charges might have been genuine, it is equally true that Mexico 
gave asylum to refugees from all sections of the ideological divide. See, Patricia Fagen, op. cit., pp.38- 
39.
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backward agriculture of the nation arose predictably the opposition of the peasants’ 
organisations, who feared that the land that had been granted to them would be taken 
away on behalf of the newcomers. Thus accordingly, there were riots in Jalisco, 
Mexico and Veracruz where it was expected that the larger concentrations of 
Spaniards would settle.37 Furthermore, there is evidence that Sinarquista elements, 
directly influenced by Falangist propaganda were stirring peasants against the 
Spaniards in the belief that their opposition to the outsiders was a sign of resistance 
against the Communists and American influx, which in their oversimplification were 
one and the same. Thus, Whetten informs us that to the most backward Mexican 
peasants:
To defend Spain and to defend Mexico is to fight against the degrading
influence of both the Anglo-Saxon and the Communist.38
Franco’s victory and the growing prestige derived from it had an immediate 
echo upon the most traditional sectors of Mexican society which saw in him the 
bulwark not only against the impending communist menace but also against the 
apparently irresistible Anglo-Saxon influence coming from the North.
Finally, there existed the historical antipathy against the Spaniard bred during 
the struggle for independence, and developed in the turbulent days of the Mexican 
Revolution. As we have seen, most Mexicans knew little else from Spain beyond the 
simplistic stereotypes they had learnt at school. Mexican pedagogues formed pupils 
under the influence of the so-called “revolutionary nationalism”, believing that the 
best way to instil a sense of national unity was to create a separate Mexican identity. 
In that direction they took good advantage of the Spanish ‘black legend” coined by 
the English to portray the Spaniards as bloodthirsty parasites driven solely by greed. 
Furthermore, the Mexican lower classes knew only the economic immigrant, 
typically a fortune-seeker that rarely mixed with the locals and who was prone to 
exploit them.
37 Excelsior, May 23, 1939. See also Alfonso Taracena, La revolucion desvirtuada, Mexico, Costa- 
Amic, 1967. pp.85, 94 and 160.
38 Nathan L. Whetten, Rural Mexico, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948. p.496.
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At his state of the nation address of 1939, Cardenas justified his decision to 
bring in the Spanish exiles, both on altruistic and pragmatic considerations. The 
emphasis was placed on the economic benefits that the emigration would report to 
Mexico. Mexico would receive men of great skills and energy that would greatly 
contribute to the nation’s development. He elaborated on the advantages that Mexico 
would obtain from inviting the refugees:
There is something more: the mixture of bloods. The Spanish root has 
created our nationality. We descend from Spain. From Spain come our 
towns; from Spain is our language; from Spain has come the religion that 
has bind our people together.39
Cardenas deplored the political usage of the Spanish immigration by the rightist 
opposition against the government. Still, the President avowed his belief that once 
the electoral agitation faded their contribution to Mexico would be duly appreciated: 
‘As their blood and spirit blended together with the Indian root have decisively 
contributed to the formation of our nationality.’40 This last statement made plain one 
of the main aims pursued by the administration in bringing a sizeable Spanish 
immigration:
The affinity of the Spanish people will allow their fusion with our 
autochthonous peoples, thus fortifying our own nationality.41
During the following months the number of Spanish refugees welcomed in 
Mexico increased with the expeditions of other ships. Thus the Ipanema arrived in 
Veracruz on July 7 with 994 refugees, the Mexique on July 27 with 2091 and the De 
Grasse with 206 to New York who then made the journey by train to Mexico City, 
bringing altogether around 5, 000 passengers.42 Thousands more arrived paying for 
their transportation as they could. All four ships had been leased by the SERE. By 
early 1940 the SERE declared that its funds had been exhausted, so the JARE took
39 El Nacional, September 2, 1939.
40 ibid.
41 It must be stressed that in 1939 Mexico exhibited a manifest demographic deficit. In that sense, 
Spanish migration could also serve to “replenish the exhausted sources of the Mexican nationality.” 
See, Secretaria de Gobemacion, Manual del Extranjero, Mexico 1939. pp. 190-192 and Gilberto 
Loyo, La politico demografica de Mexico. Mexico, Talleres Tipograficos de S. Turanza del Valle, 
1935.
42 Excelsior, July 9, August 3, 1939 and January 10, 1940.
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over the task of transporting more refugees to safe haven in Mexico. In 1941, under 
the ever more precarious conditions of an occupied France, the JARE managed to 
organise three more expeditions, those of the Saint Dominique, the Quanza, the 
Nyassa and the Serpa Pinto,43
There is no precise data informing about the total number of Spanish refugees 
that ultimately arrived to Mexico. The Mexican Office of Statistics computed less 
than 15, 000,44 while Mexican Consul in Marseille, Mauricio Fresco, estimated a bit 
over 16,000.45 Registers made by the JARE and SERE seem to be imprecise, and 
anyhow several refugees arrived through their own means.
The widespread opposition to the coming of the refugees waned over the 
ensuing months and even Mexican conservatives began to perceive the migratory 
flux as beneficial to the nation. This new attitude was visible in the leaders of El 
Universal and Excelsior, which increasingly lauded the virtues of professors and 
intellectuals46 Ultimately, the lack of sufficient transportation would prove an 
insurmountable obstacle for Cardenas to bring a larger number of exiles to Mexico, 
as he avowed to Alvarez del Vayo:
Had I had the ships I would have brought to Mexico all the Spaniards lost in 
the French concentration camps.47
C h a n g e  o f  C o u r s e . F r a n c o ’s V ic t o r y  a n d  t h e  D e c l in e  o f  C a r d e n is m o
American concern over Axis plots in Mexico increased in 1939 with the defeat of the 
Spanish Republic. New alarming publications denouncing real or purported fascist 
inroads in Mexico mushroomed every day. Among them stood out Frank Klukhohn’s 
sensationalist The Mexican Challenge that denounced Japanese spies working in 
Mexico, German influence on domestic policies, and predicted Mexico’s fall into the 
Axis orbit. These rumours paradoxically afforded the Mexican government with the
43 Altogether 1,618 refugees arrived in those four vessels. See, El Universal,April3, October 2 and 15 
and December 18, 1941.and Felix Palavicini, op.cit., p.276.
44 Felix Palavicini, op. cit., p. 223.
45 Mauricio Fresco, op.cit., p. 112.
46 Ricardo Perez Monfort, op. cit., p. 125.
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opportunity of discrediting the Right further and securing American official support 
to confront its menace.
That same year witnessed a remarkable growth, without precedent, of 
opposition to the Mexican government. Widespread animosity against the Cardenas 
administration, apparent since 1935, reached new heights at the close of his period. 
Public enthusiasm with the oil expropriation swiftly faded as inflation and recession 
fuelled popular discontent to the Right’s apparent advantage. As a consequence of 
the oil expropriation Mexico’s fiscal stability was destroyed: the Mexican peso fell 
from 3.60 to the dollar to 5 to 1. Wage increases were largely eliminated; retail 
prices soared 38 %, with food costs spiralling by 40% between 1936 and 1940, 
arousing discontent among the working and middle classes alike.49
Other events, this time from the opposite side of the political spectre, had an 
equal bearing on Cardenas increasing moderation as a way of safeguarding the 
existing conquests of the Mexican Revolution. The proclamation of the Hitler-Stalin 
pact on August 23, 1939 had ruinous consequences for Mexico’s leftist groups. The 
majority of the PCM bureaucracy subserviently adhered to the Comintern’s official 
line, specifically, to the argument that the Iron Pact was essential to keep the USSR 
out of a war between conflicting imperialisms. Many party followers felt betrayed in 
their previous devoted struggle against fascism and left in droves the PCM.
Furthermore, the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939 had the effect of alienating 
other leftists who viewed the conflict as an imperialistic attack of a powerful country 
on a weak neighbour. The parallelism with Mexico and the United States was too 
obvious to pass unnoticed. Cardenas’ strong condemnation of the Soviet attack on 
Finland in the League of Nations initiated the rupture of the President with his former 
allies.
Internationally, the move had other implications. Cardenas’ stance revealed to 
the Americans and the British, how far from being the Bolshevik of their cliches
47 Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Give Me Combat, p.214.
48 Frank L. Kluckhohn, op. cit., p.228.
49 Luis Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 168.
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Cardenas was independent and therefore could be a reliable pro-Allied leader.50 
Notwithstanding, when other governments attempted to, and succeeded in, exploiting 
the incident as a pretext to expel the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, 
Mexico sternly opposed them. The Mexican delegate, Primo Villa Michel pointed out 
that this was sheer hypocrisy in view of the fact that those same countries, which had 
passively accepted the invasions of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
now cried foul in the face of Soviet aggression.51
After the Soviet-Nazi entente became effective, even the Communists among 
the refugees from Loyalist Spain were suspected of establishing liaisons with Hitler’s 
agents. Diego Rivera denounced this apparent co-ordination between former 
adversaries dubbing them as “commu-nazis.” It is difficult to determine the veracity 
of such allegations. Communists all over the world did indeed return to pre-Popular 
Front tactics of attacking bourgeois parties and governments and to minimising the 
Fascist threat. In the Mexican case, however, no sound evidence exists of 
collaboration between Spanish Communists and domestic pro-Fascist forces. What 
may be demonstrable beyond dispute is the leading role of Spanish Communists in 
the purging of the PCM executive, as well as in the planning and execution of 
Trotsky’s murder.
On December 1939, the Comintern sent a delegation to Mexico entrusted with 
the task of purging the PCM. An extraordinary congress of the PCM was convened. 
Vittorio Codovilla and the ill-famed Vittorio Vidali, a.k.a. Commander Carlos were 
among the delegates sent to Mexico. An unidentified apparatchik under the assumed 
name of ‘Comrade Perez ‘swiftly pointed to the Trotsky question and the 
“unsatisfactory” manner in which the PCM had handled it. To this ‘Perez’ added the 
offer of sending comrades trained in Spain to help ‘purge’ the party. Barry Carr has 
suggested that Perez may well have been Codovilla. A purge took place on March 
1940 by which Valentin Campa and Heman Laborde were suspended from their 
posts of secretary-general and head of the political bureau, as they had vigorously
50 See, for instance, William O. Scroggs, “Mexican Anxieties” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 18, no. 2 
January 1940. p.272.
51 Isidro Fabela, Neutralidad Biblioteca de Estudios Intemacionales, Mexico, 1940. p.273.
52 Betty Kirk, op. cit., p. 257.
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opposed the elimination of the Old Bolshevik. Moreover, Campa and Laborde were 
accused of following an “opportunist-sectarian " line because of their “submission” to 
the new governmental policy of national unity with their slogan of “unity at all 
costs.”
Hardly had the PCM been purged when the GPU agents prepared to set the 
stage for the elimination of the former Soviet leader. On May 24, 1940 came the first 
failed attempt against the life of Trotsky. The attackers had shouted Viva Almazan! 
The PCM immediately seized the alibi provided by the use of police and military 
uniforms by the attackers and the absurd cry of support for Almazan to blame the 
foreign oil companies, the reaction and imperialism.54
The extreme right also used the attack and the ensuing scandal. A telegram sent 
by the UNVR to the President dated by the end of May purported that the attack 
corroborated the existence of foreign elements that “blatantly attempt to meddle in 
the internal affairs of the Mexican people.” Another right-wing organisation 
demanded the expulsion of foreigners that “have maliciously intervened in political 
affairs of the nation.”55
By June 18, thirty people were behind bars in connection with the attempted 
murder of Trotsky. Mexico City’s Chief of Police, General Nunez, openly 
incriminated the PCM and the GPU. Noteworthy among those involved in it were 
Nestor Sanchez Hernandez, a “student” and ex-combatant in Spain, David Serrano 
Andonegui (member of the Political Bureau), Antonio Pujol and a Communist from 
the Canary Islands, Rosendo Gomez Lorenzo. Their testimonies led to the pursuit and 
capture of yet another Spanish War veteran, Siqueiros. Mexican public opinion was 
shocked to learn that one of its greatest artists with world renown, locally held in 
high esteem, had been a GPU agent since 1928. Despite the overwhelming evidence,
53 Barry Carr, Marxism and Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico. Lincoln, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992, p.299.
54 According to the PCM, these forces aimed to create an environment conducive to reprisals and 
attacks against working class organisations in general, and mexican Communists in particular. For a 
complete chronicle of the attempt against Trotsky’s life see, El Universal, May 26, 1940. For the 
PCM’s conspiratorial version see El Popular, May 27-31, 1940.
55 Archivo General de la Nacion, Fondo Lazaro Cardenas del Rio, expediente “Trotsky”.
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the revamped organ of the PCM, El Popular went on to denounce the “monstrous 
provocation” of which the party had been victim.56
On June 26, Trotsky prompted the judge who was following the cause, to 
summon Narciso Bassols to testify. According to Trotsky, Bassols, in his capacity as 
Mexican Ambassador to Paris, had to know which Spaniards would be allowed to 
take refuge in Mexico. Thus, he could have not suffered pressures and may even have 
acquired commitments with people that sought to infiltrate Mexico with GPU 
agents.57
Bassols replied at once to the imputations levelled against him by Trotsky of 
being the “intellectual author” of his attempted assassination. He accused Trotsky of 
slander, and even threatened to file a suit against him. Furthermore, as a respected 
member of the revolutionary establishment Bassols swiftly moved his connections 
with top officials to confront Trotsky. Cardenas sided this time with Trotsky, 
provoking an outrage. The PCM publicly distanced itself from Siqueiros and Pujol 
declaring that they had never been members of the party. Despite this denial the 
action marked the decline of the PCM.
The CTM issued a strong condemnation against the murder in an attempt to 
elude unscathed the political fallout generated by the crime. A skilful power broker, 
Lombardo was briefly able to disentangle himself from the failed attempt and, 
apparently, to consolidate his new alliance with the PRM’s candidate, Avila 
Camacho. However, by late 1938 Lombardo came under a sustained attack from the 
Right, rapidly falling from grace with the official nominee and his entourage.
At this stage, the GPU had a string of agents operating in Mexico. Several of 
them had been in Spain during the war. Among the most conspicuous should be 
noted: Codovilla, Vidali, Tina Modotti, and Caridad Mercader del Rio, an old 
militant of PSUC, who had first visited Mexico with an arms purchasing 
commission.
56 El Popular, June 20, 1940.
57 Olivia Gall, Trotsky en Mexico y  la vida politica en el periodo de Cardenas 1937-1940. Mexico, 
Editorial Era, p.317.
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Her son Ramon Mercader del Rio, member of the Spanish Communist Youth, 
fought in the Aragon front and in 1937 was destined to counter-espionage and
f O
sabotage duties behind enemy lines directed by Kotov. It was precisely Kotov who, 
after becoming the lover of Caridad Mercader, picked her son Ramon as a useful 
agent, and to use him later to murder Trotsky. Mercader left Spain mysteriously. In 
June 1938 he was in Paris with a Belgian passport under the name of Jacques 
Momard. He had entered with an American passport furnished by the GPU from 
some fallen American member of the International Brigades. Mercader got into 
Mexico through Laredo on October 12, 1939. He took advantage of his amorous 
liaison with Sylvia Ageloff, a member of Trotsky’s entourage. On August 20, 1940 
Mercader murdered Trotsky. Nine days later, Cardenas issued a ‘Message to the 
Mexican Workers Concerning Trotsky’s Murder” through which he declared:
The Communist Party, as the rest of the political organisations of the 
country, has enjoyed under our government freedom and respect for its 
members and doctrines. Notwithstanding, they have deemed useful to their 
cause to forsake their alliance with the Mexican working class, in favour of 
an alliance with a foreign power. This represents an aggression to national 
sovereignty as it has organised armed assaults, in combination with foreign 
elements, thus committing offences that dishonour civilisation and 
questioning the Mexican people and government’s capacity to maintain 
order. These elements have committed the crime of betraying the nation, 
they have corrupted their doctrines of redemption and proletarian progress, 
they have hurt the nation, and thus they have committed a crime that history 
shall condemn.59
In this same statement, Cardenas somewhat cryptically asserted the principle of 
diplomatic asylum, adding that “some”, a thinly-veiled reference to Spanish 
Communist refugees, had betrayed it by “irresponsibly” disturbing the public peace 
of the host nation.
58 A Russian who directed sabotage and guerrilla warfare in Nationalist territory also known as 
Etington See Hugh Thomas, op. cit., p.389 n. 3.
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T h e  p r o t e c t io n  o f  S p a n ish  r e f u g e e s  in  V ic h y  a n d  o c c u p ie d  F r a n c e
The inauguration of Avila Camacho as president in 1940 signalled the last personal 
initiative of Cardenas towards Spain: the rescue of more than 100, 000 Spanish 
refugees who had been left stranded in France after that country’s defeat at the hands 
of Germany. One of the most pressing problems faced by Mexican diplomats was 
that of preventing the delivery to Franco of Spanish refugees under the guise of 
extradition. The cases of Lluis Companys and Julian Zugazagoitia made this all too 
pressing. Mexican officials made sure that the life of Republican leaders such as Juan 
Negrin be safeguarded. Thus, Negrin was able to leave France on the passport of 
Alfonso Castro Valle, Minister of the Mexican Legation.60 An 1877 treaty between 
France and Spain provided for extradition of common criminals, but not for political 
prisoners. Franco, however, claimed that exiles were common delinquents and 
angrily protested French acceptance of Mexican protection of the refugees. 
Immediately after the signing of the Franco-German armistice, Cardenas ordered 
Mexican Ambassador to France, Luis I. Rodriguez to confer with the newly formed 
Vichy government about the fate of the refugees in French soil.
Rodriguez met Marshall Petain on July 8, 1940 and conveyed him Cardenas’ 
wish to bring to Mexico all Spanish refugees resident in France. Petain asked 
Rodriguez why Mexico was so intent in favouring such “undesirable people”, to 
which Rodriguez replied, “they have our blood and spirit.” Petain insisted on the 
risks posed by a lot who had reneged of their traditions and customs. Rodriguez then 
retorted that Mexico would relieve France from a heavy burden, to which Petain 
replied predictably “at times of great misery rats are the first to die.”61 Petain then 
praised Cardenas as a soldier and a citizen and authorised Rodriguez to visit other 
concentration camps, which Rodriguez described as: “Dantesque gaols with 
Senegalese hangmen.” At the end of the conclave both men signed an agreement
59 “Mensaje del Presidente de la Republica a los trabaj adores en relation al asesinato de Leon 
Trotsky” in Lazaro Cardenas, Mensajes, discursos, declaraciones y  otros documentos. Mexico, Siglo 
XXI Editores, 1978, Tomo I, pp. 440-441.
60 Luis I. Rodriguez, Ballet de Sangre, pp. 138-140
61 ibid. pp. 169 and 233-235
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through which Mexico promised to grant all Spanish refugees in France immigrant 
status.62
Mexico maintained two refuge centres in rural France that cared for 2,500 
people. Another facility financed by the Mexican government looked after 1,300 
disabled war veterans and their families. In Marseilles alone, Mexican money 
supported nineteen welfare centres where Spanish exiles could get food, lodging, 
medical care. Two chateaux, Reynade and Montgrad, were leased to house another 
1500 Spanish refugees and former members of the International Brigades.64
Previously, Rodriguez went to Mountauban to visit the ailing Manuel Azana. 
The Mexican Minister was deeply shocked to encounter an emaciated man with 
sunken eyes. The former Spanish President told Rodriguez that he feared that 
Francoist agents were hounding him to take him to Madrid. Azana expressed his 
concern over the fate of his brother-in-law, Cipriano Rivas-Cheriff, who had been 
made prisoner in Spain. Rodriguez promised to intercede before Petain so he may 
stay at Montauban to recover before proceeding to Vichy where he would be placed 
under the protection of the Mexican legation. Rodriguez gave him 2000 francs as part 
of the economic assistance that the Mexican government had arranged for him.
As promised, Rodriguez parleyed with Petain about Azana* s ill health. 
Rodriguez informed Petain that Cardenas’ administration had a special interest in 
protecting Azana’s life and bringing him into Mexican territory as soon as the first 
available means of transport was secured. Petain agreed to let Azana reside in 
Montauban, without the risk of extradition, grant him permission to relocate in Vichy
62 Acuerdo Franco-Mexicano del 22 de agosto de 1940 in AHSRE, Archivo de la Embajada de 
Mexico en Francia. Caja no. 292. The note contained four clauses. The first reiterated Mexican 
willingness to bring in all Spaniards living in French territory and colonies. The second point evoked 
France’s long humanitarian tradition. The third point stressed that Mexico would assume all 
transportation expenses. On the fourth and last point Mexico asked France to collaborate in the
undertaking of the “largest emigration to ever have crossed the Atlantic Ocean.”
63 Testimonio Oral de Don Gilberto Bosques Saldivar in Desdeldiez Boletin del Centro de Estudios 
de la Revolucion Mexicana "Lazaro Cardenas”, Noviembre de 1993.
64 AHSRE, Archivo de la Embajada de Mexico en Francia. Caja no. 309; Mauricio Fresco, op.cit., 
pp.42-44.
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as soon as his health allowed him to do so, to reside at the Mexican Legation, and to 
leave France bound to Mexico.65
Meanwhile, Rodriguez found out that Rivas-Cheriff and his family had been 
arrested at Pyla-sur-Mer (Gironde) under German occupation and that he had been 
handed to Falangists who then took him to Madrid. Concerned with an aggravation 
of Azana’s health, Rodriguez dispatched Captain Antonio Haro Oliva, the aide-de 
camp of the Mexican Military attache, to Montauban to look after him. Azana 
refused to leave Montauban until the whereabouts of Rivas-Cheriff became known 
and the Nazis released his family from house detention. According to Rodriguez, he 
even contemplated the possibility of surrendering himself to Franco in order to obtain 
the release of his brother in law.66
As Azana’s health further deteriorated, Rodriguez secured the release of his 
personal medic, Dr. Felipe Pallete, from the concentration camp of Saint-Cyprien. On 
August 22, Haro Oliva informed Rodriguez that a group of Falangist agents headed 
by a certain Urraca had arrived to Montauban to abduct Azana. A day later the 
Falangists had left the town, apparently they had been tracking General Manuel 
Riquelme and Luis Fernandez Clerigo rather than Azana. Shocked by press agency 
reports wired from Paris, which informed that Azana had been arrested, Cardenas 
insisted to Rodriguez that Azana should be taken as soon as possible to Mexico on a 
Clipper via Lisbon and the U.S.
On September 15, Rodriguez had Azana and his followers transferred to the 
Hotel Midi where the Mexican flag was hoisted in order to extend diplomatic 
protection to the premises. An attempt to move furtively the former Spanish to Vichy 
failed, as the Montauban prefecture was notified candidly by Mrs. Azana of 
Rodriguez’s plans. With his plans frustrated Rodriguez reflected upon the Mexican 
government’s imperative of safeguarding Azana:
His cause, our cause, is the cause of Mexico. To care for his life is to
advance the restoration of the Republic. To expose it is to foment the
65 Luis I Rodriguez, Mision de Luis I. Rodriguez en Francia. La proteccion de los refugiados 
espanoles julio a diciembre de 1940. p.240.
66 ibid. p.244.
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political division among his followers. To loose it is to loose the national 
unity, united around him, legitimated in his person. It would complicate the 
downfall of Franco and prolong the martyrdom of more than 100000 
expatriates.67
Azana suffered a stroke on the 19th, which left him paraplegic. Rodriguez 
despaired about the prospects of moving Azana to Vichy. The Spanish Ambassador 
Lequerica sternly opposed any such attempt and the French Chancellery turned down 
all subsequent requests made in that sense by the Mexican minister. To make matters 
worse, Switzerland refused to grant Azana any sort of admission. Meanwhile, after a 
series of deliberations, First Secretary Bernardo Reyes, son of Rodolfo, was able to 
secure the release of the Rivas-Cherriff family in Pyla-sur-Mer from the Paris 
Kommandantur.
On the 29th, events took a dramatic course with the suicide of Dr. Pallete. A 
fortnight earlier, the apostolic Nuncio before Vichy, Monsignor Valerio Valeri, had 
informed Rodriguez that through papal intercession Franco had commuted the death 
penalty of Rivas-Cheriff for a life sentence. On November 4, 1940 Rodriguez arrived 
to Montauban just to see Azana expire. Cardenas ordered Rodriguez to organise a 
state funeral for Azana.
The prefect of Montauban banned any public demonstration or funeral 
procession and threatened to dissolve by force any similar event. Furthermore he 
suggested that by reason of diplomacy, the bicolour flag of Franco should cover 
Azana’s remains instead of the Republican banner. To avoid such a humiliation 
Rodriguez decided to cover the coffin with the Mexican flag.
Thousands of war veterans, many mutilated, paraded in silence paying their last 
respects to the fallen President. Rodriguez presided the retinue accompanied by 
Mexican diplomats, Gilberto Bosques, Emesto Amoux, Colonel Luis Alamillo 
(military attache), Agustin Alva, Alfonso Castro Valle and Haro Oliva. Among the
67 Luis I. Rodriguez, op. cit., p. 262.
68 See Chapter 3, p.30.
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Republicans present at the obsequies were Rodolfo Llopis, Fernandez Clerigo, 
Mariano Anso, and Azana’s former aide-de-camp, Juan Hernandez Sarabia.69
On November 9, 1942, Mexican relations with Vichy were severed. This move, 
combined with the total occupation of France on November 11, 1942, caused the 
complete termination of mass expeditions of Spanish Republican refugees to Mexico. 
Three days later the Mexican Legation was stormed by Nazi assault troops. The last 
Minister of Mexico before Vichy, Gilberto Bosques, his family and staff were taken 
as prisoners to Bad Godesberg where they were retained until April 1943, when they 
were sent to Lisbon to be swapped for German diplomats held by the Allies.70
T h e  P r e s id e n t ia l  E l e c t io n  o f  1940
It has long been accepted that 1940 marked a turning point in Mexico’s political 
history. Some contend that the revolution stabilised and became institutional others 
that the social movement of 1910 simply died.71 Be it as it may, it is clear that under 
Avila Camacho, the regime turned to the Right, embracing a developmentalist 
conservative agenda that was a far cry from the Revolution’s original postulates.
The oil expropriation of 1938 marked the apogee of the Cardenas 
administration. The move had meant the greatest realisation of its mandate, insofar as 
it represented the pinnacle of the most sought-after aspiration of the Mexican 
Revolution (i.e. the economic control of the nation’s natural resources); nevertheless 
it had a highly burdensome cost. From then on both the economic and political 
situation dangerously precipitated into a widespread crisis. The boycott dictated by 
the oil companies, and the reprisals taken by the American and British governments 
gravely affected the Mexican economy. Furthermore, attacks by the Right against the 
revolutionary establishment became ever more vicious and constant.
69 ibid. pp. 276-277.
70 Gilberto Bosques, op. cit., pp. 73-76.
71 Ariel Jose Contreras, Mexico 1940. Industrializaciony crisis politica. Mexico Siglo XXI Editores, 
1983. Albert Michaels, “The Crisis of Cardenismo” in Journal of Latin American Studies. 2, 1970, pp. 
51-79. Stanley R. Ross (ed.), Is the Mexican Revolution Dead? New York: Knopf Borsoi Book Co., 
1966.
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Inside the PRM a premature rush towards presidential succession prompted the 
mobilisation of party groups in favour of potential candidates. Political circles rallied 
about the names of Francisco J. Mugica, Manuel Avila Camacho, Rafael Sanchez 
Tapia and Juan Andreu Almazan. Such was the haste, that in December 1938, two 
years before the end of Cardenas presidential term, two of his cabinet ministers, 
Mugica and Avila Camacho resigned their posts, in order to vie for the party’s 
nomination. Likewise Sanchez Tapia relinquished his post as commander of the First 
Military Zone, and Almazan’s sympathisers also mobilised.
The PRM entered into a severe crisis. The party’s president, Luis I. Rodriguez, 
came under sustained attacks from Mugica and Sanchez Tapia’s supporters, who 
accused him of being overtly biased in favour of Avila Camacho, forcing him to 
resign at the end of 1939. Conservatives inside the party were outraged by the 
presence of Lombardo Toledano aside Rodriguez at the podium during the 
Revolution’s anniversary in November 1938. The veteran revolutionary, 
congressman and General from Veracruz, Heriberto Jara, replaced Rodriguez. 
Despite this move the crisis could not be completely resolved.
By July 1939, Almazan left the army and entered fully into the battle for 
presidential succession. A PAN convention in September 1939 endorsed half­
heartedly Almazan as its candidate.72 In the face of theses events Cardenas was urged 
to make a choice, and in November 1939 the PRM announced that its candidate for 
the period 1940-1946 would be Avila Camacho and not Mugica who had been 
regarded as the natural successor to the Cardenista reform movement.
Set off against Mugica, Avila Camacho lacked revolutionary credentials. It is 
therefore of little wonder that a contemporary comedian had made fortune 
lampooning him as the “Unknown Soldier” or the “Virgin Sword”73 as there was no 
record of him ever having taken part in actual combat. Nevertheless, his popularity 
within the army was considerable, and as such a further guarantee against the spectre 
of military rebellion.
72 Virginia Prewitt, Reportage on Mexico. New York, E.P Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. pp. 194-203.
73 William Cameron Townsend, op. cit., p.337.
284
The Republic’s Downfall and its Effects on the Mexican Revolution
The PRM had been organised mainly to elect Cardenas’ successor, and at the 
time of its creation pre-candidacies for the official candidacy were already defined. 
One of the strongest was that of Francisco Mugica. Considered the “reddest” of the 
inner Cardenas circle of intimates, Mugica was one of the revolutionaries pur sang; 
he had fought in all of the political and military battles of the movement since 1910. 
It should be mentioned that among the revolutionary elite, none worked as tirelessly 
as Mugica in promoting the causes of labour unions, Loyalist Spain and women’s 
suffrage.74 Notwithstanding, Mugica was very inflexible, almost puritanical in his 
beliefs. Widely said to be a adherent to Marxist thought, Mugica kept an intense 
correspondence with Leon Trotsky. Far from popular in the army circles and with 
the trade unions, Mugica’s radicalism would have certainly meant an insurmountable 
obstacle in the face of the impending negotiations with the U.S. On the contrary, 
Avila Camacho represented conciliation, consolidation, and ultimately, the 
revolution’s shift to the right.
The process of Presidential succession was certainly influenced by external 
factors. Had the government supported Mugica the struggle would have been rougher 
and riskier when more urgent and vital interests were at stake. Mugica had more 
personal and revolutionary merits than the other inner candidates did. His candidacy 
represented the radical trend of the Revolution. What went on Cardenas’ mind 
through those heady days remains a matter of speculation. Cardenas invoked 
international factors in order not to appoint Mugica as his successor.76 This has led 
many specialists to speculate on American pressures on Cardenas in order to prevent 
Mugica’s nomination.
An educated guess would also take into account the tragic downfall of the 
Spanish Republic as an additional factor in Cardenas’ decision. The fact that a 
valuable ally had disappeared as a result of its radicalisation highlighted Mexican 
international isolation. It seems likely that Cardenas reasoned in 1940 that Mexico 
had surpassed the limits of autonomy in the international capitalist system and that it
74 ibid. p. 105.
75 Olivia Gall, op.cit., pp. 218-222.
76 Fernando Benitez, op. cit., p. 208.
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77would therefore be sensible to reconcile the regime to the demands of capitalism. 
The only way to avoid the fate of the collapsed Republic appeared to consolidate the 
achievements of the administration through the moderation of its programme as a 
way of securing American support in a context of ultra-rightist advance.
In that sense, the victory of the military rebellion in Spain marked a change of 
course for the Mexican administration. At the international level this meant that the 
Mexican government would thenceforth submit to the American administration’s 
designs with no further objection. At the economic level this supposed the open 
embracing of the route to industrialisation, and at the political plain it signified a 
general re-orientation towards greater moderation and even the reversal of many of
70
the conquests of the working class achieved during Cardenas tenure. “National 
Unity” became the rallying cry even among the most radical sections of the Left. 
Ultimately, the discarding of Mugica meant the demise of Cardenismo and its radical 
programme.
In his early bid for presidential nomination, Mugica tried to disprove his 
reputation as a radical in an open letter published in El Universal in order to appease 
the fears of his opponents, both within and outside the PRM. Mugica offered to 
conciliate capital and labour, respect private property and preserve freedom of 
religion and press.79
His efforts would prove vain. Lombardo used his power to thwart the 
candidacy of Mugica, because of Mugica’s friendship for Trotsky. Although not 
officially a Communist, Lombardo was a fellow traveller and an avowed admirer of 
Stalin. His portrayal of Soviet Russia as the champion of true progress and real 
democracy was conspicuous and reiterated. After the Stalin-Ribbentrop Pact he 
became discreetly silent.
On November 3, 1939 Avila Camacho, a conservative general and a devout 
Catholic, was proclaimed the PRM’s official candidate. Those on the regime’s inner
77 Albert Michaels, The Crisis of Cardenismo” in Journal o f Latin American Studies 2, 1970, pp. 51- 
79: Nora Hamilton, The Limits o f State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1982, pp. 254.
78 Luis Gonzalez y Gonzalez, Los dias delpresidente Cardenas, p. 230.
19 El Universal, September 19, 1938.
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circle must have seen that certain changes in policy, a modification of the Cardenas 
revolution, was inevitable if that revolution were to continue its march. 
Circumstances at the time demanded a moderate consolidation of what had been 
achieved rather than a renewal of the radical wave that had swept the country during 
Cardenas’ tenure. There was discontent with the decision inside the major grass-roots 
organisations of the party, but Lombardo managed to control the CTM.
With their presidential ambitions abruptly cancelled both Sanchez Tapia and 
Almazan left the PRM in a haste to form new parties. Almazan’s alliance, the 
National Unification Revolutionary Party (PRUN) became the most effective and 
menacing opposition to the regime. Almazan was largely to the right of Cardenismo 
and thus was able to appeal disgruntled rightists. Still, he also appealed workers, 
peasants, military, and white-collar workers.
In 1938, adjustments to one of the regime’s most radical programmes had 
already been started: the socialistic orientation of public education. The pedagogic 
practices and rhetoric, that ordinary people had somehow or other confused with 
communism, were toned down. The more radical books were withdrawn from 
circulation. The Mexican Revolution was in its death-throes; counterrevolution had 
begun in earnest. The Rightist onslaught to split the labour movement, but above all 
to destroy Lombardo, took form both within and outside the official party.
Another salient feature of the turning tide was the return of the Catholic Church 
into public life, and its regaining of a certain degree of prominence in the educational 
realm: a manifest victory over the revolutionary policy of secularisation. For many, 
this comeback augured new confrontations between Liberals and Catholics, and even 
a downright civil war.
The ugly spectre of a coming battle between Church and State hovers over 
Mexico. This spectre appeared at the end of Spain’s Civil War when 
General Francisco Franco announced that Spain’s foreign policy would be 
dedicated to the ‘spiritual re-Conquest of Latin America.’ This foreign 
policy has since been exposed as the brain child of Hitler, presented to 
Franco as the bill for Hitler’s putting, and keeping, the Spanish dictator in 
power. The spectre at first a mere wraith, which no one took seriously, has
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over 20,000 issues per week, the official organ of the Spanish Embassy, La Gaceta 
Espahola could hardly publish 6,000 copies per week.
A number of ultra rightist weeklies such as Omega, El Hombre Libre, Semana, 
and Hoy were even more brazen in their attacks on the Republic. Not only were they 
staunch supporters of Franco; they were also vehemently pro-Axis. In fact, these 
papers would later be accused by the American government of being sponsored by 
Nazi Germany, through Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda.94
It is interesting to note in that sense that while El Nacional used the services of 
the Associated Press and Havas Antas, Excelsior reproduced dispatches of 
Transocean, the latter, the official Nazi news bureau. Most of the news published by 
Mexican newspapers had by then every indication of propagandist manipulation 
behind them.95
The polarisation of debate produced by such information contributed to create a 
climate of exaggeration and paranoia where the influence of fascism and communism 
among the native forces was grossly overstated. A shallow reading of the Mexican 
press of the time might suggest that the Axis or the USSR were making inroads in 
Mexico. Thus, a climate similar to that of Spain led several figures to recur too easily 
to epithets such as Fascist or Communist in order to discredit their opponents. This 
makes it difficult to determine the real degree of penetration that either the USSR or 
Nazi Germany may have secured at the time.
Even Daniel Cosio Villegas, Mexican Minister to Lisbon, a figure who may not 
be accused of being a supporter of Franco criticised this bias in terms of naivete. In a 
letter to Francisco Mugica, Cosio Villegas wrote:
It is shameful to observe how a small and not very intelligent nation may be 
deceived in its entirety by a press agency. Thus, according to El Nacional 
Madrid is winning while Burgos is losing. The opposite is truth: the military 
are winning, and it will not be long before their victory is complete. The
93 Maria del Carmen Ruiz Castaneda, et al, El periodismo en Mexico. Mexico, UNAM-ENEP-Acatlan, 
1981.
94 Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, op. cit., p.321.
95 J.H.Plenn, Mexico Marches, p. 68.
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only truth in this is that Mexico is, and has been, the only country avowedly 
friendly towards Spain.96
Excelsior, then the mouthpiece of the conservatives and the alienated middle 
class, upholder of capitalism, private property, family and tradition, took sides openly 
and wholeheartedly with the rebels. As the fascists took more territory from the 
Republic, the Mexican papers clamour on the Cardenas government to grant 
recognition to Franco increased. The pressure on Cardenas became tremendous from 
within the government and outside of it. Controversies aired over Mexican 
diplomatic precedents and whether the established norm had been to recognise de 
facto or de jure governments. Thus, Cardenas’ fate came increasingly to be viewed 
by the Mexican Right as inextricably linked to that of the Republic. A headline of El
07Hombre Libre even boasted: “Cardenas Defeated at Teruel.”
T h e  M e x ic a n  C a t h o l ic  C h u r c h  a n d  t h e  S p a n is h  C r u s a d e
A deeply Roman Catholic country, Mexico has been also a fiercely anti-clerical one. 
The Constitution of Queretaro, promulgated on February 1917, gave concrete 
expression to diffuse anti-clerical sentiment. Laicism became mandatory in primary 
education, and priests were banned from conducting schools (art. 3); seminary 
studies were not recognised by the State (art. 130); any religious act was forbidden 
outside the churches (art. 24); the Church and all religious organisations were 
forbidden to hold property (art .27); all building that housed institutions dependent on 
the Church were declared property of the State (articles 27 and 130); priests lost all 
political rights (articles 55, 82 and 130) and even exercise of citizenship(articles 27, 
59 and 130); the federal states were given the right to limit the number of priests (art. 
130) and the Catholic press and all confessional parties were suppressed (articles 9 
and 130).
Persecution followed. Most bishops had to leave the country, many priests went 
into hiding or into exile, and hundreds of Catholic schools were closed. In effect,
96 The full letter may be read in Clara Lida, La Casa de Espaha en Mexico. Mexico, El Colegio de 
Mexico. Jomadas 113, 1988, pp. 27-28.
97 El Hombre Libre, January 5, 1938. See also J.H. Plenn, Mexico Marches, p.68.
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since the early days of the Revolution, there had been continued Church resistance to 
everything that represented modernity. The hierarchy had never reconciled itself to 
the Revolutionary secularism and anti-clericalism. In rural areas the conflict had even 
got out of hand through guerrilla warfare known as the Cristero rebellion (1926- 
1929).98
During the ensuing turmoil a Catholic fanatic, Jose de Leon Toral, murdered 
President-elect Alvaro Obregon in 1928. Although Church and State agreed to a truce 
in 1929, mutual hatred and fanaticism continued to spawn violence. The ‘socialist’ 
education system implanted by the Cardenas administration had a profound impact 
on the religious radical Mexican right. The religious right experienced a massive 
growth during Cardenas’ tenure, which even exceeded in quantity that of the Cristero 
rebellion of the preceding decade. Many Catholics took to the streets in mass 
demonstrations, triggering street riots over issues such as socialist education, limits 
on numbers of clerics and church closures.
Whereas Hugh Thomas has suggested that the Vatican took no sides in the 
Spanish conflict, new evidence shows how from 1931 Pope Pius XI and his Secretary 
of State, Eugenio Paccelli, strongly attacked what they dubbed the “Red Triangle” i.e. 
Spain, Mexico and the USSR." Pius XI was inspired enough to speak out not only 
against Spain’s Popular Front but also against what he saw as the Bolshevism behind 
it, which, he said, had already given ample proof of its will to subvert all orders from 
Russia to Mexico.100 On April 1938 the Pope gave its blessing to Franco as a “new 
hero of Christian fortitude.”101 The Vatican had recognised the Franco government de 
facto since August 28, 1937, and extended it de jure recognition on May 3, 1938. 
Barely a fortnight after the end of the Civil War, the recently exalted Pius XII 
unequivocally declared in a radio broadcast:
98 Jean Meyer, La cristiada Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1977.
99 John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope. The Secret History o f Pius XII. Middlesex, Penguin, 2000. pp. 112, 
263.
100 Lettre Apostolique adressee aux eveques mexicains March 2, 1937.
101 Manchester Guardian, April 20, 1938.
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Peace and victory have been willed by God to Spain... which has now given 
to proselytes of the materialistic atheism of our age the highest proof that 
above all things stands the eternal value of religion and of the Spirit.102
In Mexico, the Catholic Church supported Franco, as did the Catholic Church 
throughout the world. The Mexican hierarchy, however, conceivably fearful of 
unleashing a new wave of governmental anti-clericalism, refrained from following 
the lead of the Pope in supporting the armed rebellion as a means to stop the 
“destruction of civilisation” and took a low profile attitude before the conflict. In 
consequence, Mexican bishops limited themselves to send a temperate message of 
support and sympathy for the Spanish clergy in 1937.103
By early 1939, however, Franco’s victories had emboldened even those clerics 
who had initially shied away from open confrontation. So notable was the reaction 
that in the months prior to the Republic’s defeat, Excelsior's columnist Eduardo 
Correa told the Christian Science Monitor's correspondent Betty Kirk: “When 
Franco wins there will be a great revival of Catholic activity in Mexico.”104 It is no 
coincidence, thus, that Spain and Mexico had monopolised, with 233 and 200 
“martyrs” respectively, the largest numbers of sanctified during the largest collective 
beatification celebrated by the Vatican on March 9, 2001.105
Rejection of secular solutions to the nation’s pressing social and economic 
problems had been evident in Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno 
that negatively likened Mexico with Spain. By 1936, the demise of Calles meant that 
the religious right could count on a new ally in its struggle against the revolutionary 
regime: the business elite deeply disturbed by Cardenas radical labour policies.
T h e  E c o n o m ic  E l it e
The rise of Cardenas had the effect of alienating the business sector. Labour turmoil 
and the political tension that pervaded the early stages of his mandate bitterly
102 Quoted by Dante Puzo, op. cit., p. 166.
103 Thomas G. Powell, op. cit., 111.
104 Betty Kirk, op. cit p. 135.
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estranged captains of industry and finance from his administration. Business interests 
had not been particularly well organised as lobbies. Chambers of commerce had 
emerged in the 1920’s, yet only at a local level. The Confederation Patronal de 
Mexico, COPARMEX, designed to lobby government and resist militant labour was 
only founded in 1930.
Trade unions, which had been weakened during the late Maximato, were ready 
to engage in strikes once sanctioned by the new government, alienating accordingly 
the propertied class. Cardenas mobilised labour to form a power base in his struggle 
for hegemony with Calles. Business interests first tried to temporise then actively 
opposed the Cardenas administration.
The powerful Monterrey Group in particular, led by the Garza Sada family, 
resented the President’s labour policies, transforming the “Mexican Detroit” into a 
hotbed of conspiracy against the revolutionary regime. The entrepreneurs’ association 
which included men such as Luis Garza (of the steel mill); Roberto Garza Sada (head 
of the Vidriera Mexicana); Luis G. Sada (CEO of the Cuauhtemoc Brewery); Joel 
Rocha (president of the Salinas y Rocha department stores); Manuel Barragan (first 
chairman of the Topo Chico soda factory, later of Coca-Cola, and, after 1928 editor 
of Excelsior); Pablo Salas y Lopez (Cementos Hidalgo) and Emilio Azcarraga 
(executive of the Ford Motor Company distributorship in Monterrey, who would later 
become Mexican media mogul) came to occupy the most extreme position of the 
right within the Mexican private sector.106
After the Porfiriato’s demise and the parallel fall of Nuevo Leon state governor 
and Monterrey businessmen’s benefactor, General Bernardo Reyes, the Monterrey 
Group had been through a long period of opposition and indeed exile. After 1924 the 
Monterrey Group was drawn further into the opposition, no doubt alienated by 
Calles’ radical policies. The enactment of a labour code implementing Article 123 of 
the 1917 Constitution in 1931 elicited an angry response from the Monterrey Group,
1 0 7which was vented through their newly acquired mouthpiece Excelsior.
105 El Pais Madrid, March 10, 2001.
106 Alexander M. Saragoza, The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State. 1880-1940 Austin, University 
of Texas Press, 1988.
107 Ibid. pp. 160-167. Hugh. G. Campbell, The Radical Right, pp.155-158.
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Having developed industry in their region, without the aid of the Mexican 
State, Monterrey’s brewers and steel-makers were able to enjoy a larger autonomy 
vis-a-vis the Mexican government than their peers from the centre. Their resolute 
commitment to pre-Revolutionary values and their economic muscle made them a 
unassailable target even for the revolutionary regime, which resigned itself to suffer 
their hegemony in their northern fief.
The Monterrey Group was also exceptional in its advocacy of an extreme, 
almost fundamentalist, interpretation of Catholicism. The anti-clericalism of the 1917 
Constitution upheld by the official party forthrightly appalled them. Even moderate 
politicians of the PNR were considered too radical by standards of the group. Their 
propaganda in the newspapers and radio appealed to traditional values of family, 
religion and fatherland.
In 1935-1936an momentous conflict took place between the Monterrey Group 
and the Cardenas’ administration. Lombardo Toledano had supported an attempt to 
replace the paternalistic company union that the group had founded to control labour
• • * 1 HR *in its factories with a pro-government union. Local business organisations financed 
the Golden Shirts to counter the CTM. Between November 1935 and July 1936 there 
were street battles between CTM trade unionists and Monterrey group-sponsored 
pistoleros, strikes, lockouts and heated declarations. Such was the group’s strength 
that they were able to organise a rally against the strike which mobilised 60, 000 
people. Monterrey’s bankers threatened to hold back all loans until the threat of 
strikes was revoked.109
When the president visited the northern town in February 1936, the 
entrepreneurs swiftly closed up their factories in protest. On March 16, the 
administration backed off and effectively abandoned its attempt to bring the CTM 
into Monterrey trade unions. Soon after, Monterrey became a major focal point of 
anti-Cardenista activity.
Mexican industrialists attempted to turn public opinion against the President by 
way of rightist propaganda in the newspapers and radio. The COPARMEX also
108 New York Times, February 6, 1936.
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became actively engaged in anti-governmental indoctrination at grassroots level, 
widely distributing in factories pamphlets with titles such as “Bolshevism: Number 
One World’s Public Enemy”, “Communists Atrocities in Spain”, and the “Anti- 
Communist Primer.” The latter imputed that Moscow’s agents dominated the 
Mexican government and that communism was behind both the CTM endeavours to 
unionise workers and the administration’s social reforms.
When this appeared to have failed, business interests turned to street 
intimidation, enlisting accordingly the assistance of the Golden Shirts. According to 
the State’s Attorney the Mexican fascists were responsible of several attacks against 
CTM activists in Monterrey with the apparent financial support of leading 
industrialists.110 His office was able to establish that COPARMEX had handed out 
24,700 pesos to rightists’ organisations, ranging from the Golden Shirts to the 
Cedillo movement from December 1936 to July 1937.111
According to Fernandez Boyoli, by 1937 COPARMEX-sponsored agitation 
was at full force, aiming to foment an armed uprising to overthrow Cardenas’ 
government. This campaign may have reached its climax in 1938 with Cedillo’s 
rebellion. The group secretly allotted the General with “considerable funds”, which
• 119also encompassed handouts of the oil companies, through Nicolas Rodriguez.
After Cedillo’s crushing defeat, the rightist groups, headed by Monterrey’s 
business community, turned their attention to the electoral path, founding a new 
champion for their interests in the shape of General Almazan. The financial backing 
of the Mexican businessman gave new impetus to the sundry rightist organisations 
converging around his candidacy. Under the combined effect of Cardenas’ radical 
agenda and the spell of Franco’s victory, these groups coalesced ideologically and 
organisationally as never before, posing a direct challenge to the regime’s viability.
109 New York Times, February 7, 1936.
110 Manuel Fernandez Boyoli and Eustaquio Marron de Angelis, op. cit., p.213.
111 Ibid p. 272.
112 Ibid. p. 157. Saragoza backs this claim basing himself on U.S. intelligence sources, op. cit., p.183.
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now become the embodiment of Counter-Revolution in Mexico. The latest 
incident to dramatise its existence smacks awesomely of pre-Civil War 
Spain, when the army joined with the clergy to overthrow the Republic, 
ending with the delivery of their country into the hands of Germany and the 
establishment of another totalitarian state.80
The incident to which Kirk referred to was the celebration of the canonisation 
of the Virgin of Guadalupe made to coincide with Columbus Day on October 12. 
Religious ceremonies in Mexico had not had displayed such splendour and 
ostentation since the Crowning of the Virgin in 1895. This time for greater 
aggravation of the leftists still inside the official circles, cadets from the Military 
College carrying the Mexican flag led the procession.
...and when the shooting of workers by the army is followed by open support 
of the Church by the army it is time to begin thinking of Mexico’s future in 
terms of Spain’s past.81
Still another crucial aspect of this readjustment was the shifting relationship 
between Mexican workers, the Mexican State, and national labour organisations. The 
State was no longer the mediator between Mexican labour and foreign companies, 
but the owner of the oil fields and the employer of the oil workers. Workers of the 
nationalised concerns sought to manage these interests by, and, conceivably, for 
themselves, disregarding the severe economic crisis experienced by the nation after 
the expropriation act. As Cardenas firmly rejected such demands, the trade union 
threatened to strike, and even indulged in acts of sabotage. The Mexican government 
responded to these menaces by firing 2,592 workers and by forcing the repayment of 
22 million pesos lost in revenue, attributable to the “corruption and inefficiency of 
the trade union.”83
A CTM convention in Puebla revolted against Lombardo’s “dictatorship” and 
gave its full support to Almazan. All the while, the opposition led by Almazan began
80 Betty Kirk, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
81 ibid. p. 137.
82 Compare Friedrich Schuler, op. cit., pp. 27-28 with Tziv Medin, op.cit., pp.204-206; and with 
Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y  los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero (1917-1942). Mexico, El 
Colegio de Mexico, 1968. p.263.
83 Ibid, pp.225-226.
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attacking Lombardo and the PCM and it soon became too all apparent that their 
support represented for Avila Camacho a liability rather than an asset. Not 
surprisingly, the patronage that the Left had enjoyed hitherto began to be drastically 
reduced, while the apparatus began to act against radicals in several areas.
Finally, the transition between Cardenas and Avila Camacho witnessed the 
undermining of agrarian reform. The Supreme Court of Justice applied an abrupt 
brake to the re-distribution of landed estates. The Agrarian Code was also revised to 
protect private property from the possibility of confiscation.84 Given the lack of 
independence of the judiciary with regards to the executive it seems evident that 
Cardenas had retracted from his own programme. Conservative circles in Mexico and 
abroad could hardly fail to notice the government’s shift to the Right, no doubt 
compelled by the spectacular growth of the Rightist opposition.
Although today it may be tempting to disregard such organisations as the 
Sinarquistas, the ARM, the CCM, the PAN, et cetera, as little more than fringe 
groups that were attracted to fascism, they were taken quite seriously as a threat to 
the Revolution. Their links to powerful entrepreneurs, especially the Monterrey 
Group, took the Mexican government not to underestimate them. Moreover, the 
presence of Spanish refugees in Mexico served as a reminder of how even an minor 
extremist party, given the right conditions, could plunge a nation into fascism.
Most of these groups were outspoken in their admiration of the Spanish 
Falange. The PAN itself was tainted by its sympathy for Franco and fascist theories
or 9 t
of corporativism. American diplomats were concerned about their links to 
Falange.86 After an extended European tour in July 1937, General Juan Andreu
on
himself Almazan had declared openly his admiration for General Franco. Although 
such declaration was certainly overstated by the press, it helped to portray Almazan 
as a Fascist.
84 El Universal, July 26, 1940 and August 13, 1940.
85 Soledad Loaeza, op.cit., pp. 146-148.
86 Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat. Raleigh, University of North Carolina Press, 1947. 
pp.350-351.
87 National Archives of the United States RG 812.00/30472, Blocker, “Letter to Secretary of State, 
July 19, 1937.
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Still, evidence suggests that members of the Almazan coalition did enter in 
contacts with the Spanish Falange and government. The Falange had continued to be 
attentive to tensions in Mexico. On August 23, 1940 the Spanish Ministry of the 
Interior decided to send several “clandestine groups of Falangists to counsel and 
support the followers of a totalitarian form of government.” According to the 
Minister, Valentin Galarza, “the time had come for a fascist government to seize 
power in Mexico.”88
On October 1940 a confidant of the Almazan movement approached the 
Spanish Ministry of the Interior asking for financial support for an imminent 
insurrection. Moreover the Almazanistas asked for arms and equipment. Apparently, 
the Franco regime agreed to help. In due course, Spanish diplomats inquired whether 
the Germans might be involved in the plot. The Wilhelmstrasse flatly rejected the 
proposal on grounds that “Avila Camacho could be more advantageous to Germany 
than Almazan.” Furthermore, the Germans warned their Spaniard counterparts to stay 
out of the plot.89
It goes without saying that at the time Spain lacked the requested weaponry, let 
alone the infrastructure and shipping capacity necessary to convey it into Mexico. 
Thus the projected Hispanista collaboration came to a close.
Eventually, Cardenas’ decision to admit thousands of Republican refugees 
became a heated topic and a major issue of the political campaign. On June 1939 
protesters jeered Cardenas and the Spanish refugees and clashed with PNR 
supporters until two-dozen were left wounded.90 Almazan assailed the administration 
as a “racketeer government”, which had entered in collusion with the Spanish 
“communist” refugees to drive Mexico into the Soviet orbit.91
Almazan was far from being the fascist bogey depicted by the left-wing press. 
Nor was Avila Camacho the champion of the working classes as that same press tried 
to purport. The fact that both generals abhorred communism and wanted to uproot it
88 NAUS, RG59, Box 3958, 812.00/31457 “Confidential Memorandum,” September 12, 1940.
89 NAUS, T-120, Roll 143Fr 84760, Stohrer/Madrid, “Telegram to AA,” October 5, 1940; FBI report, 
“Spanish Government Influence in the Mexican Presidential Election, 1940,”1941.
90 John W. Sherman, op. cit., p. 187.
91 New York Times, June 25, 1940.
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from Mexican life shows the ascendancy that the Mexican Right had attained, and 
how Franco’s victory induced a swing to the Right by the Mexican Revolution. The 
rationale behind this change of course was ultimately to integrate the enemies of the 
Revolution into the regime’s machinery rather than confront them in an open conflict 
that may have terminated as the Spanish Civil War in the total defeat of its tenets. In 
any case it is revelatory of the degree to which Mexican politics had become infected 
by the Spanish conflict. Domestic politics came to be seen through the Spanish 
prisms in ways that often did not correspond to sheer reality. This, however, does not 
diminish the dangers faced by the revolutionary regime even if does not 
automatically follows that a pre-fascist situation did exist.
Spurred by Almazan's continuous onslaught against revolutionary radicalism, 
Avila Camacho increasingly embraced conservative rhetoric. Lombardo’s Six-Year- 
Plan was revised giving way to a document that not only shunned most of its radical 
features but that was even renamed as Plan of Government in an apparent effort to 
discard Marxist terminology and radicalism. In the end, it became difficult to 
differentiate both candidates’ programmes.
On July 7, 1940 the presidential elections were held amid bloodshed and 
persecution. Cardenas had promised a free and clean election. The country had not 
known one since 1910 when Madero had been elected President. However, the 1940 
election was as rigged as any before it. The official results were scandalously 
distorted in the regime’s favour:
Avila Camacho 2,476,641
Almazan 151,010
Sanchez Tapia 9,840
Days before the poll, Almazan had declared that should the people’s will be 
cheated, he would lead “popular might” to put it at the service of law, and thus 
prevent an usurping faction from seizing the nation.92
92 El Hombre Libre, July 5, 1940.
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Almazan proclaimed himself the winner and left for Cuba to try to persuade the 
US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who was attending the Pan-American 
Conference, to support him. His followers insisted that he had been cheated out of his 
victory by fraudulent means and threatened with rebellion. Almazan even held an 
interview with Elliot Roosevelt, the American President’s son, in yet another vain 
attempt to obtain American collaboration to his cause. Far from getting it, Almazan 
had to swallow Roosevelt’s blessing of Avila Camacho.93 The feared military rising 
feared to materialise.
Had Cardenas chosen a leftist such as Mugica as his successor it seems highly 
probable that the political violence of 1940 would have been far greater than it 
ultimately was. The choice of a moderate as his successor neutralised the discontent 
of the Right and allowed the incorporation of conservatives to the ‘revolutionary 
family” and consequently to a peaceful resolution of the preceding polarisation.
The virulence of the Presidential election of 1940 increased the alarm over an 
invasion of “red gachupines”, as the Mexican government enlisted many refugees to 
help it counter a potential military uprising by Almazan’s supporters. Of course, this 
training was hidden as not to give rise to a Mexican nationalist reaction. These units 
were not given arms, although arsenals were ready to equip them in case of an 
emergency.
At the May Day parade of 1940, a Republican contingent marched behind the 
Republican flag, with a music band playing pasodobles and Mexican music. In one 
of their banners it could clearly be read: “UGT. Spanish officials in exile seek a post 
in the struggle against fascism.” Lombardo Toledano praised the group for being one 
of the parade’s most numerous and best organised groups.94 Owing to their military 
experience during the Civil War, many of the Spanish refugees formed a nucleus of 
highly trained and disciplined soldiers.
93 Roosevelt’s endorsement of Cardenas’ appointed heir was shown in the enforcement of the 
American Neutrality Act with regards to Mexico. This meant that the Mexican administration was 
acknowldged as the sole legal recipent of American arms exports. Roosevelt’s sanction of Avila 
Camacho was also seen in his decision to send vice-president Henry Wallace to his inauguration. See 
New York Times, December 2, 1940.
94 El Nacional, May 2, 1940.
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On October 1940 Cardenas stationed two hundred well-trained Spanish 
Republican veterans in Chilpancingo, Guerrero, where an imminent attack by 
Almazanistas was expected. This military unit included Spanish aviators.95 
Ultimately the encounter never took place but Cardenas’ willingness to use the 
refugees as allies in a showdown against Almazanistas is revealing of how pressing 
the situation had become for the survival of the regime. There were in fact armed 
uprisings in the north, but federal forces were able to quell them. At any rate, the 
utilisation of Spanish war veterans was a double-edged sword; while it reinforced the 
exiles’ links with the government that had welcomed them it also augmented the 
antagonism of its numerous political adversaries.
Shortly after the elections internecine clashes began within the PRM as the 
Right and Left attempted to wrest control of the party. The party’s right wing was 
headed by Maximino Avila Camacho, brother of the President-elect and one the most 
conservative generals inside the Mexican army. The Left belatedly grasped that the 
real enemy to be faced was not Almazan but the Avila Camacho reactionaries who 
were out to destroy the entire Cardenas programme.96 Thus, not surprisingly, after the 
election, much of the dissident right of 1940 was incorporated into the PRM.
At his inauguration, Avila Camacho declared, “I am a believer.”97 No Mexican 
President since the days of Juarez had dared to confess his faith so openly. Avila 
Camacho rapidly began to distance himself from the radical nationalism espoused by 
the Cardenas administration. In the first few months after his inauguration, a number 
of clear indications emerged suggesting that the new government was changing 
course. The socialist education amendment was reversed on December 29, 1941, 
opening the door to religious schools and instruction; a great victory by the Catholic
Q O
Church. Co-education established under Cardenas was also abolished.
The new government became also involved in a massive effort to domesticate 
the labour movement. Rapid economic growth, the subordination of unions and
95 FBI October 3, 1940 quoted by Friedrich E.Schuler, op. cit., p. 189.
96 Betty Kirk, op. cit., p.245.
97 La Prensa, September 19, 1940.
98 The Minister of Education, Luis Sanchez Ponton, one of the last remnants of Cardenismo in Avila 
Camacho’s cabinet was sacked purportedly “for reasons of poor health”, but in fact for his refusal to
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peasants and the rapprochement with the Church all helped to reconcile conservatives 
and business to the regime after 1940. Thenceforth, Mexican Conservatives’ 
flirtation with the cause of Almazan quickly faded, and Avila Camacho became, for 
the Right, the first bulwark against a potential resurgence of Cardenismo.
Most of Cardenas’ measures were reversed. His moral authority remained, 
however, untouched in two crucial issues: the continuity of oil ownership in the 
hands of the Mexican State and the refusal to establish diplomatic relations with 
Franco’s regime. Thus, in a truly remarkable development, the Spanish case became 
an untouchable legacy of Cardenas for his successors. How did such a tradition come 
about? It is clear that for an increasingly authoritarian regime, in the sense of Linz’s 
definition," such as the one presided by the PRI, which had all but abdicated from its 
founding principles, the undeviating advocacy of the Spanish Republic, however 
unrealistic, served a purpose of internal legitimisation with regards to the Mexican 
Left.
Time and again, rumours would emerge divulging that under pressure from 
Madrid and from powerful commercial interests, Mexico was about to renew its 
diplomatic links with Spain.
M e x ic o  a n d  S p a in  1 9 4 5-1977  F r o m  E n d u r in g  H o s t i l i t y  t o  F i n a l
R e c o n c il ia t io n
In spite of such hopes seven Mexican administrations would maintain Cardenas 
Spanish policy untouched. It was not until the demise of Franco himself and the 
accession of Adolfo Suarez to the Presidency of the Spanish Government that the 
administration of Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) entered negotiations conducive to 
the re-establishment of diplomatic links.
On June 1945, the Mexican delegation attending the United Nations 
Conference at San Francisco sponsored an initiative calling for the exclusion of
annul socialist education, two months before. His subsequent replacement by Octavio Vejar Vazquez 
initiated a purge of the Left within the Ministry of Education. See Betty Kirk, op.cit., p. 148.
99 J.J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain.” in S.N Eisenstadt (ed.), Political Sociology. New 
York, Basic Books, 1971. p.522.
294
The Republic’s Downfall and its Effects on the Mexican Revolution
Spain from the new world organisation, as its “spurious” government had been 
forcibly imposed by the Axis Powers. Ambassador Luis Quintanilla evoked how 
German and Italian military had brought down a legitimate government. The 
resolution was approved by acclamation.100
Ten months later, as the first General Assembly of the UN convened, Mexico 
sponsored a new initiative calling for the immediate cessation of diplomatic relations 
between all UN members and the Spanish dictatorship, as it constituted “a threat to 
world peace.”101 Forty-six nations voted in favour of the motion and only 2 against.
The exclusion of Franco’s government from the “community of nations” raised 
fresh hopes that the Republicans could be reinstated in power, thus making 
imperative the creation of an official body that could be recognised by other nations. 
Mexican support for the Spanish Republic took a new turn in August 1945, when 
Negrin and Alvarez del Vayo went to Mexico City to negotiate an accord with other 
Republican leaders to re-establish Republican institutions in exile.
The setting up of govemments-in-exile had been a widespread practice during 
the Second World War, when the “free governments” of European nations occupied 
by Germany had tried to maintain a semblance of continuity for their countries. After 
consultations with President Avila Camacho and Cardenas, Negrin and Alvarez del 
Vayo received assurances that the Mexican government was ready to give moral and 
political support to this endeavour.
Thus the Mexican government extended the right of extra-territoriality to the 
Spanish Cortes and the Council Room of Mexico City’s town hall was fitted out as 
official seat of the exiled Republican Cortes on August 17, 1945.102 The Spanish 
deputies were given immunities by the Mexican authorities. In an impressive gesture 
a of amity, Mexican troops paraded in Mexico City to pay tribute to Diego Martinez 
Barrios, who had been elected provisional President of the Republic by the Spanish 
deputies. Nine days later, with the Republican govemment-in-exile formally
100 “Acta Taquigrafica de la Tercera Sesion Efectuadael 19 de junio de 1945de la Comision 1 de la 
Conferencia de San Francisco” in Luis Miguel Diaz y Jaime G.Martini, op.cit., p.320.
101 ibid. p.322.
102 El Universal, August 18, 1945; Excelsior, August 18-19, 1945.
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constituted, the Mexican Chancellery announced its agreement to continue 
diplomatic relations.103
In Spain, the establishment of the Republic in exile was unmercifully 
lampooned as a “grotesque masquerade”, “predictably"’ sanctioned by the Mexican 
government, “a well-known friend of the Reds.”104 Mexican Conservatives too 
lambasted the Mexican government for allowing foreigners to engage in political
*activities in Mexican soil, “when Mexicans are no permitted to do so,” and for 
breaching the Estrada Doctrine.105
Ultimately, the Republican factions’ endless controversies gravely impaired the 
credibility of the Republic-in-exile as a legitimate interlocutor vis-a-vis the 
international community. Unsurprisingly, support for vigorous action against 
Franco’s regime waned among UN member-states. Moreover, the advent of the Cold 
War took the U.S. administration to disregard Franco’s Spain former links with the 
Axis, and to consider its potential as a useful ally against the spread of communism 
in Europe. Thus, by November 1950 a complete reversal of UN policy towards 
Francoist Spain became apparent, when the General Assembly voted to revoke its 
mandate for the withdrawal of diplomatic missions from Madrid and for the 
exclusion of Spain from membership in the UN’s specialised agencies.106
Two years later, Spain was admitted into the UNESCO in what ultimately 
would be the first step towards the complete normalisation of the Franco regime’s 
international links. Mexico’s representative sternly opposed the move, while the 
agency’s Director-General, Jaime Torres Bodet resigned his post, apparently in 
protest.107
103 El Nacional, August 29, 1945.
104 Jose Gutierrez-Rave, Las Cortes errantes del Frente Popular. Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1953. 
pp.183-195.
j|{
In defiance of Article 33 of the Mexican Constitution, which forbids foreigners from intervening in 
domestic politics, and, moreover, of the pledge they had given upon entering the country of not doing 
so.
105 Alfonso Junco, Mexico y  los refugiados, las cortes de paja y  el corte de caja. Mexico, Editorial 
Jus, 1959.
106 Only Mexico along with Guatemala, Israel, Uruguay and the Soviet bloc voted against the 
resolution.
107 The Observer, November 23, 1952.
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For almost a quarter of a century, increasingly conservative PRI administrations 
upheld the fiction of diplomatic recognition to a Spanish Republic that was anything 
but an entelechy. In the meantime, commercial and economic ties with Francoist 
Spain were maintained through several unofficial Francoist emissaries and the 
Portuguese Embassy.
Bilateral contacts reached a new low only two months before Franco’s death 
when the Dictatorship executed five anti-Francoists. Several European countries 
withdrew their Ambassadors from Madrid as a gesture of condemnation. Mexican 
President, Luis Echeverria, went further by calling the UN’s General Assembly to 
expel Spain from the organisation. In addition, Mexico cancelled unilaterally all 
forms of trade, transport and communication with Spain.108 Francoist die-hards 
retorted by staging massive demonstrations against the “Jewish-Masonic conspiracy 
against Spain,” spearheaded by Mexico, while reminding of Echeverria’s purported 
role in the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968.109
With Franco’s demise on November 1975, conditions for the resumption of 
diplomatic links seemed ripe. The Mexican government, notwithstanding, 
conceivably urged by the Republican exiles, delayed the move until the Spanish 
political situation “clarified.”
In March 1977, weeks before the first democratic election in Spain in over 39 
years, the governments of Mexico and the Spanish Republic agreed to cancel their 
diplomatic relations so that Mexico would be able to establish them with the
108 “Las ejecuciones una vileza” Cancela Mexico todo trato con Espana. Pide a la ONU su expulsion, 
in Excelsior, September 29, 1975.
109 Echeverria had indeed been Minister of the Interior when the government o f Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 
(1964-1970) bloodily suppressed the Mexican students’ movement of 1968. The fact that spokesmen 
of a ‘fascist regime’ made damning imputations of repression against the President of a ‘revolutionary’ 
state, only served to deepen the crisis between the two countries. For allegations against Echeverria 
see Arriba, September 30, 1975 and Ya, October 1,1975.
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Kingdom of Spain, a polity that according to Mexican officials “now represented the 
majority of the Spanish people.”110 The renewal of diplomatic links was fully 
formalised ten days later on March 28, 1977.
110 Excelsior, March 19, 1977.
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In this thesis we have focused on the Mexican aid to Republican Spain during the 
Spanish Civil War, the rationale behind it, its significance, and the impact that such 
support had with regards to its international position and in Mexico itself. We have 
tried to show how such support far from being symbolic was substantial and how it 
may have even served effectively Mexican national interests. We have also attempted 
to demonstrate how this aid was perceived by the Mexican revolutionary elite as a 
defence of its own regime against the onslaught of a burgeoning Rightist opposition, 
and how this same opposition was spurred by the Nationalists’ victory of 1939, up to 
the point of threatening a similar standoff.
The Mexican government identified the Republican cause with the struggle for 
freedom and social justice everywhere, seeing in it analogies with the Mexican 
Revolution. This had positive and negative effects. By linking the lot of the Republic 
to the permanence of his own regime, Cardenas assumed an incredibly high risk. In 
fact, the Spanish War produced a backlash in Mexico whose first manifestation was 
the Cedillo Rebellion of 1938-1939, reaching its climax with the Presidential 
Election of 1940. Newspaper reports of the time were laden with suggestions that 
Mexico could be the next stage of the factional war that had tom Spain.
The Spanish war had a direct impact in the Mexican political arena. Due to the 
obvious analogies between both countries, unsurprisingly Mexican opinion polarised 
between those who supported the rebellion and those who backed the Republican 
cause. Rightist groups, both Fascist and Catholic became staunch supporters of the 
Francoist cause. In fact, many among them began to long for the emergence of a 
Mexican Generalisimo.
A battle for the “cultural hegemony” was waged between the Mexican Right 
and Cardenas’ government against the backdrop of the Spanish war, through the 
Conservative press and over an inflamed political rhetoric, with great effect, as
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demonstrated by the extraordinary upsurge of political opposition in 1939-1940.1 The 
Mexican Right was successful in presenting the Revolutionary government as anti­
clerical, inimical to family values and communistic, thus alienating the vast majority 
of Mexicans across class lines from the revolutionary regime. Every battle won by 
the Nationalists immediately became a boost for Mexican Conservatives in their 
attempts to discredit the Revolutionary regime.
Rightist groups sprang up in anticipation of the 1940 election and clearly under 
the spell of the Nationalists’ victory in Spain. The Mexican Right included raucous 
supporters of European fascism as well as traditional conservatives. To both, 
Franco’s rebellion represented not only a vindication against the excesses of the
•y
Revolution but also a model to emulate. A civil war seemed highly feasible.
Fears aroused by the Spanish War suited the conservative opposition. 
Cardenas’ decision to admit in thousands of Spanish refugees became a subject of 
bitter controversy and a major issue in the electoral campaign. A similar animosity to 
that which had plunged Spain into civil strife was grievously setting in. Thus, while 
PAN’s founder, Manuel Gomez Morin, and General Almazan castigated Cardenas’ 
Spanish policy denouncing it as Communistic, Lombardo Toledano and the PCM 
played upon popular fears of fascist aggression by linking Almazan to alleged 
German and Falangist plots to seize Mexico and convert the General in a Mexican 
version of Franco.
In the end, the revolutionary regime was able to survive, only through 
American backing, at the cost of capitulation from its most radical policies, and by 
way of temporisation with the Church and the business elite.
Mexican commitment to the Republic may not be ascribed it to a single cause. 
It was a by-product of the rapprochement of two very different political classes, 
which, notwithstanding, shared a common goal of social betterment for their 
respective polities. While previous works have credited Cardenas alone, we have 
tried to show how many other politicians intervened in that specific policy formation. 
Mexican sympathy with Republican Spain predated Cardenas. Already during the
1 John Sherman, op. cit. pp. 87-101
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maximato, Mexican authorities had been highly enthusiastic about the creation of a 
Republican Spain. This development presented the Mexican revolutionary regime 
with the looking glass of a modem and progressive mother country, whose secular 
modernisation would disprove Catholic and Hispanista Conservatives yearnings. On 
that account, Cardenas advocacy of the Republican cause was simply an enhanced 
expression of a policy that had already existed before 1934.
In a different way, the Spanish Civil War allowed Mexico to convey its 
international principles of non-intervention, national self-determination and territorial 
integrity in search of a fairer world order and as a juridical defence, against 
imperialist aggression. The Mexican attitude towards Spain was the consequence of 
a long historical experience with foreign aggressions.
The French Intervention, when under the pretext of a civil war between 
Mexican Liberals and Conservatives, Napoleon in stepped in on behalf of the latter, 
and established a “Mexican Empire” under Maximilian of Hapsburg, could easily 
constitute for Mexican diplomacy a prior instance of what was happening in Spain.
More recently, the U.S. had intervened twice in Mexico during the 
revolutionary process. First in 1914, with the naval occupation by the Marines of 
Veracruz, and then through the so-called “Punitive Expedition” of 1916, launched by 
General Pershing against Francisco Villa.
Despite American assurances of non-intervention, enshrined in the “Good 
Neighbour” policy, Mexican officials still dreaded the prospect of U.S. meddling in 
their country’s affairs, either by deed or by omission. Hence, Mexican advocacy of 
the Spanish Republic at the League of Nations must also be understood as an appeal 
to the Great Powers, namely the U.S., to uphold international law, respect self- 
determination, and renounce unilateralism and military intervention.
The Mexican government was from the start in favour of collective security 
and firmly opposed to appeasement and capitulation to the Axis Powers’ demands. 
Mexican diplomacy had staked its tmst to the League of Nations as a mechanism for
2 Edwin Lieuwen, op. cit. pp. 127-128
301
Conclusions
the fair and peaceful solution of controversies between countries, and had acted 
accordingly before the Spanish case.
Although Mexican support to the Republic was a rational decision, a strongly 
emotional element underlay its espousal. Sheer ideological conviction took several 
Mexican officials to see Spanish events through a Mexican prism, identifying the 
Insurgent cause with the legacy of the old Spanish colonial regime that they were 
attempting to uproot: large land-holding, militarism, religious prejudice, political 
oppression, ignorance and its sequels. Differences apart, the very nature of the 
Nationalists, heavily predisposed them to favour the Republic against the “all time 
reactionaries.” On that account, we may cite Lombardo Toledano’s statement that the 
Spanish people were the “last victims of Imperial Spain”, and that, “by aiding 
Spanish Republic, a former colony (Mexico) was helping the last remaining colony 
(Spain) to rid itself from the ancient yoke.”3 For that reason too, Mexican diplomatic 
and consular officials defended with passion the Republican cause well beyond the 
instructions they had been given from their national government, often engaging 
themselves to that cause, even in infringement of their duties.
The Mexican government’s commitment to Republican Spain represented a 
striking decision insofar as it involved the active engagement of Mexican diplomacy 
in international affairs, a major departure with the country’s long-standing tradition 
of isolation and restraint.
From a material point of view, it seems equally astonishing that the Cardenas 
government had embarked in such a substantial logistical endeavour. As we have 
seen, a sophisticated infrastructure was set up by the Mexican government through its 
diplomatic agents to smuggle arms into Spain from third countries. Given 1930s 
Mexico’s circumstances, it seems remarkable that such network could have been put 
through and had operated effectively for such a long time. Due to the stealth with 
which the whole enterprise was carried out, its true extent may never be fully known.
Various authors look upon 1940 as a turning point that marked the end of the 
Mexican Revolution insofar as from that year Mexican administrations pursued a
3 Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico, CTM, 1936-1941. Mexico D.F, 1941. p. 154
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more moderate course. Many theories have been advanced to explain such shift. This 
study posits the notion that the final outcome of the Spanish Civil War might have 
had a greater relevance on that change of course, than was previously believed. From 
that perspective, the Republic’s defeat may have produced a renunciation of the 
revolutionary elite’s former goals.
After 1938, it became evident that Cardenas felt disillusioned with the working 
class in general and with its leaders in particular. The workers’ administration of the 
nationalised railways had been a fiasco, while in the oil industry, workers behaved 
irresponsibly, pursuing personal gains rather than class interest. The obstinate 
backing of Lombardo to the Nazi-Soviet pact further estranged the President with the 
labour leader. The radical excesses of the Spanish trade unions must have played a 
part in this disappointment. Mexican diplomatic correspondence is awash with 
damning references to the unruly behaviour of the factious trade unions, and how, on 
many occasions these groups privileged their particular interests over the common 
cause of the Republic.4
In this sense, the Republic’s defeat amidst a sea of factionalism may have had a 
sobering effect on the most radical elements of the Mexican Revolutionary 
establishment, whom thenceforth gave stability and regime consolidation an 
overriding importance. Hence, the need of co-opting and even incorporating into the 
system its conservative adversaries, namely Capital and the Church, rather than 
facing them in open confrontation, became an imperative.
Evidently concluding that radical reform had reached its limits, Cardenas 
decided that Mexico needed a respite in the form of a more moderate successor. 
Avila Camacho’s choice was a clear attempt to blunt the conservatives’ campaign to 
regain national office. On the contrary, Almazan’s sabre-rattling redounded 
unfavourably on his candidacy, reviving fears of a new bloodshed.
Thus, the Spanish Civil War may have immunised the Mexican Revolution 
from falling yet again in the vicious circle of renewed rebellion and endless tumult. 
The atrocities produced by the Spanish war were readily available to the larger
4 See, among others, AHSRE, exp. III-764-1; exp.(46-0) 131.III. No. 1708
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Mexican public through the press and the newsreels, which gave a thorough coverage 
of even its minutest details. Ten years of destructive armed struggle, 1910-1920, had 
already exacted a toll of more than a million lives and exhausted Mexicans’ patience 
with uprisings.
Overall, one may conclude that Mexican support to the Spanish Republic 
inaugurated a tradition of progressive foreign policy for the Mexican Revolutionary 
regime. Mexican support for the Republic was not only an explicit instance of 
Cardenas’ international principles, but also of his political beliefs in general. 
Cardenas wanted to build a different nation whereby Mexico, under an interventionist 
State, arbiter and regulator, based on the constitutional law of 1917, progressed 
towards a more egalitarian society, socially fairer, more educated and conscious, 
nationalist, yet linked to the world’s democratic and anti-imperialist causes.
As with the granting of diplomatic asylum to Leon Trotsky, or the oil 
expropriation act of 1938, Cardenas’ advocacy of the Spanish Republic represented a 
reaffirmation of national sovereignty, insofar as it implied an expansion of the 
nation’s autonomous decision making. Mexico was for the first time pursuing a 
protagonist role on world affairs without requesting permission or sanction from the 
world ’ s hegemons.
This diplomacy reached subsequently new heights with the staunch defence of 
the Cuban Revolution in the Pan-American realm, the refusal to severe diplomatic
s|e
relations with the Castro regime, its defence of the Allende government and the
subsequent severance of diplomatic relations with the Pinochet dictatorship. 
Similarly, the support for the Sandinista regime and the Mexican government’s 
continued condemnation of South Africa’s apartheid regime gave the Mexican 
foreign policy an immense prestige.
It goes without saying that Cardenas would not have been able to support Spain 
had the international circumstances been any different. It was, precisely, the turbulent 
nature of the 1930s, which afforded him the chance to pursue a firm nationalist
Mexico was the only Latin American nation not to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, despite 
American pressures to comply with the OAS guideline.
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stance and to maximise the benefits for his country at each juncture. Surely, Cardenas 
was able to exert an unprecedented diplomatic freedom due to a favourable 
international context. The world recession and the rise of Fascism greatly enhanced 
his bargaining capacity. Cardenas was thus able to conduct his foreign policy without 
risking extreme responses from the Great Powers, which he defied on several 
occasions. This he did with great shrewdness and skill.
Cardenas challenged briefly the United States, only to recoil and yield to 
Roosevelt’s pressures when the U.S. threatened to squeeze the noose. Cardenas 
confronted Britain in the knowledge that its imminent collision with Germany would 
prevent it from undertaking military retribution against Mexico. He sold all sides as 
much oil as he could, exploiting the differences between the Great Powers, and even 
had the audacity to give moral lessons to the European Powers from the rostrum 
afforded by the League of Nations.5 As far as the Spanish case is concerned, 
Cardenas’ views ran counter to mainstream opinion, and still was able to get away 
with it.
World events worked in Cardenas favour and vindicated his stance: After 1939 
fascism came to be perceived by the U.S. as a greater threat than Mexican 
nationalism. Thus it became increasingly imperative for Washington to prevent 
Mexico from falling into the Axis orbit. Although the expropriation act of 1938 had 
strained relations between Mexico and the U.S., Roosevelt upheld the Good 
Neighbour policy in the face of Fascist threat to Latin America. The relative success 
of Mexican diplomacy may be seen in the fact that Roosevelt was persuaded to 
abstain from intervening in Mexico and in his refusal to aid either Cedillo or 
Almazan. Washington tightened the enforcement of the Neutrality Act, prosecuting 
American arms dealers for selling implements of war to Mexican army officers 
without a permit. Thus, the dreaded military rising failed to materialise. In the end, 
his position on Spain helped him persuade Roosevelt that Mexico would be a reliable 
ally in the approaching hostilities.
5 Friedrich Schuler, op. cit. p.202
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Last but not least, Mexico’s support to Republican Spain, up to the bitter end, 
yielded it the dividend of a sizeable immigration of intellectuals and skilled cadres.6 
While the immigration was never as numerous as Cardenas had hoped for or 
expected, it was qualitatively transcendent, as it impacted deeply in the expansion of 
Mexican academia, research and development. Most refugees were intellectuals, 
scientists and professionals. Their contribution to Mexican culture was by all 
standards outstanding.
Finally, the arrival of a the Spanish exiles provided Mexicans with the 
opportunity to get acquainted firsthand with actual Spaniards, of progressive outlook, 
very different from the shallow stereotypes fed to them through generations of 
nationalist education. Thus, the image of the greedy gachupin was cast off for good 
from the Mexican imagery.
6 Patricia Fagen op. cit. pp. 192-204
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